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The Chinese economy has undergone a radical transformation since 1979, from a 
planned economy to a market economy. The economic reform has facilitated sig-
nificant and rapid economic growth, while regional disparities are increasing in the 
heterogeneous transitional Chinese economy. As the neoclassical perspective sub-
stantially ignores the role of institutions in shaping the economic system and cannot 
specify how paths are formed and evolve, or how the role of economic actors 
changes over time, business systems theory and evolutionary theory have been used 
in this thesis to understand the distinctive evolving regional development trajecto-
ries in the transitional Chinese economy. 
This research aims to study the changing roles of local governments in influenc-
ing the dynamic regional business systems in the transitional heterogeneous Chinese 
economy. In order to examine the evolving regional business systems, this research: 
(a) brings the regional state into business systems theory, given that both the varie-
ties of capitalism approach and conventional business systems theory ignore re-
gional differences; (b) connects evolutionary perspectives and business systems the-
ory, given that the varieties of capitalism approach and business systems theory have 
both been criticized for developing a relatively static approach; and (c) highlights 
the unique form of decentralization in China which shapes the role of the state and 
the regional business systems.   
For the purposes of this research, Zhejiang and Yunnan have been selected as 
two contrasting cases to reflect significant regional differences. Four research ques-
tions are posed: (a) what are the existing regional business systems in Zhejiang and 
Yunnan; (b) how and why have specific regional business systems and development 
trajectories been formed and evolved over time in Zhejiang and Yunnan; (c) how 
has the role of local governments evolved in the transitional economy; and (d) will 
regional differences and distinctive regional development trajectories in Zhejiang 
and Yunnan converge or diverge over time? 
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The findings and the answers to the main research questions can be briefly sum-
marized as follows. The research identified a market-led business system in Zhejiang 
and a state-led business system in Yunnan, both of which show a high degree of 
regional institutional complementarities (regional coherence). The regional resource 
base, industrial structure, the strength of the state, the institutional structure, the 
decentralization reform and promotion system, and the pre-existing regional devel-
opment path mutually shape the regional development trajectories and lead to 
strong path dependence and long-term institutional complementarities in both 
Zhejiang and Yunnan.  
Moreover, the highly competitive environment, which has been framed by the 
unique decentralization reform in China and the promotion system, plays a crucial 
part in shaping the role of local government and state–business relations, and also 
strengthens the local industrial development path in the two regions. Zhejiang’s 
local governments play a regulatory and service-oriented role from a distance, while 
Yunnan’s local governments strategically coordinate economic activities, directly or 
indirectly. Finally, the research indicates that the regional differences and distinctive 
regional development trajectories in Zhejiang and Yunnan are currently divergent, 



















DE ROL VAN LOKALE OVERHEDEN IN NIEUWE REGIONALE 
BEDRIJFSSYSTEMEN 




De Chinese economie is sinds 1979 radicaal omgevormd van een planeconomie tot 
een markteconomie. De economische hervorming heeft een significante en snelle 
economische groei mogelijk gemaakt, terwijl regionale verschillen in de heterogene 
Chinese overgangseconomie toenemen. Het neoklassieke denkkader laat de rol van 
instituties in de vorming van het economische stelsel grotendeels buiten 
beschouwing, en geeft niet aan hoe paden worden gevormd en zich ontwikkelen, 
of hoe de rol van economische actoren in de loop van de tijd verandert. Daarom 
worden de onderling verschillende regionale ontwikkelingstrajecten die zich in de 
Chinese overgangseconomie voordoen in dit proefschrift onderzocht vanuit de 
bedrijfssysteemtheorie en evolutietheorie. 
Dit onderzoek is gericht op de veranderende rol die lokale overheden spelen bij 
het beïnvloeden van de dynamische regionale bedrijfssystemen in de heterogene 
Chinese overgangseconomie. Om de zich ontwikkelende regionale bedrijfs-
systemen te onderzoeken omvat dit onderzoek de volgende elementen: (a) opname 
van de regionale overheid in de bedrijfssysteemtheorie, aangezien zowel kapital-
isme-benaderingen als de conventionele bedrijfssysteemtheorie geen rekening 
houden met regionale verschillen; (b) de verbinding van evolutionaire perspectieven 
met de bedrijfssysteemtheorie, gezien de kritiek op de relatief statische benadering 
van zowel kapitalisme-benaderingen als de conventionele bedrijfssysteemtheorie; 
en (c) het belichten van de unieke vorm van decentralisatie in China, die vormgeeft 
aan de rol van de overheid en de regionale bedrijfssystemen. 
In dit onderzoek zijn de provincies Zhejiang en Yunnan gekozen als twee con-
trasterende casussen om belangrijke regionale verschillen weer te geven. De vier 
onderzoeksvragen zijn: (a) wat zijn de bestaande regionale bedrijfssystemen in 
Zhejiang en Yunnan; (b) hoe en waarom zijn in de loop van de tijd specifieke 
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regionale bedrijfssystemen en ontwikkelingstrajecten gevormd in Zhejiang en Yun-
nan en hoe en waarom hebben die zich ontwikkeld; (c) welke ontwikkeling heeft de 
rol van lokale overheden in de overgangseconomie doorgemaakt; en (d) zullen re-
gionale verschillen en afzonderlijke regionale ontwikkelingstrajecten in Zhejiang en 
Yunnan in de loop van de tijd convergeren of divergeren? 
De onderzoeksresultaten en antwoorden op de centrale onderzoeksvragen kun-
nen als volgt worden samengevat. Uit het onderzoek bleek dat Zhejiang een 
marktgeleid bedrijfssysteem heeft en Yunnan een door de overheid geleid bedrijfs-
systeem. Beide vertonen een hoge mate van regionale institutionele complementa-
riteit (regionale coherentie). De regionale hulpbronnen, industriële structuur, kracht 
van de overheid, institutionele structuur, decentralisatie, het bevorderingssysteem 
en reeds bestaande regionale ontwikkelingspad geven wederzijds vorm aan de re-
gionale ontwikkelingstrajecten en leiden tot een sterke padafhankelijkheid en insti-
tutionele complementariteit op de lange termijn in zowel Zhejiang als Yunnan. 
Bovendien speelt de zeer competitieve omgeving die het gevolg is van de unieke 
Chinese decentralisatiehervorming en het bevorderingssysteem, een cruciale rol bij 
het vormgeven van de rol van de lokale overheid en de betrekkingen tussen over-
heid en bedrijfsleven. Ook versterkt dit competitieve klimaat het lokale industriële 
ontwikkelingspad in de twee regio's. De lokale overheden in Zhejiang spelen een 
regelgevende en dienstverlenende rol op afstand, terwijl de lokale overheden in 
Yunnan de economische activiteiten direct of indirect strategisch coördineren. Ten 
slotte blijkt uit het onderzoek dat de regionale verschillen en de afzonderlijke re-
gionale ontwikkelingstrajecten in Zhejiang en Yunnan momenteel divergeren en 
geen teken van convergentie vertonen. 
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Since 1979, the Chinese economy has undergone a radical transformation, from a 
planned economy to a market economy. After the People’s Republic of China was 
founded in 1949, the central government adopted a highly unified and centralized 
planned economic system and implemented a heavy industry-oriented development 
strategy. However, the overcentralized and unbalanced national development plan 
and the radical and overambitious political and economic campaign resulted in a 
critical economic decline. As the planned economy was proved a failure, in late 1978, 
the central government creatively introduced a reform and opening-up policy into 
the national development strategy with the aims of fixing the devastated economy 
and seeking an efficient alternative model to promote economic growth. Market 
forces became essential to the Chinese economy through a series of decentralization 
and marketization reforms, which stimulated the market and provided strong in-
centives to local authorities to promote regional development. The growth rate of 
GDP in 2018 was 6.6% and GDP itself reached 90 trillion yuan (5.9 trillion euro) 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2019). Overall, the implementation of market-ori-
ented reform has facilitated significant and rapid economic growth in the past 40 
years. 
Besides the outstanding economic performance, economic reform shaped a 
unique dual system in China. Given its status as a transitional economy, the state 
still actively guides and supports economic actors and organizations, but market 
forces play an increasingly crucial role in economic growth. While the state-owned 
elements of the economy persist and predominate, the private sector has developed 
and now makes a major contribution to the economy. Economic reform also 
moulds the way in which economic actors, organizations, and institutions coordi-
nate their economic activities and the relationships they establish across different 
domains. The relationship between the central government and local authorities, 
inter-jurisdictional relationships, state–business relations, as well as inter-firm rela-
tions, have all been reshaped in China’s transitional economy.  
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Economic system transformation can be considered an evolutionary process of 
reallocation of resources by market forces or state intervention, which leads to a 
spatial clustering of mobile capital, labour, and other resources. According to 
Kanbur and Venables (as cited in Van Helvoirt 2009: 31–32), in most developing 
and transition economies, including China, “there is a sense that spatial and regional 
disparities in economic activity, income and social indicators, are on the increase”. 
The Chinese economy is characterized by great regional differences in resource en-
dowments, industrial structures, business cultures, and institutional configurations. 
For instance, light industries or a mixture of light and heavy industries are predom-
inant in the eastern regions, while heavy industries are mainly distributed in the 
northern and western regions (Tan et al. 2015: 141) Notably, the implementation 
of economic reform in the transitional Chinese economy, with its vast territory, has 
widened the regional divergence in spite of the shift of emphasis of the national 
development strategy from the eastern, coastal region to inland areas (Map 1.1). 
More specifically, in the initial stage of economic reform, the central government 
initiated the open-door policy and selected eastern coastal cities and ports to estab-
lish special economic zones and economic development zones to encourage foreign 
businesses and foreign investment. Since then, the central government has succes-
sively conducted a “China western development plan” in 2000, “the rise of central 
China” in 2004, and “revitalizing the old northeast industrial bases” in 2006. In 2017, 
the eastern region contributed 52.6% of total GDP, while the gross regional prod-
uct (GRP) of central and western areas accounted for 21% and 20% respectively, 
with the northeastern region trailing on 6.4%. The GRP per capita in the eastern 
region was 1.9 times higher than that in the western region (National Bureau of 
Statistics 2018). The regional development in central, western, and northeastern 
China has far lagged behind the eastern region. Furthermore, the unique form of 
decentralization in China has played a major role in shaping this uneven develop-
ment pattern, with both the state and private sector actively involved in promoting 
economic development. Hence, the process of restructuring the economic, indus-
trial, and institutional configurations since 1979 has led to a significant divergence 
in regional economic development. 
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Map 1.1 
The four economic regions of China  
 
Just as the neoclassical perspective puts the market into a “social vacuum”, it 
substantially ignores the role of institutions in shaping the economic system (see e.g. 
Samuels 1984, Granovetter 1985, Bardhan 1987, Hodgson 1998). The basic as-
sumptions of mainstream economics maintain that the market is perfectly informed, 
and that limited resources are allocated by market forces, which will eventually con-
verge towards an equilibrium. However, in reality, these ideal market conditions 
have never existed in a transitional economy, such as the heterogeneous case of 
China. Therefore, the neoclassical perspective cannot specify exactly how paths are 
formed and evolve over time, and exactly how economic actors, organizations, and 
institutions coordinate change in complex socio-economic contexts.  
To understand and compare the changing role of economic actors and institu-
tions in the distinctive and evolving regional development trajectories in the transi-
tional Chinese economy, a comprehensive framework is required. Hence, this study 
applies the comparative system theory with an evolutionary perspective. As no uni-
fied operational set of measures has been developed in the comparative system the-
ory, factors that connect economic, social, institutional, technological, cultural, or 
 Eastern region 
 Central region  




Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 24
4 CHAPTER 1 
 
political concerns can all be studied in an effort to explain and understand dynamic 
regional development trajectories. However, this research does not study all possi-
ble explanations and factors but uses the basic conceptual categories of Whitley’s 
business systems theory. Factors that are external to the business systems theory’s 
conceptual framework, such as cultural, technological, political, and demographic 
factors, are not the main focus of this study. This research mainly pays attention to 
the industrial, economic, and institutional factors. 
Hence, the research objective is to study the changing roles of local governments 
in influencing the dynamic regional business systems in the transitional heterogene-
ous Chinese economy.  
To examine the evolving regional business systems, this research: (a) brings the 
regional state into business systems theory, given that neither the Varieties of Cap-
italism (VoC) approach nor business systems theory pay attention to regional dif-
ferences; (b) connects evolutionary perspectives and business systems theory, as 
both the VoC approach and business systems theory have been criticized for their 
relatively static approach; and (c) highlights the unique form of decentralization in 
China in shaping the role of the state and the regional business systems (see Chapter 
2).  
The dynamism of the regional business system consists of three parts: 
a. changes in the productive organization, i.e. enterprises (this research focuses 
on domestic industrial enterprises, with the selection of sectors and type of firms 
elaborated in Chapters 3 and 4); 
b. changes in the organization and role of the (regional) state; 
c. relationships between (regional) state and enterprises, i.e. state–business rela-
tions. 
For the purposes of this research, Zhejiang from the well-developed eastern 
coastal area and Yunnan from the less-developed western region were selected as 
two contrasting cases of the unique dual system and the heterogeneous Chinese 
economy. The regional differences between the two provinces are manifest in eco-
nomic performance, industrial structure, and institutional configurations. Zhejiang 
is seen as the “birthplace” of the private economy in China, whereas Yunnan has a 
strong state sector. Zhejiang and Yunnan, as two contrasting cases which reflect 
significant regional differences, were chosen based on theoretical replication logic 
to compare whether the empirical results produce contrasting results. In short, two 
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contrasting cases were selected in this research to understand the changing role of 
the state in distinctive evolutionary regional business systems. 
Zhejiang province (11 prefecture-level cities, 20 county-level cities, provincial 
capital: Hangzhou) is situated in the eastern coastal area of China, occupying 1.06% 
of the total land area of the country (National Bureau of Statistics 2017). The total 
population in Zhejiang reached 55.9 million in 2016, accounting for 4% of the total 
population in China (ibid.). As one of the smallest provinces by area in China, the 
population density in Zhejiang (549/km2) was 3.8 times the average population 
density in China (144/km2) (ibid.). In the past 40 years, Zhejiang has achieved 
astonishing economic growth. The GRP in Zhejiang has sharply increased from 
only 12.4 billion yuan (1.6 billion euro) in 1978, ranked 12th place out of 31 prov-
inces and autonomous regions, to 5.18 trillion yuan (0.66 trillion euro), ranked 4th 
place, with an average annual growth rate of 12.1% from 1978 to 2017(National 
Bureau of Statistics 2018).  
Yunnan province (eight prefecture-level cities, 13 county-level cities, provincial 
capital: Kunming) is a mountainous region with a high level of ethnic diversity, sit-
uated in the southwest of China, bordering Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. Yunnan 
takes up 4.1% of the total land area of China and is ranked the country’s eighth-
largest province. In 2016, the total population in Yunnan was 44.7 million, account-
ing for 3.5% of the total population in China, and the population density was 
121/km2, which is below the average population density (144/km2) in China (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics 2017). As noted above, regional development in western 
China has lagged far behind that of the eastern region. The GRP in Yunnan was 
only about 1.64 trillion yuan (0.21 trillion euro), ranked 21st out of 31 provinces 
and autonomous regions in 2017, with an average annual growth rate of 10% from 
1978 to 2017 (National Bureau of Statistics 2018). After 1997 Yunnan experienced 
seven years of economic downturn, and since 2000, Yunnan’s GRP has ranked 
amongst the bottom ten provinces in China around 24th (Yunnan Provincial Bu-
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Figure 1.1 
The real GRP of Zhejiang and Yunnan (1978-2017) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2018 
Note: Real GRP (1978-2017) of Zhejiang and Yunnan are calculated with constant price at base 
year 1978=100. (Real GRPN= GRP base year* Indices of GRPN/100) 
In Figure 1.1, real GRP in Zhejiang and Yunnan from 1978 to 2017 were calcu-
lated to show the significant gap in economic performance between the two prov-
inces. Figure 1.1 illustrates that both Zhejiang and Yunnan show upward trends 
over time. In the initial stage of economic reform, real GRP in Zhejiang was a little 
higher than that of Yunnan. However, real GRP in Zhejiang rose dramatically from 
the early 1990s, while the growth of real GRP in Yunnan was relatively slow. By 
2016, Zhejiang’s GRP was some four times higher than that of Yunnan. Neverthe-
less, their economic performance in the past decades was not the primary reason 
for selecting Zhejiang and Yunnan — rather than any other provinces in eastern 
coastal and western China — as two contrasting cases of regional variation.   
Eastern provinces like Guangdong and Fujian were given explicit policy support 
in the early 1980s to establish four special economic zones, namely: Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou. Unlike most of the eastern provinces, however, we 
cannot attribute the outstanding economic performance of Zhejiang to preferential 
national development strategies in the initial stage of economic reform. Rather, 
Zhejiang is deemed to have pursued a regional development model rather than re-
ceiving priority from the central government over other, inland regions.  
At the same time, as a relatively backward part of China, Yunnan had achieved 
rapid growth in the light industry sector during the period 1979 to 1992 (Xu and 
Yang 2014). Five state-owned enterprises (SOEs), known as the “Five Golden 
Flowers” of Yunnan, manufactured bicycles, refrigerators, TVs, washing machines, 
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However, as the private sector developed, enterprises in the light industry sector, 
mostly SOEs, lost their market dominance, and all “Five Golden Flowers” went 
bankrupt in 2000 (ibid.). Since then, and in spite of the implementation of economic 
reform over many years, the poor economic conditions in Yunnan have not im-
proved. It seems that Yunnan confronts considerable obstacles in the process of 
implementing reforms.  
Hence, compared with other regions, Zhejiang and Yunnan — representing two 
distinctive business systems and entirely different economic performances — are 
better suited to reflect significant regional variation and to understand how and why 
distinct forms and patterns have been shaped and have evolved under the same 
national-level reforms and policies in the heterogeneous Chinese economy. Taking 
an evolutionary perspective, significant empirical regional divergences are found in 
the dominant economic, industrial, and institutional configurations and structures 
in Zhejiang and Yunnan, which will be discussed in this research. Thus, in order to 
understand the evolving development trajectories and changing role of economic 
actors in Zhejiang and Yunnan in this transitional heterogeneous economy, a series 
of research questions are posed here. 
a. What are the existing regional business systems in Zhejiang and Yunnan?  
Sub-questions:  
(1) What are the dominant economic and institutional features in the two 
regional business systems?  
(2) What are the coordination mechanisms among economic actors and 
institutions?  
(3) What institutional economic factors (e.g., regional resource base, indus-
trial structure, institutional structure, or other factors in the conceptual 
framework of business systems) determine the dominant features and co-
ordination mechanisms of the existing business systems? 
b. How and why have specific regional business systems and regional eco-
nomic development trajectories been formed and evolved over time in 
Zhejiang and Yunnan?  
Sub-questions:  
(1) What institutional economic factors determine the historical develop-
ment trajectories (before 1979)? 
(2) What institutional economic factors determine the regional divergence 
in the transitional economy (1979 to present)? 
559831-L-bw-Lu
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(3) Do the regional resource bases, the regional pre-existing economic, in-
dustrial, and institutional arrangements matter?  
c. How has the role of local governments evolved in the transitional economy?  
d. Will regional differences and the distinctive regional development trajecto-
ries in Zhejiang and Yunnan converge or diverge over time? 
 
Overall, the research objective of this research is to study how the changing roles 
of local governments influence the dynamic regional business systems in the tran-
sitional heterogeneous Chinese economy, by combining business systems theory 
with evolutionary perspectives. The research mainly focuses on institutional eco-
nomic factors in shaping the role of the state and regional business systems in the 
Chinese economy. The thesis is organized as follows: Chapters 2 and 3 elaborate 
on the theoretical and analytical framework and research methodology; Chapter 4 
presents the results of the research and outlines the existing regional business sys-
tems in the two selected cases of Zhejiang and Yunnan; Chapters 5 and 6 provide 
a detailed discussion on evolving regional development trajectories and the chang-
ing role of local governments in local economic development; and the final chapter 
answers the research questions by summing up the empirical findings, theoretical 










This chapter introduces two theories which aim to explain the evolving develop-
ment trajectory in emerging and transitional economies: the evolutionary theory, 
and the comparative system approach, including the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
and business systems theory. The chapter is structured as follows. Sections 2.1 and 
2.2 describe the evolutionary perspective and comparative system approach, respec-
tively. Section 2.3 provides a critical and integrated discussion of the two theories 
and shows how the theories are applied in this research, as well as describing the 
analytical framework of the research.  
2.1 The evolutionary perspective  
Compared to mainstream economic thinking, which tends to have a static outlook 
and limited focus on economic processes through time, the evolutionary perspec-
tive offers a more dynamic approach. One of its key concepts is path dependence. 
Although the concept of path dependence has also been applied in comparative 
capitalism analysis (see section 2.2), in this research the evolutionary perspective is 
applied as it facilitates a better understanding of the evolutionary and institutional 
structures and configurations in emerging or transitional economies. 
 
2.1.1 The classical path dependence approach   
David (1985) first applied the concept of path dependence to understanding the 
processes of technologies competing for adoption. He emphasized the importance 
of economic, historical characters in dynamic economic analysis. In his definition:  
a path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one of which important in-
fluences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, 
including happenings dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces. 
(David 1985: 332) 
 
2 Concepts and Analytical Framework  
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David asserted that path-dependent phenomena are non-ergodic stochastic pro-
cesses, in which “historical accidents” may exert a long-lasting influence on out-
comes (ibid.). He adopted the concept to explain the dominance and persistence of 
the QWERTY keyboard. The QWERTY keyboard was developed in the late 1860s, 
and since then has held the market lead, even when a rival superior and efficient 
design, the DSK keyboard, was introduced onto the market (David 1985: 332–333, 
Martin and Sunley 2006: 399–400). David (1985: 334) highlighted the “accidental” 
historical events that impelled the development of the QWERTY keyboard, and 
three features that caused its technological “lock-in”, namely, technical interrelated-
ness, economies of scale, and quasi-irreversibility of investment. When a technology 
has been widely adopted and has held a dominant market position since its incep-
tion, the benefits associated with the use of the technology are high, making it dif-
ficult for customers and manufacturers, as early adopters, to switch to alternative 
technology due to the high technical conversion cost and users’ habits and skills 
(David 1985, Martin and Sunley 2006: 401).  
Arthur (1989, 1994) integrated the concept of path dependence into a broader 
theoretical framework. He not only focused on technological path dependence but 
also explored path-dependent phenomena in economic macrostructures from mi-
cro-events and behaviour (Arthur 1989, 1994, also Martin and Sunley 2006: 402). 
His approach stresses the profound impact of increasing returns on generating path 
dependence in the economy (Arthur 1989: 126). In the case of increasing returns, 
apparently insignificant random events become important and magnified by posi-
tive feedbacks, which determine economic outcomes and enhance the dominance 
over competitors (Arthur 1989: 127, 1994: 5). 
Increasing returns arise once a technology has been “chosen” by a random eco-
nomic event. When an early-established technology has acquired a dominant market 
position, self-reinforcing mechanisms bring benefits to manufacturers and custom-
ers, so that the early adopters enforce externalities onto later alternatives that seek 
to survive in the marketplace, regardless of technological superiority over the early-
established technology, which leads to lock-ins (Arthur 1989: 126–127, 1994: 3–4). 
Specifically, the dominant position facilitates an increase in production, which as-
sists technological improvement as a result of more experience in the manufacturing 
process; the unit cost is therefore reduced, and output increased (Arthur 1994: 10, 
112). Additionally, the prevalence of a particular technology encourages the estab-
lishment of compatible systems by other related economic actors (Arthur 1994). 
Hence, the benefits of self-reinforcement from large set-up or fixed costs, and 
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learning and coordination effects, attract further adoption of the technology and 
enhance its dominant market position (Arthur 1994: 10, 112). The four features 
which generate increasing returns are thus: large set-up or fixed costs, learning ef-
fects, coordination effects, and self-reinforcing expectations.   
As argued by Arthur (1989: 127, 1994: 1), a negative feedback will lead to “a 
predictable, stable, single equilibrium” for prices and market shares, while a positive 
feedback, generated by increasing returns, leads to multiple possible equilibria, so 
that even the laissez-faire market cannot provide superior technology or guarantee 
alternatives. Arthur (1994: 10) emphasizes that it is also possible to lock into an 
inefficient inferior path of development, which is difficult to escape due to the self-
reinforcing mechanisms. To escape from an inefficient equilibrium depends sub-
stantially on the degree of reversibility and transferability of self-reinforcing mech-
anisms (Arthur 1994: 118): large set-up or fixed costs, as well as learning and coor-
dination effects, are usually not reversible or transferable to the alternative 
equilibrium (ibid.). Consequently, Arthur concludes (ibid.), once the path is selected, 
it is difficult to reposition the self-reinforcing system.  
David’s and Arthur’s twin concepts of path dependence and lock-in are consid-
ered the fundamental concepts of the evolutionary approach. In summary, a path-
dependent phenomenon is a non-ergodic stochastic process, and a random small 
event may trigger a long-term effect in shaping existing technological, economic, or 
institutional configurations. The self-reinforcing mechanism, increasing returns, 
lock-in, and positive feedback will reinforce the stability and fixity of the given path, 
and only external forces can unlock the lock-in. 
 
2.1.2 Institutional path dependence approach  
While a large amount of literature has focused on technological evolution, North 
(1990) brings the concept of path dependence to institutional change analysis. In-
stitutions are created to reduce uncertainty by establishing “a stable but not neces-
sarily efficient structure” (North 1990: 3-6). North (ibid.: 5) argues that institutions 
and technology determine the total cost of exchange and production, which aggre-
gates into overall economic performance. This implies that the features identified 
by Arthur are not only relevant to the evolution of technology but can also be ap-
plied to institutional change because technology is closely connected to actors and 
institutions which contribute to the economy (Pierson 2000: 256). According to 
neoclassical and international trade theory, as well as evolutionary theory, inefficient 
institutions will be eliminated through competition, so that inferior economic sys-
tems will gradually converge towards more efficient, homogeneous and monotonic 
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types over time (North 1990: 6–7, 92). However, divergence persists. Hence, the 
two central puzzles of North’s approach are: what determines the increasing diver-
gence of economic performance between developed and underdeveloped nations 
over time; and, in stagnant economies, what explains the persistence of inefficient 
institutional arrangements, as against the expectation of economic and institutional 
structures or configurations changing to achieve better economic performance 
(North 1990: 6–7).  
Institutions, as “the rules of the game”, create the opportunities which actors or 
organizations take advantage of (North 1990: 7–8). Institutions and organizations, 
which are interconnected by formal rules and informal constraints, interact, co-
evolve, and change incrementally over time (ibid.: 95). In the words of North (ibid.: 
95), “the interdependent web of an institutional matrix produces increasing returns”. 
The path of institutional change is shaped by lock-ins, feedback processes, increas-
ing returns, and imperfect markets typified by significant transaction costs, and once 
a path is selected, “the network externality”, “the learning process”, and “the his-
torically derived subjective models” will reinforce the path (ibid.: 7, 99).  
If the market is perfectly competitive and efficient, transaction costs will be zero, 
and complete information and feedback can modify the subjective models made by 
actors so that no increasing returns occur (ibid.: 8–95). However, in the inefficient 
and incomplete market, where transaction costs are high and increasing returns arise, 
actors process incomplete information and feedback through a historical, subjective 
“mental construct”, which leads to divergent and persistent, and not necessarily 
efficient, lock-ins (ibid.: 8–101). This argument implies that “path dependence 
means history matters” (ibid.: 100) and currently existing models are shaped by in-
cremental evolution in the past. Thus, path dependence is a process which “narrows 
the choice set and links the decision-making through time” (ibid.: 98). As the con-
sequence of increasing returns, path dependence can only be altered by exogenous 
forces or unanticipated consequences of choice (ibid.: 94–112). 
Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (2005: 8) portray three stages in the process of  path 
dependence: the preformation phase, the formation phase, and the path depend-
ence phase, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1 
Constitution of a technological or institutional path – The classical model 
Source: Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (2005: 9) 
Phase I comprises an undirected search process through a range of choices; 
Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (2005: 9) pinpoint the moment when a particular, ir-
reversible institutional arrangement is selected while multiple alternatives are still 
available, labelling it a “critical juncture”. In phase II, as described by North (1990: 
98), the choice sets are narrowed through time. Once the path has been chosen, 
increasing returns arise, and the pattern of a particular type of actions or behaviour 
will be shaped by self-reinforcing mechanisms. The transition from phase II to 
phase III is through lock-in. Once lock-in occurs, the path takes on a stable, inflex-
ible, and rigid status, and becomes hard to escape. 
As the classical model of path dependence does not represent a systematic ap-
proach with clearly distinguished types or degrees, or conditions and variables, 
many scholarly works have defined and explained path-dependent sequences in 
their own terms. Setterfield asserts that institutions and the economy co-evolve in-
terdependently, with short-run and long-run consequences (Setterfield 1993, 1995, 
1997, as cited in Martin and Sunley 2006: 402). He assumes that institutions are 
exogenous to the economic system in the short run, to reduce uncertainty and guide 
economic activities, while institutional structures are endogenous to the economic 
system in the long run. Roe (1996: 667) classifies three degrees of path dependence 
as weak, semi-strong and strong, while Liebowitz and Margolis (as cited in Martin 
and Sunley 2006: 405) similarly identify three degrees of path dependence; in these 
classifications, the strong form of path dependence (for Roe) and the third degree 
of path dependence (for Liebowitz and Margolis) is inefficient, with full lock-in. 
However, these classifications are criticized by David (2001, as cited in Martin and 
Sunley 2006: 405) for employing static criteria, whereas he focuses on three varieties 
of history: weak, moderate and strong. Page (2006: 113) distinguishes between path-
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dependent outcomes and path-dependent equilibria and between path dependence 
and phat dependence.1 
The core concepts of path dependence theory have also been criticized and dis-
cussed by scholars. David (1994: 207) endorses North’s exposition of the evolu-
tionary nature of institutions and refers to institutions as the “carriers of history”. 
However, in terms of institutions being “self-evidentially ‘historical’”, he highlights 
three major conditions: the durability of learned modes of communication, the mul-
tiplicity of solutions which generate coordination benefits, and institutional com-
plementarities (David 1994: 217–218). He criticizes North’s approach for analysing 
institutions and organizations as if they are analogous to technological systems, 
stressing the different ways of solving coordination problems, the different degrees 
of rigidity in adapting to change and the extent of knowledge for development (ibid.: 
218–219). Moreover, as many critics have pointed out, if the trend of interpreting 
path dependence is solely based on the “history matters” argument, all economic 
or institutional activities and processes are determined by their history, so that the 
general principle of path dependence will no longer have analytic leverage (Page 
2006: 87, Sydow et al. 2009: 690). History does matter, but path dependence does 
not simply imply “historical determinism or past dependence” (Håkansson and 
Lundgren, as cited in Martin and Sunley 2006: 402). The past does not determine 
but rather conditions the actions and decisions of the present. Hence, as Martin and 
Sunley argue (2006: 402), “the past sets the possibilities, while the present controls 
what possibility is to be explored”.  
Furthermore, what creates path dependence is still in dispute. Some scholars 
assert that path dependence is sensitive to initial conditions which implies that mi-
nor initial changes lead to significant outcomes, while others argue that path de-
pendence is not a deterministic system: it is not determined by initial conditions but 
by the contingent events which follow initial conditions (Page 2006: 91, Vergne and 
Durand 2010: 741). Scholars also claim that “increasing returns are not necessary 
or sufficient for path-dependent sequences” (Page 2006: 101–102), but irreversibil-
ity of capital (Arrow 2003: 16), any type of negative externality (Page 2006: 101–
102), and mechanisms which decrease the attractiveness of alternatives (Vergne and 
Durand 2010: 752) can all create path dependence. Additionally, as noted above, 
the concept of lock-in describes the tendencies of economic activities or systems 
towards potential inefficiency, inflexibility, and rigidity (Arthur 1994: 28). Once 
lock-in occurs, it is difficult to escape from the stable equilibrium, and only external 
forces enable the system to escape (David, as cited in Martin and Sunley 2006: 406). 
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This concept implies that radical change can only derive from outside, which has 
been criticized by many scholars for neglecting “the endogenously generated change” 
(Martin and Sunley 2006: 407). Classical path dependence theory emphasizes the 
durability, stability, inflexibility, and inefficiency of given structures, systems or be-
haviours trapped in “attractor basin[s]” (David, as cited in Martin and Sunley 2006: 
406), but the way the path has been created is seldom discussed. Hence, many schol-
ars provide alternative perspectives for filling this theoretical void.  
 
2.1.3 Path creation approach  
Witt (1997: 771) criticizes David’s and Arthur’s concept of lock-in and argues that 
in reality, innovation and new variants do not cease due to lock-in. He claims that 
once the “critical mass” of potential adopters of incumbent technology is exceeded, 
adopters will strategically turn to new variants because the technological or indus-
trial improvement resulting from innovation ought to deliver economic advantages 
(ibid.: 768). Therefore, the status of lock-in may lead to a point of discontinuity of 
the incumbent path, as actors spontaneously look for profitable opportunities once 
the critical mass has been reached.  
Kemp et al. (2001: 269–278) discuss methods to construct transition paths 
through strategic niche management (SNM) — involving creation, development, 
and breakdown — and suggest three options for shifting to an alternative regime 
without causing losses during the transition. The first is to “change the structure of 
incentives and let market forces play … tax negative externalities and reward posi-
tive externalities” (ibid.: 279). The second is “to plan for the creation and building 
of a new sociotechnical system based on an alternative set of technologies” (ibid.: 
279). The last strategy is to “build on the ongoing dynamics of sociotechnical 
change and to exert pressures so as to modulate … change into desirable directions” 
(ibid.: 280). Although, as Kemp and his colleagues admit (ibid.: 296), their approach 
cannot address complex questions and cannot guarantee that the shift is achieved, 
they do provide a starting point of path construction.   
As the path dependence perspective emphasizes the significant role of random 
historical events in the development of novelty, Garud and Karnøe (2001: 2–6) in-
troduce Schumpeter’s (1942) concept of creative destruction into their approach 
and offer an alternative perspective for understanding the emergence of novelty, 
namely path creation. Schumpeter (1942) argues that any system is designed to be 
efficient at every given point of time, but in the long run, the system will be ineffi-
cient (Schumpeter and Swedberg 1994: 83, Garud and Karnøe 2001: 6). Hence, 
creative destruction describes a process of industrial mutation, which “incessantly 
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revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old 
one, incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter and Swedberg 1994: 83). The 
process of mutation requires refinement of inefficient structures. By using this con-
cept, Garud and Karnøe (2001: 2–6) claim that entrepreneurs, embedded in eco-
nomic and institutional structures, are knowledgeable agents with the capability and 
willingness to shape the emerging novelty. Entrepreneurs may actively and inten-
tionally deviate from the existing structures in order to create new futures regardless 
of current inefficiencies (ibid.: 6). Thus, as entrepreneurs are fully aware of the path 
they create, mindful deviation is at the core of the path creation concept (ibid.: 6). 
Garud and Karnøe (ibid.: 8) criticize the concept of path dependence for overem-
phasizing the impact of the past; path-dependent phenomena are viewed as outsid-
ers with the underlying logic of consequentiality (March, as cited in Garud and Kar-
nøe 2001: 8). Thus, the outsider perspective disregards the initiatives of agents in 
creating new paths. In contrast, with the underlying logic of mindful deviation, en-
trepreneurs in the path creation approach are considered both as insiders who have 
knowledge and understanding of how to escape from the existing structures, and 
also as outsiders who evaluate how much they can deviate from those structures 
(Garud and Karnøe 2001: 9).  
Overall, the path creation perspective highlights the deliberate, not necessarily 
exogenous, actions involved in shaping or unlocking the path. Hence, the core con-
cept of mindful deviation provides a way to understand how entrepreneurs dis-
embed from existing structures and form new futures. 
 
2.1.4 Path constitution approach  
As discussed by Meyer and Schubert (2007: 27–28), many aspects of path creation 
still need further clarification, for example, how would the path develop after being 
created by actors or how can path dependence and path creation integrate as a gen-
eral path process? Sydow, Windeler et al. (2005: 3–4), based on the path dependence 
and path creation approach, conceptualize and develop the typology of path con-
stitution, in which they extend the classical model and also stress the crucial role of 
actors in constituting new paths. The concept of path constitution can therefore be 
seen as a mixture of two perspectives.  
Path dependence (completely unplanned process) and path creation (controlled 
process) represent two ends of a continuum, and in between the two extremes, 
actors do not completely control the development of the path, due to resource 
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constraints (Meyer and Schubert 2007: 29). Even in the pure emergent processes, 
actors will estimate their chances of success in changing or impacting on the existing 
path (ibid.). The path constitution approach identifies three stages of path develop-
ment — generation, continuation, and termination — and also distinguishes be-
tween mindfulness and emergence in the formation of path processes (Sydow, Win-
deler et al. 2005: 4). In the phase of path generation, path emergence occurs in an 
undirected manner, while path creation is a mindful process in which actors inten-
tionally pursue a particular goal (ibid.: 5). In the phase of path continuation, once a 
path has been selected, the increasing returns will force an “uncontrolled continua-
tion”, termed path persistence, while actors will actively maintain the path, named 
path extension (ibid.: 6). In the last phase, path termination, the emergent path can 
be unintentionally dissolved, while the mindfully created path can be brought to a 
deliberate end by actors, known as path deviation (ibid.: 7).  
As economic and institutional structures and systems are evolving processes and 
continuously reproduced by actors, Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (2005: 31–32) 
modify and extend the model of path constitution as shown in Figure 2.2 below. 
They identify four stages in the ongoing process of path constitution: generating 
momentum, path shaping, path dependence, and path breaking (ibid.: 32). In phase 
I, both random emergence and deliberate creation exist, and the critical juncture is 
marked at the start of phase II, where the decision has been made. Due to the path-
shaping activities, the chosen path extends or persists into a lock-in phase. As em-
phasized by Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (ibid.: 22), based on the path creation 
perspective, “paths result from human activities, … where alternative ways of ac-
tions were always at hand”. Hence, besides the external shock, the endogenous 
power of humans will always play a significant role in unlocking paths. With external 
or internal intervention, the given patterns will be disrupted (path breaking) for fur-
ther developments of paths. 
559831-L-bw-Lu
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 38
18 CHAPTER 2 
 
Figure 2.2 
Breaking and creating paths 
Source: Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (2005: 32) 
Overall, the path creation perspective emphasizes mindful deviation in shaping 
or unlocking the path, which challenges the path dependence perspective on the 
concept of lock-in. Additionally, the path constitution approach integrates deliber-
ate creation and unplanned emergence in ongoing path processes. Both “chance 
events” and “human will” are important in forming a path, and both endogenous 
and exogenous forces can dis-embed the trapped path from the existing structure 
for new futures. 
 
2.1.5 The regional path dependence approach  
The concepts of path dependence and lock-in have been widely applied in under-
standing regional development in the perspectives of both qualitative and quantita-
tive change. From the perspective of evolutionary economic geography, “an ontol-
ogy of regional development is rooted in the idea of path-dependent economic 
evolution.” (Scott 2006, as cited in Martin 2010: 2). This receptivity to the concept 
of path dependence is no surprise, given that theories such as circular cumulative 
causation, by Gunnar Myrdal, and the vicious circle of poverty, by Ragnar Nurkse, 
have affinity with the “history matters” argument. Besides, as many scholars have 
argued, regional development largely relies on the capacity to establish or import 
new industries to maintain growth or offset decline (Neffke et al. 2011: 238). Hence, 
creative destruction can be viewed as the major force in the unending process of 
regional development (Schumpeter, as cited in Neffke et al. 2011: 238). In short, 
many economic geographers see path dependence as the core concept in their anal-
ysis.  
 Grabher (1993a) first brings the concept of path dependence to his case study 
of the failures of the Ruhr industrial region. He identifies a threefold lock-in of 
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regional development, comprising functional, cognitive, and political lock-in (Grab-
her 1993a: 260–264). In functional lock-in, in order to maintain and facilitate inter-
firm cooperation and reduce transaction costs, a long-term stable and close linkage 
would be established between regional core firms and their supplier sectors (ibid.: 
260–261). However, the continuity of inter-firm relations usually results in short-
comings, named boundary-spanning functions, which (a) tempt suppliers to largely 
cut their investment in R&D activities or the development of new products; and (b) 
make personal connections more significant than distribution departments in sup-
pliers (ibid.). Hence, according to Grabher (ibid.: 261), the common interest in 
maintaining long-term inter-firm relations locks the regional core firms and the sup-
pliers into a relatively close circle of exchange relations, which causes the functional 
shortcomings. Second, the “functional lock-in” process is reinforced by a “cogni-
tive lock-in”. Grabher emphasizes that the strong personal connections that are 
significant in maintaining the continuity of inter-firm relations result in a common 
orientation and groupthink between regional core firms and suppliers (ibid.: 262–
263). The common interests and orientation, as well as groupthink, may become 
serious impediments to reorganizing existing inefficient industrial structures and 
configurations, especially when a relatively large investment in equipment, technol-
ogy, or facilities is involved (ibid.: 263). Consequently, functional lock-in and cog-
nitive lock-in will cause technological lock-in, in which firms are reluctant to leave 
the current technological trajectory, hindering regional economic development 
(ibid.: 263). Third, political lock-in describes the situation in which highly developed 
formal and informal cooperative relations between local industry and local govern-
ments mean that the leading position of core industries goes unchallenged, leading, 
for example, to blocking the siting, arrival, or emergence of new industries in order 
to protect existing core industries (ibid.: 263–264). Hence, the shortcomings of the 
strong alliance prevent reorganization and innovation (ibid.: 264). By applying the 
threefold lock-in in investigating the case of the Ruhr, Grabher (ibid.: 275) con-
cluded that the decline of economic growth is due to the pre-perestroika consensus 
culture. Since then, the path-dependent approach has been widely applied in eco-
nomic geography. 
Martin and Sunley (2006) employ the path dependence model in understanding 
evolutionary regional configuration and institutional development. They define re-
gional path dependency as a locally contingent and emergent “place dependent” 
process, which is shaped by regional factors and conditions inherited from previous 
institutional structures and configurations as well as the path and patterns of re-
gional economic development (Martin and Sunley 2006: 409, Martin 2010: 20). In 
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the classical model the concept of lock-in has been interpreted as a negative and 
inefficient state; however, Martin and Sunley (2006: 415) argue that the evolutionary 
regional economy is in an ongoing process which transforms from a positive lock-
in to a negative lock-in. In the early phase, increasing returns and positive external-
ities have a positive influence on regional economic development, but the institu-
tional structures or configurations adopted may eventually lose their competitive 
advantages, and in the self-reinforcing process the increasing rigidity and inflexibil-
ity will gradually impinge on regional economic growth, heralding the negative lock-
in phase (ibid.: 415–416). Moreover, they emphasize that external shock may not 
always be sufficient to free regions from negative path dependence, especially in the 
case of interregional competition which may force entities to take a defensive posi-
tion instead of searching for and adopting a new path (ibid.: 417).  
Martin (2010: 21) provides an alternative path dependence model of local indus-
trial evolution as shown in Figure 2.3 below. He describes two types of path: the 
standard canonical path dependence model and the path which allows endogenous 
change and evolution. In the former model, the path gradually converges to a stable, 
inflexible, and inefficient stasis, which substantially hinders the possibility of shifts 
in new local industrial paths. The latter type is more open and shows a higher level 
of flexibility in adapting or evolving local industries or technologies. In reality, the 
adaptability of innovation may decline over time and the more dynamic type of path 
eventually converge towards the former type; however, Martin (ibid.: 21–22) shows 
the potential for path dependence to adapt and mutate as a dynamic process. 
Figure 2.3 
An alternative path dependence model of local industrial evolution 
Source: Martin (2010: 21) 
     Preformation Phase 
Path Creation Phase 
Path Development Phase  
Path as Movement to Sta-
ble State 
Path as Dynamic Process 
           Stasis     Adaption and Mutation  
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Notably, recent studies on path dependence and regional economic develop-
ment have substantially extended the evolutionary framework. The broad categories 
of new industrial path development have been elaborated, namely: (a) path exten-
sion: the continuation of an existing industrial and technological path with incre-
mental product and process of innovation, but facing a risk of path exhaustion in 
the long term; (b) path renewal: the transformation to different but possibly related 
activities and sectors (Isaksen and Trippl 2016: 68–70); (c) path upgrading, consist-
ing of three phases: the enhancement of position within global production networks; 
renewal of the path into a new direction; niche development; (d) path branching: 
the diversification into a new related industry with knowledge of existing industries; 
(e) path importation: the establishment of an industry which is new to the region; 
(f) path diversification: the diversification into a new related industry based on un-
related knowledge; (g) path creation: the emergence of entirely new industries and 
sectors, or the adoption of new technology or new forms of organization (Isaksen 
and Trippl 2016: 68–70, Isaksen et al., as cited in Grillitsch et al. 2018: 265–266, 
Asheim 2019). Asheim et al. (2017: 13–14) focus on the role of clusters as a tool, 
not only for promoting and extending the existing path but also for achieving path 
renewal and path creation when a wider regional development strategy is provided. 
Grillitsch and Sotarauta (2018: 7–12) emphasize the importance of opportunity 
spaces (future opportunities) embedded in existing industrial compositions in shap-
ing the regional growth path, arguing that this explains why some regions grow 
faster than other regions with similar preconditions. Frenken et al. (2007: 687) in-
troduced the concept of “the related variety” to understand the distinction between 
the different compositions of sectors in creating spillovers. The empirical evidence 
shows that the related variety is positively associated with regional economic growth 
(Frenken et al. 2007). Asheim (2019) studies the dynamic perspective on the re-
gional innovation system in promoting local economic growth and new path devel-
opment.  
Overall, the concepts of path dependence have been introduced and developed 
as essential elements in economic geography and regional studies to understand 
regional economic development. Although the concepts have been widely applied 
and extended, the evolutionary perspectives are criticized (a) for being too focused 
on the micro level of economic agents (firms and organizations) and neglecting 
macro-level forces, especially the role of the state (Morgan 2013); and (b) for their 
treatment of institutions as static entities (Boschma and Martin 2010, 26). Morgan 
(2013) emphasizes the state’s role in creating novelty and shaping the economic 
landscape in old industrial regions. Pike et al. (as cited in Morgan 2013) suggest that, 
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“the evolutionary perspective can be enriched by connecting economic, social, cul-
tural, ecological, and political concerns”. It is undeniable that more and more re-
searchers (see Grabher 2009, Pike et al. 2009, Boschma and Martin 2010, Morgan 
2013) are bringing the dynamic macro perspectives on institutions into the frame-
work of evolutionary economic geography and linking micro-level behaviour to 
macro-level forces (Boschma and Martin 2010, 26). However, the role of the state 
is still largely neglected in the firm-led evolutionary perspectives. Hence, this re-
search aims to study the changing roles of the state over time in dynamic regional 
business systems by connecting evolutionary perspectives and business systems the-
ory.  
 
2.2 The comparative system theory 
2.2.1 The development of comparative system theory 
After the collapse of Soviet bloc economies from the late 1980s onwards, the tran-
sitional economies in Eastern Europe underwent a series of radical institutional, 
structural, and regulatory changes. At the same time, the growing interdependence 
within the global economy and increasing interregional factor mobility diminished 
the constraints of national boundaries (Jackson and Deeg 2006: 5). Under these 
circumstances, capitalism, exemplified by the US model, appeared to be the only 
alternative for the transitional and emerging economies (Crouch 2005: 2), which 
sparked heated debates on typologies of economies and mechanisms of develop-
ment. Scholars attempted to figure out: (a) is the US model the “best practice” for 
the transition and emerging economies; (b) will the economic system converge on 
a homogeneous and monotonic type, or will capitalism split into different variants 
and forms; (c) will any models be able to maintain steady growth, or which model 
will deliver better economic performance (Crouch 2005: 2, Jackson and Deeg 2006: 
5)?  
The comparative system approach focuses on differentiating the various types 
of capitalism and comprehensively understanding the interrelationships and behav-
iour of actors embedded in different institutional and economic configurations. 
Comparative capitalism research has a long history of distinguishing and identifying 
diverse types of economic model, dating back to Polanyi and Shonfield (Nölke and 
Claar 2013: 34). As discussed by Stiglitz (2001) and Block (2001), Polanyi’s work 
can be considered the forerunner of a systematic approach, in which he emphasized 
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the concept of embeddedness of the economy and the interrelatedness of actors, 
institutions, and self-regulating mechanisms in a market society. They argue that 
Polanyi stressed the significant active role of the state in planning, adjusting, and 
managing, even in a laissez-faire economy. Unlike neoliberalism, Polanyi argued that 
the movement toward a self-regulating laissez-faire economy needs a protective 
countermovement to reduce uncertainty and create stability and predictability, lead-
ing to the argument that this “double movement” allows the market to be embed-
ded in various types of economy (Polanyi 1944, as cited in Block 2001, Stiglitz 2001).  
Shonfield compared the strategic capability of actors like banks and the state 
among Western developed economies with diverse institutional structures and eco-
nomic models, and identified three ideal types of capitalism: Britain’s liberalism, 
Germany’s corporatism, and Frances’s statism (Shonfield 1965, as cited in Bowman 
1967, Jackson and Deeg 2006, Schmidt 2016: 3). He observed the positive correla-
tion of the central planning mechanism with better economic performance and 
steady growth rate (Shonfield, as cited in Bowman 1967, Jackson and Deeg 2006). 
Hence, the modernization approach of Shonfield also highlights the active role for 
state intervention in the economy (as cited in Jackson and Deeg 2006).  
In the decades since Shonfield, the comparative capitalism approach has been 
substantially enlarged by bringing concepts such as neo-corporatism, game theory, 
the social systems of production, and the historical approach into comparative stud-
ies (Hall and Soskice 2001). Scholars attempt to categorize and label the various 
type of capitalism by identifying the distinctive financial, economic, institutional, 
structural, managerial, etc. features and patterns in developed countries. For in-
stance, Chandler discussed competitive managerial capitalism (Chandler 1977, as 
cited in Whitley 1999: 3), while Zysman studied the financial systems in developed 
economies and distinguished between the capital-market based model (US and UK), 
credit-based models with government-administered prices in France and Japan, and 
those with private financial institution-administered prices in Germany (Zysman 
1983, as cited in Schmidt 2016: 3). Lazonick identified three types of capitalism 
based on the level of integration of economic activities and innovation-based strat-
egies: proprietary capitalism (UK), managerial capitalism (US), and collective capi-
talism (Japan) (Lazonick 1991, as cited in Whitley 1999: 7–8). 
As previously mentioned, the breakup of the Soviet bloc and increasing global-
ization suggested a converging trend towards a single neoliberalism and the retreat 
of state intervention. However, scholars in comparative political economy chal-
lenged the monism of the convergent neoclassical theory, and the dualistic compar-
ative capitalism approach rose to prominence. The original binary identification of 
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capitalism was made by Albert, who identified two types of capitalism and labelled 
them Anglo-Saxon and Rheinish (Albert 1991, as cited in Crouch 2005: 27). The 
former type refers to nations in which free-market capitalism is embedded. such as 
the UK and US, while forms of collectivism are found in the latter type of capitalism, 
exemplified by Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Scandinavian countries, 
and Japan (Crouch 2005: 27). However, as Crouch (ibid.) argues, Albert ignored the 
different forms of collectivism; Crouch also queries the classification of France, 
Scandinavian countries, and Japan as Rheinish.  
Scholars have thus made a significant contribution to uncovering the economic, 
institutional, managerial, and structural similarities and differences among post-war 
developed economies and have substantially expanded the comparative capitalism 
approach. However, Hall and Soskice (2001: 4) are critical of earlier approaches, 
arguing that the role of government intervention has been overemphasized in the 
modernization approach, while the role of firms and employer associations in co-
ordination and the impact of regional and sectoral institutions over firm behaviour 
have been neglected in comparative capitalism. Hall and Soskice (2001: 4–5) there-
fore seek to create a new approach by placing the firm at the centre of analysis based 
on a game-theoretic perspective and emphasizing the strategic interactions between 
actors. They have formulated the varieties of capitalism approach, which extends 
comparative political economics and achieves the most significant breakthrough in 
the dualist approach. 
 
2.2.2 The varieties of capitalism approach  
The VoC approach stresses the central role of the firm in economic and institutional 
adjustment and indicates that the firm’s activities aggregate into national economic 
performance (Hall and Soskice 2001: 6, Hall and Gingerich 2004: 7). The aggregate 
economic performance therefore depends substantially on the ability of firms to 
develop relationships with other actors and also relies on the quality of firms coor-
dinating those internal and external relationships (Hall and Soskice 2001: 6, Hall 
and Thelen 2009: 8). Economic actors are relational, embedded in a particular eco-
nomic and institutional arrangement. Hence, on the one hand, actors, especially 
firms, take advantage of institutions and solve coordination problems through stra-
tegic interaction with other actors; and on the other hand, the economic system 
provides firms and other actors with institutional support, but simultaneously con-
strains the strategies of actors through the existing economic and institutional en-
vironment (Hall and Soskice 2001: 6, Hall and Thelen 2009: 10). The VoC approach 
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focuses on identifying national diversity by recognizing the distinct ways that firms 
solve coordination problems in five spheres: industrial relations, vocational training 
and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and employees (Hall and 
Soskice 2001: 7). 
Based on the different responses of firms to coordination problems, Hall and 
Soskice (ibid.: 19) categorize two ideal types: liberal market economies (LMEs) and 
coordinated market economies (CMEs). The various economic and institutional 
configurations in different countries tend to cluster around these two poles.  
The LMEs are exemplified by the US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and 
Ireland, while the CMEs are typified by Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, and Scandinavian countries (ibid.: 19). In LMEs, firms solve coor-
dination problems mainly through hierarchies and competitive market arrange-
ments, which are characterized by highly fluid markets, price-sensitive mass 
production, arms-length and short-term relations, formal contracting, less powerful 
trade unions, rapid technology transfer, and radical innovation. In CMEs, by con-
trast, firms coordinate their activities via non-market modes of strategic coordina-
tion, which feature dense networks relying on private information, collaboration 
and “patient capital”, quality-oriented flexible specialization, long-term relations, 
relational or incomplete contracting, strong trade unions, gradual diffusion of tech-
nology, and incremental innovation (Hall and Soskice 2001: 8–36, Hall and Gin-
gerich 2004: 7–8, Peck and Zhang 2013: 359–361).  
 
The fundamental concept of VoC: Institutional complementarities 
Both LMEs and CMEs are characterized by a high level of institutional and systemic 
coherence, which reveals the fundamental concept of the VoC approach: institu-
tional complementarities. As Hall and Soskice (2001: 6) stress, firms are relational, 
which means they are functionally interdependent and interactive with other actors 
and are simultaneously supported and constrained by existing institutional arrange-
ments and environments. Within a country or a region, a particular type of coordi-
nation and set of institutions in one sphere will substantially influence the institu-
tional practices of other spheres and will tend to enhance the economic returns to 
that particular institutional and economic system (Jackson and Deeg 2006: 12, Peck 
and Zhang 2013: 362, Hall 2015: 4).  
On the one hand, the concept of institutional complementarities implies that the 
internal and external complementarities between firms and other actors in different 
domains are not randomly distributed, but gravitate towards a corresponding type 
of coordination under the isomorphic power of institutions (Jackson and Deeg 
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2006: 2, Carney et al. 2009: 364–368). Hence, due to the mutual benefits of interac-
tion and the uncertainties of change, firms and other actors in a particular economic 
and institutional arrangement may be reluctant to deviate from the existing pattern 
in one sphere without the corresponding changes in other spheres (Hall and Thelen 
2009: 10–12, Hall 2015: 4). The high level of institutional complementarities and 
the uncertainty of change therefore reinforce the consistency and stability of exist-
ing economic and institutional patterns and configurations, which enhances the dif-
ferences between LMEs and CMEs with distinctive comparative advantages. Thus, 
the isomorphism of a high level of coordination results in the resistance to conver-
gence of economic and institutional configurations.  
On the other hand, the VoC approach indicates that neither ideal type of capi-
talism is superior to the other, and both LMEs and CMEs are capable of maintain-
ing a long-run exceptional economic performance (Hall and Soskice 2001: 21). This 
claim has been proved by empirical evidence that the presence of higher levels of 
market or strategic coordination — meaning higher levels of institutional comple-
mentarities and coherence in an economy — leads to higher and sustainable eco-
nomic growth rates (Hall and Gingerich 2004: 28). This implies that the more 
closely a nation or a region’s economic and institution configurations resemble 
“pure” LMEs or CMEs, the better economic performance it will achieve (Campbell 
and Pedersen 2007: 311). In contrast, a nation or region with a low level of institu-
tional complementarities is regarded as having a less cohesive system, which is as-
sumed will lead to underperformance compared to more cohesive “pure” cases 
(Hall and Soskice 2001: 45, Campbell and Pedersen 2007: 311). Institutions in the 
less cohesive system may contradict each other, making the institutional environ-
ment incapable of providing sustainable and stable support and enhancing mutual 
economic returns. Hence, the VoC approach suggests that nations clustered around 
the two poles outperform nations with hybrid or mixed types that occupy the space 
in between.  
However, Campbell and Pedersen challenge this deduction. They examine the 
economic and institutional arrangements in Denmark and claim that to locate Den-
mark in the group of CMEs is misleading due to its market-oriented decentraliza-
tion in the spheres of labour markets, vocational training, and industrial policy 
(Campbell and Pedersen 2007: 307–324). Instead, they categorize the Danish sys-
tem as a hybrid type of capitalism. However, and in contrast to the assertions of the 
VoC approach, the Danish system has been infused with hybrid features from both 
LMEs and CMEs, which provides the system with institutional flexibility in 
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adapting to the global economy (Wilthagen and Tros, as cited in Campbell and 
Pedersen 2007: 318). Campbell and Pedersen (2007: 324) argue that the additional 
flexibility of complementarities in the hybrid Danish economy has improved the 
country’s economic performance, which challenges the assertion of the VoC ap-
proach on the inferior economic performance of hybrid and mixed types of capi-
talism (ibid.: 307). In short, the case of Denmark proves that hybrid types are capa-
ble of performing as well as pure types.  
Overall, the classical VoC approach emphasizes isomorphic power in a cohesive 
system. The higher the level of institutional complementarities present among in-
stitutions across different domains, either in LMEs or CMEs, the more successfully 
economic growth can be achieved and sustained. The mutual reinforcement of in-
terconnection between institutions and patterns of behaviour lead to a long-stand-
ing “equilibrium” status, which implies that the VoC approach embraces a relatively 
static dual model characterized by strong path dependence.   
 
Extensions of the VoC approach 
As a dualistic comparative capitalism approach mainly focused on developed econ-
omies, the VoC approach has been criticized for its oversimplified typologies and 
for ignoring the transitional, developing, and emerging economies in many parts of 
the world, whose economic and institutional arrangements are more complex than 
the dual model. Scholars assert that there are far more types of capitalism present 
in economies which have not been covered by the VoC approach. This has resulted 
in a substantial amount of literature extending the VOC’s dichotomous approach.  
 
Hierarchical market economy  
Schneider (2009: 553) identifies the distinctive features of capitalism in Latin Amer-
ica and develops a “hierarchical market economy” (HME) model characterized by 
diversified business groups, multinational corporations (MNCs), low-skilled labour, 
and atomistic labour relations. Schneider (ibid.: 556–557) argues that in Latin Amer-
ican economies, market or strategic coordination in the core institutional domains 
are often replaced by hierarchies so that HMEs should not be considered simply as 
hybrid or mixed cases.  
The dominant corporate forms in Latin American countries are business groups 
and MNCs, which play a dominant role in both the market and the overall economy 
(ibid.: 555–560). Many large business groups are family-owned and controlled, and 
highly diversified, and other large private firms are mostly subsidiaries under the 
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direct hierarchical control of MNCs (ibid.: 555). Both business groups and MNCs 
are governed through highly hierarchical structures and also establish unequal hier-
archical relationships in inter-firm coordination, financing, and investment, tech-
nology transfer and markets, while market or strategic coordination are less influ-
ential in HMEs (Schneider 2009: 559–560, Nölke and Claar 2013: 38–39). Moreover, 
Schneider (2009: 565) emphasizes that the high-tech MNCs and state intervention 
compel the domestic business groups to invest in low-tech sectors. Labour relations 
are typified by short-term contracts, high turnover rate, absence of labour unions, 
and weak legal protections (ibid.: 561–562). Latin America also has relatively low 
levels of education, but firms are reluctant to provide vocational training due to the 
fear of poaching (ibid.: 564–568). Overall, the hierarchical coordination structure 
and low-skill trap cause strong negative complementarities among institutions, 
which characterize the Latin American economy. 
Consequently, as Schneider (ibid.: 569–571) asserts, the state and business elites 
infuse and shape the hierarchical economic and institutional arrangements, and state 
intervention reinforces the core features of HMEs. The hierarchical coordination 
leads to strong path dependence and long-term negative and inefficient institutional 
complementarities in Latin American economies, which prevents them from mov-
ing towards LME or CME forms, and underpins the stickiness of existing economic 
and institutional configurations (ibid.: 569).  
 
Dependent market economy 
After the collapse of Soviet bloc economies, the transitional economies in Eastern 
Central Europe (ECE) have undergone a series of radical changes. Most literature 
attempts to categorize ECE capitalism as a hybrid case (Nölke and Claar 2013: 39). 
However, Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009: 672) claim that the emerging forms of 
ECE capitalism do not fit the model of either LMEs or CMEs; rather, they develop 
a “dependent market economy” (DME) model. In transitional economies, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and transnational companies (TNCs) were welcomed to 
stimulate the economy during the ongoing process of economic restructuring 
(Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009: 677–678, Nölke and Claar 2013: 39–40). Hence, the 
state economies in ECE rely heavily on FDI and TNCs, and the DME model is 
characterized by hierarchical coordination (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009: 672–678). 
Given this heavy dependence of domestic firms on foreign finance, TNCs have 
penetrated deeply into ECE economies, with large domestic firms and small and 
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medium enterprises (SMEs) becoming local subsidiaries (Nölke and Vliegenthart 
2009: 681–684). The Western-based headquarters of TNCs exercise direct, close, 
and hierarchical control over the budgets and management decisions of local sub-
sidiaries (ibid.: 683). The industrial relations in DMEs are typified by the weak po-
sition of labour, appeasement of skilled workers, and company-level agreements 
(ibid.: 684–685). In addition, in the DME model, TNCs are reluctant to invest in 
vocational training and — to avoid the risk of running into intellectual property 
rights problems — innovation and R&D activities are carried out at TNC head-
quarters and transferred within TNC hierarchies (ibid.: 687–691) 
In sum, as Nölke and Vliegenthart (ibid.: 694) argue, in ECE economies, market 
or strategic mechanisms in the core institutional domains are often replaced by hi-
erarchical mechanisms between TNC headquarters and local subsidiaries, so that 
DMEs should not be categorized as LMEs, CMEs, or as hybrid types. Although 
the economies in ECE have had reasonable success in past years, Nölke and Claar 
(2013: 40) see a bleak future for their long-term economic performance. 
 
State-influenced market economies 
France, Italy, and Spain have been excluded from the pure LME–CME dichotomy 
and have often been categorized with other countries such as Portugal, Greece, and 
East Asian economies like South Korea and Taiwan, as “mid-spectrum economies” 
or “mixed market economies” (Schmidt 2012: 157–158). The similarity between 
these economies is the active and dominant role of the state in coordinating eco-
nomic activities, which is described by the terms “state capitalism” and “develop-
mental state” (Schmidt, Weiss, as cited in Schmidt 2012: 158). However, as the state 
may act in either a positive way (as in the French and Spanish cases) or a negative 
way (as in the Italian case), Schmidt (2012: 156–158) develops a separate model, the 
“state-influenced market economy” (SIME) model, characterized by the significant 
impact of state intervention on forming strong hierarchical interactions between 
actors and institutions. In SIMEs, firms have self-determination in corporate gov-
ernance including business strategies, investment, wage bargaining (in France), etc., 
while domains such as market rules and regulations, wage bargaining (in Spain and 
Italy) are state-led (Schmidt 2012: 158). More importantly, Schmidt (ibid.: 160) 
points out that institutional path dependencies are overemphasized, which makes it 
difficult to analyse institutional changes using the VoC approach. Schmidt (ibid.: 
160–161) therefore adopts a dynamic perspective and argues that although France, 
Italy, and Spain are all labelled as SIMEs, the distinctive roles of the state in shaping 
market regulations and social systems have changed significantly over time. Schmidt 
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examines the historical (since the 1970s) and existing political economic institutions 
and policies, as well as the economic performances during the economic crisis, in 
these three SIMEs. She concludes that the state plays a crucial role in SIMEs and 
that business and labour rely on the state to solve coordination problems (ibid.: 182). 
More specifically, business in SIMEs is more autonomous and network-oriented, 
and labour is more dependent on the state, than in LMEs or CMEs (ibid.).  
 
Asian capitalism  
Asian economies have been a success story of the world economy since the 1950s, 
represented by post-war Japan and four Asian Dragons, and their models have 
served as an example to other emerging or transitional Asian economies. The dy-
namic of Asian economies has sparked a debate on identifying Asian capitalism, 
especially after the financial crisis. The emerging literature applies the VoC ap-
proach to examine Asian capitalism. As we know, the VoC approach is a firm-cen-
tred theory, which analyses the coordination problem of homogeneous or single 
emblematic firms (Boyer, as cited in Carney et al. 2009: 367). However, while family-
controlled business groups occupy a dominant position in Asian economies, large 
heterogeneous corporate forms can also be observed there, including specialist 
firms, government-linked firms, technology-intensive firms, dragon multinationals 
(Carney et al. 2009: 366). Asian capitalism studies have often been criticized for 
oversimplifying, stereotyping, and failing to clearly define Asian capitalism (Carney 
et al. 2009: 367). 
Carney et al. (ibid.: 369–375) develop a bi-directional co-evolutionary theory to 
investigate the complex institutional dynamics in Asian economies by exploring the 
impact of changing institutional processes on firms’ behaviour, and the reverse in-
fluence of firm strategies on shaping institutional structure. Business group organi-
zations largely characterize Asian capitalism, which establishes internal quasi-mar-
kets to ease market failures and remedy the absence of formal institutions (ibid.: 
369). On the one hand, the dominant business groups provide an efficient and sus-
tainable internal market for actors and enhance economic returns (ibid.: 369–370). 
However, on the other hand, the stable and sustained equilibrium brought by busi-
ness groups hinders the establishment and development of the external market and 
the liquidity of capital (ibid.: 369–370). The dominant position of business groups 
results in a high level of stickiness of existing institutional arrangements, which are 
resistant to institutional change, and the persistence of institutional configurations. 
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Hence, Asian capitalism has been labelled oligarchic capitalism (Baumol et al., as 
cited in Carney et al. 2009: 370).  
The co-evolutionary theory also emphasizes institutional escape through brico-
lage, referring to escape from a disagreeable regulatory or institutional environment 
by the dis-embedding of existing institutional arrangements, as exemplified by the 
business strategies of ethnic Chinese-owned firms in Southeast Asian economies 
(Carney et al. 2009: 371–372).  Yeung argues that ethnic Chinese-owned firms dis-
entangle themselves from the uncongenial environment by, for example, the adop-
tion of new managerial systems and technology, internationalization of firms, etc. 
(Yeung, as cited in Carney et al. 2009: 371–372). Hence, Asian capitalism has been 
defined as hybrid, typified by institutional bricolage or recombination (Yeung, 
Crouch, as cited in Carney et al. 2009: 372)   
 
Chinese capitalism  
Scholars also attempt to categorize Chinese capitalism using the VoC framework, 
resulting in a range of conclusions, such as “looks more like a LME than a CME”, 
“functional capitalism”, “laissez-faire capitalism”, “rampant state-dominated, wel-
fare-lite capitalism”, “state capitalism”, “organized capitalism” (Arrighi, Meyer, Witt, 
Fligstein and Zhang, as cited in Peck and Zhang 2013: 358–359). Peck and Zhang 
(2013: 364–365) sketch Chinese capitalism based on VoC indicators and observe a 
quasi-CME model with a family and kinship tie (guanxi) in coordination, especially 
among private enterprises, which shows the difficulty of fitting the Chinese case 
into the existing VoC formulations.  
Peck and Zhang (ibid.: 360) adopt a variegated capitalism approach to categorize 
the contradictory tendencies of the heterogeneous Chinese developmental pattern. 
They offer divergent interpretations of the Chinese economy in three themes: mar-
ket socialism or state capitalism, socialist-developmental or neoliberal state, and 
guanxi transnationalism or power-elite (ibid.: 367). They stress the determining role 
of the state in steering the developmental trajectory which gradually and unevenly 
integrates with global capitalism, and claim that the Chinese model is closer to state 
capitalism (ibid.: 373). By investigating the economic reform since the early 1980s, 
Peck and Zhang conclude (ibid.: 380) that Chinese capitalism is a combination of 
contradictory forms, and neither socialist-developmental nor neoliberal state can 
represent the Chinese case due to the continual oscillation between market-led and 
state-led development, with little functional coherence. As well as the power-elite 
capitalism rooted in the top-down cadre management system, they emphasize the 
distinctive essence of Chinese relationality: the guanxi capitalism, characterized by 
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weak formal institutions and institutional uncertainty, allowing networks to fill the 
institutional voids, as Carney et al. (2009) argued (Peck and Zhang 2013: 382–384). 
In sum, the ongoing process of transition from a planned economy to a market-
oriented economy in China is resulting in long-term institutional contradictions ra-
ther than institutional coherence. The complexity, variation, and heterogeneity of 
the Chinese economy become problematic in terms of categorizing Chinese eco-
nomic and institutional systems within existing comparative capitalism formulations; 
rather, China has developed an indigenous and variegated capitalism (Peck and 
Zhang 2013). 
It is thus clear that scholars identify far more than two types of capitalism in 
transitional and emerging economies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia, 
greatly extending Hall and Soskice’s original dichotomous typology. This expansion 
of the comparative capitalism approach helps to fill the gaps in the oversimplified 
dualist framework by analysing more sophisticated, varied, and heterogeneous cases. 
 
Bringing the state back into the analysis  
The VoC approach of Hall and Soskice is a firm-centred theory, which stresses the 
central role of the firm in the coordination of internal and external relationships 
and economic and institutional adjustments, but which does not theorize the influ-
ential role of the state in shaping economic and institutional configurations. How-
ever, the state-led model has a long history in the comparative capitalism approach. 
The works of Polanyi and Shonfield highlight the impact of state intervention on 
the economy, but with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and increasing global integra-
tion, the state-led model has receded due to the apparent convergent trend towards 
neoliberalism (Schmidt 2012: 158). Although scholars of comparative capitalism 
have challenged the view of the monism of neoliberalism by identifying various 
forms of capitalism, represented by the expanded VoC approach, the state-led 
model cannot accommodate either the LME–CME dichotomy or the firm-based 
extension of the VoC approach.  
However, as highlighted by Schmidt (2012: 158), the state continues to play a 
crucial role, albeit in a less direct manner. Hence, an increasing body of literature 
focuses on identifying various state-led models, such as “state-led capitalism”, 
“state-driven capitalism”, “post-dirigiste”, “entrepreneurial state”, “public neo-cap-
italism”, SIMEs, etc. (Coates, Boyer, Levy, Thiberghien, Barca, Schmidt, as cited in 
Schmidt 2012: 159). These state-led models, built on the VoC approach, are mostly 
case-based, which considerably limits their generalizability to other economies. 
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However, by using a sociological framework, Richard Whitley has filled the theo-
retical voids and developed a systematic approach known as “business systems the-
ory” to measure regional or national capitalist diversity in his own terms, in which 
some core dimensions are similar to those in the VoC approach while other dimen-
sions of institutional features and environments are adapted from business systems 
comparative research.  
 
2.2.3 Business systems theory  
Like other scholars in comparative political economy, Whitley (1999: 3) criticizes 
the assumption of growing convergence to a single type of economy, which he be-
lieves to be improbable, and stresses instead the substantial variations in sets of 
economic and institutional configurations across regions and countries. The typol-
ogies of business systems theory depart from the dominant comparative capitalism 
approach and provide a new scheme to examine a much wider range of types of 
economies (Jackson and Deeg 2006: 27). According to Whitley (1999: 5), the com-
parative business systems approach aims to (a) identify and explain the common 
and distinctive features of existing systems of economic organization in specific 
institutional environments, and (b) uncover the coordination mechanisms among 
actors and institutions. It also seeks to analyse the development of and changes in 
varied forms of business systems and to establish the main determinant of the 
changes. Hence, as Whitley (ibid.: 6) affirms, the business systems approach is sub-
stantively consistent with other institutional comparative approaches. 
Whitley defines business systems as: 
…distinctive patterns of economic organization that vary in their degree and 
mode of authoritative coordination of economic activities, and in the organization 
of, and interconnections between, owners, managers, experts, and other employees. 
(Whitley 1999: 33) 
This definition emphasizes the mechanisms involved in coordinating economic 
behaviour and interactions between actors within specific economic and institu-
tional arrangements and environments. Whitley (ibid.: 42) identifies six major ideal 
types of business system, namely, fragmented, coordinated industrial district, com-
partmentalized, state-organized, collaborative, and highly coordinated, which are 
distinguished by the level of ownership coordination, inter-firm relations and em-
ployment relations. 
Fragmented business systems, exemplified by Hong Kong, are characterized by 
predominantly small owner-controlled firms in a highly competitive market, short-
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term employment and transitory inter-firm relations, low level of coordination and 
low risk-sharing between business partners. Coordinated industrial district business 
systems, represented by “the Third Italy”, are also predominantly small owner-con-
trolled firms, but show some degree of ownership and non-ownership coordination. 
In compartmentalized systems, as in the Anglo-Saxon economies, a high degree of 
ownership coordination is led by large firms in the arm’s length market, while inter-
firm coordination and employment relations are less developed. State-organized 
business systems have many similarities with compartmentalized systems, the main 
difference being that large enterprises in the latter are directly owner-controlled, 
while the supportive and guiding role of the state is more prevalent in the former, 
such as South Korea. The collaborative system is characterized by “alliance” forms 
of owner control, a greater degree of coordination within sectors, and interdepend-
ent employment relations, but a low level of inter-firm coordination in unrelated 
sectors, as in European economies. Finally, highly coordinated business systems 
establish a much higher level of intra- and inter-sectoral coordination with a greater 
degree of interdependent employment relations, such as in Japan (Whitley 1999: 
43–44).  
To better understand the distinctive types of business systems, it is essential to 
analyse the features of key institutions. As asserted by Whitley (ibid.: 47), a specific 
type of business system is developed and framed in a particular institutional context. 
He highlights the interdependence, mutual effects, and reciprocal reinforcement 
between the institutional features and business system characteristics in structuring 
business systems (ibid.: 54–55). In any market economy, the predominant types of 
economic organization directly reflect the key determinant institutions, which also 
implies that the stronger the presence of certain institutional features, the more per-
ceptible the impact of the institutional environment on structuring and shaping eco-
nomic organizations will be (ibid.: 54–55). The concept of institutional complemen-
tarities seen in the VoC approach is also relevant here: Whitley defines 
complementarity as “the degree to which … institutions encourage similar kinds of 
economic actors to behave in similar ways and reinforce each other’s effects” 
(Crouch 2005: 54, citing Whitley 2005). Compared to Hall and Soskice, Whitley 
provides much more complex dimensions of economic and institutional arrange-
ments. He differentiates four major institutional features:   
The state is compared concerning the strength of the state’s coordinating and 
developmental role, strength, and incorporation of intermediaries and strength of 
market regulation. The financial system is distinguished by the capital market or 
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credit-based. Skill development and control are compared regarding the strength of 
the public training system and union, the dominant organizing principle of unions, 
and the centralization of bargaining. Trust and authority are compared in terms of 
the degree of trust in formal institutions, paternalist authority, communitarian au-
thority and contractarian authority, and the type of business environment. (Whitley 
1999, as cited in Jackson and Deeg 2006: 27)  
Whitley links his six types of business systems to a certain set of institutional 
arrangements. Fragmented business systems are often coupled with a weak state, 
low risk-sharing by banks, weak trade unions, a poor training system, and low trust 
in formal institutions. In coordinated industrial district business systems, the local 
governments, banks, and training organizations actively collaborate with actors, 
which facilitates a somewhat higher level of trust in formal institutions. Compart-
mentalized systems are built on “arm’s length institutional contexts”, in which the 
state plays a regulatory role, highlighting the weakness of the state, and the arm’s 
length principle also applies in the highly liquid capital market. Compartmentalized 
systems are associated with weak training systems but high levels of trust in formal 
institutions (Whitley 1999: 59–61).  
In state-organized business systems, the state performs a decisive role in eco-
nomic activities, and intermediary associations and unions are tightly controlled by 
the state. Similarly, the collaborative and highly coordinated business systems are 
characterized by a strong state supporting and encouraging actors and associations, 
and credit-based financial systems. The differences between these two types of busi-
ness system are the strength of unions and related bargaining power, and the degree 
of trust in formal institutions, with the collaborative system showing higher levels 
in these dimensions than the highly coordinated business systems (Whitley 1999: 
62–63). 
If we return to the dichotomous typologies discussed earlier, Whitley’s coordi-
nated industrial district, state-organized, collaborative, and highly coordinated busi-
ness systems can be reduced to a parsimonious set of categories which match Hall 
and Soskice’s ideal type CMEs, as the exhaustiveness and complexity of variables is 
“too heavy to be handled” (Redding 2002: 224). It is undeniable that these four 
types of business systems show a relatively high degree of non-market coordination 
so that they can be seen to cluster around the pole of CMEs. Although the label of 
CME provides a broad understanding, however, this narrower typology substan-
tially ignores the details and fails to identify greater divergence of coordination 
mechanisms (Crouch 2005: 40, Jackson and Deeg 2006: 32). As Crouch (2005: 40–
41) argues, Whitley’s formulations encompass more complex dimensions, including 
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cases with two or more theoretical types, such as in the emerging and transitional 
economies. 
 
The dynamic perspective in business systems theory  
The characteristics and institutional features of business systems are interconnected 
and mutually reinforcing and constraining in particular ways. The formation of and 
changes in divergent business systems are highly interrelated with particular institu-
tional contexts, which brings us back to the fundamental concept of the VoC ap-
proach: institutional complementarities. Hence, the higher the level of institutional 
and systematic coherence in an economy; the stronger the path dependence that 
will be created. The concept of institutional complementarities is thus the founda-
tion of both business systems theory and the VoC approach. However, while the 
VoC approach has been criticized for overemphasizing institutional path depend-
ence and neglecting institutional changes, Whitley adopts a dynamic perspective in 
business systems theory.  
Unlike Hall and Soskice, who emphasize the isomorphic power of institutions 
and the consistency and stability in highly cohesive economies, Whitley focuses on 
the external and internal pressures, the conditions, the nature of consequences of 
changes in distinctive business systems. He argues that without internal support, 
the external pressure of growing global capital and product market integration is 
insufficient to cause changes in economic and institutional structures and configu-
rations (Whitley 1999: 183, Zhang and Whitley 2013). Whitley (1999: 179–183) in-
dicates that during the process of industrialization, the existing predominant types 
of economic organization and institutions are substantially shaped by pre-industrial 
economic and institutional legacies, which create strong path dependence, especially 
in the cohesive and integrated business systems. In any highly cohesive business 
system, a significant change in prevalent types of economic organization relies on 
large-scale transformations in business-system characteristics and the related deter-
minant institutions (Whitley 1999: 186–206). In other words, without allied shifts 
in predominant institutions and characteristics, or in the loosely interdependent and 
integrated business systems, major changes in prevalent types of economic organi-
zation may not occur (Whitley 1999: 183–206).  
Whitley (ibid.: 193) adds that as the crucial role of institutional factors in the 
macro-economy changes, this fundamental shift will lead to significant transfor-
mations, such as the collapse of the Soviet bloc. However, it is very rare to see 
“radical changes of dominant institutions in established market economies”. Even 
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when such changes occur, this usually involves only deviations from the original 
design, due to the stickiness of pre-existing economic and institutional structures. 
Hence, Whitley (ibid.: 193–206) asserts that changes in prevalent institutional fea-
tures and business-system characteristics are mostly incremental, resulting in “less 
obvious” shifts of economic and institutional structures and configurations.  
In sum, the VoC approach and business systems theory share the foundational 
concept of institutional complementarities, which emphasizes the isomorphic force 
in cohesive systems. The difference between the VoC approach and business sys-
tems theory is that the former stresses the stability and unwillingness to change due 
to the uncertainty of mutual benefits, while the latter highlights the importance of 
institutional factors in guiding business-system changes, and the mutual reinforce-
ment among actors and institutions when major changes occur. Whitley (1999: 183) 
asserts that, in established economies, incremental change and path dependence are 
more likely than intermittent radical changes. In short, in comparison with the VoC 
approach, Whitley’s business systems theory provides a more comprehensive and 
dynamic perspective for analysing and comparing distinctive business systems and 
the role of the state. 
 
2.3 The theoretical argument and analytical framework 
2.3.1 The theoretical argument 
VoC and business systems theory, as the two dominant comparative capitalism ap-
proaches being introduced here, share two significant features. First, the main focus 
of comparative analysis is (a) to identify the similarities and diversities of relatively 
fixed national economic and institutional configurations and coordination mecha-
nisms, (b) to group them into distinctive types of economic systems, and (c) to 
clarify how and why a particular set of economic and institutional arrangements 
exists and is maintained in a specific type of economy, and absent from other types. 
Second, comparative capitalism literature shares the notions that (a) economic ac-
tors are relational and embedded in different economic systems and (b) economic 
actions are interrelated and coordinated with particular institutional arrangements. 
As highlighted in the comparative capitalism literature, economic actors and insti-
tutions are mutually reinforcing and interconnected within specific economic and 
institutional arrangements. In any economy, institutional domains are deliberately 
deployed to provide a particular institutional environment for economic actors, and 
at the same time, economic actions and behaviour will follow a specific logic, which 
strategically fits the particular institutional environment. These notions imply the 
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underlying fundamental concept of comparative capitalism analysis: institutional 
complementarities and isomorphism. Hence, the comparative capitalism literature 
arrives at the following decisive conclusions. 
a. The presence of institutional complementarities and the isomorphic power 
of institutions reinforce the clustering of cohesive institutional domains in 
an economy. 
b. The higher the level of institutional complementarities that exists in an econ-
omy, the more cohesive the model will be, which leads to the greater effi-
ciency of coordination mechanisms and better economic performances. In 
contrast, heterogeneous cases will be less efficient and generate poorer eco-
nomic outcomes.2 
c. The mutual benefits yielded by institutional complementarities among di-
verse institutional domains, and the uncertainty of change, enhance the per-
sistence and stability of the existing economic and institutional arrange-
ments. In other words, as a result of strong institutional complementarities, 
the economic system and institutional arrangements become path depend-
ent, which explains how and why economic systems persist. 
Hence, the comparative capitalism approach asserts that the institutional com-
plementarities and isomorphic power of institutions will render existing patterns 
path dependent. The VoC approach focuses more on the stable equilibrium out-
comes of relatively static models of capitalism (Jackson and Deeg 2006: 28–29), 
while business systems theory stresses path dependence as a dynamic process of 
development of diverse systems. Hall and Soskice (2001) developed a static ap-
proach, which has been criticized for overemphasizing the stability and persistence 
of cohesive economic and institutional configurations, which make it difficult to 
explain how and why institutional change arises (Campbell and Pedersen 2007: 324–
325, Jackson and Deeg 2006: 28-34, Hall and Thelen 2009: 8–9). When patterns of 
economic actions and behaviour reach an equilibrium, path dependence will be gen-
erated. From the path dependence perspective, institutional stickiness, rigidity, and 
inflexibility will be reinforced by the isomorphic power of institutions and institu-
tional complementarities. Once lock-in occurs, only an exogenous force can free 
the patterns and behaviours from their stable equilibrium. Unlike the VoC approach, 
the business systems theory of Whitley (1999) not only uses a wider variety of co-
ordination mechanisms to identify more complex typologies, but also investigates 
the determinant institutional domains behind changes in distinctive business sys-
tems. He explicitly brings the concept of path dependence into his study and 
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highlights the importance of pre-industrial economic and institutional structures 
and configurations in shaping the existing dominant types of institutions and eco-
nomic organizations (Whitley 1999: 179–183). As mentioned above, the typology 
of the VoC approach largely ignores the greater divergence of non-market coordi-
nation mechanisms (Crouch 2005: 40, Jackson and Deeg 2006: 32). Thus, in com-
parison with Whitley’s detailed formulations, the VoC approach fails to identify the 
diverse strategic coordination mechanisms in the core institutional domains, and — 
more importantly — the model is unable to show the subtle and incremental 
changes over time in its very narrow typology. In short, business systems theory 
overcomes some of the limitations of the VoC approach in dealing with the dynam-
ics of economic systems. 
Despite the differences between the static perspective of the VoC approach and 
the dynamic perspective of business systems theory, both approaches stress the 
strong institutional path dependence in economic systems, so that their way of un-
derstanding the patterns of economic actions, behaviours, and institutional arrange-
ments follows the same logic. Based on this path-dependent logic, existing estab-
lished systems, even the mixed or inefficient cases, are unlikely to undergo radical 
fundamental transformations from one type to another, and only the “less obvious” 
incremental changes are likely in established economies. Moreover, the “equilibrium” 
perspective is rational, suggesting that economic strategies and decisions are ration-
ally determined under the isomorphic power for achieving a stable equilibrium, 
which implies that without external force, mindful deviation is unlikely to occur. 
Nevertheless, in reality, creation and mutation have not been halted by path de-
pendence or lock-ins. Institutions are created by humans to reduce uncertainty and 
paths are formed by human activities, and the human will and human actions cannot 
be completely rational or entirely consistent with the institutional environment. As 
well as external pressures, the endogenous power of human will has always played 
a central role in shaping or unlocking paths. Hence, path dependence, lock-ins, or 
equilibrium should not be considered the only possible outcomes, but should be 
seen as part of an ongoing process, which is liable to mutate and transform over 
time. 
Nölke and Claar (2013: 36) have pointed out that although an increasing number 
of comparative capitalism studies have begun to focus on institutional change, most 
of them limit the scope of their investigations to one or two decades, and neglect 
long-term evolving economic and institutional configurations and arrangements. 
Whitley (1999) emphasizes the change of dominant institutional domains in busi-
ness systems, but he offers a relatively limited historical perspective of the 
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development and change of business systems in his case studies. The initiatives and 
the role of different economic actors and organizations, including governments, 
banks, firms, associations, etc., in changing systems have not been discussed in de-
tail. Additionally, Whitley (1999) says little about the initial conditions of an econ-
omy, which will condition the present economic and institutional configurations to 
a certain degree.  
Based on the discussion above, neither the VoC approach nor business systems 
theory have provided a comprehensive systematic approach to analysing changing 
economic and institutional configurations. While it is undeniable that institutional 
complementarities, the isomorphic power of institutions, as well as the pre-existing 
economic and institutional configurations and structures, all exert a profound im-
pact on shaping paths, the initiatives of economic actors, organizations, institutions, 
and the role of exogenous forces or shocks in generating novelty and influencing 
path development, should not be disregarded. It is essential to bring together the 
concepts of path extension, path renewal, and path creation if we are to understand 
how distinctive economic and institutional configurations and arrangements be-
come shaped and changed over time. 
 
2.3.2 Analytical framework 
In this study, the main focus is to understand how the changing roles of local gov-
ernments influence the dynamic regional business systems in the transitional heter-
ogeneous Chinese economy. Business systems theory and evolutionary theory are 
used to understand how and why distinctive regional development trajectories be-
come established and evolve in the transitional heterogeneous Chinese economy.   
Although business systems theory and the VoC approach share many similarities 
in core dimensions and fundamental concepts, there are three major merits of using 
business systems theory as a broad framework in this research. First, business sys-
tems theory overcomes the limitations of oversimplified dualistic typologies inher-
ent in the VoC approach. It provides much more complex typologies and dimen-
sions as well as a dynamic view of economic and institutional arrangements, 
allowing us to examine a much wider range of economies, including the emerging 
and transitional economies (Crouch 2005: 40–41, Jackson and Deeg 2006: 27–32). 
Second, Whitley’s approach combines a micro perspective of firms with a macro 
view of the state, which shows more balance than the firm-centred VoC analysis. 
Third, because the VoC approach directly links economic outcomes to the degree 
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of coherence of an economy, it is unable to explain the rapid growth of China’s 
economy. Whitley’s approach, by contrast, does not emphasize causality between 
economic performance and the level of coherence of an economy. This means that 
business systems theory is more adaptable than the VoC approach in examining the 
emerging, transitional Chinese economy with its heterogeneous developmental pat-
tern.  
However, there are also challenges to using business systems theory in this re-
search. First, business systems theory provides a very broad theoretical and concep-
tual framework, which includes many variables and indicators. It seems all possible 
explanations and determining factors can be found within business systems theory. 
Using such a broad concept to understand the evolving regional development tra-
jectories brings challenges (too broad to use). Second, attempting to understand the 
role of the state in existing regional business systems and development trajectories 
(given outcome) by seeking evidence and explanations within business systems the-
ory may create hindsight bias, which is another challenge to the research. Moreover, 
business systems theory focuses on examining and analysing the coordination 
mechanisms among actors and institutions within a specific set of economic and 
institutional arrangements and environments, but does not study the causality, 
which means there will be alternative explanations and factors which fall outside of 
business systems theory. Third, there is the challenge of whether the findings of the 
research can be generalized beyond the selected case studies (Yin 2003: 37).    
It is notable that Whitley (1999) excludes mainland China from his East Asian 
business systems case study. His approach builds on the established market, and in 
his model, outcomes are shaped by market forces (Redding 2002: 225). Hence, from 
Whitley’s point of view, the evolutionary processes of the Chinese economy are not 
natural, and do not follow “the natural logic of cause and effect in finding paths” 
(Redding 2002: 225). Whitley’s view largely disregards the initiatives of economic 
actors in shaping and creating paths and substantially underestimates the significant 
marketization efforts in China since 1978 and the crucial role of market forces in 
the Chinese economy. Moreover, neither the VoC approach nor business systems 
theory pay attention to regional differences, whereas, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
uneven regional development and a great diversity of economic and institutional 
patterns are typical of the transitional Chinese economy. Investigating the develop-
ment trajectory at the national level will not lead to an understanding of the differ-
ences in regional economic performance, economic actors’ behaviour, and local de-
velopmental paths. There is no single explanation for the regional differences. 
Regions are subject to a set of economic and institutional arrangements and 
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historical and social legacies including specific resource bases (Andriesse 2008: 32), 
which shape a variety of developmental patterns. Such uneven regional develop-
ment is a common phenomenon, especially in emerging and transitional economies 
like China. This research therefore deploys business systems theory at the regional 
level in the heterogeneous Chinese economy. 
In this study, I neither portray the Chinese system in an undifferentiated manner, 
nor attempt to identify how many business systems exist in China, but select two 
representative provinces of China’s unique dual system, namely, the early adopter 
Zhejiang, in the eastern coastal area, and the latecomer Yunnan, in the western re-
gion. 
The research uses a broad and comprehensive framework for understanding and 
comparing the coordination mechanisms underlying the evolving regional develop-
ment trajectories and the changing role of economic actors, organizations, and in-
stitutions. Hence, adapted versions of Whitley’s formulations are applied here as 
basic conceptual categories for identifying the diverse dominant features in certain 
sets of institutional arrangements based on the Chinese economic and institutional 
context. The established regional business system is studied in three blocks, namely 
(a) enterprises sector, (b) state sector, and (c) state–business relationship, as shown 
in Figure 2.4 below. The newly defined enterprises block, including both state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and private enterprises, is broader than the private sector 
as defined by Whitley. The reason for including SOEs in the enterprises sector is 
that the ultimate goal of SOE reform in China is to wholly convert these enterprises 
institutionally to the private sector or to entirely marketize the SOEs. Hence, in this 
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The incremental process of unique decentralization reform in China has a pro-
found impact on shaping the role of the state in regional development trajectories, 
which substantially influences the dynamics of regional business systems. This re-
search is conducted from an evolutionary perspective and deploys business systems 
theory at the regional level; hence, the role of top-down decentralization reform is 
studied in this research.  
During the 1950s and early 1960s, especially, developing countries were gener-
ally observed to have centralized and unified administrative organizations or gov-
ernments (Rondinelli et al. 1983: 5–8). This tendency for governments in Third 
World countries to have centralized management was mainly due to the heavy in-
vestment in nation-building. However, over time, the negative consequences of 
overcentralized systems began to emerge, which led to serious administrative and 
economic problems: governments gradually found themselves confronted by diffi-
culties implementing national strategies and administering entirely from the centre. 
Due to poor economic performance and ineffective and inefficient governance, 
from the 1970s governments in developing countries started seeking new govern-
ance structures to more effectively, efficiently, and equitably use and distribute lim-
ited resources and to stimulate participation in national development activities, so 
as to increase productivity and promote economic growth. Decentralization was 
seen as a form of “corrective device” to solve the growing problems caused by 
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excessive centralization (ibid.). Since then, a large number of developing countries 
have initiated a fundamental transformation: decentralization. 
Rondinelli et al. define decentralization as: 
…the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising 
and allocation from the central government and its agencies to: (a) field units of 
central government ministries or agencies, (b) subordinate units or levels of govern-
ment, (c) semiautonomous public authorities or corporations, (d) area wide, regional 
or functional authorities, or (e) nongovernmental private or voluntary organizations. 
(Rondinelli et al. 1983: 13) 
  Hence, decentralization allows the central government to be better informed 
about local conditions and to react quickly by giving local authorities or organiza-
tions discretion in decision-making (Rondinelli et al. 1983: 8–13). As the degree of 
independent decision-making and responsibility transferred from the central gov-
ernment to local authorities might differ, four types of decentralization are distin-
guished by Rondinelli et al. (ibid.: 14), as follows: 
a. Deconcentration (direct control by the central government): the transfer of 
power and responsibilities from a central government to a lower-level 
branch or regional administrative units, which remain within the central 
government structure (Rondinelli et al. 1983: 19, also Bird and Vaillancourt 
2008: 3); 
b. Delegation (indirect control by the central government): the transfer of 
power and responsibilities or functions to local organizations, which are 
not within the central government structure and act as agents for the central 
government (Rondinelli et al. 1983: 19, Bird and Vaillancourt 2008: 3); 
c. Devolution (the most complete form of decentralization): regional authori-
ties or organizations are (semi-)autonomous and (semi-)independent in de-
cision-making (Rondinelli et al. 1983: 24–25, Bird and Vaillancourt 2008: 3, 
White and Smoke 2005: 6); 
d. Privatization: responsibilities and power are shifted by governments to pri-
vate sector or “parallel organizations” (Rondinelli et al. 1983: 28).  
According to many studies about decentralization in developing countries (Ron-
dinelli et al. 1983, Bird and Vaillancourt 2008, White and Smoke 2005), govern-
ments have applied various combinations of these four types of decentralization. 
However, the implementation of decentralization reform in developing countries 
has not always achieved the primary goal (Rondinelli et al. 1983: 8–13). Rondinelli 
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et al. (ibid.: 33–34) point out that “centralization and decentralization are not mu-
tually exclusive or dichotomous arrangements for governance”. Hence, the chal-
lenge for the implementation of decentralization is to find the “optimal mix” of 
discretion in decision-making and the balance between centralization and decentral-
ization (ibid.: 33–34). Rondinelli et al. conclude (ibid.: 76) that “decentralization is 
not a ‘quick fix’ for the administrative, political, or economic problems of develop-
ing countries”. The “optimal mix” for decentralizing powers and responsibilities 
evolves and shifts along with changes in national and local institutional and eco-
nomic conditions. A further challenge for implementing decentralization is that 
conflicts between central and local governments seem inevitable, especially in the 
transitional economy (Bird and Vaillancourt 2008: 4–5). In other words, the goals 
and interests of central and local governments do not always coincide in the heter-
ogeneous economy (ibid.). Without an incentive structure, decentralization may not 
have the effectiveness and efficiency intended and designed by the central govern-
ment. Hence, providing proper incentives to local authorities is vital in the imple-
mentation of decentralization, which exerts a profound impact on the behaviour of 
economic actors at the local level.  
As already noted, decentralization is an evolutionary process that plays a deter-
mining role in shaping regional development trajectories and local economic actors’ 
behaviour. This means that, if we are to understand the evolutionary business sys-
tems in Zhejiang and Yunnan, studying the decentralization reform in China is es-
sential, given that: (a) this research applies business systems theory at the regional 
level; and (b) China’s form of decentralization is unique, which shapes the role of 
the state in regional development trajectories and has a profound impact on the 
changing state–business relationship, which is neglected in conventional decentral-
ization theory.  
  Overall, this research is conducted from a dynamic perspective, using the path 
dependence approach. To understand the evolving development trajectories and 
the changing role of economic actors in Zhejiang and Yunnan in the heterogeneous 
transitional economy, the existing business systems in Zhejiang and Yunnan will be 
studied first. After identifying the dominant economic and institutional features and 
the coordination mechanisms in the two business systems, the historical develop-
mental paths of Zhejiang and Yunnan will be presented. This will include an inves-
tigation into the regional historical circumstances, initial conditions of resource ba-
ses, and distinctive institutional arrangements in Zhejiang and Yunnan, which leads 
to a classic question in path dependence theory: does history matter? If it does, 
could the highly unified and centralized policies and institutional arrangements alter 
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the impact of pre-existing regional economic and institutional configurations in the 
pre-reform period? If regional difference was reduced during the planned economy 
period, how do we explain the substantial regional difference once the economic 
reform started?  
The economic reform that began in 1978 marked a turning point in the Chinese 
economic development trajectory. Hence, the evolving economic and institutional 
structures and configurations before and after economic reform, at both central 
level and local level, are studied to understand what determines the dominant fea-
tures of the existing business systems, how and why particular development trajec-
tories are shaped, and the nature of the changing role of local governments in local 
economic development in the Chinese transitional economy. The economic reform, 
as a given set of economic and institutional arrangements, can be seen as a form of 
decentralization, which provides more room for different economic actors. With 
increasing decision-making and financial power, the behaviour of local govern-
ments and enterprises will be altered, in turn influencing the business system and 
the development trajectory. Ultimately, then, this research aims to identify the un-
derlying mechanisms or determining factors of the evolving development trajecto-












1 According to Page (2006: 89), in path dependence “the path of previous outcomes 
matters”, whereas in what he calls phat dependence, “the events in the path matter, but 
not their order”. 
2 This assumption is highlighted in the VoC approach, while business systems theory 
does not directly link economic outcomes to the degree of coherence of an economy. 
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3 Research Design and Methodology  
 
 
This chapter introduces the research design and methodology. Section 3.1 first de-
scribes the selection of the research strategy, and section 3.2 then presents the de-
sign of the research, including the units of analysis, what data are relevant, what data 
to collect, and how to analyse the results. The sampling method and data collection 
for the survey, and the method of testing whether the two cases are significantly 
different, on the basis of the survey results, are also discussed.  
3.1 Research strategy 
According to Yin (2003: 1), for conducting social science research, a number of 
different research strategies are available, including the case study, survey, histories, 
and analysis of archival information.  
Each type of strategy can be used for solving a particular type of research ques-
tion. If the researcher focuses on the “what” question, an exploratory study, survey, 
or archival research strategies will be the most advantageous research strategies to 
apply (Yin 2003: 6). On the other hand, case studies, histories, or experiments are 
better strategies when research questions focus on the “how” and “why”, because 
in order to answer these types of questions, the researcher needs large amounts of 
documentary information to explain phenomena over more than one point in time 
(ibid.: 6–7). A look back at the research questions listed in Chapter 1 shows that 
“what”, “how”, and “why” types of questions are all posed in this research, which 
suggests that it will be beneficial to use multiple research strategies. 
Besides the type of research question, the selection of research strategy also de-
pends on two other conditions: to what extent an investigator has control over ac-
tual behavioural events, and whether the research focuses on contemporary or his-
torical phenomena (ibid.: 1). According to Yin (ibid.: 7–8), the case study is a 
preferred research strategy in studying contemporary phenomena. In case study re-
search, the researcher has no control over the relevant behaviours but directly 
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observes or interviews persons involved in the event (ibid.: 7–8). This research aims 
to identify and compare the existing business systems and the contemporary devel-
opment trajectories in Zhejiang and Yunnan. The distinctive business system, the 
unique development trajectory, and the factors or variables that affect and shape 
the business system and the path are not under the investigator’s control.  
Therefore, the type of research questions, the extent of control over actual be-
havioural events, and the contemporary focus of this research meet the basic con-
ditions for the case study approach as defined by Yin (ibid.: 1). A comparative case 
study was thus judged to be the ideal research strategy for this research. For the 
investigation of prevalent attitudes and reactions of economic actors, which are em-
bedded in the existing economic and institutional context, a survey is used to iden-
tify and reflect upon the contemporary phenomena being studied. Furthermore, 
this study adopts an evolutionary perspective, exploring how and why a particular 
business system, the path of development, and the role and behaviour of economic 
actors evolve over time, to achieve a better understanding of the contemporary 
phenomena. Therefore, for dealing with the explanatory research questions, re-
search strategies including history and the analysis of archival records are also used 
to analyse the contemporary situation.   
In sum, as this research is exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory, the compar-
ative case study method is applied in combination with other research strategies, 
including survey, history, and archival research. Both primary and secondary docu-
ments are major sources of evidence and both quantitative and qualitative data are 
collected for creating internal validity. 
 
3.2 Designing the case study  
Yin (2003: 20–21) defines research design as “a logical plan from here to there (i.e. 
here: the initial set of questions to be answered, and there: some set of conclusions 
about these questions)”. Between “here” and “there”, there are two major steps — 
the collection and analysis of relevant data (ibid.: 20). Hence, in general, a research 
design deals with four major problems: “what research questions to study, what 
data are relevant, what data to collect, and how to analyse the results” (Philliber et 
al., as cited in Yin 2003: 21). As the initial set of research questions has already been 
posed in Chapter 1 and the nature of the research questions, in terms of “what”, 
“how”, and “why” questions, has also been clarified above, this section will present 
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the units of analysis, what data are relevant, what data to collect, and how to analyse 
the results.   
 
3.2.1 Units and object of analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 2, for conducting this research, a broad and comprehensive 
framework (i.e. both private and state sector) is used with the aim of understanding 
and comparing the coordination mechanisms underlying the evolving regional de-
velopment trajectory and the changing role of economic actors. Hence, the units of 
analysis as defined by Whitley’s formulations are applied here as basic conceptual 
categories for identifying the diverse dominant features in certain institutional ar-
rangements. Importantly, since the economic reform was launched in 1979, China’s 
economic system has undergone a radical institutional transformation from a highly 
centralized and unified planned economy to a market-oriented economy at both the 
micro and macro levels of the system. This means that enterprises and both central 
and local governments are units of analysis in this research. As domestic industrial 
enterprises, both private enterprises and SOEs, are the main driving forces of eco-
nomic growth in Zhejiang and Yunnan, information on industrial enterprises is col-
lected in this research. (The determining role of industrial enterprises in local eco-
nomic development in Zhejiang and Yunnan is demonstrated and explained in 
Chapter 4.) To understand and compare the changing role of the state in the dis-
tinctive and dynamic regional business systems and to understand how and why 
distinct patterns have been shaped and have evolved in the heterogeneous Chinese 
economy when national-level reform and policies are applied simultaneously, 
Zhejiang and Yunnan — two contrasting cases reflecting significant regional differ-
ences and the unique dual system — are sampled based on theoretical replication 
logic to compare whether the empirical results produce contrasting results. More 
specifically, as discussed above, there is an investigation into prevalent attitudes and 
reactions of economic actors in the existing economic and institutional context by 
means of a survey, in-depth interviews, and literature analysis, in order to identify 
and reflect the contemporary phenomena. For the purpose of the survey, two pre-
fecture-level cities in each province were selected: Wenzhou and Jinhua in Zhejiang, 
and Kunming and Qujing in Yunnan.  
Wenzhou has been considered the “birthplace” of the private economy in China, 
while Jinhua (and especially the county-level city of Yiwu) has been known as one 
of the largest small-enterprise commodity markets in China. During the initial stage 
of reform, the two selected cities in Zhejiang creatively developed their business 
models, which have provided a substantial stimulus to local economic growth and 
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have been widely applied in China. The GRP in Wenzhou and Jinhua in 2017 
reached 541.2 billion yuan (69.07 billion euro) and 384.9 billion yuan (49.1 billion 
euro) respectively, ranking them 35th and 54th out of 334 prefecture-level cities in 
China (Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018). Kunming is the provincial 
capital of Yunnan and Qujing is the second-largest city of Yunnan, contributing 
41.5% of total GRP of Yunnan in 2017 (Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Statistics 
2018). The GRP in Kunming and Qujing in 2017 reached 485.6 billion yuan (61.97 
billion euro) and 196 billion yuan (25 billion euro) respectively, placing them 41rd 
and 125th out of 334 prefecture-level cities in China (Yunnan Provincial Bureau of 
Statistics 2018).  
Given the crucial role played by Wenzhou, Jinhua, Kunming, and Qujing in the 
economic development of Zhejiang and Yunnan, industrial enterprises, including 
both private enterprises and SOEs, in these two locations were selected for this 
research. 
 
3.2.2 The selection of indicators 
In the previous chapter, the business systems theory selected for this study was 
discussed. Business systems theory is relatively adaptable to researching the hetero-
geneous transitional economy because it offers greater balance between private and 
state sectors, and provides richer and more complex typologies with a dynamic per-
spective. Hence, adjusted versions of Whitley’s formulations are applied here as 
basic conceptual categories for selecting indicators that reflect the unique business 
systems in Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
 
The indicators of existing business systems 
The enterprises sector block identifies the characteristics of industrial structure 
within the jurisdiction, and shows and compares: (a) how enterprises, both SOEs 
and private firms, coordinate their economic activities and interact with other eco-
nomic actors, such as customers and suppliers, competitors, other organizations 
and institutions; and (b) how ownership relations and the role of ownership impact 
on coordinating activities in a particular institutional context. The major indicators 
are listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
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Table 3.1 
Regional industrial structure  
Indicators Spatial level  Source 
Contemporary regional resource base 
Distribution of GRP (1979–2017) 
Local 
Local   
SY 
SY 
Industry statistics   Local  SY  
Information of sampled firms (type of firm, firm size and age) Local  Survey 
Note: The statistics yearbook is abbreviated to SY. Qualitative documentation is abbreviated 
to Qual. Archival records are abbreviated to AR. 
Table 3.2 
Enterprises sector block  
Indicators Spatial level  Source 
Ownership relations 
- Concentration of ownership 
- Involvement in management 









Non-ownership coordination  






- Employer–employee relations 







Note: The statistics yearbook is abbreviated to SY. Qualitative documentation is abbreviated 
to Qual. Archival records are abbreviated to AR. 
In terms of the institutional environment which supports and constrains the 
economic actors, the state sector block identifies the features of key institutions, 
and shows: (a) the extent to which the state is involved in economic activities; and 
(b) how the state coordinates or organizes the local economy through market regu-
lation, intermediary associations, the financial system, education and training sys-
tems, and trade unions, as shown in Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3 
State sector block (from the state perspective)  
Indicators Spatial level  Source 
The strength of the state 






- Financial policies 








The skill development and control system 
- The skill development 







State–business relations block   
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- Business-governments collaboration  Local Survey 
- The intermediary economic association National/Local Qual./Survey 
Note: The statistics yearbook is abbreviated to SY. Qualitative documentation is abbreviated 
to Qual. Archival records are abbreviated to AR. 
State sector block (from firms’ perception)  
Indicators Spatial level  Source 
The strength of the state 
- Firms’ attitudes to permit systems 
- Firms’ attitudes to market access  
- Firms’ opinions on entry barriers 
- Firms’ opinions on supporting policies 
- Firms’ opinions on public services 
 












- Sources of finance  







State-business relations block   
- Firms’ attitudes to local governments 






The state–business relationship links the private sector block and state sector 
block and highlights the interdependence, mutual effects, and reciprocal reinforce-
ment between firms and the state in shaping the particular business system. In other 
words, this sector shows how institutional complementarities and isomorphic 
power shape a corresponding type of coordination within a certain institutional ar-
rangement. The state–business relationship is also reflected in cooperation between 
firms and state and the degree of dependence of firms on local governments. The 
major indicators are listed in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 
The state–business relations block  
Indicators Spatial level  Source 
Business–government collaboration 
Intermediary economic association  
Firms’ opinions on local governments 










The indicators of regional historical pre-1979 developmental path  
To understand how and why the business systems or development patterns have 
been shaped and have mutated, this research traces back to the period before the 
establishment of P.R. China, to examine the regional historical circumstances, initial 
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conditions of resource bases, and institutional arrangements of Zhejiang and Yun-
nan. In addition, it looks at the highly unified and centralized arrangements and the 
socialist transformation implemented during the pre-reform period, to study the 
impact of the centralized arrangement on the regional path of development (see 
Table 3.5).   
Table 3.5 
The regional historical developmental path before 1979   
Indicators Spatial level  Source 
The regional development path before 1949 
- Resource bases 
- Economic, industrial and institutional structures 
 
Local 




The regional development path (1949–1978) 
- The unified national policies and related data 
- The fiscal system and policies  
- The regional path of development  
-   a. Regional development policies  













Note: The statistics yearbook is abbreviated to SY. Qualitative documentation is abbreviated 
to Qual. Archival records are abbreviated to AR. 
 
The indicators of the development trajectory of the economic reform 
(1979–present) 
As emphasized in business systems theory, institutional domains are deliberately 
distributed through every type of economic system to provide a particular institu-
tional environment for economic actors. In parallel, economic actions and behav-
iour always follow a specific logic within the economic and institutional arrange-
ments. Hence, central government policies form particular economic and 
institutional arrangements in the evolutionary scheme, which create a particular in-
stitutional environment for economic actors. In order to better understand how and 
why particular business systems, development trajectories, and actors’ behaviour 
are shaped, the detailed economic reform process is studied before the reactions of 
local-level economic actors are analysed. The relevant indicators are shown in Ta-
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Table 3.6 
The overview of economic reform in China: Decentralization (1978–2016)  
Indicators Spatial level  Source 
SOE reform and development of the private sector 
- The policies and process of SOE reform 







Fiscal decentralization at central and local level 
- Fiscal policies  
- Administrative policies 
- Public budget revenue and expenditure 
- Financial self-sufficient rates 
- Transfer payments and tax rebates 















The Chinese cadre management and promotion system 





Note: The statistics yearbook is abbreviated to SY. Qualitative documentation is abbreviated 
to Qual. Archival records are abbreviated to AR. 
Table 3.7 
Inter-jurisdictional competition  
Indicators Spatial level  Source 
Horizontal competition 
- The Hukou system 
- Tax competition 










- The administrative system 







Note: The statistics yearbook is abbreviated to SY. Qualitative documentation is abbreviated 
to Qual. Archival records are abbreviated to AR. 
Table 3.8 
The evolutionary business system of Zhejiang and Yunnan (1979–present)  
Indicators Spatial level  Source 
The development of Zhejiang economy 
- The process of development of Zhejiang 







The development of Yunnan economy 
- The process of development of Yunnan 







Note: The statistics yearbook is abbreviated to SY. Qualitative documentation is abbreviated 
to Qual. Archival records are abbreviated to AR. 
As indicated above, this research includes multiple sources of evidence, both 
quantitative and qualitative, to address the research questions. The study’s primary 
data are obtained through the survey conducted in four cities: Wenzhou and Jinhua 
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in Zhejiang and Kunming and Qujing in Yunnan. The secondary data of this re-
search come from statistical yearbooks, documentation, and archival records. As 
emphasized in Chapter 1, because no unified operational set of measures has been 
developed in business systems theory, factors that connect economic, social, insti-
tutional, technological, cultural, or political concerns can be studied to explain and 
understand the dynamic regional development trajectories. However, this research 
does not include all possible explanations and factors but concentrates attention on 
the institutional economic factors within Whitley’s business systems theory’s basic 
conceptual categories. Factors external to business systems theory, such as cultural, 
technological, political, and demographic factors, are not the main focus of this 
study. In the next section, the method for conducting the survey will be presented. 
 
3.2.3 Sampling method and data collection 
As noted above, in this research, multiple sources of evidence, including both quan-
titative and qualitative data, are collected to address the research questions and to 
create internal validity. 
 
a. Sampling method for the quantitative data collection 
Sample size 
According to Neuman (2014: 269), there are two methods to determine sample size: 
(a) to “make assumptions about the population and use statistical equations about 
random sampling processes”; or (b) to “decide a sample size by using a conven-
tional or commonly accepted amount”. Neuman (ibid.: 270-271) suggests that if 
total target populations are fewer than 500, the sample size should be about 30% 
of the total population. If the target population is over 150,000, the sampling ratio 
should be 1% (which would be equivalent to a sample size of 1,500), and if the 
population is over 10 million, the sample ratio should be 0.025%. Neuman (2014) 
also stresses that if the study is attempting to analyse many small subgroups within 
the population, it should include about 50 cases for each subgroup. As the number 
of industrial enterprises (registered legal entities) in Zhejiang and Yunnan totalled 
417,132 and 20,034, respectively, in 2014 (National Bureau of Statistics 2015), the 
ideal sample size would be more than 4000, which is not practicable for surveying 
within one year. Therefore, it was decided to take 200 enterprises in total as the 
sample size in this survey. 
The survey therefore covered 200 industrial enterprises in total, 50 in each of 
the four cities. An in-person interview was conducted with an entrepreneur or 
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senior executive in each firm. The duration of the fieldwork was from July 2015 to 
June 2016. Meanwhile, secondary data were also collected through statistical year-
books, government reports, and other literature. 
 
Testing and revising the questionnaire 
Before surveying enterprises in Zhejiang and Yunnan, three entrepreneurs in Kun-
ming were invited to test the questionnaire to find out: (a) whether the questions in 
the questionnaire fit the target interviewees; (b) whether the questionnaire repre-
sented the research objective; (c) whether the questions in the questionnaire were 
explicit and easy to understand; (d) whether there were any questions which entre-
preneurs were reluctant to answer. The entrepreneurs’ responses drew attention to 
some problems in the questionnaire: (a) some questions were no longer valid due 
to changes in industrial policies; (b) some multiple choice and ranking questions 
were too complicated, requiring too much time and patience from those completing 
the survey. After revising the questionnaire, the entrepreneurs were invited again to 
give advice. The data from the entrepreneurs who tested the questionnaire are not 
included in the research data. The survey questionnaire, in its final form, is given in 
the Appendix 1. 
 
Sampling method 
Random sampling was first adopted for conducting the survey, using a business 
directory to contact entrepreneurs and ask permission for an interview. However, 
due to outdated and inaccurate information, this method immediately proved im-
practical. An online questionnaire was then prepared and emailed to 100 verified 
enterprises from the business directory in Yunnan. Although the click rate was high, 
the return ratio was only 3%, and no respondent fully completed the questionnaire. 
Hence, no valid surveys were returned. The low return rate was attributed to the 
length of the questionnaire, necessitating a change of method: at this point, face-to-
face interview sampling was adopted for conducting the survey. Offices of the Min-
istry of Industry and Information Technology were contacted in the four cities, and 
all agreed to provide lists of various types and sizes of industrial enterprises within 
their jurisdiction, with valid contact information. Although a systematic sampling is 
an ideal method for dealing with such a list, with a shortcut selection procedure, 
due to the limited number of enterprises in the lists and a high possibility of rejec-
tion by the enterprises, all the enterprises in the lists were contacted and invited for 
interviews. 
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Data collection 
From that point, the fieldwork proceeded smoothly, and the majority of target re-
spondents were very cooperative. When a respondent showed logical inconsistency, 
or gave up halfway through the interview, the survey results were not taken into 
consideration. The in-person interviews usually lasted 30 to 40 minutes in Zhejiang, 
while the interviews in Yunnan often took at least 1.5 hours. The length of time 
taken by the interviews was determined by regional industrial structures in Zhejiang 
and Yunnan. The majority of sampled industrial enterprises in Zhejiang mainly en-
gage in light industry and manufacture small consumer goods, while most of the 
sampled industrial enterprises in Yunnan, especially large firms and SOEs, engage 
in heavy industry confronting relatively complicated coordination problems and 
business relations. Hence, compared to sampled firms in Zhejiang, firms in Yunnan 
spent more time answering each question.  
After finishing the interviews in Zhejiang and Yunnan, the registered infor-
mation of the sampled enterprises — such as registered capital, legal status, engaged 
business, etc. — was checked through the National Enterprise Credit Information 
Publicity System (http://www.samr.gov.cn). Sampled firms which provided inac-
curate information were removed from the survey. Again, secondary data, such as 
statistical yearbooks, government reports, and other literature were used to supple-
ment the survey results and also to confirm that the sampled enterprises reflect the 
dominant features of economic and industrial structures in Zhejiang and Yunnan, 
and that the survey results thus achieve the target of the fieldwork.  
There were three main limitations during the fieldwork. First, it was difficult to 
put the ideal sampling method into practice so that the sampling method had to be 
changed during the fieldwork, in order to conduct the survey. Second, the sample 
size of the survey is relatively small; hence, to minimize this problem, a large amount 
of secondary data are used to support survey results. Third, although all the survey 
results have been checked through the government publicity system, information 
directly linked to the performance of firms is hard to obtain, and can only be in-
ferred from other, indirect indicators.  
Overall, in this fieldwork, face-to-face interviews have been conducted with 
more than 200 enterprises in Zhejiang and Yunnan. After removing the invalid sur-
vey results (<10), 200 sample surveys are left as study objects in this research. 
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The survey data analysis  
As the research is intended to identify the distinctive business systems and to high-
light regional differences, the survey results are tested to show whether there are 
significant differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. The detailed information 
about the statistics results are presented in the Appendix 2: a summary is provided 
in Table 3.9 below. 
Table 3.9 
The results of statistical tests   
Indicators  Result 
firm types χ
2=59.39, 
p=0.00 significant difference 
predominant industries χ
2=70.8, 
p=0.00 significant difference 
firm age U=6175.5, p=0.004 significant difference 
firm size U=7752, p=0.00 significant difference 
five same business activities within city χ
2=25.29, 
p=0.00 significant difference 
same business per km2 U=2058, p=0.00 significant difference 
the long-term partnership with suppliers χ
2=5.2, 
p=0.022 significant difference 
the long-term partnership with clients 
χ2=0.64, 
p=0.8 
no significant difference 




being merged or acquired by other firms χ
2=15.63, 
p=0.00 significant difference 
the difficulty level of inter-firm coordina-
tion 
U=3525, 
p=0.00 significant difference 
applying for licence or certification χ
2=0.363, 
p=0.547 no significant difference 
specialized requirements χ2=36.46, p=0.00 significant difference 
the difficulty level of accessing market U=5799.5, p=0.043 significant difference 
entry incentives 
χ2=50.47, 




p=0.57 no significant difference 
supporting policies χ
2=27.9, 
p=0.00 significant difference 
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public service χ
2=13.37, 




no significant difference 
loans from financial institutions t=1.24, p=0.219 no significant difference 
sources of finance χ
2=39.37, 
p=0.00 significantly different 
the difficulty level of accessing bank loans U=1586.5, p=0.00 significant difference 
collaboration with local governments χ
2=25.97, 
p=0.00 significant difference 
types of collaboration activities χ
2=5.16, 
p=0.272 no significant difference 
importance of local governments in the en-
terprise’s development 
U=7020, 
p=0.00 significant difference 
Source: Own survey result 
 
b. Sampling method for the qualitative data collection 
The qualitative data for this research come from in-depth interviews, documenta-
tion, and archival records. Qualitative data were collected through the same in-
depth interviews with entrepreneurs and the senior managers of 200 sampled firms 
in Zhejiang and Yunnan. As mentioned above, the interviews usually lasted 30 to 
40 minutes in Zhejiang and 1.5 hours in Yunnan. As well as conducting face-to-
face interviews with sampled firms, local government officials and scholars were 
also interviewed and consulted about local economic development strategies and 
policies. These interviewees comprised: 14 local government officials from the local 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (three from Wenzhou, three 
from Jinhua, three from Kunming, and four from Qujing), and four scholars (one 
professor from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, one professor from 
Zhejiang University, and two professors from Yunnan University). Besides the in-
depth interviews, documents and archival records are also major sources for quali-
tative data collection. More than 200 books, documents, and archival records on 
Zhejiang and Yunnan’s economic development trajectories, including local govern-
ments’ written reports and administrative documents, formal studies, newspaper 
clippings, and other sources of information, are used to corroborate and augment 
evidence from interviews. 
 
In sum, Zhejiang and Yunnan were selected as two contrasting regions of the 
mixed Chinese economy. The statistically significant differences between Zhejiang 
and Yunnan regarding dominant features of industrial structure, inter-firm relations, 
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integration activities, market regulations, financial systems, etc. are proved by the 
survey results. As the research is conducted using mixed research methods, survey 
results, qualitative, quantitative, and secondary data are all incorporated to address 
the research questions and support the argument. In the next chapter, data from 
different sources will be combined to show the distinctive Zhejiang and Yunnan 
business systems. 
 
3.2.4 Limitations  
The research suffers from four major limitations: generalization, hindsight bias, cau-
salities, and alternative explanations and factors external to business systems theory.   
According to Yin (2003: 33–34), research should present “a logical set of state-
ments”; hence, construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability 
should be used to test the quality of empirical social research and case studies.   
The question of whether the results can be verified as valid and reliable is one 
of the challenges in this exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory research. There 
are three major obstacles which “threaten” the validity of the research. (a) No uni-
fied operational set of measures has been developed in the comparative system the-
ory. (b) Using the evolutionary perspective to understand the complex process of 
formation and evolution of regional business systems leads to a possible problem 
of availability of historical data. (c) The complexity of a heterogeneous and transi-
tional economy is a challenge of the causal (explanatory) case study. Hence, to in-
crease construct and internal validity, multiple sources of evidence (triangulating 
data), both primary and secondary (survey, history, and archival research, etc.), are 
used in this research.  
Yin (2003: 37) argues that the issue of generalizability — whether findings can 
be generalized beyond selected cases — is a major challenge or barrier in conducting 
case study research. Unlike survey research, the case study does not have statistics 
to back it up, but relies on analytical generalization (ibid.). Hence, the external va-
lidity of this study is low because the findings in this research can only be general-
ized theoretically.  
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, business systems theory provides a very 
broad theoretical and conceptual framework with many variables and indicators. 
Finding the possible explanations and determining factors within business systems 
theory may create hindsight bias. Furthermore, business systems theory is explora-
tory, descriptive, explanatory: the comparative case study method is not intended 
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to study causality. There will be alternative explanations and factors external to busi-
ness systems theory, which make it difficult to prove causality.  
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4 The Existing Zhejiang and Yunnan Business Systems  
 
 
The Chinese transitional economy is characterized by significant regional diver-
gence and uneven regional economic development. Although major economic re-
forms have been applied simultaneously across the whole country, distinct forms 
and patterns have developed and mutated in Zhejiang and Yunnan. Hence, to un-
derstand the changing development trajectories in Zhejiang and Yunnan, it is es-
sential to first identify:  
a. the dominant economic and institutional features;  
b. the coordination mechanisms among economic actors and institutions. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 describe the existing 
Zhejiang and Yunnan business systems, respectively, while section 4.3 provides a 
comparative analysis of the two systems.  
4.1 The existing Zhejiang business system  
Zhejiang has been described as “seven portions of the mountain, one portion of 
water and two portions of the field” (qi shan yi shui liang fen tian), which means that 
the land area of Zhejiang consists of 74.63% mountainous area, 20.32% flatland, 
and 5.05% waters (Zhao, K. 2016, National Bureau of Statistics 2017). This land-
form results in a scarcity of cultivated land in Zhejiang, which totals about 1.97 
million hectares, accounts for 1.46% of total cultivated land in China, and places 
Zhejiang 22nd out of 31 provinces and autonomous regions (National Bureau of 
Statistics 2017). The cultivated area per person in Zhejiang is about 0.035 hectares, 
which is far less than the national average of 0.096 hectares per person (ibid.). The 
gross output value of agricultural sector in Zhejiang in 2016 was 314.6 billion yuan 
(40 billion euro), only 2.8% of the total national gross output value of agricultural 
sector (ibid.). 
Zhejiang is also poor in mineral resources. Only eight kinds of mineral resources 
have been discovered, and mostly in small quantities.1 In 2006, the value of potential 
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mineral deposits in Zhejiang was estimated at only 5.57 billion yuan (0.71 billion 
euro), accounting for 0.09% of total national industrial mineral reserves (Zhang and 
Yang 2006); the natural resources composite index per person in Zhejiang was 11.5, 
which was the third-lowest of 31 provinces and autonomous regions, just above 
Shanghai (10.4) and Tianjin (10.6) (Yang, Z. 1992). At least 95% of minerals used 
in Zhejiang province are purchased from other regions (Zhejiang Provincial Bureau 
of Statistics 2014). 
As noted in Chapter 1, the population density in Zhejiang in 2016 (549/km2) 
was well above the average population density in China (144/km2). The resource 
endowments of Zhejiang are thus characterized by high population density, insuf-
ficient cultivated land, low agricultural outputs, and acute scarcity of mineral re-
sources. This poverty in agriculture and natural resources pushed the population to 
earn a living via manufacturing or commerce, and led to Zhejiang becoming one of 
the industrial and commercial centres of China.  
Figure 4.1 
The composition of GRP in Zhejiang 1978–2017 (%)   
Source: Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the manufacturing sector has been the biggest contrib-
utor to economic growth in Zhejiang since economic reform. In 1979, the agricul-
tural sector contributed 42.8% to the GRP of Zhejiang, 40.6% came from the in-
dustrial sector, including manufacturing and construction, and only 16.6% from the 
service sector (Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018). However, from 1980, 
the distribution of GRP across economic sectors in Zhejiang changed, with signif-
icant growth in the industrial sector. The industrial sector became the largest sector 
in Zhejiang, and from 1993 to 2011 it accounted for more than 50% of the Zhejiang 
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GRP (ibid.). Figure 4.1 reflects the ongoing changes in the Chinese economy, with 
the transformation of the industrial structure and the rise of the service sector. Alt-
hough the service sector in Zhejiang surpassed the industrial sector in 2014 in terms 
of GRP, and has played an increasingly important role in Zhejiang’s economy, the 
productivity of manufacturing still substantially outstrips other industries as the key 
driving force of economic growth. As the largest GRP generator in Zhejiang overall, 
manufacturing accounts for 43.3% of the Zhejiang GRP on average for the past 
four decades. Hence, to understand the dynamic path of Zhejiang’s economic de-
velopment, the manufacturing sector is the main focus of this research. 
The manufacturing sector in Zhejiang is composed of a wide variety of products, 
ranging from low-tech and low-cost products such as clothing and apparel to high-
tech products like cars. The total output of manufacturing enterprises above desig-
nated size (ads)2 in 2017 was 6.05 trillion yuan (0.79 trillion euro) (Zhejiang Provin-
cial Bureau of Statistics 2018). As the largest industry and biggest employment gen-
erator of the Zhejiang economy, the output and the number of employed persons 
in the textile, apparel and leather industry and chemical fibre manufacturing reached 
1.04 trillion yuan (0.14 trillion euro) and 1.49 million persons, accounting for 17.2% 
of total output of the manufacturing sector and 22.83% of total number of em-
ployed persons in 20173 (ibid.). Electrical machinery and apparatus manufacturing 
accounted for the second-largest percentage of total output in manufacturing in 
2017 (10.79%) and chemicals and chemical products manufacturing the third-larg-
est (9.13%) (ibid.). Additionally, Zhejiang private enterprises have dominated the 
annual ranking of China’s largest 500 private companies by revenues, for successive 
21 years (All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce 2019). In 2019, 57 out 
of 98 Zhejiang companies in the top-500 list were manufacturing enterprises, 16 of 
which were engaged in the textile, apparel and leather industry (10) and chemical 
fibre manufacturing (6) (ibid.). Together, the textile, apparel and leather industry 
and chemical fibre manufacturing dominate the manufacturing sector in Zhejiang. 
It is also notable that, compared to other provinces, Zhejiang has the smallest 
number of SOEs, which account for less than 2% of the total number of SOEs in 
China (National Bureau of Statistics 2018). In the industrial sector, the gross output 
of non-state-owned and non-state-holding industrial enterprises (ads)4 was 4.13 tril-
lion yuan (0.54 trillion euro), accounting for 62.3% of the total output of the indus-
trial sector in 2017, while the output of state-owned and state-holding industrial 
enterprises (ads) accounted for 15.2%5 and foreign-funded industrial enterprises 
(ads) accounted for 22.5% in 2017 (Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018). 
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 The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology divides enterprises into 
size categories based on three criteria: number of employees, revenue, and total 
assets.6 In 2017, the small industrial enterprises (ads) were responsible for the larg-
est output, providing 44.5% of total output of the industrial sector, followed by 
medium (31.6%) and large (23.9%) industrial enterprises (ads) (Zhejiang Provincial 
Bureau of Statistics 2018). Furthermore, the industrial enterprises below designated 
size (bds) — which are all small-sized enterprises — make up a large proportion of 
the Zhejiang economy. In 2017, the annual revenues of industrial enterprises in 
Zhejiang was 1.9 trillion yuan (0.25 trillion euro) and the number of employees was 
5.73 million persons (ibid.). In short, domestic private enterprises, especially SMEs, 
are the dominant forms of industrial enterprises and the main driving forces of 
economic growth in Zhejiang.  
The 100 sampled enterprises in Zhejiang reveal the same features as mentioned 
above. Domestic enterprises are the most prevalent type of sampled enterprises. 
The number of private firms sampled in Wenzhou and Jinhua far outweighs other 
types of sampled firms, accounting for 94% and 98% respectively. No SOEs were 
surveyed in Zhejiang, which is because (a) there are very few SOEs in Wenzhou (13) 
and Jinhua (19), and (b) SOEs in the two cities mainly engage in airport, railway, 
and harbour construction, telecoms, financing, and investment businesses. The sur-
vey results show that most of the sampled firms in Zhejiang make simple consumer 
products. In Wenzhou, 88% of sampled firms engage in manufacturing apparel, 
footwear, eyewear, or lighting equipment. In Jinhua, 24% of the sampled enterprises 
work in furniture manufacturing, followed by 22% of firms making equipment such 
as magnetic materials, electric power tools, etc. The rest of the sampled enterprises 
in Jinhua cover a wide range of product manufacturing. Notably, most sampled 
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Figure 4.2 
Firm size and firm age of sampled enterprises in Zhejiang  
 Source: Own survey results (2015-2016)  
Using the criterion “total assets” from the standard size classification of enter-
prises issued by the central government, the number of small-sized firms among the 
sampled enterprises accounts for the largest proportion in both Wenzhou and 
Jinhua, at 70% and 62% respectively (see Figure 4.2). Medium-sized enterprises in 
the two cities make up 24% and 34% of the sample, while only six large enterprises 
were interviewed in this survey. Figure 4.2 also shows that the average age of sam-
pled firms is 13.13 years. The firm age up to 18 years has the most observations of 
all sampled firms in this research, and the number of sampled firms aged 18 years 
or more declines sharply. Hence, a firm age of 18 years is considered the line of 
demarcation in this study. Only about 20% of the sampled enterprises in Zhejiang 
have been established for over 18 years.  
Overall, the features of the sample are identical to the industrial structures ob-
served in the statistical yearbook. Private enterprises, especially SMEs, in low-tech, 
low-cost, and labour-intensive light industry, predominate in Zhejiang.  
 
4.1.1 Enterprises sector block  
Ownership coordination   
As noted above, Zhejiang has the smallest number of SOEs in China and, compared 
with other types of enterprises, SOEs in Zhejiang generate the least amount of 
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output and employment. Private enterprises are the main driver of Zhejiang’s eco-
nomic growth, rather than SOEs. Due to the insignificant role of SOEs in local 
economic growth, the analysis in this block mainly focuses on identifying the dom-
inant features of private enterprises in Zhejiang. The overwhelming majority of pri-
vate firms, especially SMEs, are owned and controlled by families in Zhejiang. In-
deed, family-owned enterprises are the most common type of firms in China. In 
85.4% of private enterprises, families control more than 50% of the shares, and in 
55.5% of private firms, families not only control half of the shares but are also 
highly involved in running the firms (China’s Private Economy Research Group 
2011). Zhejiang has the second-largest number of publicly traded enterprises in 
China; however, relatively highly concentrated ownership can be observed in these 
joint-stock enterprises. 
According to a survey conducted by China Stock Market & Accounting Re-
search Database (CSMAR) in 2016, the largest shareholders in 301 listed companies 
in Zhejiang on average held 33.77% of total shares (CSMAR, as cited in Zhang, J. 
2017: 27–28). The largest shareholders in 34 listed companies in Zhejiang held 50% 
and above of total shares and about 30% to 50% of total shares in 142 listed firms 
were held by the largest shareholders (ibid.). At the same time, in 67.6% of listed 
firms the chairperson of the board also served as CEO, with only 32.3% of listed 
companies separating the positions of chair and CEO (ibid.). Hence, large-sized 
listed enterprises in Zhejiang show a high degree of concentration of ownership 
and high involvement in enterprise management. Due to the high concentration of 
ownership and involvement in the family business, the core group of family mem-
bers shows a high level of risk-sharing and commitment to the firm’s interests, as 
well as a high level of trust and a strong sense of duty. Family-based and owner-run 
corporate management can effectively reduce internal transition costs, especially for 
startups (Li et al. 2017), while at the same time, a relatively high level of exclusivity 
of ownership can be observed, especially for SMEs. 
Vertical integration is relatively weak in most of these Zhejiang firms, especially 
SMEs. Industry in Zhejiang is characterized by highly specialized division of pro-
duction processes, including manufacturing goods and services, and mature pro-
duction networks, so that a range of production processes or other business activi-
ties are seldom combined in one enterprise. Rather than “self-sufficiency”, 
enterprises in Zhejiang are highly interdependent with other enterprises, especially 
SMEs, in making intermediate goods. Compared with this relatively weak, owner-
ship-based vertical integration in Zhejiang, a lot more horizontal diversification can 
be found in large private enterprises, but less in SMEs. The horizontal 
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diversification of family business is quite similar to that found by Whitley (1999: 
149) in East Asian business systems, especially Taiwan. According to my survey, 
large enterprises in Zhejiang also tend to informally and personally diversify their 
business into a variety of sectors. The usual pattern of diversification is to establish 
separate and unrelated businesses by the core group of family members, who share 
posts in all the firm’s businesses. For instance, a large business group in Jinhua has 
diversified its business into electrical and electronic products manufacturing, phar-
maceuticals, the chemical industry, and the film and television industry. Similarly, 
an enterprise in Wenzhou works in making paper products, textiles, apparel, and 
footwear manufacturing. Given the current enthusiasm for real estate investment, 
a number of large enterprises in Zhejiang have actively invested in property. Hence, 
the ownership-based horizontal diversification in Zhejiang is to some extent oppor-
tunistic. 
Concentrated ownership and involvement in the business, as well as high levels 
of risk-sharing, commitment, trust, and a strong sense of duty are thus typical of 
the family-based enterprises in Zhejiang. This relatively high level of exclusivity of 
ownership in private enterprises, especially SMEs, is confirmed by the survey results. 
Sampled enterprises in Zhejiang do not engage extensively in merger and acquisi-
tion (M&A) activities, as illustrated in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 
Firms have (been) merged or acquired (by) other companies  
 Firms have (actively) merged or ac-
quired other companies 
Firms have (been) merged or 
acquired by other companies 
 Wenzhou Jinhua Wenzhou 
Number 3 9 1 





Firm types Private enter-
prises: 3 




Firm size  Small SMEs Small 
Product Same 3 Same: 6 
Not same: 3 
Same: 1 
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Payment 
methods 
By cash: 1 
By stock 2 
By cash: 5 
By stock: 4 








Very supportive 2 
Somewhat supportive: 
2 
No intervention: 5 
Very supportive 1 
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
Of the 50 enterprises surveyed in Wenzhou, only four have merged, or been 
merged, with other companies; in Jinhua, only nine firms have merged with or ac-
quired other companies. Notably, sampled firms stated that the primary purposes 
of integration activities are to expand production facilities or upgrade production 
techniques and equipment, rather than to diversify their products and business. The 
initial goal of promoting ownership-based integration by the central government 
was to restructure unprofitable SOEs; hence, large numbers of M&A activities were 
initiated by local governments. As private enterprises dominated in Zhejiang before 
2000, ownership-based integration activities were rare, and the local government in 
Zhejiang tended not to interfere with integration activities between firms. In 2000, 
Wanxiang Group Company (Zhejiang) acquired Scherer Corporation (US) — the 
first case of overseas M&A in Zhejiang, and in China (Zhu 2017: 41). The number 
of ownership-based transactions between listed companies in Zhejiang increased 
from 80 cases in 2010 to 375 cases by the end of 2016, including 46 cases of over-
seas M&A (ibid.).  
Based on the discussion above, the highly specialized division of production 
processes and high level of exclusivity of ownership result in relatively weak, own-
ership-based, vertical integration, greater horizontal diversification, and a low level 
of M&A activities in SMEs in Zhejiang. However, many informal, personal, and 
opportunistic ownership, horizontal diversification, and M&A activities can be 
found in large enterprises. 
 
Non-ownership coordination  
As mentioned above, industry in Zhejiang is characterized by a specialized division 
of production processes, and highly interdependent enterprises, which form a ma-
ture production network. To determine the density/concentration level of sample 
firms, two questions based on Laine’s criteria for the density of clusters (Nauwelaers 
2003: 9) are posed: (a) are there at least five firms with the same business activity in 
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the city? and (b) how many companies with the same business are there within a 
1km2 area? (See Table 4.2.) 
Table 4.2 
Density criteria in Zhejiang  
 Wenzhou Jinhua 
Are there at least 5 firms with the same business activity in city 43 35 
Average number of same business within 1km2 40 10 
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
The survey results for Zhejiang show a high level of concentration of enterprises 
and density of clusters, especially eyewear and apparel and footwear manufacturing 
clusters in Wenzhou and furniture and magnetic materials clusters in Jinhua. In 2009, 
more than 800 industrial clusters had developed in 85 out of 88 counties in Zhejiang, 
which covered 175 sectors including textile, apparel and footwear, electronic appli-
cation manufacturing, and pen making (Wu et al. 2009: 3). Textile clusters in 
Zhejiang have the largest number of workers, and electronics and apparel and foot-
wear manufacturing clusters have the second and third largest number of employees 
(Li, Y. 2014: 22–26). By the end of 2016, the sales revenues of clusters in 62 out of 
81 county cities7 in Zhejiang had reached over 5 billion yuan (0.64 billion euro) 
(Zhejiang Institute of Industry and Information Technology, Government of China 
2016). More importantly, the number of large core firms in clusters accounted for 
less than 10% of the total number of enterprises, but the sales revenues of core 
firms provided more than 80% of total revenues of clusters (ibid.). 
The clusters in Zhejiang have formed complete supply chains and distribution 
channels from obtaining all the inputs, including raw materials and production 
equipment, to transporting and marketing the products. The regional core firms 
outsource non-core manufacturing processes to other enterprises, especially SMEs, 
and trading companies develop channels of distribution for products. As discussed 
by Whitley (1999: 149–151), the inter-firm relations between typical Chinese family 
businesses are fluid, flexible, and informal, suggesting that firms are unwilling to 
maintain a long-term risk-sharing commitment. However, survey results show that 
the majority of the sampled firms in Zhejiang maintain long-term partnerships with 
suppliers and clients. The average length of time that sampled firms cooperate with 
suppliers and clients in Zhejiang is 8.23 years. Moreover, 87% and 91% of sampled 
firms in Zhejiang reported highly stable inter-firm relations with their suppliers and 
their clients, respectively. Hence, although typical Chinese family-based enterprises, 
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especially SMEs, are characterized by their mobility of entry and exit, Zhejiang pri-




The employment relations in family-owned and controlled enterprises share simi-
larities with those found by Whitley (1999: 151–152) in his study of East Asian 
business systems. In typical family-based enterprises, especially SMEs, the senses of 
obligation and commitment are weakened by the relationship between family mem-
bers and workers. As family business is characterized by highly concentrated own-
ership and a high level of exclusivity of ownership, the core group of family mem-
bers and persons who have strong personal ties with the owner often hold multiple 
senior managerial posts. Hence, there are fewer promotion prospects for workers 
who have no personal relationships with the core group of family members, which 
results in relatively high employee turnover rate in family-based enterprises. In 
Zhejiang, the annual turnover rate of workers in SMEs is about 20% to 50%, and 
the turnover rate of skilled workers and managers reached 20% (Jin 2016: 59).  
Overall, the highly concentrated ownership of family businesses, and the strong 
obligation and commitment within the core group of family members, lead to a 
significant degree of labour mobility. 
 
4.1.2 State sector block  
Economic actors are relational and interdependent and embedded in a particular 
institutional environment, which is composed of “...normative and regulatory pres-
sures exerted on organizations by the state or society” (Swaminathan and Wade 
2016: 1). The state sector plays a crucial role in the Chinese transitional economy 
and the form and extent of state involvement in economic activities substantially 
influence the formation of the dominant features of the enterprises sector. Follow-
ing Whitley’s formulation (1999: 47–48), the institutional characteristics will be 
studied through three institutional factors: the strength of the state, the financial 
system, and the skill development and control system. As the state implements reg-
ulations and policies nationally, a brief introduction of institutional factors at the 
national level will be presented before further discussion on dominant institutional 
features in Zhejiang. 
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The strength of the state 
Due to the determining role of the state in regulating and coordinating economic 
actors, the strength of the state substantially affects the mobility of capital as well 
as inter-firm relations. The extent of the strength of the state is reflected in market 
regulations and policies. Since the early 1980s, the central government has carried 
out market-oriented economic reforms. With substantial support from the central 
and local governments, the private sector has experienced phenomenal growth. It 
has played an increasingly crucial role in economic growth, especially in Zhejiang. 
To promote the development of the private sector, the central government 
largely relaxed the entry barriers for private enterprises, from stipulating the “posi-
tive list of market access” in the 1980s to introducing the “negative list of market 
access” in 2015. The “negative list” is an industry catalogue itemized by the state 
specifying industries which are prohibited from private or foreign investment or for 
which such investment is conditional on approval by local authorities (CPC State 
Council, Government of China 2015). Private and foreign capital can invest in in-
dustries and sectors which are not on the list, without administrative approval by 
local governments (ibid.). In other words, “everything which is not forbidden is 
allowed”. The implementation of the “negative list” has not only largely removed 
restrictions on market access for private enterprises and FDI, but has also greatly 
streamlined the administrative processes of local governments. The Zhejiang gov-
ernment had already introduced the “negative list” in early 2014, to remove re-
strictions on market access and simplify administrative procedures (Xu 2014).  
At the same time, in order to encourage startups, the central government carried 
out a reform of the business registration system, which significantly simplified and 
streamlined the registration procedure for the incorporation of a new company. 
Based on the 2005 version of Company Law, registered capital — an amount of 
capital contributions by shareholders — is required for incorporating a new com-
pany with the local Administration for Industry and Commerce (AIC)8 (Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress, Government of China 2005). The 
state specified that the initial amount of capital contribution should be no less than 
20% of the total amount of the company’s registered capital, and the rest of the 
amount should be paid within two years (ibid.). A business licence, organization 
code certificate, tax registration certificate, social security registration certificate, and 
statistical registration certificate were also required for starting a new business (ibid.).  
In the latest version of Company Law (2013), the requirement of the minimum 
amount of registered capital and its due has been removed (Standing Committee of 
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the National People's Congress 2013). In 2016, the central government also inte-
grated all certificates and the business licence into one consolidated business licence 
(CPC State Council, Government of China 2016). After the implementation of the 
new business registration system in mid-2015 in Zhejiang, the processing times were 
reduced by 20 working days, and 15 million yuan (1.9 million euro) of application 
fees saved for startups (Zhejiang Administration for Industry and Commerce, Gov-
ernment of China 2016). The central and local governments have thus put a lot of 
effort into deregulation of market access and simplification of the registration and 
administrative procedures in order to support the development of the private sector, 
which is recognized by the surveyed enterprises in Zhejiang. 
Figure 4.3 
Permit system in Zhejiang   
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016)  
Figure 4.3 shows data collected from two questions: is it convenient to obtain 
the business licence; and, besides the basic requirements, are other things needed 
to obtain the licence or permit? Figure 4.3 shows that about 87% of total sampled 
enterprises in Zhejiang responded that applying for a licence or certification is con-
venient. Negative responses that were received came mainly from industries that 
require higher national standards in accessing the market, such as the manufacture 
of cars, medicines, machinery, tobacco, and food. The Figure also shows that about 
80% of sampled enterprises in Zhejiang reported that “no” specialized require-
ments are needed to obtain a business license.  
Data were also collected on the difficulty of accessing the market, with responses 
ranked from very difficult (labelled 1) to very easy (labelled 7). About 48% of 
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sampled firms in Wenzhou stated that it is difficult to start a new business, while 
34% of firms had a contrary opinion, and 18% of respondents were “neutral”. 
About 54% of sampled firms in Jinhua thought that entering the market is relatively 
easy, and 30% of enterprises claim there are obstacles in starting a new business 
(Figure 4.4).  
Figure 4.4 
Opinions on the difficulty level of accessing to market in Zhejiang   
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
Hence, to understand the opinions of the sampled firms on the restrictions to 
market access, questions were asked about entry barriers, as shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 
Entry barriers in Zhejiang  
 Number of re-
ports 
Application process for licence 3 
Application process for permit or qualification 3 
Specific prescribed requirements or political discrimination for private enter-
prise 
2 
Registered capital 1 
Commercial credit 1 
Manufacturing technique 18 
Requirement on sanitation certification and technique and equipment for en-
vironmental protection 
19 
Regional protectionism 0 
Monopolies 4 
Intense competition 64 
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
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As shown in Table 4.3, 64% of sampled firms in Zhejiang claimed that intense 
competition, rather than market regulation, is the major obstacle for enterprises 
entering the market. For example, Jinhua is the largest site for mahogany furniture 
production in China, with more than 60% of mahogany furniture in China being 
manufactured there (Jinhua Government 2017). The zeal for real estate investment 
has driven up the demand for mahogany furniture, and manufacturers in Jinhua 
quickly dominated the domestic market for high-quality luxury furniture. They re-
port finding it easy to access the market. On the other hand, as manufacturing has 
gradually moved to the Chinese interior, enterprises in Wenzhou have encountered 
a shrinking market size for manufacturing textiles, apparel, and footwear. These 
firms found it less easy to access the market than firms in Jinhua. Enterprises in 
Zhejiang also mentioned difficulties in mastering manufacturing techniques and in 
meeting the requirements of environmental protection; both of these ranked much 
higher than market regulation and policies as obstacles restricting firms in entering 
the market.  
Besides deregulating restrictions to market access for startups, the Zhejiang gov-
ernment has provided favourable investment policies, improved infrastructure and 
public services, and encouraged the establishment of intermediary economic asso-
ciations with the aim of creating a better business environment to support enter-
prises and attract investments (see Table 4.4).   
Table 4.4 
Supporting policies in Zhejiang  
 Number of reports  
Green Passage scheme for firms  13 
Reducing or waiving procedures or prescribed fees 7 
Tax concession 25 
Local government provided free collateral loans 3 
Local government offered funds 27 
Local government offered concessional rent for land or equipment 15 
Local government offered subsidies for R&D 12 
Public services in Zhejiang  
 Number of reports 
Convenient transportation 86 
Sufficient electricity supply 92 
Sufficient water supply 68 
Convenient public facilities 3 
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
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However, in terms of the supporting policies provided by the Zhejiang govern-
ment, about 44% of the surveyed firms are not eligible for any favourable policies, 
and only 27% and 25% of the sampled firms have received government funds and 
tax reduction, respectively. This is because of the predominance of private enter-
prises in low-tech and low-cost light industry in Zhejiang, only a small proportion 
of which qualify to benefit from the favourable policies. The opinions about public 
services provided by local governments show a high degree of satisfaction, espe-
cially regarding local transportation and electricity supply.  
  Overall, the Zhejiang local government is highly supportive of the develop-
ment of private enterprises, reducing restrictions on market access, simplifying the 
registration and administrative procedures, implementing favourable policies, im-
proving public services, and encouraging intermediary economic associations. Mar-
ket barriers, in terms of market regulations, have been largely removed. The obsta-
cles for enterprises in Zhejiang are non-policy factors like market competition and 
manufacturing techniques. Nevertheless, although the local government provides 
various favourable policies, because the dominant industries in Zhejiang are mainly 
engaged in making small consumer goods, only a small number of enterprises qual-
ify for these favourable policies, which shapes a particular feature of business–state 
relations in Zhejiang. 
 
Financial systems 
The financial system and the banking system in China are relatively concentrated 
and regulated. Although state-owned commercial banks9 are responsible for their 
own profits and losses, they still actively support and finance the needs of SOEs, 
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Figure 4.5 
The composition of bank lending 2003–2009 (100 million yuan)   
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010) 
The composition of bank lending 2010–2016 (trillion yuan) 
Source: Research report by China Southwest Securities Co., Ltd (2018) 
As Figure 4.5 illustrates, SOEs received the most significant amount of bank 
lending from 2003 to 2016. From 2003 to 2009, bank loans for SOEs accounted 
for at least 40% of total bank loans, while only 10% of total bank loans went to 
non-state-funded enterprises through this seven year period (National Bureau of 
Statistics 2010). With the fast development of the private sector, the demand for 
capital substantially increased; however, loans for SOEs still comprised about 60% 
of total bank lending from 2010 to 2016 (Yang 2018).     
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Figure 4.6 
The composition of bank incremental lending 2011–2016 (trillion yuan)  
Source: Research report by China Southwest Securities Co., Ltd (2018) 
Figure 4.6 looks at the composition of incremental lending from 2011 to 2016, 
and shows that incremental loans for private enterprises decreased, with an espe-
cially sharp drop in 2015. Due to severe problems of overcapacity caused by over-
investment in real estate, the demand for medium and long-term loans largely de-
creased, which caused a sharp decline in incremental bank lending for private 
enterprises during this period (The People's Bank of China 2016: 6, Yang 2018). 
Hence, the banking system imposed severe constraints on the development of the 
private sector. 
When the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established in the early 
1990s, the initial purpose was to seek funding mainly for SOEs. The quota system 
was adopted, in which listed firms should be selected or recommended by provin-
cial governments (Lin and Li 2005). Hence, most of the listed enterprises were 
SOEs (ibid.). To promote the listing of private enterprises on the stock market, the 
quota system was replaced by the confirmation system. Enterprises which are wait-
ing to be listed should report to the Securities Regulatory Authority under the State 
Council for verification (ibid.). Additionally, to support private enterprises (espe-
cially SMEs) in raising funds, the Growth Enterprises Market Board was launched 
in 2008, and in 2012 the National Equities Exchange and Quotations, also known 
as the New Third Board, was established. Although the number of non-state-owned 
listed enterprises has increased, the percentage of direct financing to such firms in 
China accounted for only 16% in 2018, which is still considered low (Zhao 2018).  
Overall, compared with SOEs, private enterprises face more difficulties in ac-
cessing bank loans and the capital market, and rely on credit-based sources of 
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financing. This conclusion is confirmed by the survey results on the sources of fi-
nance and the degree of difficulty in accessing finance. The data show that sampled 
firms in Zhejiang rely heavily on self-financing and bank loans, and hardly raise 
funds in the capital market (Table 4.5).  
Table 4.5 
Sources of finance in Zhejiang  
 Number of reports 
Internal funds/retained earnings 97 
Owners’ contribution or issued new equity shares 2 
New debt issuances including commercial paper and debentures 3 
Bank borrowing 66 
Purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers 12 
Borrowing from informal financial institutions 11 
Borrowing from friends or relatives 17 
Local government investment 1 
Local government loan 1 
Foreign funds 0 
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
Table 4.5 shows that, besides internal funds and bank loans, sampled firms in 
Zhejiang also tend to borrow money from informal financial institutions and friends 
or relatives. With the boom of the private sector in Zhejiang since reform, the high 
demand for capital has stimulated the surge of informal finance due to the difficulty 
in accessing bank loans. The large volume of cash transactions between private en-
terprises gradually formed an informal financial market. The estimated volume of 
informal finance in Zhejiang was about 150 billion yuan (19.3 million euros) in 2008 
(Shao, Y. 2008). In 2011, the Wenzhou financial crisis hit the informal financial 
market hard, which resulted in a large number of enterprises going bankrupt. This 
led to local government adopting various measures to support enterprises in access-
ing finance. In 2012, the Zhejiang government started to regulate the informal fi-
nancial market. By 2014, 11 private financial services centres had been set up, and 
12,072 financial institutions had been established (General Office of Zhejiang Pro-
vincial Government 2015). At the same time, as a way of supporting private enter-
prises, local governments also began to help enterprises to list on the stock market, 
with the aim of achieving 30% of direct financing in Zhejiang by 2020 (ibid.). 
Since bank loans represent the major financing method in Zhejiang, the opin-
ions of the sampled firms were collected on the difficulty of accessing bank loans, 
ranked from very difficult (labelled 1) to very easy (labelled 7). In Wenzhou, 38% 
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of sampled firms have no access to bank loans, and 28% of sampled firms reported 
a certain degree of difficulty, all of which are SMEs. By contrast, in Jinhua the largest 
number of sampled firms (42%) stated that is was “somewhat easy” to access bank 
loans, while 36% of sampled enterprises in Jinhua failed to get loans or found some 
difficulty in accessing loans (Figure 4.7). 
Figure 4.7 
Opinions on the difficulty level of accessing bank loans in Zhejiang  
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
To sum up, most of the private enterprises in Zhejiang have little access to cap-
ital markets and rely heavily on credit-based sources of financing, including informal 
financial institutions or loans from family and friends. The financial system in 
Zhejiang can be labelled as predominantly credit-based. 
 
The skill development and control system 
(1) Skill development  
The generalist education system is applied as the basic education system in China. 
As discussed by Whitley (1999: 50), under this type of education system, vocational 
training and educational organizations are often poorly funded and have low social 
prestige. In China, vocational education has also been marginalized within the edu-
cation system, and graduates from vocational training institutions gain limited 
recognition in the labour market. In an attempt to eliminate discrimination, the cen-
tral government stipulated that local governments should take over the manage-
ment of vocational training organizations and issue certificates for graduates (Stand-
ing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Government of China 1996). 
The central government also promotes the cooperation of enterprises and voca-
tional educational institutions to train students and establish a modern apprentice-
ship system (Ministry of Education, Government of China 2018).  
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Although the condition of vocational education has improved, compared with 
general compulsory and higher education, vocational training is still in a considera-
bly inferior position. Inadequate inputs and poor school management substantially 
constrain the development of vocational education across China, as well as in 
Zhejiang. 
As discussed previously, family-owned and controlled enterprises, especially 
SMEs, are typical of Zhejiang’s economy. Family-based enterprises have very con-
centrated ownership and a high level of exclusivity. Hence, non-family workers tend 
to be highly mobile, due to the weak sense of obligation and commitment to the 
firm. Furthermore, since enterprises in Zhejiang are mainly in low-cost and low-
tech industries, their owners do not usually provide professional training to workers.     
 
(2) Trade Unions 
Based on the Trade Union Law of 1992, the basic function and duty of trade unions 
is to: 
...safeguard the legal rights and interests of the employees... through equal nego-
tiation and collective contract system... including guiding signing labour contracts; 
solving labor disputes; providing training and organizing leisure activities; caring and 
helping employees who have difficulties; etc. (Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, Government of China 2009) 
The trade union law specifies that enterprises with 25 or more workers may 
establish a trade union; however, less than 50% of private enterprises in China have 
founded trade unions (Qiao and Qian 2010). Moreover, 90% of the chairpersons 
of the trade unions also serve in other administrative positions in the firm (Wu 
2010). Based on the report, the trade unions which have been founded in private 
enterprises account for 68.9% of the total number of trade unions in Zhejiang (Yu 
et al. 2016). About 80% of trade union members hold multiple positions in their 
firms (ibid.). About 78.4% of the problems that the trade union tackled in Zhejiang 
were housing and education problems (ibid.). Overall, the role of trade unions is 
mainly to support and improve workers’ social welfare. 
To sum up, Zhejiang local government has been highly supportive of the devel-
opment of private enterprises through reducing the restrictions to market access, 
simplifying the registration and administrative procedures, providing favourable 
policies, improving public services, and encouraging intermediary economic associ-
ations. Market barriers have been largely removed. Hence, market regulations are 
not considered as obstacles for firms in entering the market. The financial system 
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in Zhejiang can be labelled as predominantly credit-based. Most of the private en-
terprises in Zhejiang have little access to capital markets and rely on credit-based 
sources of financing. Many firms in Zhejiang also seek funds through informal fi-
nancial institutions. Although the central government generally supports vocational 
education nationally, vocational training is still considered inferior to academic ed-
ucation. In Zhejiang, inadequate inputs and poor conditions for the management 
of schools have substantially limited the development of vocational education. Ad-
ditionally, employee training has been largely ignored in Zhejiang.  
 
4.1.3 State–business relations block   
The enterprise sector and the state develop interdependently. The dominant fea-
tures of the enterprises sector and the state sector collectively shape a particular 
state–business relationship. This relationship can be observed not only in formal 
and informal collaboration between the state and enterprises, but also in the degree 
of acceptance of intermediary economic associations and the extent of dependence 
of enterprises on the state. In this section, the state–business relationship in 
Zhejiang is presented.  
 
Business–government collaboration  
The data on formal and informal collaboration between the state and enterprises 
were collected through two questions: (a) whether firms have collaborated with lo-
cal authorities, and (b) what types of activities they have conducted. The survey 
showed that 91% of sampled firms in Zhejiang have no collaboration with local 
government. 
Table 4.6 
















reports 5 2 4 4 4 
Source: Own survey result 
Only nine firms in Zhejiang reported collaborative activities (Table 4.6). Infra-
structure construction sees the most frequent state–business collaboration, follow-
ing by technical cooperation, R&D activities, and vocational training and education. 
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These findings are also confirmed by the public–private partnership (PPP) projects 
launched in Zhejiang since 2016: infrastructure construction projects make up 53.8% 
of the total number of PPP projects, while education projects account for 6% in 
Zhejiang (Ministry of Finance, Government of China 2017). Overall, infrastructure 
construction is the most common type of PPP project, while very few collaborative 
activities are observed in market development, especially for SMEs in Zhejiang. 
 
Intermediary economic associations 
Industry associations are a long-standing phenomenon in China, and since the eco-
nomic reform, the number of industry associations has increased rapidly. Interme-
diary associations in China are not directly involved in regulating market entry and 
exit, but mainly provide policy consultation services, share information, and protect 
the legitimate right and interests of enterprises. Both central and local governments 
have actively encouraged and supported the establishment of industry associations, 
and in 2007 the State Council issued an official document to promote the develop-
ment of intermediary associations. However, due to failures of management, most 
of the intermediary associations in China do not function effectively. About 51% 
of sampled firms in Zhejiang have joined local industry associations; however, 
nearly all of the sampled firms reported that the support received from associations 
is limited. 
 
The degree of dependence of firms on local governments  
The nature of state–business relations can also be gleaned by observing firms’ 
reliance on local governments to help them develop. The importance of local gov-
ernments in enterprises’ development is ranked from very unimportant (labelled 1) 
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Figure 4.8 
Opinion on the importance of local government in enterprise development in 
Zhejiang   
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
Figure 4.8 reflects the opinions of the importance of the role of local govern-
ments in enterprise development. In Zhejiang, 48% of sampled firms stated that 
local governments are unimportant to enterprise development. The option of 
“somewhat unimportant” was the most reported response, accounting for 32% in 
Wenzhou and 40% in Jinhua. A neutral response was reported for 12% in Wenzhou 
and 22% in Jinhua. Notably, large enterprises tend to deem the role of local gov-
ernment in firm development to be more important. In short, enterprises in 
Zhejiang, especially SMEs, showed limited dependence on local governments to 
support their business.  
The survey also investigated incentives to enter the market. As Table 4.7 shows, 
what could be described as non-policy incentives were considered more vital than 
policy incentives to private capital entering the market in Zhejiang.  
Table 4.7 
Entry incentives in Zhejiang  
 Numbers of reports  
Simplified application process for licence 7 
Permit and qualification 7 
No specific prescribed requirements or political discrimination 6 
Reasonable threshold of registered capital 17 
No specific requirement on commercial credit 2 
Attainable requirement for manufacturing technique 17 
Attainable requirement for sanitation certification and technique for 
environmental protection 
2 
No regional protectionism 2 
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Fair market competition 23 
High market potential 48 
Family business 7 
Familiar with business 32 
A complete industrial chain 5 
Favourable investment policy 4 
State development plan 5 
Supporting enterprises 4 
Abundant resources 1 
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
As reported by 48% of sampled enterprises, high market potential is the major 
incentive for businesses to enter the market. Familiarity with the business was men-
tioned by 32% of firms in Zhejiang as the main reason for starting a new business. 
Fair market competition, reasonable requirements for registered capital, and attain-
able techniques are also seen as incentives for startups. As discussed above, alt-
hough the local government provides various favourable policies, these are subject 
to certain conditions like firm size, methods of production, type of industries, etc. 
Family-based SMEs that produce semi-finished low-cost and low-tech products are 
rarely eligible, and can seldom access the benefits from favourable policies designed 
to promote large local core firms and new emerging high-tech industries. Hence, it 
is non-policy incentives that are the major consideration of private capital when 
entering the market in Zhejiang, and non-policy related factors that form the major 
constraints in business operation.  
Overall, compared with policy incentives, enterprises in Zhejiang are more at-
tracted by non-policy incentives provided by the Zhejiang government, which ex-
plains the attitude of firms towards the role of local government in firms’ develop-
ment. 
 
4.2 The existing Yunnan business system  
Natural resource endowment is one of the important factors in shaping regional 
economic and industrial structures and configurations. If natural resources are used 
and managed properly and efficiently, they will largely promote local economic 
growth. Yunnan has 6.2 million hectares of cultivated land, accounting for 4.6% of 
the total cultivated land of China, and ranking Yunnan 8th of the provinces and 
autonomous regions of China. The average cultivated land per person in Yunnan 
(0.13 hectares) is much higher than the national average (0.096 hectares per person) 
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(National Bureau of Statistics 2017). Being restricted by geomorphological features, 
the gross output of the agricultural sector in Yunnan was only 363.3 billion yuan 
(45.9 billion euro) in 2016, representing 3.24% of the total national gross output 
from agriculture (ibid.). However, Yunnan has the largest tobacco-growing and 
manufacturing base (Qujing) in China, and as the leading cigarette-producer, Yun-
nan yielded 0.91 million tons of tobacco in 2016, accounting for 33.3% of the total 
output of tobacco in China (ibid.). The tobacco industry thus plays a crucial role in 
Yunnan’s economic development. 
Yunnan is also well-known for its large reserves of mineral resources, with 142 
types of mineral resources having been discovered (Yang, S. 2013). Among 31 prov-
inces and autonomous regions, Yunnan ranks in the top three for its reserves of 25 
types of mineral, and top ten for its reserves of 54 types of mineral resources 
(ibid.).10 The potential value of mineral deposits in Yunnan was estimated at 3.06 
trillion yuan (0.39 trillion euro) by the end of 1988 (ibid.). 
Thus, the resource endowments of Yunnan are characterized by low population 
density (see Chapter 1), sufficient cultivated land, and rich natural resources. Alt-
hough geographical features have restricted the development of the agriculture sec-
tor, Yunnan’s economy relies heavily on resource-dependent industries: the tobacco 
industry (including tobacco growing and cigarette making), the metallurgical and 
mining industry, chemical industry, tourism etc., have all played leading roles in the 
Yunnan economy.  
Figure 4.9 
The composition of GRP in Yunnan 1978–2017 (%)  
Source: Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018 
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Figure 4.9 shows that in 1978, the agricultural sector contributed 42.7% to the 
GRP of Yunnan, while 39.9% came from the industrial sector, and 17.4% from the 
service sector (Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018). In the following eight 
years, agriculture continued to make up the largest part of total GRP in Yunnan, 
before its share began to decline. In 1987, the industrial sector surpassed the agri-
cultural sector, accounting for 36.81% of total GRP (ibid.). After a significant in-
crease in the 1990s, the contribution of the industrial sector to the GRP of Yunnan 
remained steady at around 40% (ibid.). At the same time, Figure 4.9 clearly shows a 
significant growth in the service sector, which surpassed the industrial sector in 
2013 and accounted for 47.83% of Yunnan’s GRP in 2017, while the agriculture 
and industrial sectors provided 14.28% and 37.89% respectively (ibid.).  
As previously discussed, the service sector in China has become increasingly 
important in the process of transition to a post-industrial economy. The trend for 
the share of the industrial sector to first increase and then decline, while the share 
of the service sector rises, also can be observed in Yunnan. According to a report 
on Chinese industrialization, the composite score for industrialization of Yunnan 
was 55 in 2015, putting it into the category of semi-industrialization, while the na-
tional composite score was 84 and was categorized as later-industrialization 11 
(Huang and Li 2017). The process of industrialization of Yunnan thus lags far be-
hind the national level, which implies that the rise and fall of the industrial sector 
share in Yunnan’s GRP may not directly reflect the actual level of industrialization 
and the main driving force of the Yunnan economy.  
The service sector of Yunnan made up just 1.8% of the service sector in China, 
ranked 23rd among provinces in 2017 (Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018). 
The relationship between the industrial sector and (part of) the service sector in 
Yunnan is mutually reinforcing, which means that the development of producer 
services substantially relies on a solid manufacturing base. The poor performance 
in the manufacturing sector largely hinders the development of producer services 
in Yunnan, so that the increasing share of the service sector in GRP mostly comes 
from non-producer services, such as wholesale and retail, hotel and catering services, 
travel and recreational services. The wholesale and retail trade services make the 
largest contribution, accounting for 20% of value-added in the service sector in 
2017 (ibid.). The inadequate provision of producer services also restricts the devel-
opment of the industrial sector and its ability to move to the level of later-industri-
alization, which in turn widens the gap between the well-developed and less-devel-
oped regions. 
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With various natural and cultural tourism resources, tourism is the fastest-grow-
ing industry in the service sector in Yunnan, generating 692.2 billion yuan (90.4 
billion euro) of revenues in 2017, equivalent to 7.58% of total tourism revenues in 
China (Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018, National Bureau of Statistics 
2018). However, the tourism revenue of Yunnan is far lower than provinces in the 
eastern coastal region, including Zhejiang,12 as well as the adjacent provinces in 
southwest China. The main source of tourism revenues in Yunnan was ticket reve-
nue, which accounted for 40.13% of total tourism revenue, followed by the sale of 
tourism products (28.6%), while the income accruing from recreation in tourism 
only accounted for 0.17% (Lou et al. 2017). It is worth noting that tourism products 
— the second-largest source of tourism revenues — are mostly manufactured in 
Yiwu, a county city in Jinhua that has the largest tourism products manufacturing 
industry. Heavy dependence on ticket sales revenue and the underdevelopment of 
the related hospitality industries are the main obstacles to the development of tour-
ism in Yunnan.  
In short, the service sector shows a continuous upward trend in the share of 
GRP of Yunnan. However, this expansion mainly comes from traditional non-pro-
ducer services such as wholesale and retail, and tourism, whereas the producer ser-
vices which integrate and boost the manufacturing sector in Yunnan still lag behind. 
The growth of the service sector in Yunnan is not following a “natural” process of 
transition from a more mature industrial sector. As emphasized in the Industry De-
velopment Plan of Yunnan for 2016–2025, the industrial sector is still the key driver 
of economic growth in Yunnan (Yunnan Provincial Government, Government of 
China 2016: 6) Although the industrial sector in Yunnan has underperformed in the 
market in recent years, the revenues generated by that sector have still substantially 
outstripped other industries, reaching 1.2 trillion yuan (0.16 trillion euro) in 2017 
(Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018). In the past four decades, the indus-
trial sector has been the major driving force of the Yunnan economy. Hence, in 
order to understand the dynamic path of Yunnan’s economic development, the 
manufacturing sector is the main focus of this research. 
The industrial sector in Yunnan is composed of a wide variety of products from 
both light and heavy industries, including cigarettes, processed agricultural products, 
steel, and chemical products. Since 2004, the value of output generated by heavy 
industry has been approximately double that of light industry (Yunnan Provincial 
Bureau of Statistics 2018). From 1978 to 1996, the share of the output of light in-
dustry in the total output of the industrial sector had increased from 43% to 53.9%, 
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but it then declined sharply, dipping to 25.2% in 2008 (ibid.). In 2017 the output of 
light industry made up 34.8% of total output, while heavy industry accounted for 
65.2% (ibid.). As the largest industry and employment generator of the Yunnan 
economy, the output and the number of employed persons in the mining and met-
allurgical industry reached 314 billion yuan (41 billion euro) and 0.26 million per-
sons, accounting for 31.1% of the total output of the manufacturing sector and 33.1% 
of the total number of employed persons in 2017 (ibid.). The output in the tobacco 
industry reached 153.4 billion yuan (20.1 billion euro), accounting for 16.5% of the 
total output of the manufacturing sector in 2017 (ibid.). The chemical and allied 
industry, the second-largest employment provider (72,500 employed persons), con-
tributed the third-largest share (8.9%) of the total output of the manufacturing sec-
tor in 2017 (ibid.). Overall, resource-dependent industries such as tobacco growing 
and cigarette making, the metallurgical and mining industry, and the chemical in-
dustry dominate in the manufacturing sector in Yunnan. 
In Yunnan, 17.7% of the total number of industrial enterprises (ads) are state-
owned and state-holding industrial enterprises, which generated 644.6 billion yuan 
(84.3 billion euro) of output, accounting for 55.8% of the total output of the indus-
trial sector in 2017 (ibid.). Non-state-owned and non-state-holding industrial enter-
prises (ads) made up 78.4% of the total number of industrial enterprises with output 
at 460.5 billion yuan (60.2 billion euro), accounting for 41.7% of the total output, 
while the output of foreign-funded industrial enterprises (ads) generated only 4.4% 
of total output in 2017 (ibid.). In 2017, there were 96 large-sized industrial enter-
prises (ads); they had the biggest output, accounting for 39% of the total output of 
the industrial sector, followed by small (36.5%) and medium (24.3%) industrial en-
terprises (ads) (ibid.). 
Overall, large domestic enterprises, especially SOEs, contribute the largest por-
tion of total output in Yunnan. The resource-dependent industries are the key driv-
ing force of the Yunnan economy. 
The 100 sampled enterprises in Yunnan reflect the features described above. 
Domestic enterprises are the most prevalent type of sampled enterprises. Amongst 
the sampled firms in Qujing and Kunming, private enterprises account for 66% and 
60% of the total (respectively), with 29 SOEs involved in the survey across the two 
cities. Most of the sampled firms in Yunnan engaged in highly resource-dependent 
heavy industries. In Qujing, 34 out of 50 sampled firms were engaged in chemical 
and metallurgical products manufacturing, building material manufacture, and ma-
chinery and equipment manufacturing. Similarly, in Kunming, machinery and build-
ing material manufacturing were the two most prevalent industries in the survey, 
559831-L-bw-Lu
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 110
90 CHAPTER 4 
 
representing 30% and 18% (respectively) of sampled firms. Of the sampled SOEs 
in Yunnan, most work in the metallurgical, machinery and equipment, automobile, 
tobacco, and building materials industries. 
Figure 4.10 
Firm size and firm age of sampled enterprises in Yunnan  
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
According to the standard division of size of enterprises issued by the central 
government (see note 6), and applying the criterion “total assets”, the numbers of 
small, medium and large-sized enterprises were equally distributed at about 30% for 
each size in Kunming, while in Qujing, the number of medium-sized enterprises 
accounts for the largest proportion at 60%, following by the large-sized firms at 26% 
(Figure 4.10). It is noteworthy that 12 out of 16 large-sized enterprises in Kunming 
are SOEs, and 10 out of 12 SOEs in Qujing were categorized as large or medium-
sized firms. The total assets of sampled SOEs account for 91.7% of the total assets 
of sampled firms in Yunnan. The average firm age in Yunnan is 22.28 years (Figure 
4.10). Sampled firms in Kunming have the highest average firm age among the four 
cities in the survey, at 24.58 years, and half of the sampled firms in Yunnan have 
been established for more than 18 years, especially SOEs.  
Overall, the sampled results echo the features of industrial structures based on 
the statistical yearbook. Large-sized enterprises, especially SOEs, in highly resource-
dependent and capital-intensive industries, dominate in the Yunnan economy. 
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4.2.1 Enterprises sector block   
Ownership coordination 
As noted above, the Yunnan economy is dominated by large enterprises, especially 
SOEs. From the early 1980s, the central government initiated a programme of SOE 
reform by introducing a factory manager responsibility system (1981), converting 
SOEs into joint-stock companies (1992), and diversifying alternative sources of 
funds including private investment and promoting mixed ownership in SOEs (2003) 
(CPC Central Committee, Government of China 2003). By 1988, 98% of SOEs in 
Yunnan had established the factory manager responsibility system (Li, L. 2014). In 
2002, about 70% of large SOEs and 80% of medium and small-sized SOEs diver-
sified their source of capital so that they were no longer wholly owned by the state 
(ibid.). And by the end of 2007, 2,318 SOEs, accounting for 98.6% of SOEs in 
Yunnan, had completed the conversion into joint-stock companies (ibid.). 
However, a survey studying the capital structure of 3,525 SOEs in Yunnan in 
2015 found that state-owned capital accounted for 99.2% of total capital, while pri-
vate capital represented only 0.7% of total capital (Lyu 2016: 70). Hence, the ma-
jority of SOEs in Yunnan still have a single source of funds. More importantly, 
although nearly all the SOEs had converted into joint-stock enterprises a decade or 
more ago, state shareholders still retain their dominant roles in corporate manage-
ment. Company Law dictates that directors and supervisors of joint-stock compa-
nies shall be elected by shareholders’ meetings (Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, Government of China 2013), but the central government estab-
lished the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) in 2003 to appoint executive directors, and supervise and approve com-
panies’ major decisions. Research in 2010 found that in Yunnan, about 59% of ex-
ecutive directors in large SOEs and 40.1% in medium-sized SOEs were appointed 
by the local SASAC (Han 2010: 28). In 52.8% of Yunnan’s SOEs, the chairperson 
also served as CEO, and in 73.2% of Yunnan’s SOEs, the chairperson or CEO 
served as secretary of the Party committee (ibid.). Thus, although SOE reforms 
have been underway for decades in Yunnan, the local authorities retain direct con-
trol of SOEs, which exhibit a high degree of concentration of ownership and ex-
tensive involvement in enterprises’ management.  
The development of the private sector in Yunnan has lagged far behind the state 
sector. Except for a few large private steel, fertilizer, and pharmaceutical companies, 
the majority (60%) of private enterprises, mostly SMEs, make low-tech and low-
cost consumer products such as processed agricultural products (e.g. refined sugar, 
tea, coffee, and other processed food), paper products, rubber and plastic products 
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(Lyu 2016: 72). Family-owned and controlled enterprises are the most common type 
of private enterprise in Yunnan. High levels of ownership concentration, involve-
ment in running firms, risk-sharing and commitment, and exclusivity are typical of 
the family-based private enterprises in Yunnan. 
Similar to the Zhejiang case, in Yunnan, ownership-based vertical integration 
and horizontal diversification are relatively weak in SMEs, and M&A cases are quite 
rare (Table 4.8). Compared with SMEs, large enterprises, especially SOEs, are ver-
tically integrated and horizontally diversified, and M&A is much more common. 
Table 4.8 
Firms have (been) merged or acquired (by) other companies  
 Firms have merged or acquired 
other companies  
Firms have been merged or ac-
quired by other companies  
 Qujing Kunming Qujing Kunming 
Number 12 16 10 7 




























Firm size  SMEs SMEs and large SMEs and large  SMEs and large 
Product Same: 7 
Not same: 5 
Same: 11 
Not same: 5 
Same: 6 
Not same: 4 
Same: 5 
Not same: 2 
Payment meth-
ods 
By cash: 4 
By stock: 6 
Other way: 2 
By cash: 10 
By stock: 10 
By cash: 1 
By stock: 10 
By cash: 4 


























Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
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Sampled enterprises in Yunnan reported 45 cases of M&A mainly in the metal-
lurgical, chemical, and pharmaceutical industries, and equipment manufacturing. Of 
these, 28 involved large and medium-sized enterprises, including 10 SOEs and five 
former SOEs, actively merging with other companies. Meanwhile, 19 sampled firms, 
including seven SOEs and four former SOEs, reported that they had been subject 
to mergers by other enterprises. The main reason for ownership-based transactions 
is to integrate supply chains, expand production factories, and upgrade production 
techniques and equipment; however, five firms reported their aim was to reorganize 
state-owned assets; four wanted to shift from manufacturing military products to 
civilian products; and two mergers were aimed at bailing out bankrupt SOEs. 
As discussed above, the state promoted ownership-based integration, mergers, 
and acquisition for restructuring SOEs, including converting SOEs into joint-stock 
companies, bailing out loss-making and bankrupt SOEs, and reorganizing military 
use SOEs to making civilian products. In 2003, the Yunnan government began to 
promote the restructuring of SOEs in 15 sectors, mainly in heavy industry (Li, L. 
2014). By the end of 2007, 877 enterprises, including private enterprises in Yunnan, 
had been involved in restructuring of SOEs by M&A activities (ibid.). Hence, large 
numbers of M&A activities in Yunnan were initiated by local governments, as con-
firmed by the survey results. As stated by sampled firms, local governments were 
supportive in 36 out of 45 M&A cases. 
Large enterprises in resource-dependent and capital-intensive industries are ac-
tive in vertical integration. As reported by sampled firms, they tend to combine the 
management of some key production processes in their firms to reduce transition 
costs and guarantee and maintain the supply of input. Horizontal diversification 
also prevails in large enterprises, especially SOEs, but less in SMEs. Due to the 
substantial capital and technical investments required, most large enterprises in 
Yunnan strategically diversify their business into related sectors to reduce the risk 
of market volatility. For instance, a large SOEs in Qujing has diversified into chem-
ical fertilizer, organic chemicals, and fibreglass manufacturing. Besides manufactur-
ing medicines, one of the regional core pharmaceutical SOEs in Kunming also 
makes pharmaceutical-related everyday household items. Due to the real estate in-
vestment craze, large enterprises in Yunnan, including SOEs, also actively invest in 
the property and hotel sectors. Overall, with the support of the local government, 
ownership-based integration and diversification in large enterprises, especially 
SOEs, is usually formal and strategic, and specializes in firms’ and local resources, 
although it can sometimes be “opportunistic”. Integration and diversification are 
much less common in SMEs in Yunnan. 
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In Yunnan, a large number of resource-based industrial clusters have developed 
around large local core firms, especially SOEs. The data on the density of clusters, 
based on Laine’s criteria (Nauwelaers 2003: 9), show a certain degree of concentra-
tion of sampled firms (Table 4.9). However, as the size of, and land area occupied 
by, enterprises in heavy industry are much larger than those in light industry, Laine’s 
criteria do not apply in the Yunnan case. 
Table 4.9 
Density criteria in Yunnan  
 Qujing Kunming 
Are there at least 5 firms with the same business activity in city 15 26 
Average number of same business within 1km2 1 4 
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
By using location quotient (LQ), the level of industrial specialization and the 
concentration level of sectors in Yunnan compared to the national average can be 
measured.13 The LQ of 14 out of 36 sectors in Yunnan is greater than 1 (Zhu and 
Liu 2014). The tobacco industry has the highest LQ at 17.7, the LQ of the metal-
lurgical industry is around 3, and the LQ of the mining, pharmaceutical, and chem-
ical industries is about 1.5 (ibid.). Notably, 9 out of 14 sectors are highly resource-
dependent industries (ibid.), suggesting that resource-based and capital-intensive in-
dustries achieve a dominant position in the Yunnan economy. 
Market access is much more difficult in the tobacco and pharmaceutical indus-
tries, as well as heavy industry in Yunnan, than in other sectors, in terms of required 
capital, techniques, and labour force. Thus, private enterprises, especially SMEs, 
struggle to enter the market due to the higher entry requirements, while enterprises 
in the supply chains tend to maintain long-term partnerships. Survey results show 
that the majority of the sampled firms in Yunnan maintain long-term partnerships 
with suppliers and clients. The average length of time that sampled firms cooperate 
with suppliers and clients in Yunnan is 12.5 years, with 96% and 92% of sampled 
firms in Yunnan reporting highly stable inter-firm relations with their suppliers and 
their clients, respectively. Notably, as the “commanding heights of the economy” 
(Whitely 1999: 147), the state directly or indirectly influences enterprises in heavy 
industry, especially SOEs. Sampled SOEs reported that as regional core firms, they 
undertake semi-political tasks in assisting local governments to support unprofitable 
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and loss-making SOEs to prevent them from going bankrupt. Regional core firms 
usually outsource parts of the manufacturing process to these loss-making firms, 
especially SOEs, and provide them with distribution channels for their products.  
Except for the well-developed tobacco and pharmaceutical industries, many re-
gional core firms, including SOEs, in heavy industry are still manufacturing simple 
products. Hence, the supply and production chains are comparatively short. In or-
der to survive in the competitive market, firms in heavy industry that make inter-
mediate products are keen to establish long-term risk-sharing commitments with 
regional core firms. 
 
Employment relations 
As previously discussed, although nearly all the SOEs converted into joint-stock 
enterprises decades ago, the state retains a high level of involvement in the manage-
ment of these enterprises. The central government specifies that directors in SOEs 
should not be part of administrative rankings used for civil servants, as employees 
of government departments (CPC Central Committee, Government of China 1999), 
but in practice most directors still retain their administrative ranking (Han 2010). 
Hence, in some sense, a senior position in an SOE can be considered a government 
occupation. As senior managers in SOEs are appointed by the local SASAC, with 
administrative rankings, the prospects for promotion provide directors with incen-
tives to maximize the firm’s profits (Cao et al. 2011). Theoretically, the firm’s per-
formance is a measurable criterion related to promotion, which enhances the com-
mitment of managers to spread risk and maximize the firm’s interests. 
However, this incentive mechanism is inoperative. In reality, seniority is the pri-
mary measurable criterion of promotion. Moreover, as government employees, in-
come, social welfare, and benefits are guaranteed. Hence, there is no direct link 
between employees’ income and firms’ performance. As long as SOEs survive in 
the market, employees’ income is largely unaffected by firms’ performance. There-
fore, occupations in SOEs are regarded as “a lifetime guarantee” and the degree of 
labour mobility in SOEs is lower than in private enterprises. 
 
4.2.2 State sector block  
To understand the role of the state sector in affecting economic organizations and 
to identify institutional characteristics in Yunnan, three institutional factors are rel-
evant: the strength of the state, the financial system, and the skills development and 
control system.14  
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The strength of state influence on enterprises 
The determining role of the state in regulating market entry and exit influences the 
mobility of resources. The extent of state strength is reflected in market regulations 
and policies. As discussed in the Zhejiang section (above), the central government 
has substantially deregulated market access for private enterprises, and has greatly 
simplified the registration procedure and administrative processes for startups. Alt-
hough the development of the private sector in Yunnan, as led by the central gov-
ernment, has lagged behind, the Yunnan government has also reduced restrictions 
on market access for private enterprises. The Yunnan government introduced the 
negative list in 2016, and then selected Qujing to adopt this measure first in mid-
2017 (Qujing Development and Reform Commission, Government of China 2017). 
The reform of the registration system has also been applied in Yunnan since 2016, 
to simplify administrative procedures (ibid.). 
However, the relaxation of administrative entry barriers for enterprises does not 
mean that entry standards are lower. Entry requirements such as technical require-
ments, the safety standards of manufacturing processes, hygiene requirements, etc., 
vary considerably across different industries. As noted, large enterprises, especially 
SOEs, in highly resource-dependent and capital-intensive industries (e.g. tobacco, 
metallurgical and mining, chemical) form the backbone of the Yunnan economy. 
Private enterprises, especially SMEs, find it hard to access the core industries of 
Yunnan, due to the high entry requirements of technology, capital, or labour inputs. 
Hence, compared with SMEs, large enterprises, especially SOEs, dominate the core 
industries and sometimes monopolize them (e.g. tobacco industry). In other words, 
for SOEs to access the market is rarely a problem, but it is much more difficult for 
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Figure 4.11 
Permit system in Yunnan  
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016)  
Figure 4.11 shows responses to two questions: is it convenient to obtain the 
business licence; and, besides the basic requirements, are there other requirements 
needed to obtain the permit? Figure 4.11 indicates that about 84% of total sampled 
enterprises in Yunnan deemed that there are no obstacles in applying for licence or 
certification. Sampled firms that gave a negative response are mainly engaged in 
industries which require higher national standards in accessing the market, such as 
manufacturing of cars, medicines, machinery, tobacco, and food. The Figure also 
shows that about 62% of sampled firms in Yunnan reported that specialized li-
cences or permits are needed; these mainly apply to heavy industry and light indus-
try with higher entry requirements, such as the car, tobacco, and pharmaceutical 
industries.  
Figure 4.12 illustrates the data collected on the difficulty or otherwise of access-








Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 118
98 CHAPTER 4 
 
Figure 4.12 
Opinions on the difficulty level of accessing the market in Yunnan  
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
In Qujing, the majority of sampled enterprises (74%) deemed that it is not hard 
to enter the market. Most SOEs in Qujing stated that it is easy to enter the market. 
Only 4 out of 17 SOEs in Kunming felt it was difficult to enter the market. Thus, 
SOEs have a generally positive opinion about entering the market compared to 
private enterprises. The sampled firms were also asked about the barriers to market 
entry (Table 4.10). 
Table 4.10 
Entry barriers in Yunnan  
 Number of re-
ports 
Application process for licence 8 
Application process for permit or qualification 9 
Specific prescribed requirements or political discrimination for private 
enterprise 
0 
Registered capital 0 
Commercial credit 2 
Manufacturing technique 12 
Requirement on sanitation certification and technique and equipment 
for environmental protection 
9 
Regional protectionism 1 
Monopolies 7 
Intense competition 68 
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
As Table 4.10 demonstrates, 68% of sampled firms in Yunnan claimed that in-
tense competition, rather than market regulation, is the major obstacle for 
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enterprises entering the market. Only 10% of sampled firms in Yunnan had diffi-
culty in obtaining the licence and qualifications.  
As Table 4.11 shows, the Yunnan government also provides favourable invest-
ment policies, improved infrastructure and public services, and encourages the es-
tablishment of intermediary economic associations to create a better business envi-
ronment to support enterprises and attract investments.   
Table 4.11 
Supporting policies in Yunnan  
 Number of reports 
Green Passage Scheme  4 
Reducing or waiving procedures or prescribed fees 4 
Tax concession 63 
Local government provided free collateral loans 1 
Local government offered funds 20 
Local government offered concessional rent for land or equipment 21 
Local government offered subsidies for R&D 33 
 
Public services in Yunnan  
 Number of reports 
Convenient transportation 56 
Sufficient electricity supply 73 
Sufficient water supply 69 
Convenient public facilities 2 
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
As most SOEs are engaged in the resource-dependent and capital-intensive in-
dustries often considered to be the lifeblood of economic growth, large enterprises 
in Yunnan, especially SOEs, can often obtain funding from the state. Looking at 
the supporting policies provided by the Yunnan government, 24% of sampled firms 
in Kunming and only 8% of sampled firms in Qujing do not qualify for these poli-
cies. As Table 4.11 shows, 63% of sampled firms in Yunnan benefit from tax con-
cessions, and 33% of sampled firms are offered subsidies for R&D activities by 
local government. Also, 21% and 20% of firms are eligible for reductions in the 
rental of land and equipment and additional funds. Opinions about public services 
provided by local government show a high degree of satisfaction.  
  Overall, the Yunnan government plays an active role in removing restrictions 
to market access, streamlining registration and administrative procedures for enter-
prises, and improving the investment environment to attract mobile capital. 
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However, Yunnan is characterized by a strong state sector and a highly resource-
based economy, where capital and resource-based industries are the lifeblood of 
local economic growth. Hence, compared with the SOEs and large private regional 
core firms, smaller private enterprises and SMEs in Yunnan might encounter more 




As stated above in relation to Zhejiang, the financial system and the banking system 
are highly concentrated and regulated. Banks and capital markets actively serve the 
needs of SOEs, while private enterprises, especially SMEs, struggle to access bank 
loans and capital markets.  
The strong ties between SOEs and banks can be traced back to the pre-reform 
period. When the highly centralized and uniform financial system proved to be fail-
ing, the state initiated a reform of the banking system in the 1980s. This changed 
the way that SOEs accessed funds, from non-repayable bank grants to bank loans, 
and made SOEs responsible for their own profits and losses (Liu 2008). However, 
banks still undertake policy-based tasks to support SOEs. In this context of highly 
regulated stock markets and policy-based banks, private enterprises still confront 
difficulties in raising funds from the financial institution. Besides, although the stock 
exchange has been established for decades, direct financing in China only accounts 
for a small amount. 
Most SOEs in Yunnan are engaged in highly resource-dependent and capital-
intensive industries, which means huge inputs and a low degree of flexibility and 
mobility. Hence, changes in industry policies will exert a profound influence on 
these large regional core firms. As banks are fully responsible for their own profits 
and losses, they are very sensitive to and cautious about policy change due to the 
strong ties with SOEs. The real estate investment craze meant that enormous 
amounts of investment had poured into the construction industry, creating high 
demand for steel, cement, and other building materials. Thus, the steel-making and 
other related heavy industries like coal mining and coking, had seen serious invest-
ment, leading to problems of overcapacity. The consequence of overcapacity is usu-
ally a sharp fall in market prices, in this case of steel and other related products. The 
central government reacted by implementing a de-capacity policy in 2017, which 
required firms to reduce their output, but market prices kept falling as a result of 
oversupply, and some businesses went bankrupt. Banks immediately terminated 
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their credit agreements and refused further credit to these companies, including 
SOEs. As a consequence, enterprises in heavy industry in Yunnan, both private 
companies and SOEs, encountered severe difficulties in securing funds.  
Table 4.12 reveals the sources of finance for sampled firms in Yunnan. The data 
show that firms rely heavily on self-financing and bank loans; sampled firms in 
Yunnan rarely borrow money from informal financial institutions and friends or 
relatives. Additionally, there are 13 listed firms in Yunnan, mostly SOEs in heavy 
industry, which seek funds through the capital market; by contrast, sampled private 
firms in Yunnan rarely raise funds in the capital market. 
Table 4.12  
Sources of finance in Yunnan  
 Number of reports  
Internal funds/retained earnings 99 
Owners’ contribution or issued new equity shares 13 
New debt issuances including commercial paper and debentures 7 
Bank borrowing 77 
Purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers 4 
Borrowing from informal financial institutions 0 
Borrowing from friends or relatives 3 
Local government investment 3 
Local government loan 1 
Foreign funds 1 
Source: Own survey results (2015-2016) 
Since bank loans are the major financing method in Yunnan, opinions on the 
difficulty of accessing bank loans were also collected (Figure 4.13), ranked from 
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Figure 4.13 
Opinions on the difficulty level of accessing bank loans in Yunnan  
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
Due to the overcapacity of heavy industry caused by the real estate investment 
craze, described above, 36% and 22% of sampled firms in Kunming and Qujing 
cannot access bank lending, while 26% of sampled firms from Kunming reported 
varying degrees of difficulty in accessing bank loans. Qujing, which has the largest 
heavy industry cluster in Yunnan, also has the largest proportion of surveyed firms 
(58%) reporting varying degrees of difficulty in obtaining bank loans.  
To sum up, apart from listed SOEs, most private enterprises in Yunnan have 
little access to capital markets and rely instead on credit-based sources of financing 
(bank loans). The government’s de-capacity policy also had a substantial impact on 
firms in Yunnan in terms of access to bank loans. The financial system in Yunnan 
can thus be labelled predominantly credit-based (bank loans). 
 
The skill development and control system 
(1) Skill development 
Although the central government promotes the development of vocational educa-
tion, and the condition of vocational education has significantly improved in Yun-
nan in terms of increasing numbers of organizations and enrolled students, voca-
tional training still occupies an inferior position in the labour market. 
Moreover, although occupations in SOEs are regarded as “a lifetime guarantee”, 
which is expected to remain the case for a long time, a lack of professional training 
can be observed in Yunnan SOEs. The state stipulates that enterprises should spend 
an amount equivalent to 1.5% of total wages in employee training (Su 2016: 21). 
However, about 50% of workers in SOEs will receive only one or two sessions of 
employee training, at an average training cost per worker of about 10 yuan (1.28 
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euro) to 30 yuan (3.85 euro) (ibid.). Hence, in both SOEs and private enterprises, it 
is fair to say that employee training has been largely ignored. 
 
(2) Trade unions 
The typical features of trade unions in China are also found in Yunnan. The role of 
trade unions is mainly to support and improve workers’ social welfare. As already 
seen in Zhejiang, most of the chairpersons of trade unions in Yunnan also serve in 
other positions in their firms (Lu, Y. 2016). Furthermore, by the end of 2013, only 
4.2% of private enterprises in Yunnan had established trade unions (ibid.). The de-
velopment of trade unions in Yunnan has thus lagged far behind other regions.  
 
To sum up, Yunnan local government actively reduces restrictions on market 
access, simplifying registration and administrative procedures, providing favourable 
policies, improving public services, and encouraging intermediary economic associ-
ations. In Yunnan, market regulations are not considered as obstacles for firms in 
entering the market. With the exception of listed SOEs, the financial system in 
Yunnan can be considered predominantly credit-based. Most of the private enter-
prises in Yunnan have little access to capital markets and therefore rely heavily on 
credit-based sources of financing. As banks and firms are highly sensitive to policy 
changes, the de-capacity policy has had a substantial impact on firms in Yunnan in 
terms of access to bank loans. Although the central government is largely support-
ive of vocational education nationally, vocational training in Yunnan is still in rela-
tively poor shape. Inadequate inputs and poor management of vocational training 
institutions place substantial constraints on the development of vocational educa-
tion. Additionally, employee training in Yunnan has been widely neglected.  
 
4.2.3 State–business relations  
To determine the particular features of state–business relations in Yunnan, the for-
mal and informal collaboration between the state and enterprises, the degree of 
acceptance of intermediary economic associations, and the extent of dependence of 
enterprises on the state are studied. 
 
Business–government collaboration 
The collaboration between enterprises and local governments can reflect the busi-
ness–government relationship. Hence, data were collected through two questions: 
(a) whether firms have collaborated with local authorities, and (b) what types of 
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activities they have conducted. In Yunnan, 40% of sampled enterprises work in 
close collaboration with local governments. 
 Table 4.13 
















reports 28 7 18 19 4 
Source: Own survey result 
As detailed in Table 4.13, infrastructure construction sees the most frequent 
state–business collaboration. As reported by sampled firms, due to the effect of de-
capacity policies, most enterprises in Yunnan actively conduct technical coopera-
tion and R&D activities with universities or science and technology departments in 
order to upgrade their processes or products. Very few collaborative activities are 
observed in market development, or vocational training and education. This finding 
is confirmed by looking at PPP projects launched in Yunnan. Overall, infrastructure 
construction is the most common type of PPP project in Yunnan, with infrastruc-
ture construction projects making up 81.4% of total PPP project investment, fol-
lowed by tourism projects which account for 4.63% (Yunnan Provincial Govern-
ment 2017). Technological collaborations are most often found in large enterprises, 
while very few collaborative activities are observed in market development, espe-
cially for SMEs.  
 
Intermediary economic associations 
As discussed in the Zhejiang section, above, the central government has actively 
supported and encouraged the establishment and development of intermediary as-
sociations. However, the absence of effective management in industry associations 
which is prevalent across China can also be seen in Yunnan. About 61% of sampled 
firms in Yunnan have joined local industry associations; however, nearly all of the 
sampled firms reported that support from associations is limited. 
 
The degree of dependence of firms on local governments 
The condition of state–business relations can also be observed by looking at firms’ 
reliance on local government for their development. Figure 4.14 shows the 
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importance of local governments in enterprise development, according to the sur-
veyed firms, ranked from very unimportant (labelled 1) to very important (labelled 
7). 
Figure 4.14 
Opinion on the importance of local government in enterprise development in 
Yunnan  
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
The Figure shows that 74% and 56% of sampled firms in Qujing and Kunming 
(respectively) claimed that local government is “important” in varying degrees. In-
deed, 22% of sampled firms in both Qujing and Kunming expressed the view that 
the role of local government is “very important”. It is worth noting that these pos-
itive opinions tend to come from large enterprises; by comparison, very few sam-
pled SMEs deemed the role of local government in firm development to be im-
portant. 
The survey also looked at entry incentives and found that high market potential, 
policy-related incentives, and adequate resources were seen as vital consideration to 
attract capital to invest in Yunnan. 
Table 4.14 
Entry incentives in Yunnan  
 Number of reports  
Application process for licence 2 
Permit and qualification 1 
No specific prescribed requirements or political discrimination 1 
Reasonable threshold of registered capital 3 
No specific requirement on commercial credit 0 
Attainable requirement of manufacturing technique 4 
Attainable requirement on sanitation certification and technique for 
environmental protection 
4 
No regional protectionism 2 
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Fair market competition 9 
High market potential 47 
Family business 0 
Familiar with business 15 
A complete industrial chain 1 
Favourable investment policy 13 
State development plan 21 
Supporting enterprises 5 
Abundant resources 25 
Source: Own survey results (2015–2016) 
Table 4.14 shows that 47% of sampled enterprises reported that high market 
potential is the major incentive for them in entering the market, followed by abun-
dant resources (25%). The state development plan (21%) and favourable investment 
policies (13%) are also important incentives for startups, especially enterprises in 
Qujing. Thus, sampled firms in Yunnan not only work in close collaboration with 
local government and universities, but also show more reliance on local government 
compared to Zhejiang. As noted, large enterprises tend to perceive the role of local 
government in firm development as important. The sampled firms in Yunnan re-
ported that the constraints faced by firms, especially large private firms and SOEs 
in heavy industry, are mostly policy-related or the consequences of policy changes 
(e.g. the financial difficulties caused by the de-capacity policies).  
In sum, due to the massive inputs of technology and capital needed, highly re-
source-dependent firms in Yunnan are sensitive to policy change, and are therefore 
keen to establish cooperative relationships with local government, which explains 
the positive attitude of enterprises towards the role of local government in firms’ 
development. 
4.3 Comparing the existing Zhejiang and Yunnan business 
systems 
Based on the descriptive discussion above, the dominant economic and institutional 
features of Zhejiang and Yunnan business systems can be identified. The findings 
reveal a significant regional variation between the two provinces in implementing 
the market-oriented national strategy. As emphasized in comparative system theo-
ries, economic and institutional actors are functionally interdependent, mutually 
supported and constrained. In any system, key features of predominant economic 
organization can reflect the key determining institutions, while the stronger 
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institutional features can exert a more perceptible influence on economic organiza-
tions (Whitley 1999: 54–55). This “interdependent web of the economic and insti-
tutional matrix” (North 1990: 95) generates institutional complementarities. Hence, 
under isomorphic power, economic and institutional actors in a system gravitate to 
a particular form of coordination (Carney et al. 2009: 364–368, also Jackson and 
Deeg 2006: 2). In this section, the common and distinctive statistical and institu-
tional features of the existing Zhejiang and Yunnan business systems will be iden-
tified and compared. 
Statistical tests have been used to verify whether there are statistically significant 
differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. Apart from the indicators of non-own-
ership coordination, strength of market regulation, financial system, types of state–
business collaboration activities, and strength of intermediaries,15 the rest of the in-
dicators show that there are significant differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
The major distinguishing characteristics of Zhejiang and Yunnan are summarized 
in Table 4.15 below. 
Table 4.15 
Dominant features of Zhejiang and Yunnan business systems  
Industrial structure Zhejiang  Yunnan  
Natural resource base Poor Rich  
Predominant type of industries 
and firms  Low-tech, low-cost and pri-vate family-based SMEs in 
light industries 
Highly resource-dependent, 
capital-intensive large sized 
enterprises (mostly SOEs) in 
heavy industries 
Enterprise sector block Zhejiang  Yunnan  
Owner control Direct Indirect  
Ownership-based integration 
and diversification 




Non-ownership coordination High  High 
Employment relations Weak commitments and 
high mobility  
Seniority-based promotion 
and low mobility  
State sector block Zhejiang  Yunnan  
Strength of state Supportive from a distance  Supportive 
Strength of market regula-
tion From high to low From high to low 
Financial system Formal and informal credit-based 
Capital market (listed SOEs) 
and credit-based (private firms 
and SOEs) 
Skill development Low  Low 
Union strength Enterprise-based and defined Enterprise-based and defined 
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State–business relations Zhejiang  Yunnan  
Business–government collaboration  Low  High  
Strength of intermediaries Weak  Weak  
The dependence of firms on local governments Low  High  
Source: Own survey result 
Natural resource endowment is one of the factors which shapes regional indus-
trial structures and paths in regions with rich natural resources. In any economy, 
capital naturally gravitates towards the richest resources in a region. Hence, a region 
like Yunnan (with large reserves of mineral and metal resources, tobacco, and sug-
arcane), becomes heavily reliant on resource-dependent industries. As mineral and 
metal resources are often considered the “commanding heights of the economy” 
(Whitely 1999: 147), the state directly or indirectly retains or controls the ownership 
of core resource-dependent industries. Consequently, large-sized enterprises, espe-
cially SOEs, in highly resource-dependent and capital-intensive industries predom-
inate in the Yunnan economy. In contrast, a region like Zhejiang is less dependent 
on local natural resources. As the “birthplace of the private economy” in China, 
Zhejiang has established an industrial structure dominated by low-tech, low-cost, 
and private family-based light industries.   
The dominant features of industrial structures substantially determine owner-
ship structures, inter-firm relations, and employment relations, as well as labour 
mobility and market access. As discussed above, in the sections on the enterprises 
sector blocks, a highly concentrated ownership and involvement in the family busi-
ness, a high level of risk-sharing and commitment of the core group of family mem-
bers, a high level of exclusivity of ownership, and a high level of mobility, typify the 
family-based enterprises in Zhejiang. Hence, workers who have no personal ties to 
the core group of family members have less chance of promotion, which results in 
a relatively high degree of labour mobility. In Yunnan, although nearly all the SOEs 
have converted into joint-stock enterprises, the local authorities remain in control 
of SOEs, giving a high degree of concentration of ownership and extensive involve-
ment in the management of enterprises through the appointment of executive di-
rectors and senior managers. Moreover, as salaries are guaranteed and seniority is 
the primary measurable criterion of promotion, workers in SOEs show a relatively 
low degree of labour mobility. Furthermore, due to the huge inputs of technology, 
capital, and labour, highly resource-dependent firms in regional core industries in 
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Yunnan, especially SOEs, demonstrate a lower degree of mobility and entry and 
exit.  
Unlike the typical Chinese family-based SMEs which are characterized by short-
term inter-firm relations and low levels of coordination and risk-sharing between 
firms, Zhejiang’s private enterprises, including large firms and SMEs, have formed 
highly specialized and mature production networks, and tend to maintain informal 
long-term commitments. Hence, the Zhejiang business system is characterized by a 
high level of non-ownership coordination and weak vertical integration. In Yunnan, 
ownership-based vertical integration and horizontal diversification are relatively 
weak in SMEs. Given the need for substantial inputs and the inflexibility of re-
source-dependent firms in the market, large enterprises, especially SOEs, tend to 
strategically integrate and diversify into related sectors, and also to maintain long-
term partnerships with regional core firms to reduce the risk of market volatility.  
Since restrictions on market access have been reduced and registration and ad-
ministrative procedures have been simplified for private capital nationally, there is 
no significant difference in basic entry policies for startups in Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
The regional differences in accessing the market are due to the varying technical 
requirements, safety standards of manufacturing processes, hygiene requirements, 
etc. in different industries. Hence, the entry requirements for Yunnan’s core indus-
tries are stricter than those in Zhejiang. 
It is important to remember that China is experiencing an ongoing process of 
transition from a highly centralized planned economy to a market-oriented econ-
omy, which is shaping a unique dual system in China. State and market forces, as 
well as the state-owned economy and the private sector, coexist and play crucial 
roles in economic growth in China. As reforms and policies are implemented na-
tionwide, institutional contradictions are the major cause of regional differences. In 
the heterogeneous Chinese economy, the Zhejiang business system couples with a 
strong private sector and highly competitive market, while in the Yunnan business 
system, it is the state-based economy that predominates. According to the Annual 
Marketization Index16 Report of China, and with the exceptions of 2010 and 2012 
(when it was ranked 3rd), from 1999 to 2014, the marketization level of Zhejiang 
has ranked 1st or 2nd among all the provinces and autonomous regions in China, 
while Yunnan, with a considerably lower level of marketization, ranked 26th in 2014 
(Wang et al. 2017).  
Hence, the existing Zhejiang business system is built on “market-led institutional 
contexts” in which the local government plays a regulatory and service-oriented role 
from a distance, and economic actors coordinate their activities mainly through 
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competitive market arrangements. In contrast, “state-led institutional contexts” typ-
ify the Yunnan business system, in which the state plays a determining role in sup-
porting, guiding, or constraining economic activities. In other words, in the 
Zhejiang business system, economic actors solve coordination problems mainly 
through the market, while, in Yunnan, the state strategically coordinates economic 
activities, either directly or indirectly.  
Because the development of the vocational education system and the function 
of trade unions and intermediary associations are almost identical throughout China 
and have little impact on regional economic development, the main focus of this 
research is the institutional contradictions in shaping the form of inter-firm coordi-
nation, sources of finance, as well as state–business relations in the existing business 
systems in Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
Although the existing business systems in Zhejiang and Yunnan are character-
ized by high levels of ownership and non-ownership coordination in large enter-
prises and long-term inter-firm relations, the form taken by inter-firm coordination 
or integration is where we see the institutional difference. As already noted, the 
regional core firms in Yunnan, mostly SOEs, undertake tasks to assist the local 
government in supporting unprofitable and loss-making SOEs, to prevent them 
from going bankrupt. A large proportion of inter-firm coordination or integration 
activities in Yunnan are thus initiated by local government. Unlike the state-led stra-
tegic coordination in Yunnan, firms in Zhejiang are highly interdependent in a very 
competitive market, with informal long-term commitment and (sometimes oppor-
tunistic) horizontal diversification. 
Apart from a few listed SOEs in Yunnan, enterprises in both Zhejiang and Yun-
nan rely on credit-based sources of financing rather than the capital market. The 
financial system and the banking system in China are highly concentrated and reg-
ulated, which serves the needs of SOEs; this means that the “credit-based” financial 
system in Yunnan refers to bank loans, while private enterprises in Zhejiang have 
little access to bank loans but seek funds through informal financial institutions. 
Since banks are responsible for their profits and losses, they are very sensitive to 
policy change and will react immediately, which has a substantial impact on the 
ability of firms to access bank loans (see the discussion above on the impact of de-
capacity policies on firms in Yunnan). 
This research examines the impact of different institutional contexts in Zhejiang 
and Yunnan on economic coordination and financial systems. Highly resource-de-
pendent and capital-intensive firms in Yunnan are very sensitive to policy changes, 
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due to the determining role of the state in coordinating economic activities and the 
low levels of flexibility and mobility caused by the requirement for vast inputs of 
capital, technology, and labour. Firms in Yunnan are keen to establish cooperative 
relationships with local government for the development of their enterprises. In 
contrast, Zhejiang firms have a high level of mobility in the very competitive market, 
so they are less dependent on local government to support their business.  
Thus, the institutional differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan determine the 
distinctive state–business relations, in which Yunnan has a positive attitude towards 
the role of local government in enterprise development, while Zhejiang firms show 
less reliance on local government to support their business. 
This discussion leads to the identification of the Zhejiang business system as 
market-led, and the Yunnan business system as state-led. These two cases show that 
economic actions or the behaviour of firms and local governments will follow a 
specific logic and fit the particular institutional environment (i.e. market forces in 
Zhejiang or the strong state sector in Yunnan). Hence, the cases of Zhejiang and 
Yunnan suggest that the regional isomorphic power of dominant institutions rein-
forces the tendency to form a cohesive economic system within the region. Alt-
hough the transitional Chinese economy is characterized by complexity, variation, 
and heterogeneity, a relatively high degree of regional institutional complementari-
ties are present in both Zhejiang and Yunnan business systems. These relationships 
and connections are summarized in Figure 4.15 below (local government is abbre-
viated to LG). 
Figure 4.15 
The relationships and connections between the dominant features in Zhejiang 
and Yunnan business systems  
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 Local resource endowment  
Poor resource bases  Rich resource bases  
Private firms, especially 
SMEs, in low-tech, low-cost 
and family-based light indus-
tries predominant in local 
economy.  
Large-sized firms, especially 
SOEs, in highly resource-de-
pendent, capital-intensive 
industry predominant in lo-
cal economy. 
Highly concentrated owner-
ship and involvement in the 
family business; 
A high degree of labour mo-
bility. 
Zhejiang  
Industrial structures  
Ownership relations 
Inter-firm relations  
Highly concentrated owner-
ship and involvement in 
firms’ management; 
A low degree of labour mo-
bility in regional core firms 
Highly specialized and ma-
ture production networks;  
An informal long-term com-
mitment between firms; 
A high level of non-owner-
ship coordination and weak 
vertical integration. 
Highly strategic integration 
and diversification into re-
lated sectors; 
A long-term partnership with 
regional core firms to reduce 
the risk of market volatility. 
Yunnan 
Strong private sector; 
High level of mobility; 
Highly competitive market 
Strong state sector; 
Low degree of mobility; 
Low level of marketization 
559831-L-bw-Lu
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 133
 The Existing Zhejiang and Yunnan Business Systems  113 
 
Economic actors are less de-
pendent on LGs to support 
their business. 
Economic actors are more 






A regulatory and service-ori-
ented role of LGs in local 
economic development  
A determined role of LGs in 
local economic development 
(i.e. the state-led strategic 
inter-firm coordination) 
Formal and informal credit-
based financial system 
Capital market (listed SOEs) 
and credit-based (private 
firms) financial market 
Strong private sector; 
High level of mobility; 
Highly competitive market 
Strong state sector; 
Low degree of mobility; 
Low level of marketization 
Zhejiang  Yunnan 
Institutional context   
The role of LGs in local 
economic development  
Financial system 
Dominant features 
of enterprise sector  
Dominant features 
of state sector  
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Although the coordinated–industrial–district business systems and state-orga-
nized business systems defined by Whitley (1999) show some similarities to the 
business systems of Zhejiang and Yunnan, respectively, industrial and institutional 
differences exist between Whitley’s typology and the business systems identified in 
this research.  
The coordinated–industrial–district business system is exemplified by the Italian 
industrial districts, where non-ownership coordination of economic activities is rel-
atively limited (Whitley 1999: 42–43). However, Zhejiang’s industrial structure is 
characterized by a highly specialized division of production processes, and enter-
prises are highly interdependent. More importantly, unlike the Italian type of clus-
ters of equal-sized firms, the regional core firms in Zhejiang play an essential role 
in inter-firm coordination, forming hierarchical clusters. Additionally, in the coor-
dinated–industrial–district business system, local governments, banks, and training 
organizations work with strong trade unions to provide an infrastructure for col-
laboration (Whitley 1999: 60–61), whereas the local government in Zhejiang plays 
a regulatory and service-oriented role from a distance.  
The state-organized business system is exemplified by South Korea, where the 
resource bases and industrial structures are entirely different from Yunnan. The 
industrial structures substantially shape the behaviour of economic actors and de-
termine the dominant features of the Yunnan business system. Hence, there is a 
fundamental difference between the two types of business systems. There is no 
denying that the state-organized business systems and the Yunnan business system 
have some common features, whereby the state is actively involved in coordinating 
economic activities. However, large-sized enterprises, especially SOEs, in highly re-
source-dependent and capital-intensive industries dominate in the Yunnan econ-
omy, shaping the supportive role of local government in the Yunnan business sys-
tem. Due to the inputs needed and the inflexibility of resource-dependent firms in 
the market, the Yunnan business system exhibits a relatively high level of inter-firm 
coordination to reduce the risk of market volatility. In state-organized business sys-
tems, by contrast, organizational integration of economic activities is low across 
firms (Whitley 1999: 42–43). Moreover, restrictions on market access have been 
vastly reduced and simplified in Yunnan, and the local government does not tightly 
control intermediary associations and unions as in the state-organized business sys-
tems.   
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Hence, we can conclude that the Zhejiang business system does not resemble a 
coordinated–industrial–district business system, and Yunnan does not resemble a 
state-organized business system.  
As a transitional economy, China presents a contradictory heterogeneous devel-
opment trajectory; however, the mixed Chinese economy has achieved and main-
tained good economic outcomes for decades. Yunnan shows a high level of regional 
coherence (i.e. the state-led institutional contexts), but its economic performance 
has been far below the national average. Hence, there is no concrete evidence that 
shows the direct link between the economic outcome and the degree of coherence 
of a (regional) economy, as highlighted in comparative system theory. 
In sum, Zhejiang and Yunnan are selected as two contrasting cases of the mixed 
Chinese economy, which show significant statistical and institutional differences 
and a certain level of institutional complementarities. The following chapters will 
examine how each specific system has been formed and evolved, and investigate 





1 There are significant reserves of kaolin (8.2 million tons and ranked 8th), vanadium 
(38,000 tons and ranked 10th), and zinc (0.62 million tons and ranked 14th), but the 
reserves of coal, iron, copper, lead, and pyrite are amongst the smallest in China (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics 2017).  
2 Based on the statistical standard of industrial statistics, both national and provincial 
Bureaux of Statistics collect and provide detailed statistics on enterprises with annual 
revenues over 20 million yuan (2.6 million euro), namely enterprises “above desig-
nated size” (ads). Additionally, in the provincial statistical yearbook, a few statistics 
are also provided about enterprises “below designated size” (bds). Note that the 20 
million yuan level was introduced in 2011. The standard for enterprises above desig-
nated size from 1998 to 2010 was those with annual revenues over 5 million yuan 
(0.65 million euro) (Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018). 
3 The data presented here are for the manufacturing enterprises (ads), and can be 
broken down as follows. The output and the number of employed persons in the 
textile, apparel and leather industry in Zhejiang was 0.82 trillion yuan (0.11 trillion 
euro) and 1.49 million persons, accounting for 13.56% of total output and 21.2% of 
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total number of employed persons in 2017 (Zhejiang Bureau of Statistics 2018). The 
output and the number of employed persons in chemical fibre manufacturing was 
0.22 trillion yuan (30 billion euro) and 0.11 million persons, accounting for 3.69% of 
total output and 1.61% of total number of employed persons in 2017 (ibid.).  
4 According to the Zhejiang statistical yearbook, industrial statistics do not provide 
detailed information about the ownership structures and firm size of each industry. 
The figures presented here are a totalling of statistics on the manufacturing, electricity, 
gas and water supply, recycling, repairing, and maintenance sectors (Zhejiang Provin-
cial Bureau of Statistics 2018).  
5 In the industrial sector, there were only 74 SOEs, with an output value of about 0.29 
trillion yuan (38 billion euro), which accounted for 4.3% of the total output of the 
industrial sector, while state-holding enterprises accounted for 10.9% of total output 
(Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018).    
6 Table 4.16 shows the three criteria for classifying firm sizes: number of employees, 
revenue, and total assets.  
Table 4.16 
Classification of firm size 
 Large enterprises Medium enterprises Small enterprises 
Employees 2,000 and above 300–2,000 300 and below 
Revenue (million yuan) 300 and above 30–300 30 and below 
Total assets (million yuan) 400 and above 40–400 40 and below 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Government of China 2011 
Given the accuracy and reliability of the information obtained in fieldwork, total as-
sets of sampled enterprises are used to categorize the sampled firms in this study. 
7 The decrease in the total number of county cities in Zhejiang from 88 to 81 is be-
cause of a change of administrative divisions. 
8 The AIC is responsible for regulating the market, drafting rules and policies, issuing 
licences, administering registration of enterprises, etc. (The State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce, Government of China. 2010) 
9 These are Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China Con-
struction Bank (CCB), and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), also 
known as the “Big Four”. 
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10 Yunnan has the largest tin reserves (1.25 million tons) and the second-largest lead 
reserves in China, while the reserves of zinc, copper, and phosphorus were ranked 
3rd in 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017).  
11 The Report on Chinese Industrialization 1995–2015 (Huang and Li 2017), uses five 
indicators to categorize the level of industrialization of each province, namely GRP 
per capita (weight 36%), the share of economic sectors in GRP (weight 22%), the 
share of value-added in the manufacturing sector in GRP (weight 22%), the rate of 
urbanization (weight 12%), and the distribution of employment by economic sectors 
(weight 8%). Industrial transformation is broken down into five levels: pre-industri-
alization (composite score: 0), industrializing (composite score: 0–33), semi-industri-
alization (composite score: 33–66), later-industrialization (composite score: 66–99), 
and post-industrialization (composite score: >100) (Chen. et al. 2006, Huang and Li 
2017).   
12 Revenue generated by tourism in Zhejiang reached 932.3 billion yuan (121.7 billion 
euro) in 2017, ranked third in China (Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2018, 
National Bureau of Statistics 2018). 
13 When a region has higher concentration and specialization level than the national 
level, LQ will be greater than 1. 
14 National regulations and policies related to institutional factors were presented in 
the section on Zhejiang, above; I will not go into the details again here. 
15 No significant differences indicators: non-ownership coordination: long-term part-
nership with clients (χ2=0.64, p=0.8); the strength of market regulation: applying for 
licence (χ2=0.363, p=0.547), entry barriers (χ2=14.64, p=0.57), public services 
(χ2=13.37, p=0.37); financial system: loans from financial institutions (t=1.24, 
p=0.219); business–government collaboration: types of collaboration activities 
(χ2=5.16, p=0.272).  
16 The marketization index is based on five components: (a) government–market 
relations, including the ratio of market-based resources allocation, size of govern-
ment, the level of financial burden on farmers and firms and the level of govern-
ment intervention in firms; (b) non-state sector development, including percentage 
of output value of non-state sector to total industrial output value and percentage 
of output value of non-state sector to total investment of fixed assets; (c) price 
control and trade barriers, including the level of price control on retail goods, raw 
materials and agricultural goods, and the level of inter-regional trade barriers; (d) 
factor market development, including the level of financial institutions’ competition, 
the level of marketization of the financial system, the amount of FDI, the level of 
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labour mobility, and the number of transitions from technological achievements to 
production; and (e) the legal framework, including the level of property rights pro-
tection and contract enforcement, and the number of intermediate institutions (Fan 
et al. 2001). 
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5 The Historical Developmental Path of Zhejiang and Yunnan (before 1979) 
 
 
As indicated in Chapter 4, the significant empirical and institutional regional diver-
gences in the currently dominant economic, industrial, and institutional configura-
tions and structures of the two provinces will be discussed. To understand how and 
why distinct forms and patterns have been shaped and have mutated, the following 
questions will be addressed in this chapter. 
a. Do the regional historical circumstances and conditions and the pre-existing 
industrial and institutional arrangements matter, and are they relevant for 
recent economic processes and outcomes in Zhejiang and Yunnan? 
b. Did the highly unified and centralized arrangement and the socialist trans-
formation during the period of the planned economy alter the pre-existing 
(pre-1949) regional economic and institutional configurations, and did 
these reduce or enlarge the regional differences between Zhejiang and Yun-
nan? If so, how did the planned economy system change the regional struc-
tures and future growth potential? And if not, why and how could the re-
gional difference between Zhejiang and Yunnan persist in the same 
national institutional context? 
5.1 The developmental path of Zhejiang and Yunnan during the 
imperial period (before 1949) 
5.1.1 The origins of Zhejiang business during the imperial period 
As shown in Chapter 4, the resource endowments of Zhejiang at present are char-
acterized by scarcity of natural resources, insufficient cultivated land, and low agri-
cultural outputs. However, from the late 6th century to the 13th century, the Yang-
tze River Delta, including Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai, was the most advanced 
region for rice agriculture in ancient China (Perkins 1969, Ge and Gu 1994). During 
the Song era (960–1279), the agricultural technologies and farming practices in the 
Yangtze River Delta had developed significantly, with improvements to methods 
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of cultivation such as irrigation systems and agricultural tools, and the introduction 
of double cropping of rice, which substantially improved grain production (Perkins 
1969: ix-xii, Ge and Gu 1994). In the Song period, the average grain production per 
capita reached 3,500 kg per year, which is about three times greater than in the Tang 
dynasty (618–907) (Hu 1983: 25, Ge and Gu 1994: 101). Using the vast waterway 
system of the Yangtze River Delta to move grain and other goods, Zhejiang, as one 
of the major grain producers, became the major grain supplier of the imperial state 
during the Song era (Yang 1993, Ji and Wang 2014).  
Due to the increased productivity and the surplus output of grains, the agricul-
tural population started a switch to commercial crops. In the late Song period, the 
relatively higher value of the output produced by sericulture attracted some of the 
peasants to silk and cotton farming, which altered the monoculture farming system 
of paddy plantations in Zhejiang (Yang 1993, Ji and Wang 2014). In the Yuan dyn-
asty (1271–1368), agriculture in Zhejiang was still dominated by wet-rice cultivation, 
but during the Ming dynasty (1338–1644), there was a rapid growth of silk and cot-
ton farming (Li, B. 1985: 151–153). During the Ming and Qing period (1636–1912), 
Zhejiang became the major producer of silk fabric (Ji and Wang 2014). In 1391, the 
cultivated area for mulberry plantation took up 15.66% of total cultivated land; in 
1512 that had increased to 26.72%; and by 1713, mulberry plantations accounted 
for 41.4% of total cultivated area in Zhejiang (Yang 1993: 87). The significant ex-
pansion of inputs in commodity production (i.e. silk and cotton farming) resulted 
in the sharp decline of grain output, which marked the transformation of the agri-
cultural farming system in Zhejiang.  
Notably, since the Ming dynasty and for the following six centuries, there were 
no obvious improvements in agricultural technology in China (Perkins 1969: 6–7). 
During the Ming-Qing period, the Yangtze River Delta region saw a more than 
threefold increase in population;1 with unchanged agricultural technology, and no 
spare land available for agricultural expansion, agricultural production in the region 
began to stagnate2 (Perkins 1969: 6–7, Li, B. 1985: 160). In other words, the mar-
ginal product of agricultural labour approached the point of zero, which generated 
labour surplus. Surplus agricultural labour was liberated from the cultivated land 
and shifted from farm work to manufacturing and commerce (Yang 1993, Ji and 
Wang 2014). From the time of the Song dynasty, a large amount of labour was 
absorbed into silk and cotton fabric manufacturing in Zhejiang, which became the 
most important silk fabric manufacturing centre for both the imperial court and the 
supra-regional markets (Ge and Gu 1994). In addition, handicraft manufacturing,3 
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ship building,4 and paper making also developed in Zhejiang (Yang 1993, Zhang 
and Yang, 2006, Ji and Wang 2014). Dongyang, a county city in Jinhua, became 
famous for woodworking and carving and acquired a reputation as a “county of 100 
skills” (bai gong zhi xiang) (Cooper et al. 1998, Chen 2005). In the Ming-Qing period, 
manufacturing and trade expanded at a fast pace (Lam 2003: 156).  
Marx (2007: 508) asserted that “the economic structure of capitalist society has 
grown out of the economic structure of feudal society, and the dissolution of the 
latter set frees the elements of the former”. As Franklin Mendels first argued in 
1972, and as further developed by neo-Marxist scholars, the transition from feudal-
ism to capitalism and the transformation from feudal production to modern factory 
industrialization are triggered by proto-industrialization. In other words, proto-in-
dustrialization is the phase which precedes modern industrialization and capitalism, 
which is characterized by the development of commercial agriculture, the participa-
tion of surplus agricultural labour in sideline activities, and commodity production 
for interregional and international markets (Mendels 1972, Coleman 1983: 437–439, 
Ogilvie and Cerman 1996: 1–2).  
During the Song period, manufacturing activities in Zhejiang initially operated 
through family labour, but as the market demand for commodities increased, sur-
plus labour was recruited into manufacturing employment, especially in silk and 
cotton fabric manufacturing (Zhang and Yang 2006). From that point on, the cot-
tage industry developed and expanded and Zhejiang became the industrial and com-
mercial centre of imperial China (Yu 2005: 55–56). The emergence of paid workers 
(i.e. the employment relationship), the expanded supra-regional markets, and the 
rise of commercial agriculture signalled that Zhejiang had entered the phase of 
proto-industrialization and prepared the ground for the path to modern manufac-
turing and capitalism. 
Alongside the transformation from the feudal mode and relations of production 
to market-oriented production, the feudal social order had also been challenged. In 
ancient China, four occupations (si min), the feudal social order system, were 
adopted, in which people were grouped into four classes: scholar (shi), farmer (nong), 
artisan (gong), and merchant (shang) — with merchant ranked at the bottom of the 
four occupations (Lam 2003: 155, Fairbank and Goldman 2006: 108). Zhejiang mer-
chants, as both manufacturers and traders, diversified into a wide range of busi-
nesses5 (Lam 2003: 156). With the rise of cottage industries and expanded markets 
in the Song dynasty, the power and social status of merchants were greatly improved 
(Lam 2003: 155). Two prominent thinkers, Wang Yangming (1472–1529) and 
Huang Zongxi (1610–1695), who were born in Zhejiang, had a profound influence 
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on shaking the traditional social order. Wang argued that the four occupations had 
different professions, and the merchant (shang) could not be considered inferior to 
the scholar (shi) (Lufrano 1997: 44). Huang emphasized that manufacturing and 
trade are the foundation of the national economy (gong shang jie ben) (Ye 1983). 
Huang’s proposition has been considered the inspiration for the emergence of cap-
italism in imperial China (Ye 1983). These two influential thinkers and their follow-
ers challenged the social order in an attempt to improve the merchants’ social status 
in late imperial society (Lufrano 1997: 42). Their efforts exerted a profound influ-
ence on shaping the unique business culture which took root in Zhejiang. 
After the First Opium War, in 1844, several cities in Zhejiang, including Ningbo 
and Wenzhou, were opened as treaty ports (Zhang and Yang 2006). From 1843 to 
1894, 191 foreign-owned industrial enterprises were established, totalling about 20 
million yuan (2.52 million euro) of investment (Yan 2013). Although market-ori-
ented transformation is typical of proto-industrialization, and facilitates the process 
of industrialization, it is not sufficient to break down the socio-economic mecha-
nisms of feudal agrarian society and initiate the industrial process (Mendels 1972: 
241, Coleman 1983: 439, Ogilvie and Cerman 1996: 1–2). Before 1844, there was 
little change in the traditional method of production of the cottage industries due 
to the isolationist foreign policy of the imperial state. After 1844, the cottage indus-
tries experienced the full impact of the enormous inflows of foreign capital and new 
technologies (Yan 2013). The rapidly expanded foreign-owned factories and enter-
prises shook the foundations of the feudal mode of production by bringing ad-
vanced technology and machines to imperial China. In 1887, Yan Xinhou, a 
Zhejiang merchant, established a mechanized cotton ginning factory, which was the 
first private mechanized factory in imperial China (Ji and Wang 2008). When this 
first attempt at large-scale mechanized manufacturing proved successful, Yan in-
vested in unrelated mechanized factories and businesses (ibid.). Meanwhile, other 
large merchants in Zhejiang also actively adopted advanced technology and diver-
sified their businesses into a variety of sectors6 (ibid.), which reflects the typical pat-
tern of the ownership-based horizontal diversification in the existing Zhejiang busi-
ness system, as described in Chapter 4. In the late 1890s and early 1900s, Zhejiang 
experienced an investment boom in modern mechanized factories (ibid.), which 
marked the first step on the path to modern manufacturing and capitalism.  
Alongside the market-oriented transformation and increased trading activities, 
financial institutions in Zhejiang became well-developed. The earliest Chinese bank-
ing institution can be traced back to the Song dynasty, when the first paper money 
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in history (Jiaozi) was issued (Ji and Wang 2008). There were two major types of 
traditional native banks in imperial China: the draft bank (piao hao), which was es-
tablished by Shanxi merchants in the Qing dynasty, had a profound influence on 
the development of native banks in China, while the cash shop (qian zhuang) first 
appeared in Shanghai and Zhejiang in the Qing period (Fu and Turvey 2018: 148–
149). The cash shop was mainly involved in the exchange of currency in circulation, 
deposit, and credit facilities, while the draft bank focused on interregional remit-
tance, deposit, and issuing credit (Zhang 1987). These native banks could be either 
a single proprietorship or partnership-based, and their main functions were to buy 
and sell currencies, to absorb capital investment and money deposits, and to provide 
loans — the essential features of the contemporary bank (Fu and Turvey 2018: 150). 
In the 1830s, more than 150 cash shops were set up in Ningbo, Zhejiang (Ji and 
Wang 2008). From the 1800s to the early 1900s, six out of the nine biggest cash 
shops in Shanghai were owned and operated by Zhejiang merchants (ibid.). At the 
same time, pawn shops (dian dang) were rapidly developing in Zhejiang, and mer-
chants from Huzhou (a city in Zhejiang) expanded their pawnshop businesses to 
Shanghai (ibid.). After the opening of the treaty ports in 1844, besides the enormous 
inflows of FDI and new technology, a large number of foreign banks also entered 
China, which challenged the traditional banking system of imperial China. More 
importantly, the traditional banking system failed to meet capital needs for the de-
velopment of industrial mass production. Therefore, in 1897, the first commercial 
bank, Imperial Bank of China, was established with five of its nine directors coming 
from Zhejiang (ibid.). In 1908, 12 Zhejiang merchants set up the first private bank, 
Ningbo Commercial and Savings Bank (si ming yin hang) in Shanghai (Ji and Wang 
2008, Fu and Turvey 2018). In the following years, a large number of private com-
mercial banks were set up by Zhejiang merchants, and traditional financial institu-
tions like cash shops were converted into modern banks (Ji and Wang 2008, Fu and 
Turvey 2018). The current informal financial sector thus has a long tradition in 
Zhejiang, which explains the explosive growth of the informal financial market in 
Zhejiang since the 1980s and the high reliance of enterprises on credit-based infor-
mal financial institutions in the existing financial system of Zhejiang, as discussed 
in Chapter 4.  
The development trajectory of Zhejiang during the imperial period thus fol-
lowed a typical process of market-oriented transition from a feudal agrarian society 
to the path towards modern industrialization and capitalism. In other words, mar-
ket-based relations gradually supplanted feudal relations in Zhejiang during the im-
perial period. 
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There were three major transitions towards the phase of proto-industrialization 
in Zhejiang since the Song dynasty. The development of commercial agriculture 
characterizes the first transition. The improvement of agricultural technology and 
farming practices in Zhejiang increased productivity significantly in the Song period. 
This increased output of grain induced a switch of the agricultural population from 
agrarian production to commercial agriculture, and the ensuing expansion of inputs 
in commodity production (i.e. silk and cotton) marked the transformation of the 
agricultural farming system in Zhejiang. The second transition is identified by the 
emergence of surplus labour and the employment relationship, and by expanded 
supra-regional markets. Due to the stagnation of agricultural technology, the rapid 
growth in population and the lack of spare arable land for expansion, the marginal 
product of agricultural labour approached the point of zero, which generated labour 
surplus and compelled the shift from farm work to manufacturing and commerce. 
As market demand for commodities increased, surplus labour was recruited to pro-
duce goods, especially silk and cotton fabric, for the supra-regional markets. The 
third transition was characterized by the rise of the merchant class. The rapid ex-
pansion in commerce led to an increase in the wealth and power of the merchant 
class. At the same time, two influential thinkers from Zhejiang not only emphasized 
the importance of manufacturing and business, but also challenged the foundation 
of feudal social orders in their effort to improve the merchants’ social status.  
These three major transitions signalled that Zhejiang had been in the phase of 
proto-industrialization, which is the preliminary step towards modern industrializa-
tion and capitalism. In other words, there was a semblance of “sprouts of industrial 
capitalism” in Zhejiang during the imperial era. The process of market-oriented 
transition left a significant historical legacy, which became deeply implanted in the 
business culture of Zhejiang. However, as noted above, proto-industrialization on 
its own is not sufficient to upturn the socio-economic configurations of the feudal 
system, especially in the context of stagnant technology and production methods.  
When Zhejiang found itself in this condition of stagnation, it was exogenous 
forces — the inflows of FDI with advanced technology and modern machinery — 
that brought about the significant changes in technology and methods of produc-
tion. These exogenous forces triggered the beginning of the machine-centred in-
dustrial process in the 19th century and marked the start of modernization in 
Zhejiang. In other words, initiated by exogenous forces, modern mechanized fac-
tories supplanted the cottage industries as the predominant form of manufacturing, 
which played a significant role in accelerating the transition process in Zhejiang. To 
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prevent being excluded from the market, the local merchants showed a strong will-
ingness and a high level of flexibility and adaptability to adopt the new technologies, 
methods of production, and banking system, which was a major step in the transi-
tion towards large-scale mechanized manufacturing and a modern banking system. 
Hence, exogenous forces were the significant drivers in advancing the transfor-
mation in Zhejiang at a time when local industries were experiencing stagnation and 
had few linkages to the outside world because of the isolationist foreign policy of 
the imperial state. These external forces substantially extended and renewed the 
existing local development path with new technologies and new forms of organiza-
tions and created a path forward with the modern mechanized production method.  
Overall, by virtue of external inputs into the conceptual framework of the busi-
ness system — namely the inflows of FDI, as well as the cultural factor (two prom-
inent thinkers), and technological factor (advanced technology and modern ma-
chines) — the market-oriented trajectory towards modern manufacturing and 
capitalism initiated in Zhejiang during the late Song period was enhanced and pro-
moted. The predominant manufacturing industries (i.e. textile and handicraft indus-
tries), mode and relations of production (i.e. family-based factories and horizontal 
diversification), and financial system (i.e. private banks) in Zhejiang during the im-
perial period all show the embryonic form of the existing Zhejiang business system.  
In sum, from the time of the Song dynasty, it is possible to detect a market-
oriented development trajectory in Zhejiang, which shaped the early form of the 
Zhejiang business system and had a profound impact on future regional develop-
ment. 
 
5.1.2 The emergence of modern industry in Yunnan during the 
imperial period  
Before the First Opium War (1271–1840) 
Before the outbreak of the First Opium War in 1839,7 imperial China had adopted 
isolationist foreign policies for centuries. In 1374, the Ming government issued the 
sea ban, and in 1757 the Qing government adopted the Canton System, which lim-
ited China’s trade with the West to only a single trading port, Canton (Carroll 2010: 
51). China’s defeat in the war caused tremendous social changes. Hence the First 
Opium War is considered as the turning point from imperial China to modern 
China.  
Before 1271, Yunnan was an independent kingdom called Nanzhao, inhabited 
by various ethnic groups. After being conquered by the Yuan empire, the territories 
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of the Nanzhao kingdom were governed by Yuan and set up as a province named 
Yunnan (Li, G. 1995). In the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), the Tusi system was es-
tablished and implemented in regions inherited by ethnic groups (Yang, B. 2009). 
Under this system, the leaders of ethnic groups were recognized and ranked as im-
perial officials to rule over their areas (ibid.). The imperial government seldom in-
tervened in the internal affairs of ethnic groups (ibid.). Thus, locals, especially ethnic 
minorities, still maintained slash-and-burn agriculture, and bartering was the major 
method for trade (Li, G. 1995, Yang, B. 2009). As a result of increasingly severe 
rebellions by tribal leaders and conflicts between ethnic groups, the Qing govern-
ment abolished the Tusi system in 1726 and assigned government officials to Yun-
nan (Li, S. 1984). From then on, Yunnan was directly governed by the imperial state. 
From the time of the Ming dynasty, large numbers of people migrated from East 
imperial China to Yunnan. For example, from 1368 to 1424, about 2 million people 
moved to and settled in Yunnan, which not only led to an expansion of cultivated 
arable land but also brought new agricultural technologies and farming practices 
such as the introduction of agricultural tools, and double cropping of rice and other 
grains (Wang 2004, Yang, B. 2009). With the significant expansion of inputs of la-
bour and cultivated area, as well as the improvements of agricultural technology, 
the productivity and output of grains increased, which spurred agricultural labour 
to shift from farm work to manufacturing and commerce (Yang, B. 2009). Fairs and 
traditional handicraft workshops emerged in major cities in Yunnan, such as Kun-
ming and Qujing, while in remote areas, the agricultural population was still in-
volved in farming for own consumption (subsistence) rather that for local exchange 
(Li, G. 1995). Overall, the improvements in the agricultural farming system and the 
emergence of workshops and fairs in major cities had little impact on the feudal 
agrarian society, or on facilitating the process towards proto-industrialization. Out-
side the agricultural sector, it was the resource-dependent industries that had played 
the most significant role in Yunnan since the imperial period. 
Yunnan had been renowned for centuries for its rich mineral and metal re-
sources. The earliest documented evidence of silver, copper, and tin in Yunnan date 
back to the Han dynasty (25–220), and the extraction of mineral and metal resources 
in Yunnan has a long history (Li, G. 1995). During the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), 
the annual output of silver in Yunnan was about 6.13 tons, accounting for about 
50% of the total output of the Yuan empire. At a conservative estimate, throughout 
the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), Yunnan contributed 950–2,500 tons of silver to 
support the Ming economy (Quan 1967, Yang, B. 2009). In the Yuan-Ming period, 
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the imperial state had control over the major silver mines, and local merchants were 
allowed to apply for a mining extraction permit (Quan 1967). The imperial govern-
ment estimated the output of privately owned silver mines each year, and 30% of 
estimated silver output, named silver tax (yin ke), was to be submitted to the imperial 
government (ibid.). Once silver was monetized, demand greatly increased. In the 
late Ming period, the silver tax reached 40% to 50% of output, which resulted in 
the exhaustion of silver reserves under the traditional extraction methods (Quan 
1967, Yang, B. 2009). By 1855, 18 out of 19 silver mines in Yunnan had been closed 
due to resource exhaustion (Li, G. 1995). 
Copper mining in Yunnan started during the Yuan dynasty, and the imperial 
state of the Ming began to use copper to mint coins (Li, G. 1995, Yang, B. 2009). 
As demand for copper rose sharply, copper output in Yunnan substantially in-
creased and peaked in the Qing dynasty (1636–1912). Yunnan became the only sup-
plier for the imperial mint in Beijing (Li, G. 1995, Yang, B. 2009). Copper mining 
in Yunnan was fully controlled and managed by the imperial state (Yang, B 2009). 
More specifically, Beijing paid the imperial government of Yunnan 42 tons of silver 
as state loans for extracting 3,000 to 3,500 tons of copper each year (Li, G. 1995). 
Yunnan also supplied about 1,000–1,500 tons of copper to other provinces for their 
mints and for utensil manufacturing (ibid.). To extract the copper, the imperial Yun-
nan government recruited miners and investors to operate mines (ibid.). From 1736 
to 1795, the average output of copper in Yunnan reached 6,000 to 6,500 tons (ibid.). 
However, as with silver, the overextraction of copper resulted in a sharp decline in 
output (ibid.). Due to the exhaustion of silver and copper reserves, in the mid-18th 
century, the Yunnan mint started to use tin to manufacture coins (ibid.). Other re-
sources like iron, coal, and salt had also been extracted and used on a large scale 
during the Ming-Qing period (ibid.). 
Mining had thus been the major industry in Yunnan for centuries, and the vast 
majority of mines were imperial state-owned. During this period, the extraction of 
metal and mineral resources in Yunnan was monopolized by the imperial state. Alt-
hough the state allowed local merchants to invest and operate mines, local resources, 
especially silver and copper, were mainly used for national interests, making signif-
icant contributions to the imperial economy, rather than promoting local economic 
development. As Yang Bin (2009) concludes, the imperial state’s economy was built 
on exhausting local resources. Nevertheless, the resource-dependent and imperial 
state-owned and controlled heavy industries predominated in Yunnan during the 
imperial period, which is highly consistent with the predominant features of 
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ownership and industrial structures of the existing Yunnan business system as dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.  
 
The Opening of the Kunming–Haiphong Railway  
After being defeated in the First Opium War, the Qing government was compelled 
to sign the Treaty of Nanking, in which the imperial state agreed to open five treaty 
ports alongside Canton and to abolish the Canton System (Ma 1981). The Second 
Opium War broke out in 1856, leading to the Treaty of Tianjin, in which another 
11 treaty ports were agreed (Ma 1981). After this, French and British colonial ad-
ministrations were ambitious to achieve the opening of the whole of China, includ-
ing the southwest regions. In 1862 the Treaty of Saigon was signed between France 
and the last precolonial emperor of Vietnam, and from 1866 French explorers 
started surveying the Mekong River from Saigon to Kunming (Rousseau 2014). 
They wrote reports about Yunnan’s rich resources, including mines and various 
agricultural products (ibid.). In order to access Yunnan’s resources and export Eu-
ropean goods to China, the French colonial administration decided to develop a 
regular trading network from their colonies to Yunnan by building the Kunming–
Haiphong railway (ibid.). 
Figure 5.1 
The Kunming–Haiphong Railway  
Source: Rousseau (2014). 
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In 1885, the Qing government signed a treaty with the French government, in 
which the imperial state agreed to open Mengzi in Yunnan for foreign merchants, 
and the French government was allowed to invest and build railways in China (Li, 
G. 1995). Then, in 1903, the French colonial administration obtained the right to 
own, operate, and manage the railway (ibid.). From 1901 to 1910, the French gov-
ernment invested 158.46 million francs in building a 855km railway, including the 
section within China from Kunming to Hekou (466km) and the section within Vi-
etnam from Lao Cai to Haiphong via Hanoi (389km). It was the first railway in 
southwest China (ibid.). 
After the opening of the Kunming–Haiphong railway, as well as the treaty ports, 
a large number of foreign goods entered the local market, which shook the local 
economy. For products such as processed agricultural products, cigarettes, textiles, 
and handicrafts, there were significant differences in terms of price and quality be-
tween those made by traditional methods of production and those made by modern 
manufacturing (ibid.). In other words, compared with local products, imported 
products were sold at a cheap rate and with higher quality. Thus, the demand for 
foreign products, especially cotton fabric, cigarettes, and kerosene, increased 
sharply. For example, in 1909, the amount of imported cotton was 2,883 tons, and 
in 1910 it reached 4,239.6 tons (Ma 1981: 73). With a large number of foreign en-
terprises being established alongside the railway, imported products quickly mo-
nopolized the local market (Li, G. 1995). Local products had been largely driven 
out of the market, and a large number of traditional manufacturing workshops in 
Yunnan closed down (ibid.).  
At the same time, due to the demand in Western countries, significant quantities 
of tin were extracted and exported from Yunnan once Mengzi opened as a treaty 
port. The arrival of the railway was a major spur for the mining industry in Yunnan. 
In 1890 the output of tin was about 1,000 tons; in 1909 the export of tin had in-
creased to 4,282 tons (Ma 1981:73, Li, G. 1995). In 1910, the amount of tin exported 
from Yunnan was 6,195 tons, and in 1917 it reached 11,223 tons, which accounted 
for 90% of exported tin in China (Ma 1981:73, Li, G. 1995). Moreover, in 1910, the 
output of coal in Yunnan could not meet the needs of the railway and mining, so 
that coal for trains had to be transported from Vietnam to Yunnan (Li, G. 1995: 
322). As the demand for coal continued to increase, the coal mining industry in 
Yunnan developed rapidly. In 1915 the output of coal in Yunnan reached 25,000 
tons (ibid.). Although the French colonial administration failed to obtain mining 
rights in Yunnan, they fully controlled the operation of the railway and customs 
tariffs in Vietnam. Hence the French colonial administration could arbitrarily price 
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transportation and administration fees, as well as customs charges. From 1913 to 
1920, transportation fees rose five times, and in 1920, the transportation fee for 
exported products (per ton) rose about 142% (Ma 1981: 74, Li, G. 1995). The an-
nual revenues of the railway were approximately 67 million francs, which generated 
about 10 million francs of net profits (Ma 1981: 74). 
The opening of the Kunming–Haiphong railway exerted a profound influence 
on Yunnan’s economy. Before 1910, the major form of transport in Yunnan was 
road transport, which considerably restricted trading activities and expansion for 
supra-regional markets. Products were produced mainly for regional consumption. 
Hence, when the colonial project brought in the steam train, with foreign capital 
and products, regional and interregional trade expanded at a fast pace in Yunnan. 
Alongside the opening of the railway, new technologies, machines, and methods of 
production were introduced and adopted in Yunnan. For instance, from 1910, ad-
vanced machines were imported and utilized in the mining and manufacturing sec-
tors, such as leather-goods manufacturing, flour milling, and printing (Chen 2000: 
77). Two power stations and several electric bulb manufacturing enterprises were 
established (Chen 2000: 77). The arrival of new technologies brought about a tran-
sition from hand production methods to modern factory industrialization. In short, 
the opening of the railway directly triggered the process of transition from a feudal 
agrarian society to the path towards modernization and industrialization in Yunnan. 
At the same time, the imperial state also took the initiative in adopting new tech-
nologies after it was forced to open the treaty ports in 1844 which allowed an influx 
of advanced western machines. In 1861, the imperial state launched the Self-
Strengthening Movement to promote industrialization by investing in the arms in-
dustry and other manufacturing sectors. From the late 19th century, the imperial 
government established imperial state-owned and state–private co-owned8 modern 
mechanized factories9 in Yunnan (Ma 1981, Li, G. 1995). However, there was little 
change in most privately owned enterprises and factories, where traditional meth-
ods of production continued due to the lack of funds (Ma 1981). Only a few enter-
prises could afford advanced machines. Therefore, it was imperial state-owned and 
state–private co-owned enterprises, along with just a few privately owned enter-
prises, that saw the technological advancements in manufacturing during the impe-
rial period in Yunnan. 
Based on the discussion above, the opium wars and the opening of the treaty 
ports and Kunming–Haiphong railway can be viewed as “exogenous shocks” which 
directly activated the transformation process from the feudal mode of production 
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to modern factory industrialization, facilitated market expansion, and promoted the 
development of existing local industries (i.e. the highly resource-dependent and im-
perial state-owned and controlled heavy industries) in Yunnan. The arrival of these 
external forces marked a significant watershed in the process towards industrializa-
tion and modernization. 
 
The Formation of Yunnan Regional Monopoly (1912—1949) 
After the Qing dynasty came to an end, a group of warlords known as the Yunnan 
Clique (dian xi) took over Yunnan from the imperial government.10 From 1912 to 
1949, the Yunnan Clique collaborated with the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist 
government, but at the same time, Yunnan Clique kept the full autonomy within 
Yunnan.11 During this period, they established an independent social, economic, 
and institutional system in Yunnan. 
In 1912, all of the imperial state-owned and state–private co-owned enterprises 
were taken over by the Yunnan military government (Li, G. 1995). At the same time, 
the Yunnan military government established Fudian Bank as a way of building a 
highly unified financial and fiscal system, including issuing local currency (dian bi), 
controlling the mint, levying taxes, and organizing financial affairs (ibid.). As a result, 
fiscal revenues in Yunnan increased sharply in the 1930s; annual fiscal revenues 
were maintained at 30 million local currency, and the fiscal surplus was about 7 
million local currency (ibid.). Apart from military and government expenditures, the 
majority of fiscal revenues were used for investing in mining and smelting industries, 
the textile industry, tobacco growing and cigarette manufacturing, chemical and 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, match and paper making, and two electric power 
plants for maintaining power supply (ibid.).  
Before the outbreak of the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan, in 1937, 
there were 3,925 enterprises in China, 81% of which were located in coastal east 
China (Su 2015). In wartime, a large number of enterprises had been destroyed due 
to the Japanese invasion. Thus, in 1937, the KMT Nationalist government started 
to move enterprises and factories from coastal areas to southwestern regions like 
Yunnan, Sichuan, and Chongqing (ibid.). Some of these KMT Nationalist govern-
ment-owned modern mechanized factories and enterprises were re-established in 
Yunnan. For example, Central Machinery was moved and re-established in Kun-
ming in 1939, and became the first and the largest machinery manufacturing state-
owned enterprise in China (Zhao 2015: 142). By the end of 1940, at least 600 en-
terprises had relocated to Yunnan, 448 of which were mining companies, with the 
rest including both military enterprises, such as the Central Aircraft Manufacturing 
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Company, and companies that produced civilian products (ibid.). To facilitate trans-
portation for machines and equipment, the KMT Nationalist government and the 
Yunnan military government built roads linking Yunnan with adjoining provinces 
and countries, including Myanmar (ibid.: 141–142). Meanwhile, a large number of 
enterprises and factories were solely or jointly founded by KMT nationalist govern-
ment and the Yunnan military government (Li, G. 1995). Given the large-scale in-
vestment by the two governments, the development of highly resource-dependent 
and capital-intensive industries proceeded at pace. Some of those enterprises still 
exist and play a crucial role in Yunnan’s economy. More importantly, state-owned 
enterprises dominated the market, with the KMT Nationalist government fully con-
trolling and managing Yunnan’s mineral and metal resources, the tobacco industry, 
and match manufacturing by 1939, which left no room for private enterprises in 
Yunnan (ibid.). In short, the highly monopolized state sector placed substantial con-
straints on the development of the private sector in Yunnan.  
The discussion above makes it clear that, since the late 13th century, Yunnan’s 
economy has been characterized by highly resource-dependent and capital-intensive 
industries due to the province’s rich natural resources. This resource endowment 
determined the distribution of local resources and interests, as well as the regional 
industrial structures in Yunnan. As the “commanding heights of the economy” 
(Whitely 1999: 147), the imperial state and local ruling parties directly controlled the 
ownership of core resource-dependent industries, such as mining and smelting, and 
the tobacco industry. The imperial, military, and KMT state-owned enterprises were 
absolutely dominant in the Yunnan economy, which resulted in the absence of the 
private sector in local economic development for centuries. Hence, a high level of 
state intervention in the economy can be observed, dating back to the 13th century. 
The path of development in Yunnan since the Yuan dynasty was not a spontaneous 
process of transition from feudal production towards modern factory industrializa-
tion. The transition to industrialization in Yunnan was initiated and facilitated by 
exogenous forces and the state. 
Four historical events — the mass migration, the opening of the Kunming–
Haiphong railway and the colonial project, as strong external forces, and the relo-
cation of modern mechanized companies initiated by the state — played a decisive 
role in the process of industrial transition in Yunnan from the 13th to the mid-20th 
century. In the Ming dynasty, a large number of immigrants with advanced agricul-
tural technology can be seen as the first external shock,12 which improved the agri-
cultural/farming system and increased the output of grain, and then induced a 
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switch of the agricultural population from agrarian production to manufacturing 
and commerce. The opening of the Kunming–Haiphong railway was the most sig-
nificant external event in Yunnan before 1949. The colonial project directly stimu-
lated the development of local industries, especially the mining industry. It also pas-
sively enabled Yunnan to establish modern mechanized firms with advanced 
technology and to expand supra-regional markets, which marked the start of mod-
ernization in Yunnan. In wartime, the relocation of large numbers of modern mech-
anized companies from eastern areas to Yunnan by the state significantly enhanced 
the dominant position of the state-owned resource-based heavy industry in the 
Yunnan economy. In short, thanks to these external forces and the role of the state, 
Yunnan was able to “escape” from traditional production methods, and to step 
onto the path to industrialization and modernization.  
Given that local industrial structures substantially conform to the local resource 
base in regions with large natural resource reserves, forms of capital, including for-
eign capital and state investment, naturally gravitate towards the richest resources. 
Hence, in Yunnan, local core industries (i.e. highly resource-dependent heavy in-
dustries) got the most funding, and inflows of new technology and advanced ma-
chinery brought about significant growth in productivity. In other words, the adop-
tion of new technology and machines largely promoted local core industry and 
enhanced the local industrial structure. The result of these external forces and state 
activity was to substantially extend and invigorate the existing local development 
path with new technology and new forms of organization, and to pave the way for 
modern mechanized production methods. Since the state retained control over re-
sources, the distribution of these local resources, the dominant position of state-
owned resource-dependent industries in the Yunnan economy, and the determining 
role of the state in coordinating economic activities, all remained unchanged and 
were even enhanced during the process. 
In short, factors external to the conceptual framework of the business system 
— namely migration, the opening of the railway, and the colonial project — as well 
as the role of state, each played a crucial role in promoting the development of local 
core industries. A state-led and highly resource-dependent development trajectory 
can be observed in Yunnan, which shaped the early form of the existing Yunnan 
business system and has had a profound impact on regional development.  
 
Before 1949, Zhejiang and Yunnan both made the transition from a feudal mode 
of production to the path towards modern manufacturing systems. However, the 
processes of industrialization in Zhejiang and Yunnan exhibited huge regional 
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differences. Zhejiang and Yunnan followed very different development trajectories 
in the imperial era. For example, Zhejiang had entered the phase of proto-industri-
alization during the Song period (920–1279), while the transition in the farming 
system in Yunnan (i.e. the shift of the agricultural population from agrarian produc-
tion to manufacturing and commerce) began in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), after 
new agricultural technologies and farming practices had been introduced by immi-
grants. Moreover, compared with the vast waterway system and well-developed 
ship-building industry in Zhejiang, the major form of transportation in Yunnan be-
fore the establishment of the Kunming–Haiphong railway in the early 20th century 
was road transport, which significantly restricted the development of the supra-
regional market.  
The discussion above indicates that the regional development trajectories of 
Zhejiang and Yunnan were shaped by both internal and external factors to the busi-
ness system. While exogenous forces played an essential role in the transition pro-
cess in both provinces, they were especially significant in bringing changes in tech-
nology and production methods in Yunnan. The major transitions in Yunnan (i.e. 
the transition in agricultural farming systems and the transition from hand produc-
tion methods to modern factory industrialization) were initiated by exogenous 
forces. Without exogenous forces, it is unlikely that Yunnan would have been able 
to embrace the process of industrialization and expand its market.  
It is worth noting that the transition to factory industrialization in the two prov-
inces did not bring about the trend towards convergence of a homogeneous and 
monotonic type over time, but rather enhanced and promoted the two distinctive 
regional development trajectories. Since the imperial period, Zhejiang has followed 
a market-led development trajectory while Yunnan’s path has been state-led. Re-
gional core industries have attracted and received the most funding, including FDI 
with associated inflows of new technology and advanced machinery, as well as state 
investments, further enhancing the regional industrial structures. Given the highly 
concentrated ownership of local resources and regional core industries, the monop-
olized local market, and the high level of state intervention in the local economy, 
Yunnan can hardly be said to have established a market-oriented regional develop-
ment trajectory, let alone to have promoted the emergence of capitalism. An in-
creasing divergence between the local economic development paths of Zhejiang 
and Yunnan before 1949 can thus be observed. The institutional changes in the two 
provinces (i.e. the transition from the feudal agrarian society to Zhejiang’s modern 
industrial capitalism and Yunnan’s state monopoly) shaped and were shaped by the 
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region-specific industrial structure, which in turn reinforced the tendency towards 
a relatively cohesive system at the local level, even in the transitional feudal econ-
omy. 
To sum up, the path of development in Zhejiang and Yunnan, which culminated 
in the market-led business system in Zhejiang and the state-led business system in 
Yunnan described in Chapter 4, can be traced back with a relatively high degree of 
consistency to events and developments long before the establishment of P.R. 
China.  
5.2 The position of Zhejiang and Yunnan in the planned 
economy period (1949–1978)  
5.2.1 An overview of the planned economy in China 
China had begun the process of transition from a feudal agrarian society to a mod-
ern industrial society before the establishment of P.R. China in 1949. However, 
successive years of wars and social upheaval significantly interrupted the process of 
transition and caused economic devastation. In 1949, the country’s total output was 
only 44.6 billion yuan (5.74 billion euro), 70% of which was generated by the agri-
cultural sector, while 30% came from the industrial sector (Hu 2001), with the out-
put of modern industry accounting for about 17% of the total output (Chen, Y. 
2004: 50). These figures indicate that the economy of most parts of China remained 
predominantly agricultural with limited industrial growth. 
When P.R. China was founded in 1949, the central government made rapid eco-
nomic recovery and industrialization its top priorities. Based on the process of Eu-
ropean industrialization, the common view was that the optimum industrialization 
sequence must necessarily start with the development of light industry (such as tex-
tiles) (Teubal 1973). This pattern could also be observed in the phase of proto-
industrialization in Zhejiang. However, in the early 1950s, the industrialization strat-
egy in China was based on the development of heavy industry. The concentration 
on heavy industry in the initial stage of industrialization was not only to imitate the 
Soviet economic system but was also based on the argument that this was the opti-
mum way to quickly boost productivity and accelerate the process of industrializa-
tion, in light of the given factor endowments for manufacturing. More specifically, 
the total resident savings deposit in 1952 was only 860 million yuan (110 million 
euro) (Hu 2001), and net exports in China had been negative during wartime, which 
resulted in very small foreign exchange reserves in the early 1950s (ibid.). This com-
bination of low savings ratio and small foreign exchange reserves meant there were 
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insufficient national savings to fund a rapid economic recovery and to promote 
sustainable industrialization.  
Under these circumstances, the new government believed that a highly central-
ized and unified economic system would be the best way to achieve the transition 
from an agricultural economy to a mass manufacturing-based economy, as it would 
allow the government to efficiently allocate scarce resources. In short, according to 
national development strategy in the early 1950s, the development of heavy industry, 
as the starting point of industrialization, would spur growth in light industry and 
eventually build an independent industrial system. Therefore, a heavy industry-ori-
ented development strategy was developed and implemented through a highly cen-
tralized form of economic planning in China from 1949 to 1978. 
 
The highly centralized and unified economic system 
After the establishment of P.R. China, and in order to lay the foundation for pro-
moting its heavy industry-oriented strategy of industrialization, the central govern-
ment launched the first Five-Year Plan (1953–1957) which concentrated on invest-
ing in industry-based projects, establishing enterprises, and collectivizing or 
nationalizing agriculture, the handicraft industry, and private enterprises, known as 
socialist transformation. More specifically, under this first Five-Year Plan, there was 
a sharp increase in the number of projects and central enterprises. From 1953 to 
1957, the central government launched 694 industry-based projects, 85% of which 
involved heavy industry; 156 projects were assisted by the Soviet Union (Hu 2001). 
The number of central government-owned and operated enterprises rose from 
2,800 in 1953 to 9,300 in 1957 (Yu, J. 2019). At the same time, to maximize the 
efficient use of scarce resources and to coordinate economic activities, the central 
government extended the socialist transformation to “all sectors relating to the na-
tional economy” (Hu 2001). Public–private partnership enterprises were adopted 
for assistance in the socialist transformation process of private enterprises. By the 
end of 1956, the agricultural and industrial sectors had completed the process of 
transition (Hu 2001). In 1957, the number of industrial enterprises, including SOEs 
and public–private enterprises, reached 170,000 (National Bureau of Statistics 1999). 
All aspects of procurement, investment, production, supply and distribution, pric-
ing, and financial activities (firms were designated a specific bank account and su-
pervised by a commissioner) were entirely controlled and regulated by the state (Hu 
2001, Coase and Wang 2016: 7).  
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A highly centralized fiscal system was implemented to unify the management of 
subnational revenues and expenses. According to the “Decision on Centralized and 
Unified Administration on Fiscal Revenues and Expenditures” issued in 1950, in 
order to minimize expenditure and maximize utility, (a) local revenue and expendi-
ture budgets were assessed and determined by the central government, (b) local 
governments were required to turn local revenue over to the central government, 
(c) local expenditure was apportioned and determined by the central government, 
and (d) enterprises were not allowed to retain their profits, and costs were taken 
from local expenditure (He et al. 1990). A unified revenue collection and budget 
apportionment fiscal system (tong zhi tong shou), also known as “eating from one big 
pot” (chi da guo fan), was thus established (Qian 1999, Lin and Liu 2000). 
With fiscal management highly concentrated in the central government, local 
governments had no separate budget and also had no managerial right to adjust the 
operating budget (Qian 1999, Lin and Liu 2000). Under the unified fiscal system, 
local expenditure was not linked to local revenue, so that the subnational govern-
ments were not responsible for the financial consequences of allocation decisions. 
Also, the budget apportionment system left no room for inter-jurisdictional coor-
dination. Although the fiscal system was initially designed with the aim of balancing 
the budget and improving operational efficiency, it failed to provide subnational 
governments with incentives to devote themselves to local economic development. 
Furthermore, the highly unified fiscal system might enable the central government 
to allocate scarce resources efficiently; however, information and coordination 
problems were inevitable. First, as the increasing number of enterprises and projects 
had been established by the central government without delegating managerial au-
tonomy to local authorities and enterprises, the central government experienced 
unavoidable managerial and supervisory difficulties. Second, in the planned econ-
omy, prices of all commodities for producers and consumers were set by the central 
government. However, without a market mechanism, price signals are invalid. It 
was therefore difficult for the central price-setting authority to collect the actual 
information on demand and supply that was needed to determine prices and create 
a rational pricing system — an issue which eventually damaged economic efficiency. 
The central government gradually realized the managerial and supervisory diffi-
culties generated by the overcentralized economic system, such as asymmetric in-
formation, coordination difficulties, price distortion, and economic inefficiency (Hu 
2001; Du, C. 2009). Therefore, in 1956, Mao Zedong gave a speech on “The Ten 
Major Relationships”, in which he emphasized the importance of mobilizing initia-
tives of both central and local governments and proposed reshaping the relationship 
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between central and local governments through delegating decision-making power 
and supervisory duties to local authorities (Mao 1977). This speech provided a foun-
dation for the decentralization drive during the pre-reform period (Mao 1977, Hu 
2001, Du, C. 2009). 
 
The attempts at decentralization during the pre-reform period  
To ease managerial and supervisory problems, while at the same time maintaining 
the centralized and unified economic system, the central government adjusted fiscal 
arrangements multiple times from 1957 to 1978.  
In late 1957, the State Council stipulated a series of regulations for delegating 
decision-making power and supervisory duties to subnational authorities. By the 
end of 1958, the supervisory duties and managerial rights of about 80% of industrial 
enterprises had been devolved to local governments (State Council, Government 
of China 1958, Zhang, M. 2013). Yu, J. (2019) Notes that 70% of delegated indus-
trial enterprises were engaged in heavy industry, and that 8,100 out of 9,300 central 
government-owned and operated enterprises were devolved and under the super-
vision of local governments. At the same time, a system of dual leadership was 
adopted for supervising and managing enterprises (State Council, Government of 
China 1957). More specifically, the central government mandated targets of pro-
duction, number of employees, wages, and profits for delegated firms, and con-
trolled the distribution of resources (State Council, Government of China 1957). 
Meanwhile, local governments were allowed to adjust the resource allocation based 
on actual need, on condition that delegated firms fulfilled their production tasks, 
and to retain 20% of government-mandated profits from the delegated firms and a 
portion of additional profits13 when excess products were produced (ibid.).  
In 1958 the central government implemented a five-year fiscal arrangement, 
known as the determination of expenditures by revenues (yi shou ding zhi), which 
precisely specified the scope of local governments’ revenues and expenditures and 
ratified local budgets and the percentage of shared local revenue (Standing Com-
mittee of the National People’s Congress 1958). More importantly, local govern-
ments were empowered to retain additional revenue and arrange expenditure (ibid.). 
The percentage of local expenditures to total expenditures increased substantially 
from 29% in 1957 to 55% in 1961 (Zhang, Q. 2011). These figures indicate that the 
adjustment of fiscal arrangements after 1958 gave decision-making authority to lo-
cal governments and fostered local initiatives.  
559831-L-bw-Lu
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 159
 The Historical Developmental Path of Zhejiang and Yunnan 139 
However, the central government rushed into decentralization. Local govern-
ments were inexperienced in organizing economic activities, having had limited au-
tonomy and no authority over local expenditures from 1949 to 1957. Therefore, 
under resource-scarce conditions, the sudden delegation of authority directly re-
sulted in regional protectionism and the radical and overambitious Great Leap For-
ward campaign (1958–1962), and also substantially increased the gap between the 
growth of heavy industry and that of light industry, since local governments had to 
allocate scarce resources to fulfill the targets for heavy industry (Hu 2001). These 
problems caused a severe deterioration of the national economy. The central gov-
ernment decided to recentralize, taking autonomy away from local authorities and 
back to the central government, to restore order and deal with the economy. In 
1959, the “Zong Er Fen Cheng” fiscal arrangement was applied, in which the cen-
tral government determined the distribution of revenues between central and local 
governments once a year (Chen and Guo 2016: 98). In 1962, the proportion of local 
revenue to total revenue was less than 40% (Zhang, Q. 2011). The supervisory du-
ties and managerial rights of delegated industrial enterprises were also retrieved 
from local authorities. The number of central government-owned and operated en-
terprises jumped from 1,200 in 1958 to 10,533 by the end of 1965, which together 
produced 42.2% of total industrial output (Lin 1999: 32).  
However, under the recentralized administrative system, information and coor-
dination problems returned. Consequently, after the recovery from the severe eco-
nomic recession caused by the Great Leap Forward campaign, the central govern-
ment decided to conduct the second wave of decentralization during the pre-reform 
period.  
In 1971, the central government implemented an annual reassignment of fiscal 
contractual responsibility policy (ding shou ding zhi, shou zhi bao gan), which substan-
tially expanded local financial power and fiscal responsibilities and provided local 
authorities with greater incentives for local development (Chen and Guo 2016: 98–
99). This fiscal arrangement prescribed revenue and expenditure responsibilities for 
local governments and set an exact quota of revenues which should be turned over 
to the central government (ibid.). Importantly, local governments were allowed to 
retain excess profits or received grants for deficits (ibid.). In 1974, local revenue 
accounted for 82.8% of total revenue (National Bureau of Statistics 2017). In 1969, 
the central government had downsized the number of administrative divisions of 
central governments from 90 to 27, and once again devolved decision-making 
power and supervisory duties to subnational authorities (Zhao, X. 2007). From 1965 
to 1976, the number of central government-owned and operated enterprises 
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declined sharply from 10,533 to 1,600 (ibid.). However, due to the economic and 
political chaos caused by the Cultural Revolution, in 1974, the central government 
decided to recentralize financial power by fixing the percentages of profit retention 
and prescribing expenditures. In 1976, fiscal arrangements were modified again to 
provide incentives for local governments (Chen and Guo 2016: 98–99).  
As this discussion shows, the serious managerial and supervisory difficulties 
which were generated by overcentralization compelled the central government to 
adjust fiscal arrangements and increase subnational authorities’ decision-making 
power and supervisory duties. Although the central government made several at-
tempts to decentralize financial power between 1950 and 1978, the pre-reform pe-
riod was characterized by a highly unified and centralized fiscal system of revenue 
collection and budget appropriation (Qian 1999, Lin and Liu 2000). In other words, 
during this period, all of the fiscal rearrangements were applied under the planned 
economic system. The central government acted as the main investor and played an 
absolute leading role in economic development; decentralization during the pre-
reform era failed to delegate actual decision-making power and managerial rights to 
local governments. Moreover, the main aim of decentralization, prior to reform, 
was not to change the role of local governments in regional economic development, 
but simply to solve information and coordination problems and provide incentives. 
This examination of the development trajectory in the planned economy period, 
including the severe economic recession and the economic consequences of the 
radical and overambitious political and economic campaign during the pre-reform 
period, provides convincing evidence that:  
a. The “imported” and “transplanted” Soviet unified and centralized economic 
system was not the optimal option for deploying China’s scarce resources 
and promoting its industrialization in a sustainable way;  
b. The choice of heavy industry-oriented development strategy failed to build 
up an independent industrial system and caused unbalanced growth of 
heavy industry vis-à-vis light industry.  
Due to the absence of market mechanisms and actual decision-making power 
for subnational authorities, information and coordination problems, allocative inef-
ficiency, and lack of incentives were inevitable in the highly centralized and unified 
planned economy system. In short, the planned economy system in place from the 
1950s to 1978 had been proved a failure. Although the central government was 
unable to establish efficient and relatively stable fiscal arrangements, it did gain 
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practical experience from the unsuccessful attempts of decentralization during this 
period, which, to a certain degree, reduced the fiscal policy implementation barriers 
for the coming economic reform in China. Therefore, once the political chaos 
ended, the central government immediately began the market-oriented transition 
from a planned economy to a market economy. 
 
5.2.2 The marginalized position of Zhejiang in the planned economy 
period (1949–1978) 
As already described, long before the establishment of P.R. China, Zhejiang had 
been on the path towards modern industrialization and capitalism, with an identifi-
able market-oriented development trajectory. However, due to the implementation 
of the socialist transformation of private enterprises from 1953 to 1957, the pre-
dominant private sector enterprises and private financial system in Zhejiang had 
been collectivized or nationalized (Chen 2005).  
To achieve the transition from an agricultural economy to a mass manufactur-
ing-based economy, a heavy industry-oriented development strategy with a highly 
centralized form of economic planning was developed and implemented in China 
from 1949 to 1978. For reasons of national security, the central government would 
not initially select regions situated in the coastal area to establish the core heavy 
industries.14 As Zhejiang province is situated in the eastern coastal area, it was not 
given any priority by the central government during the initial period of the estab-
lishment of China (Coase and Wang 2016). Moreover, Zhejiang is poorly suited to 
developing heavy industry due to its scarcity of major energy, metal, and mineral 
resources. Hence, from the early 1950s to the late 1970s, because of its location and 
geographic constraints, Zhejiang province was marginalized in the state’s heavy in-
dustry-oriented development strategy and received very little central government 
investment.  
The total national investment in infrastructure from 1953 to 1978 was 646.4 
billion yuan (81.1billion euro), while the infrastructure investment in Zhejiang was 
only 9.9 billion yuan (1.24 billion euro), accounting for 1.5% of total investment, 
which ranked about 24th out of 31 provinces and autonomous regions. From 1952 
to 1978, the state investment per person in Zhejiang was 411 yuan (51.5 euro), just 
50% of the average national level, and the lowest in China (Ma, L. 2008). Moreover, 
as Table 5.1 shows, from 1953 to 1980 the number of medium and large-sized pro-
jects launched in Zhejiang was extremely small. From 1953 to 1957 central govern-
ment invested in just seven projects in Zhejiang; the only regions with lower num-
bers of projects were Guangxi (three) and Tibet (three) (National Bureau of 
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Statistics 1996). After a slight increase from 1958 to 1965, the number of projects 
dropped again, representing 0.9% of the total number of centrally funded projects 
from 1971 to 1975 and ranked 26th among 31 provinces and autonomous regions. 
(National Bureau of Statistics 1996).       
Table 5.1 
The medium and large sized of project launched in Zhejiang (1953–1980)  
 1953-1957 1958-1962 1963-1965 1966-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 
National  595 581 355 743 742 515 
Zhejiang  7 16 11 9 7 18 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 1996 
Being marginalized in the heavy industry-oriented development plan, receiving 
little central government investment, and carrying out very few medium and large-
sized projects, the growth of the state sector in Zhejiang remained weak, even under 
the highly unified and centralized arrangement. 
Figure 5.2 
The distribution of GRP in Zhejiang (1952–1978) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 1996 
During the planned economy era, the agricultural sector had a dominant posi-
tion in Zhejiang. Figure 5.2 shows that from 1952 to 1978, the agricultural sector 
contributed the largest proportion of GRP in Zhejiang, surpassing the industrial 
and services sectors. Although the output of the industrial sector in Zhejiang grad-
ually increased, in 1978 the proportion of industrial output in Zhejiang was 5.3% 
lower than the overall proportion of industrial sector output in China, while the 
proportion of agricultural output in Zhejiang was 9.4% higher than the national 
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average (National Bureau of Statistics 1996). In the same year, the agricultural pop-
ulation accounted for 88.6% of the total population in Zhejiang (Zhejiang Bureau 
of Statistics 2016). However, due to the stagnation of agricultural technology, the 
lack of spare land for agricultural expansion, Zhejiang’s marginalized position in the 
national development strategy, and restrictions on migration, especially for rural 
workers, there was an increasing problem of surplus agricultural labour struggling 
to survive. Taking Wenzhou as an example, in 1978, there were at least one million 
people who could be classed as surplus agricultural labour (Ma 2009: 6). In the con-
text of the serious economic conditions that afflicted all of China as a result of 
overcentralization, surplus agricultural labour in Zhejiang was eager to move away 
from the land and search for employment. At the same time, the severe problem of 
unemployment also spurred local governments to put more efforts into creating job 
opportunities.  
In summary, during the pre-reform period, Zhejiang was marginalized in the 
national development strategy, which seriously affected local economic develop-
ment. Simultaneously, the highly centralized and unified fiscal system failed to pro-
vide incentives to local governments to promote regional development. This “pas-
sive” economic development path resulted in the slow growth of the state-owned 
industrial sector. However, precisely because of its weak state sector, Zhejiang 
would find itself at an institutional advantage in the coming transition from planned 
economy to market economy. 
  
5.2.3 The Third Front Movement in Yunnan in the planned economy 
period (1949–1978) 
As described above, Yunnan was in a very different position to Zhejiang. Because 
of its rich mineral and metal reserves, the state and local ruling parties in Yunnan 
had kept direct control over the ownership of core resource-dependent industries 
since the imperial period. Long before the establishment of P.R. China, the state-
owned resource-based heavy-industry enterprises absolutely dominated the Yunnan 
economy, which resulted in the absence of the private sector in local economic 
development for centuries. Unlike Zhejiang, the development trajectory in Yunnan 
before 1949 was state-led and highly resource-dependent. After P.R. China was 
founded in 1949, the central government took over the enterprises owned by the 
military government or KMT, which were mainly involved in resource-based heavy 
industry. Due to the long-standing and highly concentrated ownership of enter-
prises, the regional industrial structure — including the predominant forms of en-
terprise and the main driving forces of the local economy — had remained virtually 
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unchanged throughout successive years of social upheaval and had even been en-
hanced in the planned economy period. The central government’s heavy industry-
oriented development strategy was closely aligned with the existing industrial struc-
ture and economic configuration in Yunnan. Hence, the state-led and resource-de-
pendent heavy industries’ dominance of the regional development path in Yunnan 
had persisted and increased. 
From 1964, based on national defence considerations, the central government 
instigated the “Third Front Movement”, which was primarily a military-oriented 
development programme (Naughton 1988: 351). The “Third Front” was a military 
geographical concept, which involved 13 provinces in southwest and mid-western 
regions in China, including Yunnan province (Chao 2009). In order to create a self-
sufficient industrial base area for a strategic reserve, the central government directly 
invested in national defence through military hardware, but also through infrastruc-
ture such as transportation, mining, machinery production, energy plants, etc. 
(Naughton 1988). 
In 1965, the central government drew up the Third Five-Year Plan (1966–1970) 
and launched 21 national projects, including coal mining, electric power supply, fer-
tilizer production, and road building, and involving a total of 220 million yuan (27.8 
million euro) of investment in Yunnan. At the same time, the provincial govern-
ment initiated 59 provincial projects and invested 329.8 million yuan (41.7 million 
euro) in heavy industry and infrastructure (Chao 2009). In 1966 the amount of in-
vestment in fixed assets in Yunnan was 1.1 billion (0.14 billion euro), ranked 4th 
out of 31 provinces and autonomous regions, and in the following years, the annual 
investment averaged 800 million to 900 million yuan (100–112 million euro) (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics 1996). However, due to the economic and political chaos 
caused by the Cultural Revolution, only 40% of projects were completed, which 
caused huge losses and exerted a significantly negative impact on Yunnan’s eco-
nomic development (Chao 2009: 105).  
In 1969, the central government decided to launch the second round of the 
Third Front Movement, in which it planned to build a strategic base in Yunnan and 
encouraged the utilization of the region’s mineral and metal resources in developing 
the steelmaking and other nonferrous metal making industry (Chao 2009: 106). 
Thus, the provincial government selected Kunming, Qujing, Dali, and nearby areas 
to establish a heavy industry strategic base. From 1969 to 1973, 70% of infrastruc-
ture investment went to the selected areas. Moreover, from 1969 to 1971, 53 ord-
nance factories, shipyards, and communications equipment factories were 
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established (ibid.: 107). Yunnan’s total industrial output value in 1969 was 2.2 billion 
yuan (0.28 billion euro), which ended the downward trend of its industrial output 
in previous years (ibid.). However, this costly programme resulted in a severe im-
balance between agriculture, light, and heavy industry, with the result that, in 1973, 
the provincial government had to reduce infrastructure investment by 15% and give 
priority to the development of agriculture (ibid.).  
In 1980, the Third Front Movement came to an end. From 1953 to 1978, the 
total investment in infrastructure in Yunnan was 17.4 billion yuan (2.18 billion euro), 
and from 1966 to 1980, central government carried on 64 national projects and 
invested 15.1 billion yuan (1.9 billion euro) in Yunnan, accounting for 7.35% of 
total national investment (National Bureau of Statistics 1996, Chao 2009: 105). Dur-
ing the Third Front Movement, 168 “Third Front” enterprises were established, 
including 38 military industry enterprises and 126 enterprises in heavy industry 
(Chao 2006: 33). By 1980, there were 47 military enterprises in weapons manufac-
turing, shipbuilding, aerospace, the electronics industry, and the nuclear industry 
(ibid.). With the enormous national and provincial investment in heavy industry and 
infrastructure construction, Qujing became the second-largest industrial city in 
Yunnan.  
Since its establishment in the Yuan dynasty, Yunnan has gone through dramatic 
shifts from a state monopoly economy to a planned economy. It is interesting that 
for centuries, although Yunnan has experienced these major changes, the industrial 
structure, the distribution of local resources, and the predominant type of enter-
prises has not changed. During the Ming-Qing period, the imperial state maintained 
tight control over local resources; during wartime, the provincial military govern-
ment and KMT monopolized the local core industries; and after P. R. China was 
founded, the central government adopted a highly centralized and unified economic 
system. During the pre-reform period, with central government investment, Yun-
nan’s dominant industrial and institutional features — a strong state sector, the pre-
dominance of highly resource-dependent heavy industries, and the long-term ab-
sence of the private sector — were strengthened and enhanced. However, the long-
standing institutional and industrial features in Yunnan generated a relatively high 
level of “institutional stickiness” in regional development and became an institu-
tional disadvantage in the transition from planned economy to market economy. 
To sum up, prior to 1949, Zhejiang and Yunnan were on very different devel-
opment trajectories and the processes of industrialization in the two provinces 
showed huge regional differences. Although both were eventually able to move 
away from a feudal mode of production towards a modern manufacturing system, 
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the transition to industrialization in the two provinces did not illustrate the trend 
towards convergence of a homogeneous and monotonic type over time, but rather 
formed two distinctive regional development trajectories: Zhejiang’s market-led and 
Yunnan’s state-led developmental paths.  
In the transition from the feudal economy towards industrialization and mod-
ernization, the developmental paths of Zhejiang and Yunnan showed a clear ten-
dency to shape a cohesive system at the regional level. The regional development 
paths and the local industrial, economic, and institutional structures and configura-
tions in the two provinces were substantially enhanced and promoted by adopting 
new technologies and methods of production. However, after the establishment of 
P.R. China, the imposition of a highly centralized and unified economic system left 
little room for subnational authorities to promote regional economic development. 
The socialist transformation compelled Zhejiang to deviate from its market-led de-
velopment trajectory, while Yunnan’s development trajectory persisted and was en-
hanced. Hence, the highly unified and centralized arrangement, the socialist trans-
formation, and the heavy industry-oriented development strategy formed an 
institutionally monotonic type of development trajectory. 
Although, institutionally, both Zhejiang and Yunnan completed the socialist 
transformation and carried out national development plans, the regional differences 
between them persisted. The implementation of the national development strategy 
at the local level was shaped by the region-specific resource base and geography, as 
well as institutional setting. Thus, the implementation of the monotonic type of 
development trajectory at the national level did not bring about convergence to a 
homogeneous and monotonic type of development in Zhejiang and Yunnan. The 
path of development in Yunnan during the pre-reform period was highly consistent 
with the pre-existing industrial and institutional configurations, while the develop-
ment of the state sector in Zhejiang was relatively slow.  
An examination of the transition from feudal system to proto-industrialization 
and then socialism in Zhejiang and Yunnan shows that the process was full of con-
flicts, involving social order, institutional structure, the distribution of interests, and 
the emergence of novelty. The discussion above has already answered the questions 
listed at the beginning of this chapter.  
a. The great diversity of regional historical circumstances and conditions and 
the pre-existing industrial and institutional arrangements in Zhejiang and 
Yunnan dating back to the imperial period do matter. Internal factors, such 
as the regional resource base (especially in Yunnan), geographical location, 
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industrial structure, and the strength of state intervention in local economic 
activities (the role of the state), and external factors, such as cultural factors, 
exogenous forces like migration and the inflow of FDI and new technolo-
gies, mutually shaped the historical development trajectories in Zhejiang 
and Yunnan. The pre-existing industrial and institutional configurations 
and structures are not only relevant to economic processes and outcomes 
but also exert a profound impact on the existing forms of development 
patterns.  
b. The highly unified and centralized arrangement and the socialist transfor-
mation during the period of the planned economy did not completely alter 
the pre-existing regional economic and institutional configurations, or elim-
inate the regional differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. Although 
Zhejiang and Yunnan institutionally formed a monotonic development tra-
jectory during this period, the heavy industries and the state sector in 
Zhejiang were not well developed, while the industrial structure and the 
state sector in Yunnan had been significantly enhanced. The regional dif-
ferences between Zhejiang and Yunnan had persisted during the planned 





1 The population of the Yangtze River Delta region was about 8.7 million in the early 
Ming dynasty, and in the mid-Qing period, the number reached 26.4 million (Li, B. 
1985: 160). 
2 Agricultural production first increased because of the increase in capital and labour 
inputs and then achieved an equilibrium (Perkins, as cited in Chen, N. 1972). 
3 From the time of the Song dynasty, handicraft making in Zhejiang included porce-
lain and pottery making, wood and stone carving, and basket making (Yang 1993, 
Zhang and Yang, 2006, Ji and Wang 2014).  
4 Ship building in Zhejiang was in a leading position during the Song dynasty (960–
1279), which contributed the major part of Song’s fiscal revenues (Zhang and Yang 
2006).  
5 Compared with merchants in Zhejiang, the merchant groups from other regions, 
like Shanxi (jin shang), Anhui (hui shang), Jiangsu (su shang), and Guangdong (yue shang), 
seldom diversified their businesses.  
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6 For example, textiles and apparel, matches, and electric bulb manufacturing, paper 
making, oil-pressing, etc. 
7 The first Opium War (1839–42) was fought between the Qing and Britain. It was 
the result of the imperial state’s attempt to suppress the illegal opium trade, which 
had led to widespread addiction in imperial China and was causing serious social 
and economic disruption. British traders were the primary source of the drug in 
China (Pletcher 2020). 
8 To solve the fund-raising problem, the imperial government introduced imperial 
state–private co-ownership enterprises in the mining industry (Ma 1981). Although 
the imperial state encouraged local merchants to invest in mining, the proportion 
of local merchants was relatively low (Ma 1981, Li, G. 1995). 
9 The imperial state-owned and state–private co-ownership factories were mainly in-
volved in mining, minting, and handicraft making (Ma 1981, Li, G. 1995).   
10 The Yunnan Clique grew out of the New Army, which was formed by the imperial 
state of the Qing dynasty following Western standards. After the start of the Xinhai 
Revolution, which aimed at overthrowing the rule of the Qing government, the New 
Army in Yunnan joined the Beiyang army and took control of Yunnan from the im-
perial state. 
11 When the Qing dynasty came to an end, the Beiyang government took over China 
for a short period (1912–1928). The army of the Beiyang government was called the 
Beiyang army. The warlords in Yunnan initially came from this army. Although they 
did not belong to KMT at start, some of the warlords in Yunnan cooperated and 
united with KMT. Yunnan Clique kept the full autonomy of Yunnan. 
12 From 1368 to 1424, about 2 million people moved to and settled in Yunnan, which 
not only resulted in an expansion of cultivated land but also brought new agricultural 
technologies and farming practices such as the introduction of agricultural tools, and 
the double cropping of rice and other grains (Wang 2004, Yang, B. 2009).  
13 The amount of additional retained profits was decided by the central government. 
14 After the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the KMT retreated to Taiwan. In 
the 1950s, KMT President Chiang Kai-shek launched plans to counterattack main-
land China, such as “Project National Glory”. 
559831-L-bw-Lu





The Development Trajectories of 




Chapter 5 showed that the planned economy system from 1949 to 1978 was a fail-
ure. The unsuccessful attempts at decentralization during the pre-reform period 
failed to delegate actual decision-making power and managerial rights to local gov-
ernments and SOEs. The severe managerial and supervisory difficulties, infor-
mation and coordination problems, subnational authorities’ lack of incentives, and 
unbalanced growth of heavy industry and light industry seemed impossible to re-
solve in this highly centralized and unified system. Nevertheless, despite the disap-
pointing results, the practical experiences from decentralization facilitated the im-
plementation of decentralization policies in the economic reform that was to come 
in China. Therefore, once the political chaos had ended and the dust had settled, 
the central government was in a position to conduct a radical institutional transition 
from planned economy to market economy in order to restore order and rebuild 
the devastated economy.  
In the pre-reform period, both Zhejiang and Yunnan had completed the socialist 
transformation and taken part in national development plans; however, as we saw 
in Chapter 5, the regional differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan persisted.  
The main aim of this research is to analyse the developmental path of Zhejiang 
and Yunnan; therefore, in this chapter, the following questions will be addressed:  
a. How have the development trajectories of Zhejiang and Yunnan been 
changed and (re)formed in the radical transition from planned economy to 
market economy?  
b. How do economic actors, such as local governments and enterprises, react, 
respond, or adjust their behaviour to this radical policy change?  
c. How does the market-oriented reform alter the pre-existing regional eco-
nomic and institutional configurations and regional differences?  
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As emphasized earlier in this research, economic actions and behaviour follow 
a specific logic within the given economic and institutional arrangements. The cen-
tral government’s policies play a key role in forming economic and institutional ar-
rangements, which condition the regional institutional environment for economic 
actors (e.g. subnational authorities and enterprises). Therefore, before answering 
the questions listed above, the detailed economic reform process will first be intro-
duced.  
6.1 The overview of economic reform in China 
Having experienced the severe economic recession caused by the over-centralized 
economic system and the radical and overambitious political and economic cam-
paigns during the pre-reform period, the major objectives of economic reform were 
to devolve actual decision-making power to enterprises and local governments, to 
bring in the market mechanism, and to provide incentives to subnational authorities 
and enterprises. The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China in December 1978 marked the start of economic reform. 
This section will examine how economic reform has been conducted in China. 
 As the major target of economic reform, decentralization will be studied from 
the perspective of enterprises (involving the reform of SOEs and the development 
of the private sector), and the perspective of the central and local levels of govern-
ment (the fiscal decentralization at both levels, and the subnational fiscal systems). 
To fully understand the continued enthusiasm of local governments in China for 
promoting local economic development, two main factors can be highlighted: a) the 
incentives provided by decentralization reform; and b) the Chinese cadre manage-
ment and promotion system. 
 
6.1.1 Decentralization  
Decentralization to markets: The reform of SOEs and the development 
of the private sector  
During the pre-reform period, all sectors relating to the national economy had com-
pleted the process of nationalization and socialist transformation. The overconcen-
tration of authority in the management structure resulted in managerial and super-
visory difficulties and problems of inefficiency, and also failed to provide incentives 
to enterprises to increase productivity. Hence, two core goals in the transition from 
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a planned to a market economy were the delegation of authority to enterprises, in-
cluding SOE reform, and the development of the private sector.  
 
(1) The reform of SOEs  
In the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China, the central government emphasized that the priority of economic 
development was the growth of productivity by devolving decision-making power 
to both SOEs and local governments. In 1979, the central government carried out 
SOE reform and directly delegated power to SOEs by allowing them to retain profit 
and by expanding managerial autonomy. This was the first time that the central 
government had directly delegated authority to SOEs (Coase and Wang 2016: 39–
40). In 1980, the State Council announced that 60% of retained profits were to be 
used for the enterprise’s development and 40% of retained profits were to be used 
for workers’ bonuses (Zhou 2013). In 1981, the central government decided to del-
egate more autonomy to enterprises, requiring them to assume responsibility for 
profits and losses under the profit-retention system (ibid.).  
However, the profit-retention system proved problematic: in order to maximize 
the retained profit, a large number of SOEs intentionally underreported their profits. 
Hence, in 1984, the central government introduced a taxation system with a 55% 
profit tax rate to replace the profit-retention system. The taxation system officially 
specified the distribution of profits between SOEs and governments (Zhou 2013). 
This gave rise to new problems, as the 55% profit tax rate and the 10% average 
adjustment tax rate cut deep into the SOEs’ profits and reduced their productivity 
incentives. As a result, SOEs’ output and fiscal revenue declined continuously for 
22 months (Zhou 2013). The central government therefore introduced the mana-
gerial responsibility contract system in factories and enterprises to increase the 
profit retained after tax, and to delegate more power to enterprises, separating own-
ership from management rights, and clarifying the division of responsibilities and 
powers between the government and enterprises (Huang, Q. 2018).  
It is undeniable that from 1984 to 1992, the central government went to consid-
erable lengths to delegate more power to SOEs and to separate ownership from 
management rights. However, production activities were still prescribed by state 
plans. Hence, the implementation of the taxation system and the contract manage-
ment responsibility system did not alter the fundamental relationship between the 
state and enterprises (Zhou 2013). A speech by Deng Xiaoping in 1992 marked a 
turning point in SOE reform, and the Constitution issued in 1993 modified the 
Chinese economic system from a planned economy (as per the Constitution of 
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1954–1988) into a market-oriented economy. The central government specified that 
the goal for SOE reform was to establish a “modern” corporate system, which clar-
ified issues of property rights, and specified the separate responsibilities, powers, 
and functions of the government and enterprises. In 1994, the “modern” corporate 
system, i.e. the joint-stock company, was introduced in 100 enterprises on a trial 
basis for two years (He 1995). In 1996, the process of converting SOEs into joint-
stock companies was implemented nationally (ibid.). 
However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the central government established SASAC 
in 2003 to appoint executive directors who would supervise and approve companies’ 
major decisions. Given that SASAC still appoints a high percentage of executive 
directors, SOEs are still subject to a substantial degree of state involvement in their 
day to day management. Furthermore, in practice, the salaries of employees are not 
linked to productivity (Han 2010), meaning that SOEs do not provide strong in-
centives to workers to increase productivity and improve their products. Hence, 
future SOE reforms still need to introduce market mechanisms and delegate real 
managerial autonomy to SOEs. The inefficient management structure of SOEs has 
become one of the major obstacles in the economic reform, especially in regions 
with a strong state sector, such as Yunnan. 
 
(2) The development of the private sector 
Privatization began in rural areas. In 1979, the central government introduced the 
“Household Responsibility System” in rural areas. During the pre-reform period, 
the people’s commune system was adopted in rural areas, with three levels of ad-
ministrative hierarchy: production team (the basic unit), production brigade, and 
the people’s commune (the highest level) (Xu 2006). The people’s commune system 
established a large number of collective ownership “commune-brigade enterprises”, 
which mainly worked in agro-industry and raw materials industries (ibid.). To sup-
port the development of heavy industry, the quota system was used for production 
(ibid.). The household responsibility system first appeared in Anhui province in 
1978, where local authorities gave approval to contract out land and output quotas 
to 20 households (ibid.). Due to the high output that resulted, the central govern-
ment rolled out the household responsibility system nationally in the following years. 
Under this system, the surplus of output quotas was at the households’ disposal. By 
the end of 1983, 93% of production teams in rural areas had adopted the household 
responsibility system, leading to a remarkable increase in productivity (ibid.) which 
laid the groundwork for further development of the private sector. 
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In 1979, about 15.38 million surplus labourers1 in China were looking for em-
ployment (Gong 2005). The central government acknowledged the “individual 
economy” as the “appendix to and complement of the socialist collective economy” 
and in 1981 it promoted the individual economy as a “necessary complement” to 
socialism, marking the revival of the private economy (Coase and Wang 2016: 58). 
To solve the problem of surplus labour, the central government permitted workers 
to operate self-employed businesses, which were prescribed precisely by law, and 
allowed SOEs to contract out some parts of their businesses, such as handicraft and 
component manufacturing and repair or other services to self-employed workers, 
as needed (Gong 2005). By the end of 1980, 400,000 people had started a self-
employed business, accounting for 6% of total employment (ibid.).  
Individuals or families who ran these individual businesses were permitted to 
hire a maximum of seven persons, including five apprentices and two assistants as 
needed (ibid.). This later became the criterion for differentiation between individual 
businesses and private enterprises (ibid.). In 1982, the central government acknowl-
edged the legal status of the individual economy by writing the individual business 
into the constitution, meaning that the state shall protect the lawful rights and in-
terests of individual businesses (National People’s Congress, Government of China 
1982). 
 In 1984, the central government officially issued a document on the reform of 
the economic system. It declared that the focus of economic reform should be to 
transform the planned economy into a commodity-based economy. The central 
government also encouraged development of various forms of ownership economy, 
including individual businesses, under the precondition of ensuring dominance of 
the common ownership economic system (Wang, C. 2014). From 1981 to 1984, the 
number of individual businesses in rural areas increased from 961,000 to 7.1 million, 
while the number in urban area rose from 868,000 to 2.2 million (Wang 2003). Thus, 
in the space of five years, from 1979 to 1984, individual businesses emerged and 
mushroomed, especially in rural areas.  
After the implementation of economic system reform in 1984, the number of 
individual businesses rapidly increased and the size of the businesses expanded in 
the following years. The regulated maximum of seven persons per individual busi-
ness was not enough to satisfy the demands of growing productivity. The number 
of individual businesses with eight or more employees gradually increased, leading 
to the differentiation between individual businesses and what were termed “private 
enterprises”. In 1988, private enterprises were legalized, and the private sector was 
officially written into the constitution and recognized as “appendix to and 
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complement to the collective ownership-based economic system”. The state under-
takes to protect the lawful rights and interests of the private sector and enterprise 
(Wang, C. 2014). By the end of 1988, the number of private enterprises with eight 
or more employees totalled 225,000 (Gong 2005: 51).  
By the end of 1983, the number of employees in commune-brigade enterprises 
totalled 32.3 million (Hu and Zheng 2003: 57). In 1984, the central government 
issued a report on the development of commune-brigade enterprises, in which it 
renamed them “township and village enterprises” (TVEs), and encouraged them to 
start businesses in food processing, the feed industry, equipment manufacturing, 
construction material manufacturing, and the energy industry. The central govern-
ment also offered support to households or individuals to set up TVEs. Hence, 
TVEs could be run by people’s communes, households, individuals, or other col-
lective forms (Wang, C. 2014). After 1984, numerous TVEs were established in 
rural area by individuals and households with separate or collective ownership struc-
tures. In practice, these new TVEs operated as private enterprises and became the 
most important contributors to the rural economy.  
Influenced by revolutions in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, in 1990 a newspaper in Beijing published an article asking whether China 
was undergoing a capitalist economic reform or a socialist economic reform? The 
article caused a heated debate. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping gave a speech on his tour 
of several southern cities. This speech and the policy that followed, “Decision on 
the Development of the Socialist Market Economy” (1993), brought an end to the 
“capitalism or socialism” debate (Gong 2005). Deng Xiaoping affirmed the reform 
and the policy strongly encouraged the development of — and relaxed the social 
and political environment for — the private sector. From that point on, the private 
sector grew rapidly. From 1992 to 1997, the growth rates for individual businesses 
and private enterprises were 85.8% and 309.1% respectively (Yang and Zeng 2000: 
79). As mentioned in Chapter 4, in order to promote the development of the private 
sector, the central government also relaxed the entry barriers for private enterprises, 
from stipulating the “positive list of market access” in the 1980s to introducing the 
“negative list of market access” in 2015. It also reformed the business registration 
system, which significantly simplified and streamlined the registration procedure for 
the incorporation of a new company.  
Overall, since 1992, the central government has shown its support for the de-
velopment of private enterprises by reducing restrictions to market access, simpli-
fying registration and administrative procedures, providing favourable policies, 
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improving public services, and encouraging intermediary economic associations. 
The private sector now plays an increasingly significant role and has become a major 
contributor to the economic development of China. 
 
Decentralization to subnational governments: Fiscal decentralization 
at central and local level  
Since 1979, along with the SOE reform and privatization, the central government 
has initiated two waves of fiscal decentralization in an effort to resolve information 
and coordination problems and to find an appropriate division of financial power 
between the central government and local governments. The adjustment of fiscal 
arrangements exerts a strong influence on governments’ behaviour and also deter-
mines the relationship between the central government and subnational authorities.  
  
(1) The fiscal contracting system (1980–1993)   
In 1980, the central government introduced the revenues-sharing system, also 
known as the fiscal contracting system (hua fen shou zhi, fen ji bao gan), which marked 
the beginning of a new kind of fiscal scheme (Chen and Guo 2016: 100). This fiscal 
scheme, referred to as “eating from separate stoves”, emphasized the responsibility 
of subnational levels of government for their budget balance (Qian and Xu 1993: 
146, Qian, 1999, Chen and Guo 2016: 100). The central government specified the 
scope of local governments’ revenue and expenditures and ratified local budgets 
and the percentage of shared local revenue (Chen and Guo 2016: 100). Under the 
revenues-sharing fiscal system, revenues were divided into central fixed revenues,2 
local fixed revenues3 and other local revenues. The central government-owned and 
operated enterprises were required to turn 80% of their revenue over to the central 
government and 20% to local governments (Lin and Liu 2000: 4). Central and local 
expenditures were also clearly defined, and the share scheme and five-year quota of 
subsidies were fixed (Chen and Guo 2016: 101). As well as Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Shanghai, between 1980 and 1984, four new fiscal sharing schemes were introduced. 
Fifteen provinces, including Zhejiang, were required to remit a specific portion of 
revenues to the central government, while three undeveloped provinces, including 
Yunnan, received a fixed amount of subsidies with 10% annual increment (Qian 
and Xu 1993: 146, Lin and Liu 2000: 6, Mu et al. 2014: 37). In 1982, the central 
government devolved a number of other powers to local governments: decision-
making and administrative approval power, and supervision authority over local in-
vestment, foreign exchange, education, medical and health care4 (Mu et al. 2014).  
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With all these changes, total revenues increased from 113 billion yuan (4.5 billion 
euro) in 1978 to 435 billion yuan (55.8 billion euro) in 1993 (National Bureau of 
Statistics 2017), but the implementation of the fiscal contracting system resulted in 
a significant imbalance of financial power between the central and local govern-
ments, as illustrated in Figure 6.1.  
Figure 6.1 
General public budget revenue (1978-1993)  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
From 1978 to 1993, central revenues were far less than local revenues. From 
1978 to 1984, central revenues showed a slight upward trend, peaking in 1984, when 
they accounted for 40.5% of total revenues. However, from 1985, when the new 
fiscal sharing schemes were applied, the percentage of central revenue to total rev-
enues declined. In 1993 the central government only took 22% of total revenues, 
while the central expenditures accounted for 28.3% of total expenditures (National 
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Figure 6.2 
Financial self-sufficiency rates from 1978 to 1993 (%) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
Figure 6.2 shows self-sufficiency rates5 for central and local governments from 
1978 to 1993. While local financial self-sufficiency maintained a high level of close 
to or above 100% in that period, central financial self-sufficiency rates were far 
lower. The rate of the central government gradually increased and peaked at 98.8% 
in 1990, followed by a decrease to 73% in 1993 (National Bureau of Statistics 2017). 
These numbers imply that local governments were self-sufficient, while central 
budget revenues were unable to cover central government expenditures. 
In this context, the central government devolved more expenditure responsibil-
ity to subnational authorities. Local governments demanded commensurate finan-
cial powers by increasing local non-tax revenues. As local governments collected all 
the taxes without the involvement of the tax bureau, and as the fiscal contracting 
system was not rule-based, local governments, especially those with high remittance 
ratios, often tended to reduce or give exemptions on enterprises’ taxes, which were 
supposed to be remitted to the central government (Jin et al. 1999: 28).  
Extra-budgetary revenue is an important source of local revenue, and therefore 
is worthy of attention here. The extra-budgetary revenue consisted of tax surcharges, 
SOEs’ retention of profits, and special funds, local administrative fees, etc. which 
did not fall under the national public budget management system. In other words, 
local governments were allowed to have extra-budgetary funds at their disposal for 
local expenditures. The extra-budgetary funds had emerged in the 1950s and be-
came officially standardized in 1983 when the central government issued an interim 
measure for the management of extra-budgetary revenue (Jin et al. 1999: 15, Loo 
and Chow 2006: 227). 
559831-L-bw-Lu
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 178
158 CHAPTER 6 
 
Figure 6.3 
The percentage of the national government revenue (NGR) and extra-budget-
ary revenue (EBR) to GDP 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
After the implementation of the fiscal contracting system in 1980, extra-budg-
etary funds expanded considerably. In 1978, the total extra-budgetary revenue ac-
counted for 10% of GDP, while the overall budget revenue was 31% of GDP. In 
1992, the percentage of the total extra-budgetary revenue to GDP increased to 
14.2%, while the share of budget revenue to GDP decreased to 12.8% (National 
Bureau of Statistics 2012). Looking at the period 1978–1992, Figure 6.3 shows that 
extra-budgetary revenue surpassed national government revenue in most years.  
Figure 6.3 indicates that extra-budgetary revenue peaked at 33.6% in 1982 (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics 2012). When extra-budgetary funds were officially stand-
ardized in 1983, the number declined to 20.5%, and after a significant rise in the 
following two years, showed a downward trend again in 1986, when the central 
government issued a document on tightening the management of extra-budgetary 
revenue. Although the number showed a downward trend, the extra-budgetary rev-
enues were much larger than the national budget revenue (National Bureau of Sta-
tistics 2012). It is worth noting that, from 1982 to 1992, the percentages of local 
extra-budgetary revenue to total extra-budgetary revenue remained at around 60%, 
which means that with the extension of local autonomy since 1980, local govern-
ments sought more extra-budgetary funds to maximize their local financial power. 
Hence extra-budgetary funds became one of the main sources of local revenue.  
As shown above, since the adoption of the fiscal contracting system in 1980, 
with increases in local governments’ discretionary and financial powers, local budget 
revenue and extra-budgetary funds largely surpassed central revenues. On the one 
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hand, the fiscal contracting system provided local governments with strong incen-
tives to promote local economic development. On the other hand, the decline of 
the central government’s financial power brought an imbalance between central and 
local budget revenues, which led the central government to initiate the second wave 
of fiscal decentralization in 1994. 
 
(2) The tax-sharing system (1994–present) 
To resolve the problem of unbalanced central and local budget revenue and to pro-
vide adequate sharing schemes to both level of governments, in 1994, the central 
government introduced the tax-sharing system, which fundamentally altered the 
revenue-sharing system between central and subnational governments (Wong 2000: 
7). 
Under the tax-sharing system, taxes were divided into: 
a. Central fixed income, including: customs duties, consumption tax, value-
added tax (VAT) revenues collected by customs, income taxes from central 
enterprises, banks and nonbank financial intermediaries; the remitted prof-
its, income taxes, business taxes and urban construction and maintenance 
taxes of the railroad, bank headquarters and insurance companies; and re-
source taxes on offshore oil extraction;  
b. Local fixed income, including business taxes, excluding those listed above in 
central fixed incomes, income taxes and profit remittances of local enter-
prises, urban land use taxes, personal income taxes, the fixed asset invest-
ment orientation tax, urban construction and maintenance tax, real estate 
taxes, vehicle utilization tax, the stamp tax, animal slaughter tax, agricultural 
taxes, title tax, capital gains tax on land, state land sales revenues, resource 
taxes derived from land-based resources, and the securities trading tax;  
c. Central–local shared income, including VAT with a fixed rate of 75% for the 
central government and 25% for local governments,6 securities transaction 
tax with 50% for the central government and 50% for local governments, 
and resources tax which are levied with varying categories (Wong 2000: 7).  
Before 1994, the revenue-sharing schemes varied between provinces or regions, 
leading to the criticism that the sharing schemes were not rule-based (Jin et al. 1999: 
42). The tax-sharing system established a fixed tax rule between central and local 
governments (ibid.). More importantly, a national tax bureau and local tax bureaux 
were established for collecting central government revenues and local taxes, 
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respectively, which prevented local governments from underreporting or reducing 
national taxes, as discussed above (Jin et al. 1999, Wong 2000: 8). 
With the aim of resolving the unbalanced revenue distribution, the tax-sharing 
system recentralized financial power from local governments. In 2002, an adjust-
ment of fiscal arrangements was applied with a “fiscal centralization effort”. Firm 
income tax and individual income tax, which used to be considered local fixed in-
come, were categorized as central–local shared income with a fixed rate of 60% for 
the central government (Chen and Guo 2016: 108–109). In 2012, to reduce enter-
prises’ financial burden of multiple taxing, the central government replaced the 
business tax with VAT (Ying Gai Zeng), which substantially cut the tax paid by en-
terprises. This reform could also be seen as a fiscal centralization effort. 
Figure 6.4 
General public budget revenue (1994-2016)  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
When the tax-sharing system was adopted in 1994, the percentage of central 
budget revenue to total budget revenue significantly increased, rising from 22% in 
1993 (see Figure 6.2) to 55.7% in 1994 (Figure 6.4). For the period 1994 to 2016, 
the ratio of central budget revenue to local budget stood at around 50: 50 (National 
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Figure 6.5 
General public budget expenditure (1994-2016) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
The system also specified the distribution of financial powers and expenditure 
responsibilities between central and local governments. As shown in Figure 6.4, the 
percentage of local revenue to total budget revenue has remained stable at around 
50% since 1994, but Figure 6.5 shows clearly that the percentage of local expendi-
tures to total expenditures has continuously increased. In 1994, the percentage of 
local revenue to total revenue was 44.3%, but the percentage of local expenditures 
to total expenditures increased steadily to reach 69.7%. When the new sharing 
schemes were introduced in 2002, the percentage of local revenue to total revenue 
basically remained at the same level, but the percentage of local expenditures in-
creased from 69.3% in 2002 to 85.4% in 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics 2017).  
Figure 6.6 
General public budget expenditure of the central and local governments 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2017) 
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Figure 6.6 looks at the general public budget expenditure in 2016; it shows that 
total expenditures from the central government reached 2.74 trillion yuan (0.35 tril-
lion euro), while the total expenditure of local governments was about 16 trillion 
yuan (2.04 trillion euro). More specifically, almost all of the expenditures on foreign 
affairs and national defence came from central government, along with about 66% 
of expenditures on interest payment on debts and management of grain and oil 
reserves, as well as 58% of expenditure on financial affairs. However, more than 
90% of expenditures on general public services, education, medical and health care, 
transportation, housing security, environmental protection, etc., as well as over 80% 
of spending on public security, were provided by local governments (National Bu-
reau of Statistics 2017). 
Figure 6.7 
Financial self-sufficiency rates from 1994 to 2016(%) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
We saw above (Figure 6.2) that local government financial self-sufficiency rates 
were high: in 1993 local self-sufficiency stood at 101.8%, while the central govern-
ment self-sufficiency rate was 73%. However, when the tax-sharing system was 
adopted in 1994, the local financial self-sufficiency rate declined sharply to 57.2%, 
and the central self-sufficiency rate jumped to 165.7% (Figure 6.7). The central gov-
ernment’s self-sufficiency rates continued to rise, reaching a peak of 310.8% in 2011. 
In the following years, despite a slight decrease, the rates remained stable at 260% 
and above. However, from 1994 onwards, the local self-sufficiency rates stayed con-
stant at a relatively low level of around 55% (National Bureau of Statistics 2017). 
More importantly, regional self-sufficiency rates show a significant variation. 
Provinces and regions in East China, such as Shanghai, Jiangsu, Guangdong, 
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Zhejiang, etc. have the highest self-sufficiency rates, while the rates of regions in 
the Southwest area including Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan had much lower rates, 
putting them at the bottom of all provinces and regions. Shanghai was ranked first 
with a self-sufficiency rate of 92.6%, following by Jiangsu (81.4%), Beijing (79.3%), 
and Guangdong (77.3%). Zhejiang was ranked fifth with 76%, while the self-suffi-
ciency rate of Yunnan was 36.1% ranking it 23rd. Notably, only 9 out of 31 prov-
inces or regions’ self-sufficiency rates were higher than the average local self-suffi-
ciency rate (55%) (National Bureau of Statistics 2017).  
Thus, since the implementation of the tax-sharing system, the central govern-
ment’s self-sufficiency rates have shown rapid improvement. However, the majority 
of local governments have experienced severe budget deficits, especially those in 
less developed regions like Yunnan, further extending regional disparities. The ma-
jority of local governments have been in budget deficit for the past 20 years. Clearly, 
with the implementation of the tax-sharing system in 1994, the percentage of local 
budget revenue to total budget revenue was significantly reduced, while at the same 
time local governments had to take on more expenditure responsibilities. The local 
expenditure responsibilities have been increasingly incommensurate with local fi-
nancial power. 
In this context, in order to resolve the problem of local budget deficits while 
maintaining local governments’ profits and providing incentives, central govern-
ment adopted a tax rebate scheme (Tax Rebate t (year) = Tax Rebate (t-1) * [1 + 0.3 * 
(0.75 * VAT increase + Consumption Tax increase)t]) and transfer payment system, which 
consists of general transfer payments and earmarked transfer payments for specific 
purposes (Qian 1999, Jin et al. 1999, Wong 2000: 8). The general transfer payments 
are used for adjusting and filling the local fiscal gap caused by the implementation 
of policies which increase local governments’ expenditures and also with the aim of 
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Figure 6.8 
Transfer payments from central government to local governments (billion) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
As the graph in Figure 6.8 shows, the transfer payments increased substantially 
from 1994 to 2016, especially general transfer payments. In 1994, earmarked trans-
fer payments and general transfer payments amounted to 36.1 billion yuan (4.6 bil-
lion euro) and 13.6 billion yuan (1.8 billion euro), respectively. When the new tax-
sharing policy was implemented in 2002, central governments increased earmarked 
transfer payments to 243.5 billion yuan (31 billion euro) and general transfer pay-
ments to 158 billion yuan (20.1 billion euro). Since then, as more fiscal responsibil-
ities were assumed by local authorities, there has been a sharp rise in the total 
amount of transfer payments from central to local governments, especially general 
transfer payments. In 2016, earmarked and general transfer payments reached 2,071 
billion yuan (264 billion euro) and 3,186 billion yuan (406 billion euro), respectively. 
Figure 6.9 
Tax rebates and transfer payments in Zhejiang and Yunnan (billion) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2017) 
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According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics (2017), the amount of 
tax rebates and transfer payments to provinces and regions in East China was con-
siderably lower than to regions in Southwest and central areas. In 2016, Shanghai 
received the lowest tax rebates and transfer payments (47.7/ 6.2 billion yuan) among 
the 31 provinces or regions; Zhejiang received 87 billion yuan (11.3 billion euro) in 
transfer payments and tax rebates (ranked 26 out of 31); while Sichuan received the 
highest amount at 398.4 billion yuan (51.8 billion euro) and Yunnan had the fifth-
highest amount at 266.7 billion yuan (34.7 billion euro) (National Bureau of Statis-
tics 2017). It is clear that underdeveloped regions received much higher amounts of 
tax rebates and transfer payments (Figure 6.9), mainly to reduce inter-jurisdictional 
inequality. 
As mentioned in the previous section, after extra-budgetary revenue was offi-
cially standardized in the early 1980s, extra-budgetary funds had risen sharply. As a 
key source of local revenue, the extra-budgetary revenue had surpassed the total 
budget revenue, leading the central government to tighten control over the increas-
ing local extra-budgetary funds (Loo and Chow 2006: 227).  
In 1993 central government reclassified several extra-budgetary items under the 
budget system, and in 1994 it stipulated that local governments should ask permis-
sion for the imposition of any newly added administrative fee from either provincial 
or central governments (Loo and Chow 2006: 227). Although this reclassification 
caused a significant decline in its rate of increase in 1993, in 1994, the percentage 
of extra-budgetary revenue to GDP climbed again to 30% while the percentage of 
budget revenue to GDP was 20%. In the following two years, the number of extra-
budgetary revenue continued to climb and reached 61.8% in 1996, whereas the 
budget revenue showed a downward trend (National Bureau of Statistics 2017). 
In 1997 the intra-budgetary government fund (fee) had been removed from the 
extra-budgetary revenues, which resulted in an enormously fall, and in 1998 the 
percentage of the extra-budgetary revenues to GDP was 9.1%. From 1998 to 2010, 
the number of extra-budgetary revenues fluctuated; after peaking at 18% in 2005, 
the number declined steadily to -9.7% in 2010, whilst the percentage of budget rev-
enues to GDP fluctuated from 11.7% (2009) to 32.4% (2007) (National Bureau of 
Statistics 2017). 
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Figure 6.10 
Central and local extra-budgetary revenues from 1993 to 2010 (billion) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
Figure 6.10 shows the trajectory of extra-budgetary revenues from 1993 to 2010. 
Due to multiple reclassifications in the coverage of extra-budgetary revenues over 
this period the extra-budgetary revenues fell; however, the amount of local extra-
budgetary revenues continued to increase, from 119 billion yuan (15.2 billion euro) 
in 1993 to 540 billion yuan (68.8 billion euro) in 2010, with a peak of 629 billion 
yuan (80.2 billion euro) in 2007. In the same period, central extra-budgetary reve-
nues remained relatively constant at around 37 billion yuan (4.7 billion euro) (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics 2017).  
From 1997 to 2010 the percentages of local extra-budgetary revenue to total 
extra-budgetary revenue had remained steady at 90% and above, meaning that cen-
tral government had significantly tightened the management of local extra-budget-
ary revenues; nonetheless, local governments actively sought more extra-budgetary 
funds as important supplementary revenue for maximizing their financial power. In 
mid-2010, however, the central government decided to reorganize extra-budgetary 
revenues and to include all extra-budgetary funds in the national public budget man-
agement system (Ministry of Finance, Government of China 2010). Hence, from 
2011, no extra funds could be used to expand local financial power. Since then, 
local governments, especially in underdeveloped regions, have relied heavily on 
transfer payments from the central government to cover local budget deficits and 
to narrow the regional growth gap, which can explain the sharp increase of general 
transfer payments from 2011.  
Since the pre-reform period, the central government has made several attempts 
at decentralizing and recentralizing financial power, as it tried to establish what de-
gree of centralization and decentralization could optimize the sharing schemes. The 
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fiscal reform of 1994 is considered a “fiscal centralization effort” for resolving the 
unbalanced central and local budget revenues which had been an issue since the 
1980s. Although it is indisputable that the central government devolved greater 
power and responsibilities to the local authorities, the sharing scheme adopted in 
1994 resulted in a considerable mismatch between local financial power and local 
expenditure responsibilities. In other words, after 1994, local governments gained 
control over a majority of administrative, managerial, and decision-making powers 
but, at the same time, they were assigned much greater expenditure responsibilities. 
Local governments suffered a severe budget deficit, so the central government in-
troduced the tax rebate scheme, the transfer payment system, and the extra-budg-
etary revenues (repealed) to maintain the local governments’ profits and provide 
incentives, and reduce inter-jurisdictional inequalities. The change of fiscal arrange-
ment directly impacts on central–local relations and on local governments’ behav-
iour. In the next section, the subnational fiscal system will be discussed. 
 
(3) The subnational governments’ fiscal system 
Before introducing the subnational governments’ fiscal system, administrative divi-
sions in China will be briefly discussed for a better understanding of the subnational 
government structure and the relations between the local levels of authority in 
China. 
 
M-form hierarchical administrative system 
The division of the country into counties and provinces long pre-dates the estab-
lishment of modern China, and the provincial boundaries have largely been in place 
since the Qing dynasty (1636–1912).7 However, the administrative divisions were 
frequently reorganized, in accordance with changes in national administrative plan-
ning, until the Constitution of 1979 was issued,8 which established a four-tier ad-
ministrative system as shown in Figure 6.11: province–prefecture–county–town-
ship (National People’s Congress, Government of China 1979). 
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Figure 6.11 
The administrative divisions in China (2016)  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2017) 
The central government administers 33 provincial-level divisions, including 22 
provinces, five autonomous regions, four directly controlled municipalities, and two 
special administrative regions (National Bureau of Statistics 2017). Prefectural-level 
divisions are the second-level divisions,9 which consist of 293 prefecture-level cities, 
eight prefectures, 30 autonomous prefectures, and three leagues (National Bureau 
of Statistics 2017). County-level divisions are the third administrative layer, and 
township level is the lowest unit of rural administration (National Bureau of Statis-
tics, Government of China n. d.). Although county-level divisions contain both ur-
ban centres and rural areas, the county economy in China is based on the rural 
economy (Zou 2015: 1). 
Qian and Xu use the concept of the “multi-divisional form of organization” to 
describe China’s organizational structure: “[the] Chinese economy has been orga-
nized into a multi-layer-multi-regional form (the M-form organization)” (Qian and 
Xu 1993: 544), in which the organizational structure of a region is separated into 
several semi-autonomous subnational divisions (regional governments). In other 
words, the hierarchical structure and internal organization, such as divisions and 
departments, in each level of local government are set up to mirror those of the 
central government. The organizational structure of the central and local levels of 
government is identical. In the M-form organization, operating units are semi-au-
tonomous and financially self-sufficient (Qian and Xu 1993: 544). Hence, each op-
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enterprises within its jurisdiction rather than on superior levels of government 
(ibid.); this was especially true after the adoption of the tax-sharing system, as local 
governments were assigned much more responsibility. The lowest operating units 
of the M-form hierarchy (county or township level governments) are in a relatively 
weak bargaining position (ibid.). 
In the early 1950s, the central government implemented the heavy industry-ori-
ented development strategy. According to national planning, the industrial devel-
opment strategy was city-based, while rural areas took responsibility for cities’ food 
supply (Ma 2005). To ensure the food supply from rural areas to cities, a “city ad-
ministering county system” (shi guan xian) was introduced in 1958 on a trial basis in 
the three directly controlled municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) and one 
province (Liaoning), and by the end of 1960, the “city administering county system” 
was applied in 52 cites (Ma 2005, Tang 2008). Under this administrative system, 
cities were authorized to administer their surrounding counties, which were previ-
ously governed by prefectural-level authorities (Ma 2005: 486–487). However, this 
national development strategy in the pre-reform period resulted in a severe “price 
scissors” phenomenon, with agricultural prices far below their actual value, which 
caused substantial damage to the development of rural regions. Therefore, once 
economic reform started, the central government introduced three major measures, 
namely “converting counties to cities” (xian gai shi), “expanding or merging cities”, 
and “merging counties into cities”, to establish relations between cities and counties 
and to stimulate the economy in rural regions (Ma 2005: 481).  
In 2002, the “city administering county system” was applied nationally (Tang 
2008).10 However, both central and local governments have kept seeking better 
ways of optimizing the administrative structure. In practice, as the superior author-
ities exercise fiscal administrative and managerial control over lower-level authori-
ties, and there are no specified regulations on expenditure responsibilities at the 
local level, the lower levels of local government, especially county levels, have less 
financial power and more expenditure responsibilities, as well as an inferior fiscal 
bargaining position, compared with prefecture level (Yang, D. 2011: 56). Hence, in 
2005, the central government introduced a “province directly administering county 
system” to improve the fiscal bargaining position of county-level divisions (Wang 
2013).  
The central government thus operates an M-form administrative system, in 
which operating units (local level of governments) are semi-autonomous and rela-
tively financially self-sufficient (Qian and Xu 1993: 544). Therefore, the interde-
pendence between regional governments is relatively weak (Boone et al. 1998: 195). 
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The M-form structure provides a high level of institutional flexibility in conducting 
“pioneering experiments” for economic reform in selected regions without depend-
ing on the cooperation of other subnational authorities; this mean that, if they 
should fail, the “pioneering experiments” would not disturb the overall economy 
(Qian and Xu 1993: 546, Boone et al. 1998: 195). More importantly, as more ad-
ministrative and financial powers were delegated to local governments, and in the 
context of substantial regional differences, the weak interdependence between re-
gions gave local authorities space to interpret and carry out regulations and policies 
based on distinctive regional socio-economic structures and configurations. 
 
The subnational governments’ fiscal system 
Based on the Budget Law of China, the central government requires that at each 
subnational level — provincial, prefecture, county, and township — governments 
should establish their own financial management system and maintain a balanced 
budget (Ministry of Finance, Government of China 2014, Lam and Wingender 2015: 
6). Although financial powers and expenditure responsibilities between central and 
local governments were clearly defined in the tax-sharing system in 1994, the central 
government did not specify the measures and distribution of revenue collection and 
expenditure responsibilities at each level of subnational governments, except for 
the provincial government. The 1995 Budget Law specifies that “local government 
at the county level and above shall determine the financial management system of 
local government at lower levels in accordance with the principle of the tax-sharing 
system between the central and local governments as well as the relevant provisions 
of the governments at higher levels” (Ministry of Finance, Government of China 
1995). Hence, the revenue-sharing schemes and the division of financial power and 
expenditure responsibilities at the local levels of government take different forms 
in different provinces.   
Fiscal revenues of subnational governments can be divided into fixed income 
and shared income. Two major types of local fiscal revenue-sharing schemes are 
usually applied between upper and lower subnational governments: tax-sharing and 
distribution based on totals or incremental revenues (Lyu and Sun 2008, Yang, D. 
2011). Taxes, which are assigned entirely to provincial or lower levels of local gov-
ernments as fixed income, vary across provinces. For instance, VAT, business tax, 
income tax from enterprises and personal income tax are usually designated as the 
main types of shared taxes between provincial and prefecture/ municipal/ county 
governments. Some local governments also assign supplementary types of taxes, 
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such as resource tax, urban land use tax, real estate tax, etc. with fixed sharing rates 
as subnational shared taxes (Xu 2014: 85). Moreover, various fiscal sharing schemes, 
such as allocation based on total revenues, incremental revenues, fixed base, etc., 
are also applied between prefecture-level and county-level governments (Lyu and 
Sun 2008). Unified revenue collection and budget apportionment fiscal systems, 
fiscal contracting, or sharing systems are usually introduced between county and 
township governments (Lyu and Sun 2008). In short, tax bases with high mobility 
between jurisdictions are put under the central government, while local govern-
ments usually collect tax bases with low mobility between jurisdictions.   
Since 1994, tax-sharing and allocation based on incremental or total revenue 
system (fen shui jia zeng liang fen chen yu zong er fen xiang) were implemented in Zhejiang 
province. Zhejiang provincial revenues are composed of (a) 25% of VAT paid by 
enterprises in the energy sector; (b) 40% of income tax from other enterprises; (c) 
60% of business tax from banks and nonbank financial and insurance institutions, 
income tax from telecoms and highways; and (d) provincial non-tax revenues. 
Zhejiang municipal or prefecture and county revenues are composed of (a) 25% 
VAT, excluding the part shared with central and provincial governments; (b) 40% 
of income tax from enterprise; (c) 40% of personal income; (d) 40% of business tax 
from banks and nonbank financial and insurance institutions, urban land use taxes, 
urban construction and maintenance tax, real estate taxes, deed tax, etc. (General 
Office of Zhejiang Provincial Government 2015).  
The apportionment based on total revenues (zong er fen cheng) is applied in Hang-
zhou; the distribution ratio between Hangzhou and Zhejiang provincial govern-
ment is 84: 16 (ibid.). The other municipal and county governments are required to 
remit 20% of incremental revenues based on previous year’s final account to the 
provincial government and are allowed to retain the remaining incremental reve-
nues themselves (ibid.). 
Tax-sharing and the prescribed remittance quota system (fen shui jia ding er shang 
jie) has been applied in Yunnan since 2001 (Yunnan Provincial Government 2001).  
Yunnan provincial fixed incomes are composed of business tax from provincial 
and all tiers under provincial banks, nonbank financial and insurance institutions, 
income taxes from provincial SOEs and state-holding enterprises as well as provin-
cial administration fees (ibid.).  
Yunnan prefecture and municipal fixed incomes consist of 25% of VAT, busi-
ness tax excluding the taxes levied by central and provincial governments, income 
taxes from prefecture and municipal SOEs and state-holding enterprises, urban land 
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use taxes, urban construction and maintenance tax, real estate taxes, vehicle utiliza-
tion tax, the stamp tax, animal slaughter tax, agricultural taxes, deed tax, and VAT 
on land (Yunnan Provincial Government 2001, also Wong 2000: 7). In addition, 
three prefecture cities are required to remit a prescribed quota of revenues to the 
provincial government: Kunming (30%), Yuxi (30%), and Qujing (15%) (ibid.). 
The tax rebate scheme and the transfer payment system applied by the central 
government are also adopted by subnational governments. The tax rebate scheme 
between central and provincial governments has been imitated by the majority of 
subnational governments, while various transfer payment systems have been ap-
plied between provincial and lower level of local governments (Wang, Y. 2008). As 
mentioned in the previous section, local governments have been suffering a severe 
budget deficit since the adoption of the tax-sharing system in 1994. To maximize 
their financial power, local governments were eager to seek extra-budgetary reve-
nues. However, after the repeal of the extra-budgetary revenues in 2010, local gov-
ernments, especially in underdeveloped regions, are excessively dependent on trans-
fer payments from central government or superior local governments.  
In his context, in order to reduce the dependence on transfer payments, most 
provincial governments introduced an incentive coefficient in their allocation of 
general transfer payments between higher and lower levels of local government 
(Yang, D. 2011: 56): 
incentive coefficient t (year)= (local budget revenues growth rate(t-1)-provincial av-
erage budget revenues growth rate(t-1)) * a certain proportion determined by local 
governments.  
 It is clear from this formula that the incentive coefficient is directly relevant to 
budget revenues (i.e. the higher the local budget revenue increases, the higher the 
value of the incentive coefficient). Hence, compared to the underdeveloped regions, 
developed areas are more likely to acquire transfer payments. The adoption of the 
incentive coefficient provides a strong motivation for local-level authorities to pro-
mote local economic development as a way of obtaining more transfer payments 
from superior authorities and expanding local financial power. However, in practice, 
as the superior authorities have fiscal administrative and managerial power over 
lower-level authorities, transfer payments or subsidies are frequently held back 
(Yang, D. 2011: 56).  
Subnational authorities have thus specified the precise apportionment of reve-
nues, taxes, and transfer payments between different levels of subnational 
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governments. However, the division of expenditure responsibilities between each 
level of local government is not clearly defined. Also, there are overlaps in expendi-
ture responsibilities such as education, medical and health care, etc. between each 
level of local government. Without clear regulations, local governments tend to shift 
more expenditure responsibilities onto the lower level of government and seize fi-
nancial power from that lower level, as well as holding back transfer payments or 
subsidies (Yang, D. 2011). Therefore, the lower levels of local government have less 
financial power and more expenditure responsibilities, especially after the imple-
mentation of the tax-sharing system in 1994, as demonstrated by looking at the 
prefecture and county financial self-sufficiency rates shown in Figure 6.12. 
Figure 6.12 
Prefecture and county financial self-sufficiency rates (%) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
As the Figure shows, in 1993 the prefecture governments’ financial self-suffi-
ciency rate was 67.2%, while the county governments’ self-sufficiency rate was 
51.5%. When the tax-sharing system was implemented nationally, the rate at pre-
fecture level increased and levelled off at around 70%. After a slight increase in the 
self-sufficiency rate at county level, the rate declined from 65% to 47.3% in 2000. 
Overall, from 1993 the county self-sufficiency rates stayed constant at a low level, 
and about 40% to 50% of expenditures depended on transfer payments or other 
extra-budgetary revenues; the prefecture self-sufficiency rate is significantly higher 
than the rate at county level (National Bureau of Statistics 2007). 
The prefecture and county governments are assigned the majority of expendi-
ture responsibilities on public facilities, infrastructure construction and other public 
services. However, the financial powers of these two levels of government are not 
commensurate with their expenditure responsibilities, which means that prefecture 
and county fiscal revenues are not adequate for their expenditures (Li, X. 2017).  
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Notably, as the main source of county and township government revenues, ac-
cording to the Ministry of Agriculture, the average total of agricultural taxes and 
other related fees was between 160 billion yuan (20.2 billion euro) and 180 billion 
yuan (22.7 billion euro) each year before the implementation of rural tax reform (Ni 
et al. 2007). Aiming to lighten the tax burden on peasants, central government 
launched a pilot rural tax reform scheme to abolish agricultural taxes in Anhui prov-
ince in 2000, and in 2003 the rural tax reform was applied nationally (Cui, Y. 2011). 
By the end of 2005, agricultural taxes in 28 provinces and 210 counties in Hebei, 
Shandong, and Yunnan had been revoked (ibid.). On 30 December 2005, the Stand-
ing Committee of the National People’s Congress (2005) issued “The Decision on 
Abolishing the Regulation on Agriculture Tax”, which officially repealed agricul-
tural taxes in the whole nation from 1 January 2006. However, since agricultural 
taxes were repealed, county and township budget revenues have been drastically 
reduced. Although central government increased the transfer payments for county 
and township governments right away, the amount of transfer payments — 66.2 
billion yuan (8.3 billion euro) in 2005 and 78.2 billion yuan (9.9 billion euro) in 2006 
— compensated for less than half of the losses to budget revenues in county and 
township levels of government (Ni et al. 2007, Yang, D. 2011). Apparently, it is 
impossible to remedy through transfer payments the fiscal shortfall caused by abol-
ishing agricultural taxes.  
The discussion above indicates that, due to the imbalances in local financial 
power and local expenditure responsibilities, local governments have suffered from 
increasing fiscal deficits. As the higher levels of local government have discretionary 
power over the fiscal arrangements of the lower levels of local government, more 
expenditure responsibilities have been assigned to lower-level authorities, while the 
higher-level authorities tend to seize financial power and retain transfer payments 
and subsidies. Compared with the higher-level local authorities, the lower levels of 
local government confront severe local budget shortfalls, especially since the repeal 
of agricultural taxes. In the semi-autonomous and relatively financially self-suffi-
cient M-form administrative system, local governments actively promote local eco-
nomic growth based on distinctive regional economic and industrial features to in-
crease local financial power and acquire more transfer payments. Overall, fiscal 
decentralization has provided strong incentives and substantially shapes the behav-
iour of local governments in regional development, which forms the development 
trajectory of the local economy. 
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6.1.2 The Chinese cadre management and promotion system  
As discussed in the previous section, decentralization reform and the M-form ad-
ministrative system have provided strong incentives for local governments in re-
gional development. However, as Zhou, L. (2007) argues, although decentralization 
is undeniably important in promoting local economic growth, it does not fully ex-
plain why local governments did not lose their enthusiasm for local development as 
the pendulum of centralization and decentralization of fiscal sharing schemes 
swung back and forth, and especially when the tax-sharing system caused a consid-
erable imbalance between local financial power and expenditure responsibilities, 
damaging local interests. In other words, the incentives provided by decentraliza-
tion are not enough to explain why local governments seem largely unaffected by 
these repeated changes of fiscal arrangements, but still keep on zealously promoting 
regional economic growth (ibid.). Therefore, this section asks the question: “besides 
the incentive provided by decentralization reform, is there any other fundamental 
incentive provided for local governments?”.  
 
The principal–agent relationship and incentive problems  
To answer this question, the concept of the principal–agent relationship will be 
brought into this discussion to illuminate the central–local relationship, the possible 
incentive problems between central and local governments, and the treatment of 
incentive problems. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308) define the principal–agent relationship as a 
contract, in which an agent has decision-making authority and performs service on 
behalf of a principal. According to Laffont and Martimort (2001: 39), when a prin-
cipal has a lack of time or ability to perform a task himself, and is willing to delegate 
that task to an agent who can access information that is not available to the principal, 
incentive problems occur. Therefore, the uncertainty and information gaps in a 
principal–agent relationship are the fundamental considerations in designing the 
contract (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 308, Laffont and Martimort 2001: 40). Many 
scholars (e.g. Lu 1997, Wang 2004, Zhou, L. 2004, Zhou et al. 2007) have drawn an 
analogy between the principal–agent relationship and the relationship between the 
central government and local governments in China. Compared with subnational 
authorities, the central government, as the decision-maker, has difficulties in access-
ing actual information. Therefore, the central government (the principal) delegates 
administrative and financial power, decision-making authority, and tasks to local 
governments (the agents).  
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However, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out, the agents may not always 
pursue the same goals as the principal, because both parties may seek to maximize 
their interests. Similarly, in the central–local relationship, the central government 
aims to promote national economic development, while local governments are 
more inclined to protect local interests, and local officials may pursue their personal 
ambitions.  
If there is no asymmetry of information between the principal and agents, or 
when the principal and agents pursue different interests, the principal can easily 
observe the agents’ behaviour and effort and simply reward the agent based on 
performance (Laffont and Martimort 2001: 156). However, when the agents are 
better informed, the agents’ effort and performance will be difficult for the principal 
to evaluate or observe, which may trigger the problems of hidden information or 
hidden actions and deviation from task. Compared with the central government, 
local governments are well-informed. Hence, when local governments have a ten-
dency to pursue local interests, moral hazard or adverse selection may occur. In 
practice, the asymmetric information problem inhibits the central government from 
directly observing and measuring local governments’ efforts and performance.  
The incentive problem often occurs in highly centralized and unified systems, 
characterized by fixing budget and output quotas and operating a standard reward 
system (Weitzman 1980: 302–303). After studying Soviet incentive schemes, Weit-
zman (1976: 252) points out that there are static and dynamic incentive problems 
in the Soviet reward system, which rewards quota overfulfilment or penalizes quota 
underfulfilment. More specifically, future targets are set partially based on current 
performance. Hence, agents tend to underreport their production capacity and out-
put in order to lower the targets and make rewards easier to obtain, also known as 
the “ratchet effect” (ibid.: 252). When the contracting system was applied in the 
1980s in China, local governments, especially those with high remittance ratios, of-
ten tended to underreport, reduce, or grant exemptions from enterprise taxes in 
order to maximize local financial power (Jin et al. 1999: 28). 
As agents will respond to incentives, establishing applicable incentives for agents 
is a way to limit divergences from the principal’s interest and bring the agent’s aims 
and objectives into line with the original plan (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 308, Laf-
font and Martimort 2001: 40). Various scholars (e.g. Weitzman 1980, Freixas et al. 
1985, Laffont and Tirole 1993), have studied the ratchet effect and the treatment of 
incentive problems. Lazear and Rosen (1981: 842) propose a “rank-order payment 
scheme”, in which salaries depend on the rank order of workers in a firm rather 
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than each worker’s output level. They argue that when monitoring and measuring 
workers’ effort and performance is difficult, workers can alter their input, hence it 
is much easier to measure and compensate workers based on their relative position 
in a firm (ibid.: 842, 863). Meyer and Vickers (1997: 575) believe that “comparative 
performance information can reduce the ratchet effect”. They emphasize that 
“comparative performance information can be provided through competition, 
which improves efficiency in a principal–agent relationship” (ibid.: 547–548, 553). 
Therefore, comparative performance and the ordinal position-based rank-order in-
centive schemes are possible ways of reducing incentive problems. 
 
Rank-order tournament scheme  
The Chinese cadre management and promotion system has been based on compar-
ative performance and the ordinal position-based rank-order incentive scheme since 
the 1980s, which provides strong incentives to local government officials to pro-
mote regional economic development and to compete for promotion. Hence, Zhou 
(2004) claims that the Chinese cadre management and promotion system could be 
seen as a “rank-order tournament scheme”, which provides a reasonable theoretical 
explanation for the behaviour of local governments and officials. 
Inherited from the Soviet model, the Chinese cadre management nomenklatura 
system was established in the early 1950s and is still in use today (Manion 1985: 204, 
212, Edin 2003: 6). The system consists of lists of leading positions of party units 
with the power to make personnel changes, and lists of reserves or candidates for 
these positions (Burns 1989: ix). According to the Law of Public Servants (National 
People’s Congress 2017), there are five levels of administrative hierarchy: the central 
level (guo jia ji), the provincial and ministerial level (sheng bu ji), the prefectural de-
partment and bureau level (ting ju ji), the county and division level (xian chu ji), and 
the township and section level (xiang ke ji). In each level of administrative hierarchy, 
leading cadres, chiefs, and deputies are assigned “performance targets” (Edin 2003: 
10), which can be monitored and measured by a higher administrative level. When 
effort and performance cannot be directly observed, GRP, as the comparative per-
formance information, is the most important index of local economic performance. 
At each level, the central and local party committees, with the cooperation of per-
sonnel departments, can evaluate and compare performance, authorize cadre ap-
pointment, promotion transfers, removals, or dismissals of the leading cadres at a 
lower level (Manion 1985: 205, Edin 2003: 17). 
From the 1950s until 1983, party committees had authority over senior person-
nel decisions two levels down the administrative hierarchy, which meant that the 
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central party committee controlled personnel decisions of leading cadres at the pro-
vincial and prefectural levels (Burns 1987: 37). However, in this two-level-down 
nomenklatura system, the scope of management and the number of leading cadres 
directly managed by the central party committee was too large (Manion 1985: 217–
218). Therefore, in 1984, the central government implemented the nomenklatura 
reform to decentralize personnel management (Burns 1987: 38). The number of 
leading cadres directly controlled by the central committee was reduced from 13,000 
to 7,000, and the party committee at each level could only supervise one level down 
in the administrative hierarchy (ibid.). Since 1984, the central party committee has 
only authorized the appointment, promotion transfers, removals, or dismissals of 
chiefs and deputies at provincial and ministerial level, and local party committees 
have full control over the local management of leading cadres. As Burns (ibid.: 40) 
argues, the decentralization of the nomenklatura system gave local authorities 
greater autonomy in personnel decisions, which provided incentives for local gov-
ernments to improve efficiency in cadre management.  
In summary, along with the implementation of decentralization reforms which 
give subnational governments administrative and financial power, they also have 
autonomy in personnel decisions and cadre management. The semi-autonomous 
and relatively financially self-sufficient M-form administrative system gives local au-
thorities space to promote local economic development and adjust the develop-
mental path according to regional features. Hence, decentralization can be seen as 
a process of top-down reform, in which local governments are relatively self-con-
tained and have greater autonomy in regional development. At the same time, the 
nomenklatura system is a bottom-up cadre promotion system, in which the author-
ity over personnel decision-making is centralized at a higher administrative hierar-
chy level. As Zhou, L. (2004) argue, the nomenklatura system can be seen as an 
“internal labour market”, meaning that the promotion of leading cadres is con-
ducted internally within the system. Once new entrants are appointed in the no-
menklatura system, they will not easily opt-out of the system, because of certain 
features: 
a. the hierarchical wage structure, in which the wage rates increase from lower 
position to higher position within the system; 
b. in both the internal nomenklatura system and the external labour market, 
dismissal, removal, or “hop over” are usually considered to be bad signals 
for future employment. 
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Hence, the nomenklatura system generates strong “lock-in effects”. As the 
measurable criterion of local economic performances, GRP is highly related to lead-
ing cadres’ promotion, so that leading cadres are closely involved in local develop-
ment for promotion. At the same time, the rank-order tournament results in com-
petition for promotion between leading cadres at the same level of the 
administrative hierarchy, which intensifies inter-jurisdictional competition for re-
sources in promoting local economic development. Compared with less-developed 
regions, people from provinces with better economic performance have occupied 
the majority of positions in the Central Committee of the CPC: 13 out of 204 mem-
bers of the Central Committee are from Zhejiang, while there is only one member 
from Yunnan (Song 2017). Thus, it is clear that provinces with lower growth have 
fewer promotion prospects than provinces with high performance. 
The top-down reform delegates greater autonomy and space to local govern-
ments in regional development, while the bottom-up promotion system provides 
strong incentives for leading cadres to devote themselves to local economic devel-
opment. As Blanchard and Shleifer (2001: 179) suggest, “the economic benefits of 
decentralization in China depend on some form of political centralization”. The 
rank-order tournament thus explains why local governments are virtually unaffected 
by the pendulum of the fiscal arrangement, enthusiastically promoting regional eco-
nomic growth, even when the fiscal arrangement could damage local interests. The 
strong incentives for local governments and cadres derive from the highly compet-
itive environment, which created the decentralization reform and centralized cadre 
management and promotion system. Hence, to understand how and why a specific 
development trajectory has been shaped in a region, it is essential to identify first 
what economic and institutional arrangements determine or have the most signifi-
cant influence on economic actors’ behaviour. Overall, the tax-sharing system, M-
form administrative system, and the rank-order tournament scheme play a crucial 
role in shaping the distinctive regional path of development. 
 
6.2 Inter-jurisdictional competition   
Section 6.1 presented an overview of economic reforms in China and asked what 
particular institutional and economic arrangement or environment created by the 
central government is the main driving force in shaping local governments and 
firms’ behaviour. The tax-sharing system adopted in 1994 resulted in the redistri-
bution of financial power and expenditure responsibilities between central and pro-
vincial governments. While the central government has delegated the majority of 
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administrative, managerial, and decision-making powers to provincial governments, 
more expenditure responsibilities have been shifted to local authorities, to an extent 
that is incommensurate with local financial power and has caused severe budget 
deficits. Meanwhile, the strong incentives deriving from the rank-order tournament 
for the promotion of leading cadres underlie the enthusiasm of local authorities for 
promoting local economic growth so as to raise local revenue, which significantly 
intensifies competition between local governments. This section will therefore dis-
cuss how subnational governments, with discretionary power, compete in this 
highly competitive environment, and how inter-jurisdictional competition influ-
ences evolving local development trajectories. 
Boyne (1996: 708) argues that competition between local authorities has two 
forms:  
a. competition between different areas for mobile resources like households 
and businesses (horizontal intergovernmental competition); 
b. competition between different tiers of local governments for local revenues 
(vertical intergovernmental competition). 
Both horizontal and vertical competition are observed between subnational gov-
ernments in China.  
 
6.2.1 Horizontal competition  
Tiebout’s work (1956: 419–420) on horizontal intergovernmental competition 
states that individuals are fully mobile and choose a jurisdiction based on the taxes 
and public services provided by local government, while jurisdictions compete for 
residents who can produce a pareto-optimal outcome (Revesz 1992: 1236–1237). 
Wilson (1999: 271) says that Tiebout’s work incorporates both public choice theory 
and tax competition theory. In 1975, Fischel and White extended Tiebout’s Hy-
pothesis to include mobile firms, assuming that firms are fully mobile and choose 
the region they prefer and which supplies them with public inputs; subsequent work 
has introduced labour and capital into the Tiebout Hypothesis (Wilson 1999: 272). 
Local governments compete for resources to increase local revenues, which mainly 
depend on taxpayers, including labour and firms located within their jurisdiction 
(Eberts and Gronberg 1988). The main method for local authorities to attract re-
sources is to lower taxes. As Eberts and Gronberg (ibid.: 3) argue, if local govern-
ments attempt to increase tax or reduce the provision of public services, there is a 
possibility that taxpayers will choose neighbouring jurisdictions which better meet 
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their preferences. However, Oates (1972: 143, 1988: 336) argues that jurisdictions’ 
competition to attract business investment by lowering taxes will lead to less effi-
cient levels of provision of local public services. 
Throughout this discussion, one of the underlying assumptions of tax competi-
tion is that actors are fully mobile. In China, although each individual is allowed to 
choose where to reside and to work, the household registration system (1950), also 
known as the “Hukou system”, which identifies individuals according to infor-
mation including registered residential jurisdiction, name, age, family members, etc., 
largely restricts the mobility of residents. The Hukou system is closely connected 
with the provision of basic welfare such as education, public health services, pen-
sions, and other public services for residents registered within the jurisdiction, 
which is a significant obstacle to moving from one jurisdiction to another. Notably, 
the Hukou system divides residents into “agricultural” and “non-agricultural” pop-
ulations (Wu and Treiman 2002). In 2016, there were 169.34 million rural–urban 
migrants out of a total of 245 million migrant workers in 2016 (National Bureau of 
Statistics 2017). Although there are large numbers of migrant workers who are fully 
mobile and able to choose where to work, it is difficult for rural–urban migrant 
workers to settle in cities and gain access to basic welfare provided by urban gov-
ernments. Registering as non-agricultural and settling in a city requires home own-
ership or a certain length of time working in that city. Hence, the Hukou system 
significantly restricts the mobility of individuals. 
Compared with the limited mobility of individuals, firms are selective and mo-
bile in intergovernmental competition. As 70% of local budget revenues consists of 
income tax from local enterprises and VAT (Ren et al. 2015), local governments 
compete for mobile capital to increase local revenues. Also, the central government 
delegates some discretion in deciding tax deductions and granting tax exemptions: 
local governments will often make use of this power by promising tax deductions 
or exemptions when signing agreements with enterprises, as a way of attracting cap-
ital investment (Ye 2017). Compared with internal capital, FDI is much more mo-
bile and has a higher level of policy flexibility (Fu and Zhang 2007). The inflow of 
FDI provides job opportunities, brings in technology, and expands the market, ex-
erting a positive influence on local economic growth. According to Li and Shen 
(2008), when the rate of FDI increases by 1%, the GDP growth rate will increase 
by 0.04%. To encourage local governments in their efforts to attract FDI, provincial 
and prefecture-level governments have the discretion to waive or reduce local in-
come tax for any enterprises with foreign investment (State Council, Government 
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of China, 1991). Hence, tax is one of the main weapons in intergovernmental com-
petition.  
Using data from 1995 to 2010, Zhu and Du (2013) found that the local marginal 
tax burden ratio to incremental GRP showed a significant downward trend, which 
provides evidence of tax competition since the tax-sharing reform. Pang (2007) 
have tested for and shown a significantly positive relationship between FDI and the 
level of intergovernmental competition. Fu and Shen (2012) provide convincing 
evidence in support of horizontal tax competition between local governments 
through lowering the effective tax rate. They also found that besides tax competi-
tion, local governments in the eastern coastal area are inclined to compete through 
the provision of public services or improved infrastructure, while local governments 
in western regions are still apt to compete by lowering the tax rate to attract invest-
ments (ibid.). Li and Shen (2008) support this conclusion, arguing that tax compe-
tition was the main method of intergovernmental competition during the 1990s. 
However, fierce intergovernmental competition spurs a race to the bottom among 
local governments, which aggravates local fiscal difficulties (ibid.). Hence, local gov-
ernments started to change competition strategies, and diverse forms of competi-
tion began to emerge. Regional differences in horizontal competition are found be-
tween the eastern and western regions. Li and Shen (2008) confirm the suggestion 
that local governments in the well-developed eastern area compete with tax rates 
but also through public inputs, which can improve the productivity of capital for 
attracting investments, while tax competition is still the dominant form of intergov-
ernmental competition in less-developed western areas. 
 Oates’ argument (1972: 143, 1988: 336) that tax competition might lead to an 
inefficient provision of local public services, has been proved in inter-jurisdictional 
competition in China. The budgetary expenditures can basically be divided into 
three categories: productive expenditures (e.g. infrastructure construction, agricul-
tural productive expenditures and other production-related expenditures), non-pro-
ductive expenditures (e.g. education, medical and health care, public services, etc.) 
and other administrative fixed expenditures. Fu and Zhang (2007) use the actual tax 
rate of foreign-funded enterprises to measure local competition. When the intensity 
of local competition increases by one unit, the proportion of infrastructure invest-
ment in whole budgetary expenditures will increase by 0.95%, while the ratio of 
non-productive expenditures to total local expenditures will decrease by 0.62% 
(ibid.). Notably, Fu and Zhang (ibid.) argue that compared to the well-developed 
eastern region, provinces in the western region are at a disadvantage in inter-
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jurisdictional competition. Hence, once they receive extra funds, subsidies, or na-
tional investments, they are inclined to increase investment in productive expendi-
tures such as infrastructure rather than non-productive expenditures. Although lo-
cal governments in western regions also increase inputs into education, medical and 
health care, and other public services, the proportion of non-productive inputs to 
total expenditures is considerably lower than the productive expenditures.  
The discussion above suggests that, as the implementation of the tax-sharing 
system and rank-order tournament scheme have substantially intensified regional 
competition for mobile capital so as to raise local revenue, tax competition is the 
main type of horizontal intergovernmental competition. However, fierce tax com-
petition spurs a race to the bottom among local governments, which exacerbates 
local fiscal deficits. Local governments, especially in the developed eastern regions, 
started to switch competition strategies, turning to the provision of public services 
and improved infrastructure. It is clear that inter-jurisdictional competition does 
exert a significantly positive influence on local economic growth, but at the same 
time it also results in inefficient provision of local public services, especially in non-
productive expenditures.  
 
6.2.2 Vertical competition   
As mentioned in the previous section, a semi-autonomous and relatively financially 
self-sufficient M-form, four-tier administrative system (province–prefecture–
county–township) was constructed in China. In this administrative system, prefec-
ture-level cities have discretionary power over the fiscal arrangement of their sur-
rounding counties, known as the “city administering county system” (shi guan xian). 
Due to the severe imbalance in local financial power and local expenditure respon-
sibilities after the implementation of the tax-sharing system, more expenditure re-
sponsibilities have been assigned to lower-level authorities, especially the county 
level of governments while, in order to reduce local fiscal deficits, the higher-level 
authorities tend to take financial control and hold back transfer payments and sub-
sidies. Compared with the prefecture-level of governments, the county govern-
ments face severe local budget shortfalls, especially since the repeal of agricultural 
taxes. It seems that, under the “city administering county system”, the prefecture-
level governments take advantage of their administrative power to squeeze county 
governments’ financial resources, which compounds the county governments’ fi-
nancial difficulties. Therefore, the “city administering county system” might bring 
inefficiency in county economic development. 
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Due to the fiscal deficit, more than two-thirds of local budget revenues have to 
be used for covering “fixed expenditures” such as personnel and other administra-
tive costs, often referred to by the Chinese expression: chi fan cai zheng (“budget 
revenues only for eating”) (Herrmann and Feng 2004: 406). Hence, productive and 
non-productive expenditures only account for a minor part of total county expendi-
ture (Yin and Zhu 2011). The abolition of agricultural taxes caused a drastic reduc-
tion in county budget revenues so that county-level governments now depend heav-
ily on transfer payments. Yin and Zhu (2011) used data from 2001 to 2005 covering 
2,067 counties to study the county governments’ expenditure preferences. They 
found that the influence coefficient of transfer payments to productive expendi-
tures and non-productive expenditures was 0.58 and 0.05, respectively, meaning 
that the majority of transfer payments were used for productive expenditures. These 
transfer payments are vital for county economic development.  
In this context, counties are eager to raise local revenues and extricate them-
selves from prefecture governments’ restraint by demanding more financial power 
and discretionary control over local financial arrangements. Hence, with the aim of 
reducing the fiscal deficit, increasing fiscal power, and preventing prefecture au-
thorities from holding back tax rebates, transfer payments, or subsidies from county 
governments, the central government introduced a “province directly administering 
county system” (sheng guan xian) in 2005. In this administrative arrangement, coun-
ties are directly administered by the provincial government, including allocating tax 
rebates, transfer payments, or subsidies. In 2008, the central government gave pri-
ority to major agricultural counties in adopting the “province directly administering 
county system”, and in 2009, the central government announced that this system 
should be applied nationwide, except for the autonomous regions, by the end of 
2012 (State Council, Government of China 2009). In 2011, 970 out of 1,636 coun-
ties in 27 provinces adopted the “province directly administering county system” 
(Tao, S. 2013).  
After the implementation of the “province directly administering county sys-
tem”, the financial difficulties at the county level were effectively reduced and the 
financial power between prefecture and county levels of government rebalanced. 
Yang and Yin (2015) test the ratio of expenditure responsibility to budget revenues 
at the county level in nine provinces from 2003 to 2007, and the results show that 
the proportion increased by 10.2%. This suggests that the financial power of county 
governments has been increased and enhanced, while the corresponding financial 
power of prefecture governments has decreased (Yu, H. 2016). More importantly, 
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as increasing discretionary power has been delegated to county governments, the 
relationship between prefecture and county-level authorities has shifted from a su-
pervisor–subordinate relationship to a relatively equal balance of power in local fi-
nancial arrangements, which has resulted in vertical competition between prefecture 
and county governments (ibid.). The vertical competition between prefecture and 
county governments has been confirmed by Wang and Fang (2015), who find that, 
after adopting the new administrative system, the tax rate at county level declined 
by 0.45% to attract investment so as to raise local revenues.  
Therefore, with the implementation of the “province directly administering 
county system”, the relationship between prefecture and county levels of govern-
ment was altered, which granted county governments a degree of financial power 
which is roughly equivalent to that of prefecture governments. In the vertical com-
petition between prefectural and county-level governments, the strategies for at-
tracting mobile capital to increase local revenues are, in practice, the same as the 
strategies found in horizontal competition, such as lowering the tax rate, improving 
infrastructure, implementing favourable policies, etc. 
Since Zhejiang is the third-smallest province in China, the distance between the 
prefectural cities and counties is short, and the number of counties which are ad-
ministered by prefecture-level cities is relatively small (Wu 2004). Zhejiang has 
therefore followed the “province directly administering county system” since 1953, 
long before the central government introduced this system in 2005 (ibid.). When 
the tax-sharing system was adopted in 1993, Zhejiang province adjusted the sharing 
scheme between the provincial government and prefecture and county govern-
ments, based on their level of economic development (Yu, H. 2016). The allocation 
was based on the premise of fulfilling the local financial planning tasks and main-
taining a balanced budget.  
a. For four less-developed prefecture cities and 28 counties, the provincial gov-
ernment provides proportional subsidies based on each region’s incremen-
tal revenues, and also gives an amount of reward equal to 5% of incremen-
tal revenues to prefecture cities, and 10% of incremental revenues to 
counties. 
b. For five well-developed prefecture cities and 25 counties, the provincial gov-
ernment provides a reward equal to 5% of incremental revenues to prefec-
ture cities and 10% of incremental revenues to counties (ibid.: 61–62).  
In 1992, Zhejiang launched a reform named kuo quan qiang xian, aimed at rein-
forcing the counties’ economic development by devolving more power to them. 
From 1999, the Zhejiang provincial government delegated economic management 
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power to county governments that was commensurate with that of prefecture au-
thorities, and devolved administrative examination and approval power for 2,621 
projects or items to county governments. Hence, since the 1950s, county authorities 
in Zhejiang province have had considerable discretionary power to determine 
schemes for local economic development.  
As mentioned above, in 2009, the central government decided to implement the 
“province directly administering county system” nationwide. In 2009, Yunnan pro-
vincial government selected only three counties, Zhenxiong, Xuanwei, and Ten-
chong, to apply the new administrative system (Yunnan People’s Congress Standing 
Committee 2011). By the end of 2010, earmarked transfer payment to the three 
counties had risen 43.5% year-on-year to 3.2 billion yuan (0.4 billion euro) and the 
general transfer payment had increased 13.3% year-on-year to 2.4 billion yuan (0.3 
billion euro) (ibid.). In short, the implementation of the “province directly admin-
istering county system” in Yunnan is still in its initial stage. 
Figure 6.13 
Zhejiang and Yunnan self-sufficiency rates (%) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
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Figure 6.13 presents the financial self-sufficiency rates for Zhejiang and Yunnan 
at prefecture and county level. It shows that Zhejiang has maintained a high degree 
of financial self-sufficiency at both levels, while in Yunnan financial self-sufficiency 
rates are considerably higher at prefecture level than county level. From 2003, 
Zhejiang’s prefecture and county governments’ self-sufficiency rates remained 
steady around 95% and 74%, respectively. In Yunnan, the average self-sufficiency 
rate at prefecture level was about 69% while at county level it showed a downward 
trend from 36.5% in 2005 to 28% in 2015. This means that in Zhejiang, the budg-
etary revenues at both prefecture and county level can cover most budgetary ex-
penditures, while about 70% of budget expenditures at county level in Yunnan de-
pend on non-budget revenues such as transfer payments from superior authorities 
or various sources of government loans (Zhejiang Bureau of Statistics 2016, Yun-
nan Bureau of Statistics 2016). As already noted, only three counties in Yunnan 
have adopted the “province directly administering county system”, lagging far be-
hind other provinces, and the county level of government in the province still suf-
fers from serious financial difficulties.  
To sum up, under the “city administering county system”, after the implemen-
tation of the tax-sharing system, the prefecture-level of government took advantage 
of its administrative power to squeeze county governments’ financial resources and 
to assign more expenditure responsibilities to county governments. The county 
governments thus found themselves facing severe local budget shortfalls. To reduce 
the fiscal deficit and increase fiscal power, the central government introduced a 
“province directly administering county system”. As increasing amounts of discre-
tionary power were delegated to county governments, the relationship between pre-
fecture and county-level authorities altered. The two levels of government had rel-
atively equal financial power in local financial arrangements, which resulted in 
vertical competition between prefecture and county governments for attracting in-
vestment so as to raise local revenues. In practice, the purpose, strategies, and meth-
ods of the vertical competition between prefectural and county-level of govern-
ments are the same as those of the horizontal competition. 
This discussion on inter-jurisdictional competition has shown that both hori-
zontal and vertical competition derive from the implementation of the tax-sharing 
system and the rank-order tournament scheme. Local governments engaged in the 
two forms of competition aim to attract mobile capital so as to raise local revenue. 
Tax competition is one of the main types of intergovernmental competition, while 
other strategies include the provision of public services and improved infrastructure.  
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Additional factors such as the size of the local market, market accessibility, 
transport, labour wage rate, etc. all shape the investment environment, which sub-
stantially affects investors. Regions like Zhejiang, with a high marketization level, a 
high degree of mobility of entry to and exit from the market, and specialized and 
mature production and logistics networks, are better placed to attract mobile capital 
compared to regions like Yunnan. The latter, with low marketization level and low 
market mobility, is in a much less favourable position in competing for capital. To 
raise local revenue, local governments in regions that have difficulty attracting in-
vestment tend to put more effort into supporting local core firms. In short, a re-
gion’s ability to attract mobile capital exerts a profound influence on local govern-
ments’ behaviour and shapes state–business relations. Overall, intergovernmental 
competition makes a significant impact on regional development trajectories. 
 
6.3 The recent evolutionary business system of Zhejiang and 
Yunnan (1979 to the present) 
In the pre-reform period, both Zhejiang and Yunnan had completed the socialist 
transformation and carried out the national development plans; however, the re-
gional differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan persisted. In this section, three 
questions will be answered.  
a. How have the development trajectories of Zhejiang and Yunnan been 
changed in the radical transition from the planned economy to the market 
economy?  
b. How do economic actors, such as local governments and enterprises, react, 
respond or adjust their behaviour to this radical institutional change?  
c. Does the market-oriented reform alter the pre-existing regional economic 
and institutional configurations and regional differences? 
The main focus of this section is the path of development and the behaviour of 
economic actors in the transitional economy in Zhejiang and Yunnan. An in-depth 
discussion of how and why a particular path or a pattern of economic actors’ be-
haviour has been shaped will be presented in section 6.4. 
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6.3.1 The revival and development of the Zhejiang economy 
The initial stage of economic reform (1979–1991) 
As discussed in previous sections, to overcome the problems generated by the 
planned economy, central government launched its economic reform. In 1979, cen-
tral government acknowledged the “individual economy” as the “appendix to and 
complement of socialist collective economy” and in 1981 it promoted the individual 
economy as a “necessary complement” to socialism, which marked the revival of 
the private economy (Coase and Wang 2016: 58). In addition, as central government 
indicated in an official document issued in 1981, state-owned and collective enter-
prises were allowed to contract out parts of their business, including handicraft and 
small component manufacturing and repairing or other related services, to self-em-
ployed individuals — a practice which was entirely consistent with traditional 
Zhejiang merchants’ business activities in the imperial era. These changes allowed 
surplus labour and the pre-existing traditional handicraft industries to be “activated” 
(Chen, L. 2005). Within a short time, a large number of those classed as surplus 
labour, especially from rural areas in Zhejiang, started up businesses in small con-
sumer goods, handicraft and component manufacturing (Ma, L. 2009: 125).  
It is worth noting that, throughout the period of the privatization reform which 
began in 1979, the central government found itself confronting an ideological di-
lemma, which resulted in the private sector suffering from policy constraints and 
social discrimination (Coase and Wang 2016: 58–59, 75). In 1982, central govern-
ment acknowledged the legal status of the individual economy and in 1988 individ-
ual businesses with eight or more employees were officially legalized as “private 
enterprises”. Although the number of individual businesses and private enterprises 
rapidly increased, before the market-oriented economy was officially recognized as 
an integral part of Chinese socialism in 1992, these businesses and enterprises had 
not received the protection from central government to which they were entitled 
(Coase and Wang 2016: 58–59). However, when the central government, and local 
government officials from other provinces, were still trapped in this ideological di-
lemma, Zhejiang local government had already started supporting individual busi-
nesses and private enterprises, especially in Wenzhou, the cradle of the private econ-
omy in China.   
In Wenzhou, which had received the smallest proportion of central government 
investments during the pre-reform period, the state-owned economy was relatively 
weak. After the “individual economy” was recognized by central government in 
1979, Wenzhou authorities officially registered the first “individual business” in 
China on 30 November 1979 (Ma, L. 2009: 125, Coase and Wang 2016: 58). A large 
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number of individual businesses based on the family workshop rapidly appeared, 
causing a heated nationwide debate on “capitalism or socialism” (Ma, L. 2009: 32). 
In the initial stage of privatization reform, the Wenzhou government had faced 
relatively strong political and social pressures from the central government and local 
governments in other provinces with regard to its support for the individual econ-
omy. As described above (section 6.1.1), during the pre-reform period, the people’s 
commune system in rural areas had established a large number of “commune-bri-
gade enterprises”, which mainly worked in agro-industry and the raw materials in-
dustry (Wang, C. 2014). After the reform, the central government renamed these 
commune-brigade enterprises “township and village enterprises” (TVEs) and en-
couraged households or individuals to set up TVEs, meaning that TVEs could be 
run by people’s communes, households, individuals, or other collective forms (ibid.). 
To reduce political risks and obstruction and to promote the individual economy, 
in 1980 the Wenzhou government allowed the family-based individual businesses 
and private firms to “put on a red hat”, affiliating themselves to the state-owned 
TVE sector, which received ideological protection. The “red hat” enterprises were 
termed “hang-on household” (guahu) enterprises (Parris 1993). These family-based 
guahu enterprises rose rapidly in number, especially in rural area, and became the 
typical business model in Zhejiang. In the 1980s, Wenzhou’s “one region, one firm, 
all families affiliated” model was widely applied in Zhejiang: local government es-
tablished one TVE and let all the family-based workshops or family businesses 
within their jurisdiction affiliate with the TVE; at the same time, each workshop 
and individual business assumed sole responsibility for its own profits or losses 
(Cao, Z. 2006: 105). By the mid-1980s, 62% of family-based businesses in Zhejiang 
were guahu enterprises (Parris 1993: 245). This model provided the basis for the 
highly specialized and interdependent industrial cluster in Zhejiang.  
From 1979 to 1984, due to the acute nationwide shortage of essential consumer 
goods and components for SOEs, firms in Wenzhou made great profits from low-
cost clothes, footwear, buttons, tools, etc. (Cao, Z. 2006: 91). In the mid-1980s, 
increasingly intense competition meant that enterprises were keen to expand the 
scale of production and improve production quality. Affiliation with the state-
owned sector did not suit the needs of these firms, which led to the appearance of 
the joint-stock cooperative enterprise. With the aim, once again, of reducing politi-
cal risks and obstruction, in 1987 the Wenzhou government issued an official doc-
ument, emphasizing that the joint-stock cooperative enterprise is the complement 
of the socialist collective economy (Ma, L. 2009). From 1980 to 1990, the Wenzhou 
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government issued dozens of official documents to regulate and provide localized 
legitimate protection for the private sector, which represented the first regulations 
on private enterprises in China (Ma, L. 2009). By the end of 1987, there were about 
2,2000 joint-stock cooperative enterprises registered in Wenzhou (Cao, Z. 2006: 
113). The Wenzhou model was adopted in other regions in Zhejiang and, building 
on Wenzhou’s successful experience, TVEs and SOEs in Zhejiang began the tran-
sition from the state-owned sector to the private sector. 
At the same time, other local governments in Zhejiang also provided protection 
and supported individual businesses and private enterprises. Yiwu is a county city 
in Jinhua, where the sugar industry had flourished since the Ming dynasty and which 
had formed 31 trade markets in 1922 (Zhou, H. 2009). Due to the poor availability 
of cultivable land in Yiwu, large numbers of local residents worked as salespeople, 
peddling sugar in exchange for the traditional fertilizer — feathers. However, “sugar 
for feathers” peddling activities had been severely restricted during the planned 
economy period (ibid.). As soon as the individual economy was recognized by cen-
tral government, Yiwu government began issuing “sugar for feathers” licences to 
local residents: 12,000 licences were issued from 1980 to 1981 (ibid.). In 1979, the 
Yiwu government had also issued an official document on resuming the trade mar-
kets, in which they stated that the trade market is not only a traditional custom but 
also a necessary complement of the socialist economy. Two years later, the Yiwu 
fair trade market was reopened (Ma, L. 2009: 23). In the following years, Yiwu’s 
trade markets expanded and have promoted the development of industrial clusters 
in other cities in Jinhua. 
Overall, from 1979 to 1991, with strong support from local governments, the 
private sector emerged and developed rapidly in Zhejiang. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, in 1979, the agricultural sector contributed 42.8% to the 
GRP of Zhejiang, while the proportion of industrial sector was 40.6% (National 
Bureau of Statistics 1996). From 1980 to 1991 the proportion of output value from 
industrial sector surpassed the other two sectors, maintaining a steady rate of 45% 
(ibid.). Indeed, from 1983 to 1991 the proportion of industrial output in Zhejiang 
was higher than the overall proportion of industrial sector output in China (ibid.).  
It can thus be said that in the initial stage of reform, when individual businesses 
and private enterprises confronted political and social discrimination, Zhejiang local 
governments were generous towards the private sector. Importantly, different levels 
of local government in Zhejiang exhibited different attitudes towards the private 
sector. Lower-level local authorities, such as county or prefectural governments, 
took positive action in promoting private business, while the provincial 
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government’s support to the private economy was more tacit (Chen, S. 2009: 37, 
Ma, L. 2009: 67). It was too politically risky for the provincial government to take a 
clear-cut stand on promoting the private sector (Ma, L. 2009: 67). Nevertheless, 
Zhejiang local governments had a very tolerant attitude towards private sector en-
terprises in the 1980s and early 1990s. With the support and protection of local 
governments, the number of family-based individual businesses and private enter-
prises increased significantly. 
Overall, then, the private sector was quick to emerge and develop in Zhejiang. 
The pre-existing economic, industrial, and institutional configurations in Zhejiang, 
which were already more market-oriented, were rapidly “activated” when the re-
form started. The emerging private sector not only absorbed large numbers of sur-
plus labourers but also met the needs of local governments facing difficult eco-
nomic conditions. Hence, the successful emergence of the private sector in 
Zhejiang was the product of pre-existing social, economic, cultural, and institutional 
configurations, combined with the initial distribution of resources, which also had 
a profound impact on local governments’ behaviour. Since 1978, Zhejiang local 
governments have been deeply involved in local economic development. In the in-
itial stage of reform, prefectural and county-level governments actively provided a 
safe political and legal environment to emerging private sector businesses, which 
laid the foundations for the later development of high specialized industrial clusters 
in Zhejiang, while the provincial government, constrained by political risks, gave its 
tacit support to the private economy. During this period, lower-level local govern-
ments played a significant role in local economic development, especially in Wen-
zhou. 
 
Economic development after 1992 
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s speech ended the “capitalism or socialism” debate by 
introducing the notion of the socialist market economy, and his “no debate, try 
boldly” principle (Coase and Wang 2016: 66) created a more flexible political envi-
ronment which considerably encouraged the development of the private sector. In 
1993, Zhejiang provincial government issued an official document, emphasizing the 
importance of the private sector to local economic development and encouraging 
local authorities to treat the private sector as a crucial source of growth (Ma, L. 2009: 
76). Zhejiang was the first province to prioritize the development of the private 
sector, and from then on, the lower-level local authorities actively devoted them-
selves to supporting and promoting the private sector (ibid.: 76–77).  
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The rapid growth of the private sector within the economic development of 
Zhejiang was attributed to the diffusion effect of the successful Wenzhou model. 
In the 1980s, the Wenzhou model was widely adopted in other regions, even in 
some cities which had state-owned sector such as Ningbo, Shaoxing, Jiaxing, Hu-
zhou, and Hangzhou (Ma, L. 2009: 125). As already noted, TVEs made a significant 
contribution to the development of the private sector and marketization in Zhejiang, 
especially in the 1980s and early 1990s. The TVEs acted like an incubator for new 
enterprises, providing legitimate protection of the private sector, creating job op-
portunities for large numbers from the surplus labour force in rural areas, and pro-
moting rural industrialization and urbanization. Unlike SOEs, TVEs had relatively 
high levels of flexibility and were not subject to control through the state’s industrial 
production plans, enabling TVEs to determine their own products and production, 
based on market demand (Coase and Wang 2016: 55–56). These features provided 
the affiliated family-based workshops or family businesses in Zhejiang with great 
opportunities for development. As the economic reform progressed, TVEs were 
gradually privatized. By 1994, 83% of TVEs were actually private enterprises (Coase 
and Wang 2016: 55). From the early 1980s onwards, the “one region, one firm, all 
families affiliated” model provided a basis for shaping the highly specialized and 
mature production networks in Zhejiang. With the support of local governments, 
industrial clusters in Zhejiang developed rapidly and made a significant contribution 
to local economic growth.  
When the tax-sharing system was adopted in 1994, the majority of administrative, 
managerial, and decision-making powers had been delegated to local governments, 
with each level of subnational government required to establish its own financial 
management system and to maintain a balanced budget. Under this self-contained 
system, and with the strong incentives deriving from the rank-order tournament, 
local officials devoted themselves to promoting local economic development. To 
provide more incentives to local governments, alongside the “province directly ad-
ministering county system”, the Zhejiang provincial government carried out admin-
istrative reforms which gave greater administrative autonomy to counties which had 
better economic performances (Chen, S. 2009: 38). From 1992 to 1997, 13 counties 
were granted administrative autonomy and some approval power at prefecture level, 
and in 2002 the provincial government devolved administrative authority of 313 
items to 17 counties and three districts. In 2006, Yiwu was selected for a pilot pro-
ject to expand socio-economic administrative authority (ibid.). With increasing eco-
nomic administrative autonomy, Zhejiang’s counties generally saw their economies 
improve. In 2007, counties in Zhejiang contributed 62.4% of GRP and 54.3% of 
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total fiscal revenues, and created 70.5% of all jobs (ibid.). Hence, the financial and 
administrative system adopted in Zhejiang and the rank-order tournament have 
played a substantial part in promoting local economic development. 
As well as making various commitments to tax deductions, exemptions, and re-
funds to firms in different industrial zones, Zhejiang governments tended to invest 
in productive expenditures, especially in infrastructure construction. Due to the lack 
of infrastructure investment during the pre-reform period, infrastructure construc-
tion had lagged behind, especially in Wenzhou, which had no railway system or 
airport. In 1995, infrastructure investment in Zhenjiang was 23 billion yuan (2.9 
billion euro), accounting for 20% of total investment in fixed assets, and in 2000 
the investment in infrastructure increased to 87.6 billion yuan (11 billion euro), rep-
resenting 38.7% of total investment in fixed assets. Although the percentage of the 
investment in infrastructure to the investment in fixed assets has decreased, the 
ratio has remained around 25% and in 2017 the total investment in infrastructure 
was 741.8 billion yuan (93 billion euro), accounting for 27.8% of total fixed assets 
investment in Zhejiang. At the same time, in order to compete for mobile resources, 
the Zhejiang government regulated the informal financial organizations and estab-
lished various credit guarantee institutions for SMEs; in addition, in 2004 Zhejiang 
provincial government launched a training project for private enterprises (Ma, L. 
2009: 117).  
After the tax-sharing reform, and with increasingly fierce competition between 
local governments for leading cadres’ promotion, the main role of local govern-
ments was to provide favourable policies, relax regulations and simplify application 
processes, invest in productive expenditures, and create a good business climate for 
attracting mobile capital. Notably, after China became a member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the import and export value sharply increased 
in China. With their geographical advantages, firms in Zhejiang — mainly private 
enterprises — started exporting and embedding themselves in global value chains. 
As private enterprises can easily enter the global market, these firms are becoming 
less dependent on the domestic market and local governments. Hence, since the 
mid-1990s, the role of local governments in Zhejiang has gradually shifted to ser-
vice-oriented governance which shapes the state-supported type of environment. 
With the support of local government (from a distance), the private sector has 
grown rapidly and has become the main contributor to local economic development 
and the processes of development that have shaped the current Zhejiang business 
system. 
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6.3.2 The developmental path of the Yunnan economy  
The short boom of light industry before 1992 
During the pre-reform period, the implementation of the heavy industry-oriented 
development strategy and the Third Front Movement resulted in serious imbalances 
between agriculture and industry, as well as between light and heavy industry. At 
the same time, the Great Leap Forward campaign and the Cultural Revolution 
nearly destroyed the national economy. Hence, after the end of Cultural Revolution 
in late 1976, leading cadres made many trips abroad not only to rebuild relations 
between China and other countries, but also to find solutions for rebuilding the 
devastated economy (Coase and Wang 2016: 42). After the Third Plenum in 1979, 
the central government carried out a series of reforms. In order to resolve the struc-
tural imbalances, the central government made the development of agriculture a 
priority, slowed down the development of heavy industry, and increased investment 
in light industry (ibid.: 157–158). Furthermore, with the aim of tackling the ineffi-
ciency problem of SOEs generated by the highly centralized and unified manage-
ment system, central government devolved greater decision-making power to both 
local governments and SOEs; shortly afterwards, it allowed SOEs to retain their 
own profits and introduced the managerial responsibility contract system into SOEs. 
After 1992, with the private sector fast developing, central government encouraged 
SOEs to convert to joint-stock enterprises in order to guarantee the autonomy of 
enterprises, and to specify their responsibilities as a way of introducing the market 
mechanism into SOEs. 
Due to the acute shortage of essential goods, from 1979 to 1990, the first priority 
of Yunnan was to develop agriculture and light industry. In the initial phase of eco-
nomic reform, and in the light of local conditions, Yunnan provincial government 
naturally turned to the most resource-rich industries including tobacco, tea, sugar, 
pharmaceuticals, and rubber, as well as mineral and metal mining and the smelting 
industry (Yang, Q. 2010: 32). During this period, only the central and provincial 
governments had approval rights for investment in infrastructure. The Yunnan pro-
vincial government therefore reduced investment in non-productive and off-budg-
etary projects, so that it could concentrate resources on the development of agri-
culture and light industry as well as mining (ibid.: 22). In the late 1980s, tobacco, 
sugar, tea, rubber, and mining became the major contributors to local economic 
development.  
In the late 1970s, the central government had promoted the transformation of 
military enterprises into “civilian SOEs” by encouraging them to make related com-
mercial goods or to diversify their businesses to other sectors (Chao, L. 2009). 
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Hence, from 1979 the majority of Third Front military enterprises in Yunnan 
started converting into “civilian SOEs”. In 1979, three military enterprises began to 
manufacture consumer goods and to build their own brand: Spring Flower bicycle, 
Orchid refrigerator, and Camellia vehicle. Together with White Rose washing ma-
chine and Japonica television, made by two SOEs, these five products — known as 
the “Five Golden Flowers in Yunnan” — had risen to national prominence by the 
early 1990s (Yang and Zhan 2014). During this period, light industry in Yunnan 
developed substantially. At the same time, as required by central government in 
order to control the scale of investment in fixed assets, the Yunnan government cut 
investment in infrastructure construction (Yang, Q. 2010: 32). In addition, the Yun-
nan government carried out financial reform aimed at changing the basis of invest-
ments from grants to bank loans, and adopted the managerial responsibility system 
in SOEs, meaning that SOEs had more decision-making powers and should assume 
sole responsibility for their own profits and losses (ibid.). 
As illustrated in Figure 4.9, from 1978 to 1990, with government support, agri-
cultural sector made up the largest part of total GRP in Yunnan. In 1978, the output 
value of agricultural sector was 2.9 billion yuan (0.36 billion euro), accounting for 
42.7% of GRP of Yunnan, while industrial and service sectors contributed 39.9% 
and 17.4% respectively. The proportion of agricultural sector remained above 40% 
from 1978 to 1985, followed by a slight decline. Overall, except for 1988 and 1989, 
agricultural sector had the largest output value among the three sectors. 
Figure 6.14 
The share of gross industrial output in Yunnan (1978–1990) 
Source: Yunnan Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
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Figure 6.14 shows that from 1978 to 1990, the percentage of output value of 
heavy industry to the total industrial output value shows a downward trend. In 1978, 
the output value of heavy industry in Yunnan was 3.2 billion yuan (0.4 billion euro), 
accounting for 57% of total industrial output value, while the output value of light 
industry was 2.4 billion yuan (0.3 billion euro), accounting for 43%. However, with 
the change of developmental strategy from 1979, the output value of light industry 
in Yunnan began an upward trend. In 1989, the output value of light industry sur-
passed that of heavy industry and in 1990, light industry contributed 52.5% of total 
industrial output value in Yunnan (Yunnan Bureau of Statistics 2016). 
Thus, during the initial stage of reform, investment in heavy industry was re-
duced in order to address the disproportionate growth of heavy industry compared 
to light industry. With government support, the output value of agricultural industry 
and light industry increased. In this stage, the state sector was still in a dominant 
position, while the private sector played no role in local economic development. 
 
The enhancement of the state sector after 1992 
In 1990, the Yunnan provincial government stated that the major targets of its 
Eighth Five-Year Plan were to: (a) maintain the growth of the tobacco, sugar, and 
tea industries; (b) focus on the development of the phosphorus, rubber, steel and 
other metal making and paper making industries; and (c) increase investment in 
infrastructure construction (He, Z. 1990). Moreover, in a report in 1993, the pro-
vincial government emphasized the importance of service sector and stated that the 
first priority in the 1990s should be develop the tourist industry (He, Z. 1993). Ac-
cording to Yunnan’s Ninth Five-Year Plan (1995–2000), the provincial government 
was to focus on: (a) promoting four local core industries: tobacco, biological re-
sources development, mining, and tourism; (b) increasing input into infrastructure 
construction; and (c) supporting projects to develop high-tech machinery (Yang, Q. 
2010: 32). As already noted, after the end of the “capitalism or socialism” debate in 
1992, the central government created a relatively supportive political environment 
for private capital and substantially promoted the development of the private sector. 
Hence, in Yunnan’s Ninth Five-Year Plan, the provincial government encouraged 
the development of collective enterprise and individual business, and planned to 
attract FDI (ibid.).  
In 2000, Yunnan’s provincial government proposed a strategy for promoting 
local economic development through launching large projects, including 100 pro-
vincial projects and 100 prefecture projects (ibid.). At the same time, besides pro-
moting the four core industries, the provincial government substantially increased 
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its investment in agricultural infrastructure and electric power plants, to solve the 
problem of electricity supply, and continued to support the development of the 
non-state sector (ibid.). In 2003, as well as the local core industries, Yunnan’s pro-
vincial government focused on supporting the chemicals industry, coal mining, the 
construction materials industry, and the electronics and rubber industries (ibid.). An 
examination of the Five-Year Plans of the following years demonstrates that the 
Yunnan local government has generally been consistent with its investment and 
industrial development strategy.  
Figure 6.15 
The share of gross industrial output in Yunnan (1991–2015) 
Source: Yunnan Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
The proportion of output of agricultural sector to the GRP of Yunnan shows a 
significantly downward trend from 32.8% in 1991 to 15.5% in 2015, as illustrated 
in Figure 4.9. Since the provincial government started to promote the tourist indus-
try in the early 1990s, the proportion of output value of service sector gradually 
increased, from 32.5% in 1991 to 43.3% in 2015, surpassing the contribution of 
industrial sector from 2014. Nevertheless, the proportion of industrial sector re-
mained above 40% from 1993 to 2015. Overall, from 1991 to 2015, industrial sector 
had the largest output value among the three sectors, while service sector shows an 
upward trend. Moreover, as shown in Figure 6.15, from 1991 to 2001, the output 
value of light industry in Yunnan was higher than that of heavy industry, although 
from 2003, the output value of light industry declined sharply and the output value 
of heavy industry increased, from 116.2 billion yuan (14.5 billion euro) in 2003, 
accounting for 53.4% of total industrial output value, to 791.2 (98.6 billion euro) in 
2015, or 65% of total industrial output value (Yunnan Bureau of Statistics 2016). 
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It is clear that since 2000, the development of light industry has slowed down 
while heavy industry acts as a major contributor to Yunnan’s economic develop-
ment. It is worth noting that the output value of the tobacco industry in Yunnan 
accounts for nearly 40% of the total output value of light industry (Yunnan Bureau 
of Statistics 2016), meaning that, with the exception of the tobacco industry, the 
development of light industry in Yunnan has been at a relatively small scale com-
pared with heavy industry. The “Five Golden Flowers” came to prominence as rep-
resentative of Yunnan’s light industry, but as the private sector developed in China 
and large numbers of manufacturers emerged, the “Five Golden Flowers” gradually 
lost ground in the competitive market. By 2002, they had been completely driven 
out of the market (Yang and Zhan 2014). With the rapid growth of the private 
sector in other regions, especially eastern coastal areas like Zhejiang province, SOEs 
gradually lost their advantage. Moreover, the strategy of the Yunnan provincial gov-
ernment to promote local economic development through large projects, launched 
in 2000, resulted in increased investment in heavy industry, and a decline in the 
output of light industry in Yunnan.  
As described earlier in this thesis, Yunnan has been a typical resource-based 
economy due to the region’s rich natural resources. In 2000, the output value of 
resource-based industry accounted for 48.5% of total industrial output value in 
Yunnan, and in the following years, that percentage increased. In 2007, the output 
value of resource-based industry accounted for 66.7% of total industrial output 
value, and in 2012 the proportion peaked at 80.6% of total output value. From 2013 
the figure has decreased slightly and settled at around 76% of total industrial output 
value (Yunnan Bureau of Statistics 2016). As discussed above, when local govern-
ments attempt to carry out economic reform, they always turn to the most resource-
rich industries or sectors; as a result, Yunnan’s provincial government focused on 
local natural resources and promoted the resource-based economy in both light and 
heavy industry after the economic reform — a strategy which is highly consistent 
with the path of development in Yunnan since the 13th century. Several SOEs 
which were established by Yunnan’s military government during the war period are 
still in existence and still manufacturing today. Overall, Yunnan’s local economic 
development has relied extremely heavily on local resources, especially mineral and 
metal resources. However, the majority of enterprises in resource-based industries 
are engaged in processing low value-added raw materials and simple products, an 
industrial structure which brings relatively low economic rewards.  
We have also seen in previous sections that Yunnan has had a strong state sector 
for centuries. Although provincial governments have encouraged the development 
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of the private sector and implemented SOE reform since the early 1980s, SOEs in 
Yunnan still play a dominant role in local economic development and the private 
section in Yunnan is comparatively weak. The output value of SOEs and state-
holding enterprises in 2010 accounted for 79.6% of total industrial output value in 
Yunnan, and although from 2011 to 2015 this showed a downward trend, the out-
put value of SOEs and state-holding enterprises still accounted for at least 60% of 
total industrial output value (Yunnan Bureau of Statistics 2011–2016). However, 
the performance of SOEs and the effects of reform in Yunnan are disappointing. 
During the market transformation, large numbers of SOEs in both light industry 
(for example the “Five Golden Flowers”) and heavy industry went bankrupt and 
more SOEs have found themselves in a financial predicament.  
It can thus be argued that the resource-based industrial structure and the domi-
nance of loss-making SOEs are the two major constraints on Yunnan’s economic 
development. Based on my interviews with sampled SOEs in Yunnan during the 
fieldwork, and building on the approach of Coase and Wang (2016) and their ex-
planation for the failure of SOE reforms, the lack of success of SOEs in Yunnan 
can be attributed to the following factors.  
a. SOEs have been subject to supervision not only by every level of govern-
ment, from central SASAC to the local-level SASAC at which the SOEs are 
registered, but also by the bureaux of specific industries; hence, SOEs have 
been in a “web of regulation” (Coase and Wang 2016: 70–71). As many 
sampled SOEs in Yunnan confirmed, even after the SOE reform, the busi-
ness activities of SOEs have remained constrained by “administrative red 
tape” (ibid.: 55–56). This means that while entry barriers and the adminis-
trative procedures for private enterprises have been substantially reduced 
and simplified, SOEs in Yunnan, as well as in other provinces, have to wait 
for approval by SASAC and other authorities. However, business opportu-
nities cannot wait. 
b. Although the responsibility system and joint-stock company model have 
been adopted in SOEs, in practice the salaries of employees are not linked 
to productivity and more than half of executives are appointed by SASAC 
(Han 2010). Therefore, SOEs fail to provide incentives to workers to im-
prove their products and productivity or to adopt new technologies (Coase 
and Wang 2016: 72). The majority of sampled SOEs in Yunnan, especially 
upstream firms, are reluctant to invest in new products or technology 
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unless unexpected situations occur, such as the implementation of “de-ca-
pacity” policies.  
c. As the backbone of Yunnan’s economy, the highly resource-dependent and 
capital-intensive SOEs have maintained strong ties with local governments. 
These strong relations between authorities, firms, and SOEs result in the 
phenomenon of soft budget constraints, meaning that the Yunnan local 
government is willing to bail out inefficient or loss-making firms, which 
substantially hinders SOE reform as well as the development of the local 
economy.  
It is notable that, in Yunnan, the soft budget constraint phenomenon applies 
both to SOEs and to large regional core enterprises in the private sector. Hence, 
even though the regional core firms might have poor economic performance, the 
local government still tends to provide financial, institutional, or administrative sup-
port. For instance, many firms in the steel industry have been affected by the de-
capacity policies in Qujing. To overcome the “steel crisis”, six large regional core 
firms integrated as the largest iron and steel corporation in Qujing, initiated and 
promoted by local government.  
In view of the discussion above, it is not difficult to understand the poor eco-
nomic performance of Yunnan. Yunnan has a long history of heavy industry and 
has a strong state sector which has exerted control over local resources since the 
days of ancient China. This typical institutional and industrial structure and config-
uration in the imperial and the war eras was strengthened during the pre-reform 
period, and became an institutional obstacle during the transformation to a market 
economy in the 1990s, exerting a profound influence on the behaviour of local 
governments. An examination of the Five-Year Plans since 1978 shows the Yunnan 
governments’ deep involvement in local economic development. The major local 
industries were, to a significant degree, guided, invested, and overseen by local gov-
ernments. At the same time, the predominant SOEs in Yunnan have been super-
vised by every level of government and constrained by “administrative red tape” 
(Coase and Wang 2016: 55–56). Economic reform in Yunnan has been a top-down 
affair, meaning that the provincial government acts as decision-maker while lower 
levels of government act as executants. After the tax-sharing reform, with increas-
ingly fierce competition between local governments for leading cadres’ promotion, 
local governments have tended to bail out inefficient or loss-making firms in order 
to survive in the competitive environment. Basically, the role of Yunnan local gov-
ernments has not changed during the economic reform: the high degree of reliance 
on local government is typical of the institutional features of Yunnan as a state-led 
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environment. With the support of local government, SOEs and heavy industry are 
still the main contributors to local economic development, which shapes the current 
Yunnan business system. 
To sum up, since the economic reform was launched in 1979, China’s economic 
system has undergone a tremendous transformation at both the micro and macro 
levels of the system. The emergence and development of the private sector, pro-
moting the establishment of a “modern” corporate system in SOEs, and the relax-
ation of market regulations for enterprises have given vitality to the market. Mean-
while, under the terms of fiscal reform, local governments are required to establish 
a financial management system and maintain a balanced budget, and more discre-
tionary powers to determine local financial systems have been delegated to local 
governments. Thus, self-contained and relatively independent local governments, 
with strong incentives provided by the rank-order tournament under the nomen-
klatura system, compete for resources to maximize local interests. Taking a pano-
ramic view of the transformation since 1979, it is clear that the implementation of 
the unique decentralization reform and the promotion system together create a 
highly competitive environment for local governments in promoting local eco-
nomic development, which becomes one of the fundamental forces shaping devel-
opment trajectories and economic actors’ behaviours. 
Local governments and enterprises in Zhejiang and Yunnan have had different 
reactions and responses to these institutional changes. The market-oriented reform 
has not fundamentally altered the pre-existing regional economic and institutional 
configurations in Zhejiang and Yunnan. Rather, their regional differences have per-
sisted and been enhanced. The final part of this chapter will present an in-depth 
discussion of how and why particular development trajectories and certain patterns 
of economic actors’ behaviour have been shaped. 
 
6.4 The changing role of local governments in Zhejiang and 
Yunnan since 1979 
This chapter has discussed the economic reform in China and how local govern-
ments and enterprises in Zhejiang and Yunnan reacted to the institutional changes 
being introduced. The market-oriented reform did not alter the pre-existing regional 
economic and institutional configurations in Zhejiang and Yunnan. The regional 
differences between Zhejiang (market-led development trajectory) and Yunnan 
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(state-led development trajectory) have persisted and even been enhanced in the 
transitional economy. This section will address the following questions.  
a. How could economic actors and the private sector in Zhejiang be activated 
immediately reform began? Why did Yunnan have different reactions to 
the reform?  
b. Why was there little resistance in Zhejiang to institutional change from a 
highly unified and planned economy to a market-oriented economy, while 
Yunnan exhibited strong institutional stickiness during the reform?   
c. How are we to understand the evolving role of local governments in the 
transitional economy?  
d. Will regional differences and the distinctive regional development trajecto-
ries in Zhejiang and Yunnan converge or diverge over time? 
 
6.4.1 The changing role of local governments in Zhejiang  
As already described, Zhejiang reacted immediately to the changes in the central 
government’s attitude towards the private sector. Since the start of economic re-
form in 1979, and with substantial support from local government, the private sec-
tor in Zhejiang has experienced phenomenal growth and now plays a crucial role in 
local economic growth.  
Once the privatization reform began, the pre-existing development path and 
business culture in Zhejiang contributed significantly to the quick revival of the 
private sector in Zhejiang. As shown in Chapter 5, Zhejiang’s development trajec-
tory since the imperial period followed a typical process of transition from a feudal 
agrarian society to the path towards modern industrialization and capitalism. With 
the establishment of market-based relations and a market-led development path, 
Zhejiang had formed a relatively high degree of regional cohesion. The dominant 
manufacturing industries (i.e. textiles and handicrafts), mode and relations of pro-
duction (i.e. family-based factories and horizontal diversification), and financial sys-
tem (i.e. private banks) in Zhejiang during the imperial period evidenced the em-
bryonic form of the existing Zhejiang business system. Hence, the early form of the 
business system and market-oriented development trajectory in Zhejiang could be 
observed.  
During the planned economy period, the socialist transformation and the heavy 
industry-oriented development strategy temporarily compelled Zhejiang to deviate 
from the market-led development trajectory. However, institutional changes always 
have to conform to the region-specific resource base, even in a highly unified and 
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centralized system. Because of national security considerations and the regional re-
source endowment, Zhejiang was marginalized in the state’s development strategy, 
which resulted in the slow growth of the state sector in Zhejiang. However, pre-
cisely because of this weak state sector, Zhejiang had an institutional advantage: a 
low level of institutional stickiness. The marginalized position, weak state sector, 
and severe economic conditions provided room for the sprouts of a market-ori-
ented business system to be quietly preserved during the pre-reform period. When 
the central government initiated its market-oriented reform, which is entirely con-
sistent with the path of development before the planned economy period in 
Zhejiang, the economic actors in Zhejiang could be quickly re-activated and could 
immediately respond to the changes in the central government’s attitude towards 
the private sector. Hence, the planned economy period can be considered as an 
interruption or repression of the market-led development trajectory of Zhejiang.   
The market-led business system and business culture have exerted a persistent 
influence on the behaviour of economic actors in Zhejiang during the transition 
from the planned economy to the market economy. Those who could be classified 
as surplus labour, who suffered from survival pressure and who were eager to search 
for employment in the pre-reform period, immediately responded to the relaxation 
of entry barriers of traditional manufacturing and handicraft industries. At the same 
time, local governments actively guided, protected, and supported the emerging pri-
vate sector as a way to overcome unemployment and promote the development of 
individual enterprise, as the highly centralized planned economy was recognized to 
have been a failure.  
At the initial stage of reform, the private sector had to confront political, ideo-
logical, and social pressures. In order to protect and promote the newly emerging 
individual business sector, local government innovatively created a legal framework, 
namely “red hat” enterprises, and also encouraged and guided enterprises to begin 
new forms of inter-firm coordination through the “one region, one firm, all families 
affiliated” model. This new form of enterprise and the new model of coordination 
were the most important institutional innovations in the early stage of reform in 
Zhejiang, which not only provided political protection and support for the devel-
opment of the private sector, but also shaped the early form of the industrial cluster 
in Zhejiang. In the 1990s, this model was widely applied and helped to form a large 
number of industrial clusters, which shaped the distinctive existing industrial struc-
tures in Zhejiang.  
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As discussed in Chapter 5, since the imperial period, Zhejiang had already shown 
an openness to innovation, and a high level of flexibility, capability, and adaptability 
when facing external shocks. New technologies were actively adopted and new 
forms of organization were created for surviving in the given economic and insti-
tutional environment; at the same time, the market-led development path was em-
braced and promoted. The historical shocks experienced in Zhejiang since the im-
perial period had a lasting impact on the behaviour of economic actors, and gave 
deep roots to the developmental path and business culture in Zhejiang. Hence, alt-
hough Zhejiang encountered ideological and social pressures and political risks in 
the initial stage of economic reform, local governments and firms continued to 
show a high level of flexibility and adaptability in institutional innovation. The new 
forms of organization for defusing institutional pressures (such as a certain level of 
resistance to the radical institutional change from a planned economy to a market-
oriented economy) substantially extended and renewed the existing local develop-
ment path. As the national market-led development strategy is entirely consistent 
with Zhejiang’s development trajectory, the institutional innovation of its local gov-
ernments and firms and the state–business interaction and cooperation have inno-
vatively enhanced path dependence of its market-led development trajectory. 
Before 1992, when the rest of China was still trapped in the “capitalism or so-
cialism” ideological dilemma, local governments in Zhejiang, especially the lower 
levels of local authorities, were highly supportive and positively involved in regional 
economic development by offering political protection and responding dynamically 
to business initiatives. After the ideological debate was resolved in 1992, the central 
government created a more relaxed political environment in which to carry out the 
market-oriented reform and delegated more decision-making and financial powers 
to local governments. The promotion system was also linked to regional economic 
performances. Hence, the implementation of the tax-sharing system, the M-form 
administrative system, and the rank-order tournament scheme all provided strong 
incentives to promote regional development, intensifying inter-jurisdictional com-
petition for attracting mobile capital.  
The highly competitive environment for local governments shaped by the 
unique decentralization reform and promotion system in China drove Zhejiang’s 
local government to change the way it regulated economic actors and the level at 
which it became involved in economic activities. In other words, as a result of inter-
jurisdictional competition, the role of local governments in Zhejiang gradually 
shifted to a regulatory and service-oriented role, from a distance. Two factors can 
explain the changing role of Zhejiang local governments. First, because tax 
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competition, one of the major forms of inter-jurisdictional competition, spurs a race 
to the bottom among local governments, tax competition strategies between local 
governments gradually show a tendency to homogeneity. Hence, in order to create 
a favourable regional investment environment to attract mobile capital, other forms 
of inter-jurisdictional competition become important, such as providing good pub-
lic services and improving infrastructure. Second, as discussed in Chapter 4, the 
Zhejiang business system was characterized by a high marketization level and high 
degree of mobility in entering and exiting the market, as well as labour mobility, and 
specialized and mature production and logistics networks. Due to the high degree 
of competitiveness, mobility, and fluidity of market entry and exit, the economic 
actors coordinate their activities mainly through the competitive market arrange-
ment, without local government intervention. In other words, in the highly market-
ized investment environment, it is risky for local governments to directly invest in 
firms because highly mobile firms have the option to choose their jurisdiction and 
may decide to move to access other opportunities. Hence, to attract investment in 
the highly competitive environment after 1994, Zhejiang’s local governments grad-
ually took on an arms-length, service-oriented role which included implementing 
favourable policies, relaxing regulations, simplifying application processes, estab-
lishing private financial service centres, improving infrastructure, etc., to create a 
positive investment environment. 
Overall, inter-jurisdictional competition plays a crucial part in shaping the role 
of local government in Zhejiang (i.e. a regulatory and service-oriented role, from a 
distance) and determining state–business relations (i.e. enterprises in Zhejiang 
shows less dependence on local governments to support their business). Moreover, 
the target market of private enterprises in Zhejiang gradually shifted from the do-
mestic market to the global market once China joined the WTO in 2001. The 
change of target market, as an external factor, influences state–business relations 
and the role of local governments, as firms become less dependent on the domestic 
market and local authorities. Therefore, the highly competitive environment has 
substantially enhanced and strengthened the market-led development trajectory in 
Zhejiang.  
It is worth mentioning that Zhejiang’s economic performance has been ahead 
of most of China for decades, but due to rising labour costs in Zhejiang, labour-
intensive and low-tech manufacturing industries have started shifting to inner China 
or Southern Asian countries. The traditional light industries in Zhejiang have grad-
ually lost their advantage and are now facing great challenges.  
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Zhejiang is dominated by low-tech, low-cost, family-based, small and medium-
sized private enterprises, which form highly specialized and mature production net-
works, and tend to maintain informal long-term commitments and long-term inter-
firm relations. These distinctive industrial structures were initially shaped by the 
“one region, one firm, all families affiliated” model, which expanded and became 
the basis for a large number of clusters in Zhejiang. However, as Martin and Sunley 
(2006: 415) argue, the evolutionary regional economy is an ongoing process which 
can transform from a positive lock-in to a negative lock-in. According to Grabher 
(1993a), the stable linkage between regional core firms and suppliers would result 
in functional shortcomings in terms of investment in R&D and the development of 
marketing and distribution departments within clusters, locking the firms into a vi-
cious circle of exchange relations.  
As mentioned above, the cooperative model in Zhejiang has been persistent and 
has shaped the long-term inter-firm relations with informal long-term commit-
ments since the 1980s. For decades, the positive feedbacks and economic outcomes 
of the Zhejiang model have enhanced the dominant path of industrial development. 
Due to their long-term commitments and in order to maintain and facilitate inter-
firm cooperation and reduce transaction costs, both regional core firms and firms 
in upstream, especially family-based, SMEs dispense with investment in R&D and 
innovation activities. The stable linkages between regional core firms and suppliers 
in Zhejiang cause a functional lock-in and ultimately result in technological lock-in 
due to the unwillingness to leave the existing technological trajectory. However, 
firms in Zhejiang mainly manufacture simple consumer products with a relatively 
small input of capital and technology; this implies less investment and a high degree 
of reversibility and transferability. In the highly competitive and fluid market, firms 
in Zhejiang, especially SMEs, have sufficient possibility to escape from an ineffi-
cient path of development. Hence, the challenge for local economic development 
in Zhejiang is to recognize inefficient paths and to make efforts to de-lock firms 
from the negative lock-in process. 
 
6.4.2 The changing role of local governments in Yunnan 
Given that local industrial structures substantially conform to the local resource 
base and capital naturally gravitates towards the richest resources in a region, since 
the late 13th century, Yunnan had developed a highly resource-dependent and cap-
ital-intensive industrial path. The strong impact of historical shocks (the mass mi-
gration, the opening of the Kunming–Haiphong railway, the colonial project, and 
the relocation of modern mechanized companies) largely reinforced and enhanced 
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the local industrial structure and industrial path. Due to their commanding height 
in the local economy, core resource-dependent industries were directly controlled 
by the imperial state and local ruling parties, resulting in a high level of state inter-
vention and the absence of the private sector in regional economic development 
for centuries. Thus, external forces and the role of the state initiated and promoted 
industrialization, while the ownership of local resources and the level of state inter-
vention in Yunnan remained unchanged. Overall, then, we can observe the early 
form of the business system and the state-led and highly resource-dependent devel-
opment trajectory in Yunnan. 
This state-led and resource-dependent development path has been intensified 
since the foundation of P.R. China in 1949. The national heavy industry-oriented 
development strategy was mirrored by the local industrial structure and industrial 
path in Yunnan. Moreover, the socialist transformation had largely consolidated the 
position of the state sector in the local economy. From 1949 to 1978, with the im-
plementation of the central government’s policies and investment, Yunnan’s dom-
inant industrial and institutional features — the strong state sector, and the domi-
nance of highly resource-dependent heavy industries — persisted and were 
substantially promoted. However, the long-standing institutional features and vir-
tual absence of the private sector in Yunnan generated a high level of “institutional 
stickiness” in the regional development path, which became an institutional disad-
vantage manifest in a certain level of resistance to the institutional transition from 
a planned economy to a market economy.  
In contrast to its drastic implementation of the socialist transformation of the 
private sector in the pre-reform period, after the central government had initiated 
the economic reform in 1979, it proceeded incrementally to carry out the radical 
fundamental transformation from a highly centralized planned economy to a mar-
ket-oriented economy. Hence, in the transitional Chinese economy, state interven-
tion and market forces, as well as the state-ownership based economy and private 
sector, coexist and play crucial roles in economic growth. As previously discussed, 
in the initial stage of reform, the market-oriented development strategy was contro-
versial, and the development of the private sector faced political and ideological 
pressures. In this initial phase, Yunnan’s local governments made attempts to solve 
the imbalance in the local industrial structure and conducted SOE reform.11 How-
ever, due to the ideological and social pressures and risks, the lack of an existing 
private sector, and the strong impact of the pre-existing development path with its 
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high level of institutional stickiness, the local governments did not put more effort 
into supporting the emerging private sector in the initial stage of the reform.  
It is interesting that for centuries, historical shocks did not bring about changes 
in the local industrial and institutional structure and configurations but rather en-
hanced and promoted the long-standing development path, thereby shaping a 
highly cohesive system in Yunnan. Yunnan has gone through regime and institu-
tional changes from the feudal economy to a state monopoly economy, and then 
from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy. At every stage, institu-
tional changes or historical shocks reinforced the institutional stickiness in Yunnan. 
This high level of institutional stickiness and the cohesive system led to a relatively 
high degree of resistance to market-oriented change and industrial path adjustment. 
In short, before 1992, the state sector continuously played the most important role 
in local economic development, while the private sector was absent. Local govern-
ments were highly involved in economic activities and played a determining role in 
supporting, guiding, or constraining economic activities. The state-led and highly 
resource-dependent development trajectory in Yunnan was maintained. 
After 1992, however, the central government created a highly competitive envi-
ronment for local governments to promote local economic development by imple-
menting the unique decentralization reforms, namely the tax-sharing system and the 
M-form administrative system, and the rank-order tournament scheme. This com-
petitive environment plays a crucial role in shaping local governments’ behaviour. 
As tax competition tends to lead to homogeneity, the regional investment environ-
ment determines a region’s ability to attract mobile capital. In Yunnan, the invest-
ment environment is built on the state-led institutional environment and is substan-
tially influenced by the existing regional industrial path. Yunnan’s economy has 
been dominated by the highly resource-dependent heavy industries with a vast input 
of technology, capital, and labour, and characterized by a high level of non-owner-
ship coordination and long-term inter-firm relations, some of which are initiated by 
local governments, in the regional core industries. These features of local industrial 
structure and the relatively high level of local government intervention in coordi-
nating economic activities result in a low marketization level and a low degree of 
mobility of market entry and exit, as well as a low degree of labour mobility. More-
over, as Yunnan province is located in the inland area of China, the logistics costs 
of entering the market are much higher than in the eastern area, which is one of the 
major disadvantages of the province. Hence, mobile capital may not be willing to 
choose the Yunnan market as its jurisdiction, which also explains the slow growth 
of the private sector in Yunnan. In short, the Yunnan market is in an unfavourable 
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position in competing for mobile capital. To survive in the highly competitive en-
vironment and address the need to raise local revenue, local governments tend to 
put more effort into supporting regional core industries and protecting local core 
firms. 
Besides the relatively unattractive investment environment in inter-jurisdictional 
competition, the financial and political burdens of unemployment and welfare ex-
penditure are major reasons for local governments to protect local core firms. SOEs 
and large private enterprises in the capital-, resource-, and labour-intensive heavy 
industries create a large number of job opportunities and also have responsibility 
for covering the expenditures of workers’ welfare (Lin and Tan 1999: 429). There-
fore, local governments actively support local core enterprises and protect them 
from bankruptcy. Moreover, Yunnan’s local governments are willing to bail out 
inefficient or loss-making firms by providing financial support or requesting re-
gional core firms to share their product distribution channels (buyers). Given the 
active involvement of the local government in economic activities and the protec-
tive role it plays, firms are keen to establish cooperative relationships with local 
governments and display a positive attitude towards the role of local government in 
enterprises’ development. 
Overall, inter-jurisdictional competition plays a crucial part in shaping the gov-
ernment’s direct and indirect regulatory and supportive role and the highly collab-
orative and dependent state–business relationship in Yunnan. It can therefore be 
said that the highly competitive environment substantially underpins the state-led 
development trajectory and strengthens the path dependence in Yunnan. 
However, given the poor economic performance of Yunnan and the soft budget 
constraint (i.e. local governments financially supporting and bailing out underper-
forming local firms), it seems clear that local government intervention and support 
do not ultimately contribute to extending or renewing the existing local industrial 
path or yielding good returns in the realms of inter-jurisdictional competition. On 
the contrary, Yunnan is locked into an inefficient, inferior path of development, 
and the feedback and economic outcomes of Yunnan are far from satisfactory. Due 
to the strength of regional path dependence, it is difficult for Yunnan to escape at 
the present stage.  
As Grabher argues (1993a: 261), the common interest in keeping long-term in-
ter-firm relations locks regional core firms and suppliers into a relatively close circle 
of exchange relations, which cause functional shortcomings. While maintaining the 
common interest, facilitating inter-firm cooperation, and reducing transaction costs, 
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neither regional core firms nor upstream firms will invest in R&D or undertake 
innovation activities on their own initiative, unless an unexpected situation occurs, 
such as the de-capacity policy that was implemented due to overinvestment in the 
real estate industry.12 Also, although most of the heavy industry enterprises in Yun-
nan are manufacturing simple products, they have enormous investments in equip-
ment, technology, facilities, and labour input. More importantly, firms in the pro-
duction chain are highly technically interrelated. Thus, it is difficult for regional core 
firms and their suppliers in Yunnan to switch to alternative technologies due to the 
high technical conversion cost, as reported by sample firms during the research. 
Therefore, the strong and stable linkage between regional core firms and suppliers 
in Yunnan causes functional lock-in and ultimately results in technological lock-in.  
Moreover, regional core SOEs undertake semi-political tasks to assist local gov-
ernments in supporting unprofitable and loss-making SOEs to prevent them from 
going bankrupt, by building a long-term stable collaboration. These political tasks 
imply that to build a stable linkage with local governments would benefit enterprises 
in terms of having access to the production chain and maintaining long-term stable 
relations with local core firms. To survive in the competitive market, firms are keen 
to establish close relationships with local governments; this state-led inter-firm co-
ordination strengthens the connections between firms and local governments, 
which entraps Yunnan into a process of political lock-in. 
Arthur (1994: 118) argues that to escape from an inefficient, inferior develop-
ment path depends on the degree of reversibility and transferability. As described 
above, the regional core firms in Yunnan are highly resource-dependent and capital- 
and labour-intensive, which signifies a low degree of reversibility of investment and 
transferability of technology. Hence, at least in the short term, it is difficult for 
Yunnan to de-lock from the negative functional, technological, and political lock-
in processes. 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the market-oriented development trajectory 
in Zhejiang and the state-led development trajectory in Yunnan have persisted and 
even been enhanced. The strong impact of historical shocks and the pre-existing 
cohesive regional systems in Zhejiang and Yunnan since imperial times largely pro-
moted and strengthened the local industrial structures and industrial paths and re-
inforced the behaviour of economic actors. Hence, in the initial stage of economic 
reform, faced with ideological and social pressures, Zhejiang local governments cre-
atively extended and renewed the existing local development path by creating new 
forms of organizations, while Yunnan found itself confronting difficulties in 
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market-oriented change and industrial path adjustment due to a high level of insti-
tutional stickiness. After 1992, the highly competitive environment shaped by the 
unique decentralization reform and promotion system in China played a crucial role 
in shaping the role of local government and the state–business relationship in 
Zhejiang and Yunnan, further enhancing the market-led development trajectory in 
Zhejiang and underpinning the state-led development trajectory in Yunnan. The 
strong isomorphic power or institutional complementarities in a cohesive system 
persistently self-reinforce the existing distinctive features of local industrial and in-
stitutional structures. Therefore, the behaviour of firms and local governments has 
followed a specific logic, which conforms to the particular local cohesive system. 
External factors, such as exports and the impact of global markets, also amplify the 
regional differences and the distinctive regional business systems. Zhejiang and 
Yunnan find themselves on opposite paths, and their development trajectories are 






1 The surplus labourers were from rural areas and “sent-down youth” from urban areas. “Sent-
down youth” were educated urban students, who were sent to rural areas to eliminate the gap 
between urban and rural areas in 1960s, known as the “Up to the Mountains and Down to the 
Countryside Movement”. In late 1979, about 10 million urban educated “sent-down youth” 
returned to the cities 
2 Including central enterprises’ revenues and customs duties.  
3 Including SOEs’ revenues, salt taxes, agricultural taxes, industrial and commercial income 
tax. 
4 As well as the fiscal sharing schemes, the 1982 Constitution specified that “article 99 and 
100: ... local people’s congress at and above the county level were allowed to adopt and issue 
local resolutions and regulations and approve, alter, annul and examine plans and the budgets 
of their respective administrative areas for local economic, social and cultural and public ser-
vices’ development” (Mu et al. 2014). 
5Financial self-sufficiency rates=general budget revenues/general budget expenditures*100% 
6 Based on VAT generated within the local government’s territory. 
7 The existence of county-level divisions (xian) can be traced back to 690 BC (Zhong 2003: 
18). A two-tier administrative system was established by the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC), which 
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became the basic administrative structure in succeeding dynasties (Liu et al. 1999: 83, Zou 
2001, Zhong 2003: 18, Zhao 2010: 46). In the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) a four-tier adminis-
trative system was adopted, in which province-level divisions were set up as the first-level 
divisions and a new administrative system was formed in managing ethnic minority regions 
(Peng 1996, Zhu 2015). The Qing dynasty (1636–1912) set up 18 provinces based on a three-
tier system (province–fu–county) (Zhong 2003: 22, Zhao 2010). 
8 After the collapse of the Qing dynasty, the province–fu–county system was replaced by a 
province–dao–county administrative system in the mid-1910s, and a decade later, dao-level 
divisions were abolished and a new level of divisions — municipality (shi) — was established 
at the same administrative level as counties (Zhong 2003: 22, Zhao 2010). Hence, before 1949, 
there was a two-tier administrative system (province–county and municipality). In 1949, the 
central government decided to set up six “Great Administrative Areas”, namely North China, 
Northeast, East China, Central and South, Northwest and Southwest, as the first-level divi-
sions in order to quickly restore order after the war (Hua 1998). When the economic and 
political situation became stable, this level of division was abolished (ibid.). The first version 
of the Constitution was issued in 1954 which provided a three-tier administrative system. The 
first-level divisions consisted of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly 
under the central authority, and the second-level administrative divisions were counties, au-
tonomous counties, and municipalities, while townships and ethnic townships formed the 
third administrative level (National People’s Congress, Government of China 1954). 
9 Notably, the earliest prefectural-level divisions, named the prefectural administrative regions 
(xin zheng du cha qu), were set up as quasi-administrative divisions of provincial governments 
to assist in supervising and coordinating the work of regions in 1932 (Wu and Chen 2008: 101). 
In the 1950s, the prefectural administrative regions were renamed “special regions” (zhuan qu), 
which were vested with governmental functions for oversight of the administration of counties 
and municipalities (Zhao 2010: 88). Although the prefectural-level divisions have been rear-
ranged multiple times in terms of administrative functions, this level did not serve as inde-
pendent local governments (Wu and Chen 2008: 101), until the central government entitled 
the executives of regional people’s congresses as regional authorities of state administration in 
1978 (ibid.). In other words, prefecture-level divisions were officially established as second-
level administrative divisions at that point. 
10 In 1998, 211 prefecture-level cities administered 1,186 counties, accounting for 56% of the 
total number of counties; by the end of 2001, 253 out of 265 prefecture-level cities managed 
1,445 counties, representing 70% of the total number of counties (Tang 2008: 57–59). 
11 The Yunnan local government prioritized: (a) addressing the imbalance in the growth of 
heavy industry and light industry by slowing down the development of heavy industry and 
increasing investment in light industry and the agriculture sector; and (b) conducting SOE 
reform, including converting military enterprises into civilian SOEs. 
 
559831-L-bw-Lu
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 234
214 CHAPTER 6 
 
 
12 Overinvestment in the real estate industry meant that enormous amounts of investment 
had poured into the construction industry, rapidly increasing demand for steel, cement, and 
other building materials. Thus, steel making and other related heavy industries including 
coal mining and coking, saw high levels of investment, which resulted in severe problems 
of overcapacity. In this context, the central government implemented a de-capacity policy, 
which required firms to reduce their output. The consequences of the policy were felt in-
stantly, with a sharp decline of the market price of steel and other related products, which 
compelled heavy industry enterprises — especially the firms downstream in the production 
chain — to look for new opportunities or to develop new technologies or new products. 
Based on my survey results, from 2015 onwards medium and large-sized heavy industrial 
enterprises have become active in technical cooperation and R&D activities with other 
SOEs, research institutions, and universities. Interestingly, firms actively pursue innovation 
in the search for an alternative path to recoup losses, on the one hand; but on the other 
hand, enterprises also reported inadequate funds for new investment. In the short-term, 
heavy industry enterprises in Yunnan cannot escape from the technological lock-in process.  
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7 Conclusions and New Research Agenda  
 
 
This chapter sums up the research objectives, the empirical findings on the research 
questions, their theoretical implications and contribution to theory, as well as the 
new research agenda. The chapter consists of four sections. Section 7.1 provides a 
presentation of the research objectives and research findings; section 7.2 answers 
the research questions. Section 7.3 then gives discusses the theoretical implications 
and contributions, and section 7.4 proposes some elements for a new research 
agenda. 
7.1 Research objectives and findings 
7.1.1 The research objectives 
Significant uneven regional development and a great diversity of economic and in-
stitutional patterns are typical of the transitional Chinese economy. The implemen-
tation of the economic reform since 1979 has widened regional divergence in this 
heterogeneous economy.  
As the neoclassical perspective substantially ignores the role of institutions in 
shaping the economic system and cannot specify how paths are formed and evolve, 
or how the role of economic actors changes over time (see e.g., Samuels 1984, 
Granovetter 1985, Bardhan 1987, Hodgson 1998), business systems theory and evo-
lutionary theory have been applied in this thesis to understand and compare dis-
tinctive and evolving regional development trajectories in the transitional Chinese 
economy and the changing role of economic actors and institutions in the regional 
business systems. 
The objective of this research was to study the changing roles of local govern-
ments in influencing the dynamic regional business systems in the transitional, het-
erogeneous Chinese economy. The dynamic regional business system consists of 
three blocks: enterprise sector block, including SOEs and domestic private enter-
prises, state sector block, and state–business block. To conduct the research, 
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Zhejiang and Yunnan were selected as two contrasting cases to reflect significant 
regional differences based on theoretical replication logic for predicting contrasting 
results. 
 
7.1.2 The empirical findings  
The existing business systems in Zhejiang and Yunnan  
The findings reveal a statistically significant institutional variation between Zhejiang 
and Yunnan and relatively high regional institutional complementarities in imple-
menting the market-oriented national strategy within each region. Two distinctive 
cohesive regional business systems have taken root and evolved in Zhejiang and 
Yunnan. 
The regional industrial path partially reflects the local natural resource base, es-
pecially in a region with rich natural resources, like Yunnan, which has established 
a heavily resource-based industrial structure. Large-sized enterprises, especially 
SOEs, in highly resource-dependent and capital-intensive industries predominate in 
the Yunnan economy. Compared with Yunnan, Zhejiang is less dependent on local 
natural resources. As the “birthplace of the private economy” in China, Zhejiang 
has established an industrial structure dominated by low-tech, low-cost, and private 
family-based light industries.  
The distinctive dominant features of regional industrial structures are closely re-
lated to regional ownership and employment relations, inter-firm relations, the level 
of mobility, and marketization of the local market. Highly concentrated ownership 
and involvement in the family business and a high level of flexibility typify the fam-
ily-based enterprises in Zhejiang, resulting in a relatively high degree of labour mo-
bility. Zhejiang private enterprises, including large firms and SMEs, form special-
ized and mature production networks and tend to maintain informal long-term 
commitments. With a strong private sector and a high level of mobility of firms, the 
Zhejiang business system is characterized by a high level of marketization. The ex-
isting Zhejiang business system is built on a market-led institutional environment 
in which the local government plays a regulatory and service-oriented role from a 
distance, and economic actors coordinate their activities mainly through the com-
petitive market arrangement. 
Although nearly all the SOEs in Yunnan have converted to joint-stock enter-
prises, the local authorities remain in control of SOEs with a high degree of con-
centration of ownership and high involvement in enterprises’ management, which 
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results in a relatively low degree of labour mobility in SOEs. Due to the vast input 
of technology, capital, and labour, and the inflexibility of resource-dependent firms 
in the market, firms in regional core industries, especially large private enterprises 
and SOEs, tend to maintain long-term partnerships with other regional core firms 
to reduce the risk of market volatility. In other words, Yunnan firms show a con-
siderably lower degree of mobility and a high level of inter-firm coordination. More 
importantly, the state plays a determining role in supporting, guiding, and initiating 
economic activities, especially among regional core firms, which assist local govern-
ments in supporting unprofitable and loss-making SOEs to prevent them from go-
ing bankrupt. Hence, the existing Yunnan business system is built on a state-led 
institutional environment, in which the state strategically coordinates economic ac-
tivities, directly or indirectly.  
As the restrictions around market access have been greatly reduced and simpli-
fied nationally, there is no institutional difference in market-entry policies for 
startups in Zhejiang and Yunnan.1 Moreover, the vocational education system and 
the role and function of trade unions and intermediary associations are almost iden-
tical throughout China, and have little impact on regional economic development.  
Because the financial system and the banking system in China are highly con-
centrated and regulated, and primarily serve the needs of SOEs, private enterprises, 
especially SMEs, have virtually no access to bank loans and the capital market. Ex-
cept for a few listed SOEs in Yunnan, enterprises in Zhejiang and Yunnan do not 
access to the capital market and instead rely heavily on credit-based sources of fi-
nancing.2 Therefore, in the state-led institutional context, highly resource-depend-
ent and capital- and labour-intensive firms in Yunnan are sensitive to policy changes 
and keen to establish and maintain cooperative relationships with local govern-
ments for their firms’ development. However, in the market-led institutional envi-
ronment, Zhejiang firms are less dependent on local governments to support their 
business. 
The behaviour of economic actors (firms and local governments) in Zhejiang 
and Yunnan thus fit the particular regional institutional environment (i.e. the mar-
ket-led and state-led institutional context in Zhejiang and Yunnan respectively). 
Hence, the cases of Zhejiang and Yunnan confirm that the regional isomorphic 
power of dominant institutions reinforces the tendency to form a cohesive eco-
nomic system within the region. In the heterogeneity which typifies the transitional 
Chinese economy, a relatively high degree of regional institutional complementari-
ties is present in the business systems of both Zhejiang and Yunnan.   
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Overall, this research has identified a market-led business system in Zhejiang, 
and a state-led business system in Yunnan, which show significant statistical and 
institutional differences and a high degree of institutional complementarities in the 
local cohesive system. 
 
The historical development trajectory in Zhejiang and Yunnan  
This research adopted a dynamic perspective. To understand the evolving develop-
ment trajectories and the changing role of economic actors in Zhejiang and Yunnan 
in the heterogeneous transitional economy, the historical developmental paths in 
Zhejiang and Yunnan are presented in Chapters 5 and 6. The economic reform that 
began in 1979 marked a turning point in the Chinese economic development tra-
jectory. Hence, the evolving economic and institutional structures and configura-
tions before and after economic reform at both central level and local level were 
studied to understand what determined the predominant features of the existing 
business systems, how and why particular development trajectories were shaped, 
and continue to be shaped, and what the changing role of local governments has 
been in local economic development in the Chinese transitional economy. 
 
 The historical developmental path of  Zhejiang and Yunnan (before 1949) 
A poor resource base characterizes the existing Zhejiang business system, but from 
the 10th to the 13th centuries, Zhejiang was one of the major grain producers and 
suppliers of imperial China (Yang 1993, Ji and Wang 2014). Due to increased 
productivity and the surplus output of grains, the agricultural population started 
switching to commercial crops (i.e. silk and cotton farming) (Yang 1993, Ji and 
Wang 2014). Since the mid-14th century, stagnant agricultural technology, rapid 
population growth, and the lack of spare arable land for expansion generated labour 
surplus. These workers were spurred to shift from farm work to manufacturing and 
commerce. The rapid expansion in commerce led to the increase of the merchant 
class, which challenged the foundation of feudal social orders, meaning that market-
based relations gradually supplanted feudal relations in Zhejiang during the imperial 
period. Hence, Zhejiang’s development trajectory in the imperial period showed a 
typical process of market-oriented transition from a feudal agrarian society to the 
path towards proto-industrialization and capitalism.  
The inflows of FDI and advanced technology in the mid-18th century, as exog-
enous forces, were significant factors in driving forward the transition in Zhejiang 
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when local industries experienced stagnation. At the same time, the local merchants 
showed a strong willingness to adopt new technologies and methods of production, 
and a high level of flexibility and adaptability, which marked a new stage in the 
transition towards large-scale mechanized manufacturing. The adoption of new 
technologies and new forms of organization substantially extended and renewed 
the existing local development path and also created new paths by adopting modern 
mechanized production methods. By virtue of exogenous forces, the market-ori-
ented trajectory towards modern manufacturing and capitalism since the late Song 
period in Zhejiang had been enhanced and promoted.  
Overall, the research shows that an early form of market-oriented development 
trajectory existed in Zhejiang long before the establishment of P.R. China, charac-
terized by dominant family-based textile and handicraft industries, relatively high 
levels of horizontal diversification, and a strong informal financial system (i.e. pri-
vate banks). 
Since the late 13th century, Yunnan’s economy has been characterized by highly 
resource-dependent and capital-intensive industries due to the region’s rich natural 
resource base. Four historical events pushed Yunnan onto the path to industriali-
zation and modernization from the 13th to the mid-20th century. Without exoge-
nous forces and the role of the state, it is likely that Yunnan would not have been 
able to initiate the process towards industrialization and expand its market. With 
the inflows of new technologies and advanced machinery, capital naturally gravi-
tates towards local core industries. In the case of Yunnan, this meant that the exist-
ing regional industrial structures were enhanced and promoted, and the local devel-
opment path was strengthened and invigorated by new technologies and new forms 
of organization, creating a new path characterized by modern mechanized produc-
tion methods. 
The imperial state and local ruling parties directly controlled the ownership of 
core resource-dependent industries, including mining and smelting and the tobacco 
industry. For an extended period, up to 1949, state-owned enterprises absolutely 
dominated the Yunnan economy, which resulted in a strong state sector and the 
absence of the private sector in local economic development over the course of 
centuries. Hence, a high level of state intervention in local resources and economic 
activities and a strong state sector can be observed in a region with a rich resource 
base. The development trajectory of Yunnan before 1949 was built on a state-led 
institutional context. In other words, predominant industrial and institutional fea-
tures of the existing state-led business system in Yunnan (i.e. the strong state sector, 
the dominance of highly resource-dependent heavy industries, and the long-term 
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absence of the private sector) can be identified long before the establishment of 
P.R. China.  
Before 1949, both Zhejiang and Yunnan completed the transition from the feu-
dal economy to the path towards modern manufacturing systems. However, the 
processes of industrialization in the two provinces showed huge regional differ-
ences. Zhejiang and Yunnan have been on very different development trajectories 
since the imperial period. In both cases, exogenous forces played an essential role 
in the transition process, bringing about significant changes in technology and pro-
duction methods and greatly enhancing and promoting the existing local develop-
ment path. Hence, the outcome of the transition process was not a trend of con-
vergence towards a homogeneous type over time; rather, the distinctive regional 
development trajectories were strengthened. 
Internal factors, such as the regional resources base (especially in Yunnan), in-
dustrial structure, and the strength of state intervention in local economic activities 
(the role of the state), and external factors, such as cultural factors, exogenous forces 
like the inflows of FDI, new technologies, and migration, reinforced the tendency 
to shape a relatively cohesive system at the regional level, even in the feudal econ-
omy. 
 
 The historical developmental path of  Zhejiang and Yunnan (1949–1978) 
After the establishment of P.R. China, the adoption of a highly centralized and uni-
fied economic system, the implementation of a heavy industry-oriented develop-
ment strategy, and the socialist transformation came together to form a monotonic 
type of development trajectory in China, which left no room for the private sector 
and very little room for local governments to promote regional economic develop-
ment. As a result, Zhejiang had to deviate entirely from the market-oriented devel-
opment trajectory shaped before 1949. In contrast, Yunnan’s state-led development 
trajectory was utterly consistent with the national development strategy so that Yun-
nan’s developmental path was maintained and even substantially enhanced after 
1949.  
Nevertheless, the implementation of the monotonic type of development tra-
jectory at the national level did not bring about the convergence towards a homo-
geneous and monotonic type in Zhejiang and Yunnan. In contrast, the regional 
differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan persisted. In the highly centralized and 
unified planned economy, the regional resource base played a determining role for 
559831-L-bw-Lu
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 241
 Conclusions and New Research Agenda  221 
the central government in formulating the regional development trajectories, which 
also determined the role of a region in the national development strategy.  
Because of its location and geographic constraints (i.e. low mineral and metal 
reserves), Zhejiang province was marginalized in the state’s heavy industry-oriented 
development strategy and received very little central government investment, which 
resulted in the slow growth of the state sector and the stagnation of the local econ-
omy during the pre-reform period. In contrast, Yunnan had been selected as part 
of “the Third Front Movement” and received direct investment from the central 
government because of its location and rich resource base. With central government 
investment, Yunnan’s principal industrial and institutional features — the strong 
state sector and the dominant highly resource-dependent heavy industries — were 
further entrenched. Hence, even though the central government adopted a highly 
unified system and implemented the monotonic type of development trajectory, 
regional differences persisted.  
To sum up, although institutionally both Zhejiang and Yunnan had completed 
the socialist transformation and participated in the national development plans, the 
development trajectories in the two provinces showed huge regional differences. 
The regional industrial structure and the implementation of the national develop-
ment strategy at the local level had to take account of the local natural resource base 
and geographical location. Hence, the institutional changes did not bring about the 
trend of convergence towards a monotonic type over time. The path of develop-
ment in Yunnan during the pre-reform period showed a high degree of consistency 
with the pre-existing industrial path and institutional structure, while the develop-
ment of the state sector in Zhejiang remained relatively slow. 
 
 The development trajectories of  Zhejiang and Yunnan in the economic re-
form (1979–present) 
Having experienced the severe economic recession caused by the over-centralized 
economic system and the radical and overambitious political and economic cam-
paign during the pre-reform period, the central government initiated the economic 
reform in 1979 to devolve actual decision-making power to enterprises and local 
governments, to bring in the market mechanism, and to provide incentives to sub-
national authorities and enterprises. However, before 1992, China was still trapped 
in the “capitalism or socialism” ideological dilemma, and the development of the 
private sector had to confront political, ideological, and social pressures. 
In the initial stage of the reform, Zhejiang local governments and firms reacted 
extremely quickly to the changes in the central government’s attitude to the private 
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sector. The effect of historical shocks and the pre-existing cohesive system in 
Zhejiang dating back to the imperial period had a long-lasting effect on economic 
actors’ behaviour. The developmental path and business culture were proven to be 
deeply rooted in Zhejiang. Hence, Zhejiang’s local firms and local governments 
showed a high level of flexibility and capacity for institutional innovation. New 
forms of organization (such as the “red hat enterprises” and the “one region, one 
firm, all families affiliated” model) were created to defuse institutional pressures, 
reduce political risks, and remove obstacles for the emerging private sector, greatly 
enhancing the market-led development trajectory in Zhejiang. In contrast, due to 
the ideological and social pressures, the long-term absence of the private sector, and 
the effect of the pre-existing development path with its high degree of institutional 
stickiness, local governments and firms in Yunnan did not put a lot of effort into 
supporting the emerging private sector, and the existing development path in Yun-
nan became further entrenched. 
After the ideological debate was brought to an end in 1992, the central govern-
ment created a more relaxed political environment to carry out the market-oriented 
reform and delegated more decision-making and financial powers to local govern-
ments. To fully understand why local governments in China have demonstrated a 
relatively strong enthusiasm for promoting local economic development, two main 
factors were highlighted in the research: (a) the incentives provided by the decen-
tralization reform; and (b) the Chinese cadre management and promotion system.  
The fiscal decentralization reform delegated greater autonomy and space to local 
governments in regional development, while the Chinese cadre management and 
rank-order tournament promotion systems, which are based on comparative per-
formance and ordinal position-based rank-order incentive schemes, provide strong 
incentives for leading cadres in each region to devote themselves to promoting re-
gional economic development and competing for promotion. Hence, in spite of all 
the changes in the fiscal arrangement, local authorities remain enthusiastic in pro-
moting regional economic growth so as to raise local revenue, which significantly 
intensifies the competition between local governments (i.e. attracting mobile capital, 
investing in infrastructure construction, supporting R&D activities, business–state 
collaboration, etc.). Hence, the unique decentralization reform and the rank-order 
tournament scheme provide a highly competitive environment for local govern-
ments to raise local revenue, which shapes their behaviour in regional development 
and moulds the development trajectory of the local economy. 
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The highly competitive environment shaped by the unique decentralization re-
form and promotion system in China impelled Zhejiang’s local governments to 
change their way of regulating economic actors and to play a regulatory and service-
oriented role from a distance, in the context of the high marketization level and the 
high degree of mobility in the local market. In the highly marketized local invest-
ment environment, enterprises in Zhejiang show less dependence on local govern-
ments to support their business. Besides, as the target market of private enterprises 
in Zhejiang has gradually shifted from the domestic market to the global market, 
firms are growing ever-less dependent on the domestic market and local govern-
ments. Therefore, the highly competitive environment and the influence of the 
global market reinforce and strengthen the market-led development trajectory in 
Zhejiang.  
However, due to its low marketization level, the low degree of mobility, and the 
high logistics costs, the Yunnan market is in an unfavourable position in competing 
for mobile capital. In order to survive in the highly competitive environment, local 
governments tend to put more effort into supporting regional core industries and 
protecting local core firms, thus shaping the direct and indirect regulatory and sup-
portive role of Yunnan local governments. As Yunnan local governments have been 
actively involved in economic activities and have played a protective role, firms are 
keen to establish cooperative relationships with local governments and show a pos-
itive attitude towards the role of local government in enterprise development. 
Therefore, the highly competitive environment underpins the state-led develop-
ment trajectory and strengthens path dependence in Yunnan. 
Since the start of economic reform in 1979, local governments and enterprises 
in Zhejiang and Yunnan have reacted differently to the marketization reform. The 
highly competitive environment shaped by the unique decentralization reform and 
promotion system in China plays a crucial part in shaping the role of local govern-
ment and the state–business relationship in Zhejiang and Yunnan. The market-ori-
ented reform has not brought about any deviation from the pre-existing regional 
industrial path and institutional structures in Zhejiang and Yunnan but rather has 
enhanced and amplified the distinctive local development trajectories in the transi-
tional heterogeneous Chinese economy. 
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7.2 Research questions  
7.2.1 What are the existing regional business systems in Zhejiang and 
Yunnan?  
The research has identified a market-led business system in Zhejiang, and a state-
led business system in Yunnan, which show a high level of institutional comple-
mentarities. 
 
 What are the dominant economic and institutional features in the two 
regional business systems?  
The dominant economic and institutional features in the two business systems are 
summarized in Figure 7.1 below (local government is abbreviated to LG). 
 
What are the coordination mechanisms among economic actors and 
institutions?  
The existing Zhejiang business system is built on a market-led institutional environ-
ment, in which local governments play a regulatory and service-oriented role from 
a distance, and economic actors coordinate their activities mainly through compet-
itive market arrangements. The existing Yunnan business system is built on a state-
led institutional environment, in which the state strategically coordinates economic 
activities, directly or indirectly.  
 
What institutional economic factors determine the dominant features 
and coordination mechanisms of the existing business systems? 
The factors determining the dominant features and coordination mechanisms of 
the existing business systems are shown in Figure 7.1 below (local government is 
abbreviated to LG). 
Figure 7.1 
The relationships and connections between the dominant features in Zhejiang 
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 Local resource endowment  
Poor resource bases  Rich resource bases  
Private firms, especially 
SMEs, in low-tech, low-cost 
and family-based light indus-
tries predominant in local 
economy.  
Large-sized firms, espe-
cially SOEs, in highly re-
source-dependent, capital-
intensive industry predomi-
nant in local economy. 
Highly concentrated owner-
ship and involvement in the 
family business; 
A high degree of labour mo-
bility. 
Zhejiang  
Industrial structures  
Ownership relations 
Inter-firm relations  
Highly concentrated owner-
ship and involvement in 
firms’ management; 
A low degree of labour mo-
bility in regional core firms 
Highly specialized and ma-
ture production networks;  
An informal long-term com-
mitment between firms; 
A high level of non-owner-
ship coordination and weak 
vertical integration. 
Highly strategical integra-
tion and diversification into 
related sectors; 
Long-term partnerships with 
regional core firms to reduce 
the risk of market volatility. 
Yunnan 
Strong private sector; 
High level of mobility; 
Highly competitive market 
Strong state sector; 
Low degree of mobility; 
Low level of marketization 
559831-L-bw-Lu
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 246
226 CHAPTER 7 
 
 
Economic actors are less de-
pendent on LGs to support their 
business. 
Economic actors are more de-






A regulatory and service-ori-
ented role of LGs in local 
economic development  
A determining role of LGs in 
local economic development 
(i.e. the state-led strategic 
inter-firm coordination) 
Formal and informal credit-
based financial system 
Capital market (listed SOEs) 
and credit-based (private 
firms) financial market 
Strong private sector; 
High level of mobility; 
Highly competitive market 
Strong state sector; 
Low degree of mobility; 
Low level of marketization 
Zhejiang  Yunnan 
Institutional context   
The role of LGs in local 
economic development  
Financial system 
Dominant features 
of enterprise sector  
Dominant features 
of state sector  
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7.2.2 How and why have specific business systems and regional 
economic development trajectories been formed and evolved 
over time in Zhejiang and Yunnan?  
The process by which the development trajectories in Zhejiang and Yunnan have 
formed and evolved from the imperial period to the present has been summarized 
in section 7.1.2. Why particular types of business systems have been formed and 
evolved will be answered in the following sub-questions.  
 
What institutional economic factors determine the historical development 
trajectories (before 1979)? 
As summarized in the previous section, internal factors, including regional re-
sources base (especially in Yunnan) and geographical location, industrial structure, 
and the strength of state intervention in local economic activities (the role of the 
state), as well as external factors, such as cultural factors, and exogenous forces 
including the inflow of FDI and new technologies, and migration, mutually shaped 
the historical development trajectories in Zhejiang and Yunnan, so that regional 
differences persisted even in the highly unified and centralized planned economy. 
 
What institutional economic factors determine the regional divergence in 
the transitional economy (1979 to present)? 
Similar factors to those listed for the earlier period, both internal factors, such as 
regional resources base (especially in Yunnan) and geographical location, industrial 
structure, and the strength of state intervention in local economic activities (the role 
of the state), and external factors, including cultural factors (business culture) and 
exogenous forces like the global market, also shaped the development trajectories 
in Zhejiang and Yunnan in this period.  
At the same time, the impact of pre-existing regional economic, industrial, and 
institutional arrangements has led to strong path dependence and long-term insti-
tutional complementarities in both Zhejiang and Yunnan, thus intensifying the re-
gional divergence.  
Moreover, the unique decentralization reform in China and the incentive mech-
anisms for local cadres shape a highly competitive environment for local govern-
ments competing to raise local revenue. This highly competitive environment plays 
a crucial part in shaping the role of local government and the state–business rela-
tionship and in strengthening the local industrial development path in the two re-
gions. The regional differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan have persisted and 
been enhanced. 
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Do the regional resource bases, the regional pre-existing economic, 
industrial, and institutional arrangements matter?  
The regional resource bases (especially in regions with rich natural resources), the 
regional pre-existing economic, industrial, and institutional arrangements do matter: 
they play a crucial role in shaping the particular type of business systems and have 
also resulted in strong path dependence in both Zhejiang and Yunnan.  
 
7.2.3 How has the role of local governments evolved in the 
transitional economy? 
The role of Zhejiang’s local governments has clearly changed in the transitional 
economy. At the initial stage of reform, the development of the private sector faced 
political, ideological, and social pressures. To safeguard and promote the emerging 
private sector, local governments activity provided political protection and sup-
ported the development of the private sector. Since the imperial period, the state 
sector in Yunnan has played the pre-eminent role in local economic development, 
while the private sector remained virtually absent. Yunnan’s local governments have 
been highly involved in economic activities and have played a determining role in 
supporting, guiding, or constraining economic activities. 
After the ideological debate was brought to an end in 1992, the central govern-
ment created a more relaxed political environment to carry out the market-oriented 
reform. The implementation of the decentralization reform and promotion system 
created a highly competitive environment for local governments to promote local 
economic development, which has greatly influenced the behaviour of local gov-
ernments. Due to the high degree of competitiveness, mobility, and fluidity of mar-
ket entry and exit in Zhejiang, it is risky for local governments to invest in firms 
directly. Hence, to attract investment in the highly competitive environment, 
Zhejiang’s local governments have gradually shifted to playing a service-oriented 
role from a distance to create a positive investment environment. Compared with 
Zhejiang, the Yunnan market is in an unfavourable position in competing for mo-
bile capital. To survive in the highly competitive environment, local governments 
therefore tend to put more effort into supporting regional core industries and pro-
tecting local core firms. 
Hence, after 1992, the highly competitive environment substantially strength-
ened the market-oriented behaviour of local governments in Zhejiang and the level 
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of state intervention in Yunnan. The role of local governments has largely enhanced 
the market-led development trajectory in Zhejiang and the state-led development 
trajectory in Yunnan. 
 
7.2.4 Will regional differences and the distinctive regional 
development trajectories in Zhejiang and Yunnan converge or 
diverge over time?  
This research has indicated that the market-oriented development trajectory in 
Zhejiang and the state-led development trajectory in Yunnan were formed in the 
imperial period. After 1992, the highly competitive environment shaped by the 
unique decentralization reform and promotion system in China substantially 
strengthened the development trajectories in both Zhejiang and Yunnan. The be-
haviour of firms and local governments has followed a specific logic that substan-
tially conforms to the regional resource base, industrial structure, regional economic 
and institutional environment in each case. The strong isomorphic power in both 
Zhejiang and Yunnan resulted in the persistence of industrial and institutional con-
figurations in the transitional heterogeneous Chinese economy. Compared to 
Zhejiang, Yunnan has a relatively high level of resistance to change due to its strong 
state sector, the continuing absence of the private sector, institutional stickiness, 
and highly resource-dependent core industries. Hence, at the present stage, the de-
velopment paths of Zhejiang and Yunnan are pointing in opposite directions and it 
seems most likely that their development trajectories will diverge rather than con-
verge. 
Notably, both internal and external factors, especially the highly competitive en-
vironment shaped by the decentralization reform and promotion system, have re-
inforced these highly cohesive regional business systems and generated a relatively 
strong path dependence in regional development trajectories. However, the regional 
development trajectories are not as harmonious or deterministic as they may appear. 
The industrial paths in both Zhejiang and Yunnan show a certain level of functional 
and technological lock-in. As labour-intensive and low-tech manufacturing indus-
tries start shifting to inner China or Southern Asian countries, firms in Zhejiang, 
which are embedded in global value chains, will gradually lose their advantages and 
confront some serious challenges. The steel-making industries in Yunnan have ex-
perienced overcapacity problems, and the global push towards cleaner fuels also 
challenges the coal industry. In both Zhejiang and Yunnan, industrial upgrading and 
generating novelty in the industrial regions are potential solutions for coping with 
external forces or influences, such as the global market. 
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7.3 Theoretical implications and contributions 
7.3.1 Theoretical implications  
The empirical findings discussed above show the evolutionary development trajec-
tories of the regional business systems in Zhejiang and Yunnan. Table 7.1 presents 
the set of indicators discussed and charts the shifts in each indicator from the im-
perial period to the present.    
Table 7.1 
The change of indicators in the evolution of regional business systems in 
Zhejiang and Yunnan  
Industrial 
structure  Before 1949 1949–1978 1979–present 
Natural resource 
base 
Zhejiang  Stagnant Poor Poor 
Yunnan  Rich Rich Rich 
Predominant 
type of indus-









cost and private 
family-based 




















tor block  Before 1949 1949–1978 1979–present 
Owner control 

















Zhejiang  High horizontal diversification  State-led 
High (large firms) 
Low (SMEs) 
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Employment rela-





and high mobility 
 Yunnan  Limited  
Seniority-based 
promotion and 
low mobility  
Seniority-based pro-
motion and low mo-
bility  
State sector 
block  Before 1949 1949–1978 1979–present 
Strength of state Zhejiang  Low  High 
Supportive from a 
distance 
Yunnan  High  High Supportive 
Strength of mar-
ket regulation Zhejiang  Some High From high to low 























(listed SOEs) and 
credit-based (pri-
vate firms and SOEs) 
Skill develop-
ment Zhejiang  N/A Low Low 
 Yunnan  N/A Low Low 
Union strength 
Zhejiang  N/A Enterprise-based and defined 
Enterprise-based 
and defined 
Yunnan  N/A Enterprise-based and defined 
Enterprise-based 
and defined 
State–business relations  Before 1949 1949–1978 1979–present 
Business–governments col-
laboration 
Zhejiang  Low N/A Low 
Yunnan  Some N/A  High 
Strength of intermediaries Zhejiang  Strong merchant group 
N/A Weak 
 Yunnan  Weak N/A Weak 
The dependence of firms on 
local governments 
Zhejiang  Low  High  Low  
Yunnan  High High High 
The changes in the indicators shown in Table 7.1 paint a clear picture. With the 
exception of indicators for Zhejiang during the period of the planned economy 
(1949–1978), the development paths of Zhejiang and Yunnan have been largely 
consistent with the pre-existing market-led Zhejiang business system and state-led 
Yunnan business system. The radical institutional changes from the feudal agrarian 
economy to proto-industrialization, then to the planned economy, and finally to the 
market-oriented economy have not brought about the trend towards convergence 
of a homogeneous type of regional development trajectory in Zhejiang and Yunnan, 
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but have enhanced and promoted the distinctive regional development trajectory in 
each province. Table 7.1 shows that in the period of the planned economy (1949–
1978), the indicators for Zhejiang and Yunnan are identical. However, the indica-
tors for Zhejiang before 1949 and after 1979 exhibit a relatively high degree of sim-
ilarity. At the same time, the indicators for Yunnan demonstrate a high degree of 
consistency from pre-1949 right through to the present. The planned economy pe-
riod can thus be considered a temporary interruption or repression of Zhejiang’s 
market-led development trajectory, while the developmental pattern, industrial path, 
and predominant industrial and institutional structures of both Zhejiang and Yun-
nan have endured. 
In the pre-reform period, the highly unified and centralized economic system 
led to an institutional homogenizing process within regional development as the 
socialist transformation resulted in a monotonic type of development trajectory in 
China, which left no room for the private sector and very little room for local gov-
ernments to promote regional economic development. Under such a monotonic 
system, regional development potential that derived from a distinctive local indus-
trial path and institutional configurations could not be realized, especially in 
Zhejiang. Hence, the pre-existing market-led development trajectory largely stag-
nated. In contrast, the development trajectory of regions with rich resources, re-
source-dependent industries and strong state sectors — which fitted the centralized 
pre-reform system — were substantially enhanced, as in the case of Yunnan. How-
ever, due to the severe nationwide economic recession caused by the over-central-
ized economic system and the overambitious political and economic campaign, the 
strengthening of this pre-existing industrial and institutional structure did not lead 
to regional economic growth and resulted in strong institutional stickiness.  
We can thus say that, although the highly unified and centralized economic sys-
tem led to an institutional homogenizing process in regional development, the rad-
ical institutional changes did not smooth out the unevenness of the regional econ-
omy. More importantly, although there were several attempts at decentralization 
during this period, the role of local governments was seriously restricted, and no 
incentive mechanisms were provided for local governments to promote regional 
development. Overall, the role of local governments during the pre-reform period 
was to passively accept and execute tasks from higher-level authorities.  
The institutional “homogenization” of regional development during the pre-re-
form period was derived from institutional and political forces shaped by the highly 
unified national policies. Thus, when the political and institutional forces of 
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homogenization were replaced by market forces after the start of economic reform, 
the institutional environment changed, providing room and incentives for local gov-
ernments to pursue their developmental path, especially through the implementa-
tion of decentralization and the promotion system.  
 The incentive mechanism created by the decentralization reform and promo-
tion system (the highly competitive environment for local governments) is one of 
the most important driving forces in shaping the role of local governments and the 
existing regional development trajectories. In the case of the two studied provinces, 
it enhanced the strong path dependence in the two regions and contributed signif-
icantly to the divergence of regional business systems in China. Figure 7.2 shows 
how the unique decentralization pattern and incentive system (promotion system) 
play out in market-led and state-led institutional environments, and how they shape 
regional development trajectories and the behaviour of economic actors (local gov-
ernment is abbreviated to LG). 
Figure 7.2 
The role of decentralization and the promotion system in regional economic 
development 
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Decentralization Promotion system 
Devolving greater autonomy 
and space to LGs; 
Assigning more expenditure 
responsibilities to LGs, caus-
ing fiscal deficits. 
The comparative perfor-
mance and ordinal position-
based rank-order tourna-
ment scheme. 
Providing strong incentives for lead-











ization level; high 






tion level; low level 
of mobility; highly 
resource-dependent 
and huge inputs. 
 
The market-led investment 
environment: easier to at-
tract mobile capitals. 
The state-led investment envi-
ronment: hard to attract mo-
bile capital.  
LGs tend to support regional 
core industries and protect lo-
cal core firms.  
Hence, firms, especially SOEs, 
are more dependent on LGs. 
LGs play a service-oriented 
role from a distance to cre-
ate a beneficial investment 
environment.   
Hence, firms are less de-
pendent on LGs. 
Strong path dependence of regional 
development trajectory. 
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As Figure 7.2 indicates, the central government devolves greater autonomy and 
space for local governments. More specifically, with the implementation of the M-
form administrative system and fiscal decentralization, local governments become 
semi-autonomous and financially self-sufficient. The incentive system (the rank-or-
der tournament promotion system) links GRP growth to the leading cadres’ pro-
motion opportunities. Together, the promotion system and decentralization reform 
create a highly competitive environment for local governments to raise local reve-
nues so as to promote the local economy. The intensive inter-jurisdictional compe-
tition substantially shapes the behaviour of local government officials. On the one 
hand, they actively devote themselves to promoting the local economy, which de-
pends on the existing economic and institutional structure. On the other hand, they 
become risk-averse and short term-oriented, meaning that local governments tend 
to reject radical changes and long-term projects in the highly competitive environ-
ment and focus instead on promoting existing regional core industries and seizing 
existing opportunities. Hence, the competitive environment shaped by the unique 
decentralization reform and promotion system substantially underpins the role of 
the state in local industrial and institutional structures and the state-led development 
path, and thereby increases regional disparities.  
As defined by North (1990: 98), path dependence is a process which “narrows 
the choice set and links the decision-making through time”. At the moment that a 
particular irreversible institutional arrangement is selected from the choice set, in 
which multiple alternatives are still available, the choice set is permanently narrowed. 
Once the path has been chosen, a particular type of actions or behaviour patterns 
will be shaped by self-reinforcing mechanisms. 
The path dependence in the industrial paths and development trajectories in the 
two regions is the consequence of a “natural selection” in the highly competitive 
environment for raising local revenue, which is shaped by decentralization and the 
incentive system. Economic actors (local governments and firms) in market-led and 
state-led institutional environments behave differently in the inter-jurisdictional 
competition. 
Zhejiang had experienced a “natural” process of market-oriented transition 
since the imperial period and has a significant historical legacy underpinning its 
business culture. Hence, economic actors in Zhejiang exhibited high levels of adapt-
ability in the marketization reform. More importantly, local governments in 
Zhejiang showed themselves to be very capable of innovation in protecting and 
supporting the emerging private sector and the market-oriented development tra-
jectory. Hence, compared with Yunnan, the market-led institutional environment 
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gave Zhejiang a much wider choice set for both firms and local governments in the 
context of inter-jurisdictional competition. Given the high degree of mobility in the 
local market, local governments in Zhejiang play a service-oriented role from a dis-
tance to create a beneficial investment environment, which shapes the state–busi-
ness relationships in Zhejiang. Thus, the market-oriented development trajectory 
has been enhanced.  
When a region has a resource-based comparative advantage and has already 
formed a long-lasting, highly resource-dependent industrial structure in a state-led 
institutional environment, like Yunnan, the choice set is narrowed when it comes 
to inter-jurisdictional competition, due to the high degree of durability, stability, 
inflexibility, and irreversibility of given structures. Therefore, local governments 
tend to protect and support the existing local core industries and firms, resulting in 
a close state–business relationship. In other words, although previous and existing 
sets of possibilities already show increasing rigidity and inefficiency and signs of 
entering the lock-in process, the choices selected represent a suboptimal solution 
but a feasible way for economic actors to survive in the face of competition, which 
further reinforces path dependence. 
  Therefore, the implementation of decentralization and marketization reform in 
China neither reduces the unevenness of regional development nor brings about a 
trend towards convergence of a homogeneous development pattern. Regional dif-
ferences persist and increase.  
The two cases of path dependence studied here led to completely different eco-
nomic outcomes. Unlike classical path dependence theory, which emphasizes the 
inflexibility and inefficiency of the path-dependence phenomenon, in this research, 
regional path dependence is a “neutral” concept, which could play a positive or 
negative role in regional economic growth. The analysis of the existing development 
trajectories of Zhejiang and Yunnan demonstrates that the following factors play 
key roles in shaping and strengthening distinctive local development patterns.  
a. Internal factors, such as regional resources base (especially in Yunnan) and 
geographical location, industrial structure, the strength of the state, institu-
tional structure, as well as the unique decentralization reform in China and 
the incentive mechanisms for local cadres which shape a highly competitive 
environment for local governments competing to raise local revenue.  
b. External factors, including cultural factors (business culture), and exogenous 
forces such as the global market. 
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These factors mutually shape the development trajectories in Zhejiang and Yun-
nan, and lead to long-term regional institutional complementarity, enhancing re-
gional divergence. 
 
7.3.2 Theoretical contribution 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Whitley (1999) excludes mainland China from his East 
Asian business systems case study. From Whitley’s point of view, the Chinese econ-
omy’s evolutionary processes are not natural, and do not follow “the natural logic 
of cause and effect in finding paths” (Redding 2002: 225). Whitley’s view substan-
tially disregards economic actors’ initiatives in shaping paths and considerably un-
derestimates the significant efforts of marketization in China since 1978 and the 
crucial role of market forces in the Chinese economy. Hence, this research has fo-
cused on the transitional Chinese economy to enrich business systems theory.  
At the same time, due to its overemphasis on the stability and persistence of 
cohesive economic and institutional configurations, the VoC approach has been 
criticized for developing a static approach, which makes it difficult to observe and 
explain how and why institutional changes occur (Jackson and Deeg 2006: 28–34, 
Campbell and Pedersen 2007: 324–325, Hall and Thelen 2009: 8–9). Unlike the VoC 
approach, Whitley (1999) explicitly brings path dependence into business systems 
theory and highlights the importance of pre-industrial, economic, and institutional 
structures and configurations in shaping the existing predominant types of institu-
tions and economic organizations (Whitley 1999: 179–183). Hence, compared with 
the static aspects of the VoC approach, business systems theory can be applied in 
dealing with the dynamics of economic systems.  
Although an increasing number of comparative capitalism studies have begun 
to focus on institutional change, most of them investigate only one or two decades 
and neglect the long-term evolving economic and institutional configurations and 
arrangements (Nölke and Claar 2013: 36). Whitley (1999) emphasizes the change of 
predominant institutional domains in business systems, but he offers a relatively 
limited descriptive historical perspective of development and change in business 
systems in his case studies. Additionally, Whitley (1999) says little about the initial 
conditions of an economy, and business systems theory overall is short on detail of 
the evolving economic actors in the changing systems. 
Hence, both the VoC approach and business systems theory have failed to pro-
vide an adequately systematic approach to analysing changing economic and insti-
tutional configurations. Thus, to understand the evolving development trajectories 
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and the changing roles of economic actors in the heterogeneous transitional econ-
omy, this research was conducted from a dynamic perspective by introducing an 
evolutionary perspective. 
Moreover, neither the VoC approach nor business systems theory pay attention 
to regional differences or to the cohesive system at the regional level in the hetero-
geneous transitional economy. The markedly uneven regional development and the 
great diversity of economic and institutional patterns typify the transitional Chinese 
economy. At the same time, a high degree of cohesion can be observed in systems 
at the regional level. To investigate the development trajectory at the national scale 
does not help us to understand differences in regional economic performance, eco-
nomic actors’ behaviour, and local developmental paths, let alone the regional in-
stitutional complementarities. There is no single explanation for regional differ-
ences. Regions are subject to a set of economic and institutional arrangements and 
historical and social legacies with specific resource bases (Andriesse 2008: 32), 
which inform a variety of developmental patterns. Uneven regional development is 
a common phenomenon, especially in emerging and transitional economies such as 
China. Therefore, this research adopted business systems theory at the regional level 
in the heterogeneous Chinese economy.  
Most empirical studies focus on well-developed regions or economic core areas, 
while the regional development trajectories in the less-developed areas or the pe-
ripheral regions are largely disregarded, and there is very little comparative analysis 
of two regions with fundamental differences. A comparative analysis between the 
core economic area and peripheral regions does not simply compare the develop-
ment levels of the two, but seeks to understand how distinctive economic and in-
stitutional configurations and arrangements become shaped and changed over time.  
As discussed above, the decentralization reform in China has profoundly im-
pacted on and shaped regional development trajectories. From the 1970s, many 
developing countries embarked on fundamental transformations in the search for a 
more effective and efficient governance structure (Rondinelli et al. 1983: 5–8). Im-
plementing decentralization reform in developing countries has not always been as 
successful as planned (ibid.: 8–13). Two challenges are inevitable in the decentrali-
zation process: (a) to find the balance between centralization and decentralization 
(the “optimal mix”); and (b) to provide proper incentives for local governments to 
ensure that the goals and interests of central and local governments coincide (Ron-
dinelli et al. 1983: 8–13, Bird and Vaillancourt 2008: 4–5). Therefore, as Rondinelli 
et al. argue: (1983: 76), “decentralization is not a ‘quick fix’ for the administrative, 
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political, or economic problems of developing countries”, but an evolutionary pro-
cess which changes and adjusts along with changes in national and local economic 
and institutional conditions, especially in transitional and heterogeneous economies.  
In applying evolutionary business systems theory at the regional level in the het-
erogeneous Chinese economy, the impact of decentralization on shaping the re-
gional development trajectory and economic actors’ behaviour is thus indispensable. 
Although decentralization reform has a significant impact on emerging or transi-
tional economies, the role of decentralization is rarely addressed in comparative 
systems analysis. Highlighting the role of decentralization enabled this research to 
be conducted from an evolutionary perspective and business systems theory to be 
applied at the regional level.  
Additionally, although the degree of independent decision-making and respon-
sibility transferred from central government to local authorities might differ (Ron-
dinelli et al. 1983: 14), China’s decentralization pattern is very different from the 
four types of decentralization distinguished by Rondinelli et al. (ibid.). Three major 
elements characterize the unique decentralization process in China: fiscal decentral-
ization (financial power), M-form organization (semi-autonomous system), and the 
incentive system (rank-order tournament promotion system). These three elements 
of decentralization significantly intensify inter-jurisdictional competition and shape 
the particular behaviour patterns (e.g. focus on promoting local economy, risk aver-
sion and short-term orientation), which determine the existing regional business 
systems and enhance path dependence. Therefore, adding decentralization (espe-
cially the fiscal side), the hierarchical structure of governments, and incentive (pro-
motion) systems into business systems theory as indicators can foster a better un-
derstanding of economic actors’ behaviour, and the role of local governments vis-
à-vis central governments in local economic development.   
Based on the discussion above, the theoretical contributions of this research are: 
a. to focus on the transitional heterogeneous Chinese economy and to enrich 
the typology of business systems theory; 
b. to apply business systems theory to studying the regional level and the role 
of the state in dynamic regional business systems, thereby explicitly exam-
ining the role of decentralization and promotion systems in shaping the 
behaviour of subnational local governments; 
c. to examine regional institutional complementarities in the heterogeneous 
transitional economy;  
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d. to fill a gap in comparative analysis between the economic core area and the 
peripheral region in the heterogeneous Chinese economy; 
e. to connect the evolutionary perspective to business systems theory. 
 
7.4 The new research agenda 
In this study, business systems theory and evolutionary theory have been applied to 
understand how and why distinctive regional development trajectories become es-
tablished and transformed in the heterogeneous Chinese economy, and to examine 
the changing role of economic actors in the evolving economic and institutional 
environment at the regional level. Whitley’s business systems theory provided the 
basic conceptual categories used in this research to identify the diverse dominant 
features in specific sets of institutional environments at the regional level. Three 
major merits of using business systems theory as a broad framework in this research 
were discussed in Chapter 2; these are: a) compared to other approaches, business 
systems theory provides more complex typologies and dimensions to examine a 
wider range of economies; b) it shows more balance than the firm-centred VoC 
analysis; and c) the VoC approach fails to explain the rapid growth of China’s econ-
omy, whereas Whitley’s approach is more adaptable. A comparative case study 
method was applied in this research. However, there are also challenges to using 
business systems theory and comparative case study research methods in research. 
First, the major challenge or barrier in this type of case study is whether the 
findings can be generalized beyond selected cases (Yin 2003: 37). For findings to be 
generalized, as emphasized by Yin (ibid.), replications must be made to test the the-
ory. Therefore, more research on replicating the results in other regions to test the 
findings is one element of a new research agenda. For example, a large-n compari-
son study could be undertaken to expose patterns and to aid generalization, and 
hierarchical cluster analysis could be used to group and identify similar patterns. 
For a better understanding of whether the findings in this research can be gen-
eralized, topics for research in other regions could include: 
a. The role of decentralization on evolutionary regional business systems. As 
discussed in this thesis, the combination of three elements typify China’s 
decentralization; thus, where central governments have applied various 
combinations of types of decentralization, new research could focus on 
what type of decentralization works or has most impact in a region.   
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b. The role of pre-existing industrial and institutional structures on evolutionary 
regional business systems. As business systems theory offers a limited de-
scription of historical trajectories, the initial conditions of pre-existing in-
dustrial and institutional structures should be studied. 
c. The question of whether evolutionary development trajectories converge or 
diverge in regions with different industrial structures and institutional en-
vironments. Given the strong impact of the decentralization process in en-
hancing path dependence and regional divergence in Zhejiang and Yunnan, 
the impact of decentralization also needs more attention.  
Second, business systems theory focuses on identifying and analysing the coor-
dination mechanisms among actors and institutions within specific economic and 
institutional arrangements and environments, but it does not study the causalities. 
Moreover, no unified operational set of measures has been developed in compara-
tive system theory to explain the diversity of regional economic development. Local 
economic development has been studied using various methods and models. In this 
research, the basic conceptual categories of Whitley’s business systems theory have 
been applied. Hence, the second element of a new research agenda is to include 
alternative explanations and factors such as FDI, global value chains, cultural fac-
tors, technological factors, etc., and to conduct causal studies. Moreover, various 
other aspects, such as regional innovation systems, spillover effects, the core–pe-
riphery model, the concept of related and unrelated variety, could also be added in 
analysing the evolutionary local business system. This research has focused on the 
industrial sector; another possibility for further research is to investigate the chang-
ing role of agricultural and service sectors in regional development trajectories. In 
other words, alternative explanations and factors and ways of analysis could be in-
troduced in further studies.  
One notable weaknesses of this research is the relatively small size of the survey 
sample. One hundred sampled firms in each province is not enough to build a sta-
tistical model, especially in Yunnan (where the difference between SOEs and pri-
vate firms generates outliers). Moreover, the design of the survey questions proved 
to be too complicated to conduct a statistical analysis. Hence, in any research going 
forward, the sample size could be increased, and survey questions could be simpli-
fied.  
Finally, Zhejiang and Yunnan are fundamentally different in their development 
trajectories, but both cases exhibit a relatively high degree of consistency. Zhejiang 
and Yunnan are two extreme cases with a markedly strong private sector or state 
sector, which explains the strength of path dependence and the divergent trend of 
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their development paths. The way that regions with more heterogeneous institu-
tional structures evolve and what factors determine their development trajectory 
could be another element of a new research agenda. 
Overall, the comparative analysis of the Zhejiang and Yunnan development tra-
jectories that is presented in this thesis offers a wide variety of opportunities for 




1 The regional differences in accessing markets are largely due to the varying technical require-
ments, manufacturing processes’ safety standards, hygiene requirements, etc. in different in-
dustries. 
2 The “credit-based” financial system in Zhejiang mostly refers to informal financial institu-
tions. 
559831-L-bw-Lu








 Questionnaire for entrepreneurs 
 
1. The name of your company is _________________ 
 
2. Which province and city does your company locate in?  
Province ______________ 
City _____________  
 





4. [Single-select multiple choice] 
Which registration categories of enterprise does your company belong to? (   
)  
A. State-owned enterprises, including Collective-owned enterprises 
B. Private Enterprises 
C. Joint State collective enterprises 
D. Cooperative enterprises 
E. Share- Holding Corporation limited 
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F. State sole funded corporations 
G. Limited liability corporations 
H. Enterprise with funds from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan 
I. Enterprise with foreign funds  
J. Other. Please indicate what category is it?  ____________  
 
5. When was your company established?  
_____________________ 
 
6. [Single-select multiple choice] 
Which of the following sectors does your company belong to? (   ) 
A. Mining  
B. Manufacturer. Please indicate what sector it is? ____________ 
C. Production and supply of electric power and water  
D. Wholesale trade and retail trade  
E. Transport  
F. Real Estate  
G. Financial or insurance organization  
H. IT 
J. Other sector. Please indicate what sector is it? __________________  
 
7. How many employees do you have in your company? ________ 
How frequently is the turnover of the workers? _________________ 
What is the value of the registered capital of this company? _______  
What is the value of the current total assets of this company? ________ 
What is the value of the investment of this company in the last year? ___ 
 
8. Is it convenient to obtain a business license, trade license, and trade qualification 
certification? 
Yes/ No please specify the reason_____________________ 
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9. Are there other criteria other than basic requirements considered in obtaining the 
license or permit of your company?  Yes /No  
If your answer is “yes”, please list the criteria: ___________  
 
10. Do you think it is reasonable and why?  _______________ 
This question aims to determine whether the local government formulated addi-
tional rules or regulations for particular registered categories of enterprises or sec-
tors to increase the difficulties in obtaining the license or permit. 
 
11. How many days did you have to wait to obtain the license or permit of your 
company? ____________days 
 
12. What is/are the original principal business(es) which you registered in Admin-
istration of Industry and Commerce? _____________ 
What is/are your currently principal business(es)? _______________ 
 
13. Do you need to update or obtain a new business license, trade license, and trade 
qualification certification when you want to enlarge or operate a new business?  
Yes, please list the criteria: _____________________. / No  
 
14. Do you need to pay extra fees other than basic prescribed fees for obtaining the 
license or permit of your company?  Yes /No  
If your answer is “yes”, can you estimate what is the percentage of the extra fees to 
total prescribed fees? ____________________________ 
 
15. [Single -select multiple choice] 
How would you rate the level of difficulty in applying the license or permit of your 
company and accessing to market? (   ) 
A. Very difficult  
B. Somewhat difficult  
C. A little bit difficult  
D. Neutral  
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E. A little bit easy  
F. Somewhat easy  
G. Very easy  
 
16. [Multiple- selects multiple choice] 
Please choose what factors prevent or constrain your company from accessing the 
market? (            ) 
A. The difficult and complex application process for a license. 
B. The difficult and complex application process for permit or qualification. 
C. The specific prescribed requirements or political discrimination for private en-
terprise while you apply for a license or permit 
D. High threshold of registered capital while you apply for a license or permit 
E. High threshold of company’s commercial credit while you apply for a license or 
permit 
F. High threshold of manufacturing technique  
G. High level of requirement on sanitation certification and technique and equip-
ment for environmental protection 
H. You can feel the regional protectionism for companies that initially registered in 
other regions. 
I. There are monopolies in your sector 
J. Intense competition 
K. Other factors. Please indicate what are they? ___________ 
 
17. [Multiple- selects multiple choice] 
Please choose what factors encouraged your company to access the market? (            ) 
A. The easy and convenient application process for license  
B. The easy and convenient application process for permit and qualification  
C. There is no specific prescribed requirements or political discrimination for pri-
vate enterprise while you apply for a license or permit 
D. Reasonable threshold of registered capital while you apply for a license or permit 
E. There is no specific requirement of company’s commercial credit while you apply 
for a license or permit 
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F. Attainable threshold of manufacturing technique  
G. Attainable level of requirement on sanitation certification and technique and 
equipment for environmental protection 
H. You have never felt the regional protectionism for companies that initially reg-
istered in other regions. 
I. Fair market competition  
J. High market potential  
K. Other factors. Please indicate what are they? ____________ 
 
18. [Multiple- selects multiple choice] 
Does the local government provide favorable policies to your company? (       ) 
A. The local government provided “Green Passage” to your company when you 
registered in Administration of Industry and Commerce. 
B. The local government reduced or waived some procedures or prescribed fees 
when you registered in the Administration of Industry and Commerce.  
C. The local government provided tax concession for your company. Please indicate 
the details of tax concession. _______________  
D. The local government offered concessional rent for land or equipment for your 
company. 
E. The local government offered funds to your company. ________  
F. The local government offered subsidies for your company's 
R&D activities. 
G. The local government provided free collateral loans to your company.  
H. Other policies. Please indicate what they are? __________ 
 
19. [Multiple- selects multiple choice] 
Does the local government provide the following public services to your company? 
(      ) 
A. The convenient transportation  
B. The sufficient electricity supply  
C. The Internet access  
D. The sufficient gas supply  
E. The sufficient water supply  
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F. The regular employee training projects 
G. The convenient public facilities like schools, hospitals, commercial centers, etc.  
H. Other policies. Please indicate what they are? _____________ 
 
20. [Rank items numerically] 
How do you price your products or services? Please rank in order of importance 
from most important to least important. 
(  ) The local government provides guidelines to enterprises to set the price. 
(  ) Based on the market price of the identical products 
(  ) The price of products is fixed based on the cost of the products. 
(  ) The price of products is fixed based on the agreements between companies. 
(  ) The price of products is fixed based on the company’s target profit of the prod-
ucts.  
(  ) The price of products is fixed based on the contract between your company and 
the buyer of products.  
(  ) Other. Please indicate what they are? _______________ 
 
21. [Rank items numerically] 
What are your company’s sources of finance? Please rank in order of importance 
from most important source to least important source. 
(  ) Internal funds/retained earnings 
(  ) Owner’ contribution or issue new equity shares  
(  ) New debt issuances, including commercial Paper and debentures 
(  ) Bank borrowing 
(  ) Purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers 
(  ) Borrowing from informal financial institutions 
(  ) Borrowing from friends or relatives 
(  ) Local government investment 
(  ) Local government loan 
(  ) Foreign funds 
(  ) Other source. Please indicate what is it? ______________________  
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22. [Single -select multiple choice] 
How would you rate the level of difficulty in accessing bank loans? (  ) 
A. Very difficult  
B. Somewhat difficult  
C. A little bit difficult  
D. Neutral  
E. A little bit easy  
F. Somewhat easy  
G. Very easy  
 
23. [Single -select multiple choice] 
How would you rate the level of difficulty in accessing informal finance institutions? 
(   ) 
A. Very difficult  
B. Somewhat difficult  
C. A little bit difficult  
D. Neutral  
E. A little bit easy  
F. Somewhat easy  
G. Very easy  
 
24. Did your company has ever merged or acquired other companies? Yes/No 
If your answer is ‘yes, please answer the following questions. 
(1) When did you take over the company/ these companies? _____ 
(2) Why did you take over the company/ these companies? ____ 
(3) What is/ are the registration categories of enterprise of the company (these com-
panies), which had been merged or acquired by your company? _ 
(4) How many employees did the company/ companies have? _______ 
(5) Does the company (these companies), which had been merged or acquired by 
your company, have the identical products as your company? Yes/No 
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If your answer to the question is “No”, please indicate what did they produce? 
_____ 
(6) [Multiple- select multiple choice]  
How did you conduct the takeover? (   ) 
A. By cash 
B. By stock  
C. Other. Please indicate what is it? ______________  
(7) [Single -select multiple choice] 
Does the local government encourage or support the activity? (  ) 
A. Very supportive  
B. Somewhat supportive  
C. A little bit supportive  
D. No intervention  
E. A little bit discouraged 
F. Somewhat discouraged  
G. Very discouraged  
If your answer to the question is from A to C or from E to G, please indicate the 
way the local government supported or discouraged the activity. _________ 
 
25. Did your company has ever been merged or acquired by other companies? 
Yes/No 
If your answer is ‘yes, please answer the following questions. 
(1) When did your company have been taken over by other company/ companies? 
______________________ 
(2) Why did your company have been taken over by other company /companies? 
_________ 
(3) What is/ are the registration categories of enterprise of the company (these com-
panies), which had merged or acquired your company? ______ 
(4) How many employees did the company/ companies have? _______ 
(5) Does the company (these companies), which had merged or acquired your com-
pany, have the same product as your company? Yes/No 
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If your answer to question is “No”, please indicate what did they produce? 
_____________ 
(6) [Multiple- select multiple choice]  
How did your company have been taken over? (   ) 
A. By cash 
B. By stock  
C. Other. Please indicate what is it? ______________  
(7) [Single -select multiple choice] 
Does the local government encourage or support the activity? (  ) 
A. Very supportive  
B. Somewhat supportive  
C. A little bit supportive  
D. No intervention  
E. A little bit discouraged 
F. Somewhat preventive  
G. Very preventive  
If your answer to question is from A to C or from E to G, please indicate the way 
the local government supported or prevented the activity. 
____________________________ 
 
26. Are there at least five firms with the same business activity as your company in 
your city?  Yes/ No 
 
27. If your answer to question No. 26 is “Yes”, can you estimate how many em-
ployees do the largest and smallest firms with the same business activity as your 
company have?  _______ 
 
28. How many companies with the same business as your company are there per 
km2 within the same area?  
_________________ 
 
29. Does your company coordinate with other companies? Yes/ No 
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30. [Rank items numerically] 
If your answer is “Yes” to question 29, Please rank in order of frequency of the 
different types(s) of the enterprise(s), which your firm has cooperated with, from 
most frequent to least frequent?  
(  ) SOEs in the same industrial sector  
(  ) Private enterprises in the same industrial sector  
(  ) Foreign-funded enterprises in the same industrial sector  
(  ) SOEs in the different industrial sector  
(  ) Private enterprises in the different industrial sector   
(  ) Foreign-funded enterprises in the different industrial sector   
 
31. [Rank items numerically] 
What kinds of coordination does your company have conducted with SOEs? Please 
indicate the location of the firms with which your firm has cooperated. 
(  ) To purchase components from SOEs ___________________ 
(  ) To purchase production equipment from SOEs ______ 
(  ) To sell components to SOEs ___________________ 
(  ) To outsource business to SOEs ___________________ 
(  ) Technical cooperation with SOEs ___________________ 
(  ) Research and development of products/processes/markets with SOEs   
(  ) To share market resource with SOEs ___________________ 
(  ) To training workers with SOEs __________________ 
(  ) Other. Please indicate what are they? __________________ 
 
32. [Rank items numerically] 
What kinds of coordination does your company have conducted with private en-
terprises? Please indicate the location of the firms with which your firm has coop-
erated. 
(  ) To purchase components from private enterprises __________ 
(  ) To purchase production equipment from private enterprises ____ 
(  ) To sell components to private enterprises ___________________ 
559831-L-bw-Lu
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 273
 Appendix   253 
(  ) To outsource business to private enterprises ___________________ 
(  ) Technical cooperation with private enterprises ______ 
(  ) Research and development of products/processes/markets with private enter-
prises 
(  ) To share the market resource with private enterprises_____ 
(  ) To training workers with private enterprises __________________ 
(  ) Other. Please indicate what are they? __________________ 
 
33. [Rank items numerically] 
What kinds of coordination does your company have conducted with SOEs? Please 
indicate the location of the firms with which your firm has cooperated. 
(  ) To purchase components from foreign-funded enterprises ____ 
(  ) To purchase production equipment from foreign-funded enterprises__ 
(  ) To sell components to foreign funded enterprises _____________ 
(  ) To outsource business to foreign-funded enterprises  ______ 
(  ) Technical cooperation with foreign funded enterprises ______ 
(  ) Research and development of products/processes/markets with foreign funded 
enterprises______________ 
(  ) To share the market resource with foreign-funded enterprises _______ 
(  ) To training workers with foreign-funded enterprises _____ 
(  ) Other. Please indicate what are they? __________________ 
 
34. Please rank in order from the most frequent type of coordinate to the less fre-
quent type of coordinate. 
The most frequent type: ____________  
The frequent type: ____________ 
The less frequent type: ____________ 
 
35. [Multiple- select multiple choice] 
How is this coordination realized? (  ) 
A. Via the guided or supported by local government   
B. Via formal industrial association  
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C. Via informal negotiation between firms 
D. Other. Please indicate what they are? _____________________ 
 
36. Does your company have a long-term partnership with suppliers? Yes/No  
 
37. Does your company have a long-term partnership with clients? Yes/No  
 
38. If your answer to questions No.36 and No.37 are “Yes”, please answer the fol-
lowing questions. 
How long have your company been work with? ________________ 
What kind of business is/are it/they? ______________________ 
 
39. Does your company have a long-term partnership with other firms? Yes/No  
If your answer is “Yes”, please answer the following questions. 
How long have your company been work with? ________________ 
What kind of business is/are it/they? ______________________ 
 
40. [Single -select multiple choice] 
How would you rate the level of difficulty in coordinating with other companies? 
(   ) 
A. Very difficult  
B. Somewhat difficult  
C. A little bit difficult  
D. Neutral  
E. A little bit easy  
F. Somewhat easy  
G. Very easy 
 
41. [Open-ended text] 
Based on the answer to question 40, please indicate why do you think it is difficult/ 
not difficult? _________________________ 
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42. [Rank items numerically] 
What is (are) the target market(s) of your company’s product(s)? Please rank in or-
der of importance from most important to the least important market of your prod-
uct(s). 
(  ) Local Market 
(  ) Adjacent Province Market 
(  ) Domestic Market 
(  ) Foreign Market 
 
43. Whether the industry sector, which your company belongs to, has already had 
local business association? Yes. Please indicate the name of the business association 
_______________________/ No 
 
44. If any company wants to apply for being a member of this business association, 
whether are there some requirements for joining the association?  
Yes. Please indicate what the requirements are? ________ 
No. 
 
45. Is your company a member of this business association?  
Yes. Please indicate the role of the businesses association they play in your company. 




46. Does your company have any cooperation with the local government? Yes/No 
 
47. [Rank items numerically] 
If your answer is “Yes” to question 46, Please rank in the frequency of different 
types of interaction from most frequent to least frequent? 
(  ) Infrastructure construction  
(  ) Market development  
(  ) Technical cooperation 
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(  ) Research and development of products 
(  ) Training and education  
(  ) Other. Please indicate what are they? _________ 
 
48. Do you have local government officials on your boards? Yes / Once / No 
 
49. [Open-ended text] 
If your answer is “Yes” to question No.48, what kind of role do they play in your 
company? What benefits for the company? What challenges for the company? 
_________ 
 
50. Do you have party committees within your company? Yes/No 
 
51. [Open-ended text] 
If your answer is “Yes” to question No.50, what kind of role do they play in your 
company? What benefits for the company? What challenges for the company? 
 
52. [Single -select multiple choice] 
Does the relationship with the local government have become more important for 
the development of your company?  
A. Very unimportant  
B. Somewhat unimportant  
C. A little bit unimportant  
D. Neutral  
E. A little bit important 
F. Somewhat important 
G. Very important 
 
53. [Open-ended text] 
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Based on the answer above, please indicate why do you think it is important/ not 
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Appendix 2 
Survey results  
As the research is intended to identify the distinctive business systems and to high-
light regional differences, the survey results are tested to show whether there are 
significant differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan.  
 
1 The local economic performance in Zhejiang and Yunnan 
The real GRP in two provinces from 1978 to 2015 were used to examine the dif-
ferences in the local economic performance in Zhejiang and Yunnan. As the indi-
cators were time series and the long-term and persistent trends of time series would 
jeopardize the results of tests, the “stationarity” test was run before the two-sample 
t-test. 
Figure A1 
The real GRP in Zhejiang and Yunnan 
Note: a. Real GRPN= GRP base year* Indices of GRPN/100) 
         b. The Real GRP in Zhejiang and Yunnan are calculated with constant price at the base year 
1978.  
The figure above shows that real GRP in both Zhejiang and Yunnan had an 
increasing trend over time, which could be inferred that the data of real GRP in the 
two provinces were not stationary. Therefore, the Dickey-Fuller test was conducted 
to explore whether a unit root presented in data, so that the stationary of data could 
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be tested. The null hypothesis: variable is nonstationary, and the alternative hypoth-
esis: variable is stationary. The result of the DF test showed that the test statistic of 
both variables was larger than the interpolated DF critical value at 5% level, hence, 
we cannot reject H0, meaning that there were unit-roots presenting and the data had 
a non-stationary problem. After taking the logarithm and first-order difference, the 
problem of non-stationary in both Zhejiang and Yunnan’s real GRP was eliminated, 
which means variables were stationary. The results are reported below. 
Figure A2  
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root (Real GRP) 
 
Table A1  
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root (Real GRP) 
Zhejiang    
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root   Number of obs= 36 
  --------------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller------------- 





Z(t)  -3.188 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0207 
Yunnan    
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs= 36 
  --------------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller------------- 





Z(t)  -5.846 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
By using the newly generated stationary variables, a two-sample independent t-
test was run to determine if there were differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
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Table A2  
Two-sample t test with equal variances (Real GRP) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
dlnrea~Z 37 0.1160 0.0071 0.0430 0.1017 0.1303 
dlnrea~Y 37 0.0958 0.0044 0.0269 0.0868 0.1048 
combined 74 0.1059 0.0043 0.0371 0.0973 0.1145 
diff  0.0202 0.0083  0.0036 0.0369 
diff = mean(dlnreal_GRP_Z) - mean(dlnreal_GRP_Y) t= 2.4238 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 72 
Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9911 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0179 Pr(T > t) = 0.0089 
 
The result shows that the difference in means was estimated as 0.02 with a 95% 
confidence interval from 0.0036 to 0.037. The two-tailed p-value is 0.018, so there 
was evidence that the real GRP in Zhejiang and Yunnan differed in their mean. 
2 The regional industrial structures in Zhejiang and Yunnan 
2.1 Real GRP of industrial sector from 1978-2015: significant difference 
The graph shows that the real GRP of industrial sector in both Zhejiang and Yun-
nan had an increasing trend over time, which can be inferred that the data are not 
stationary and the result of the DF test shows that there were unit-roots presenting 
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Figure A3 
The real GRP of industrial sector in Zhejiang and Yunnan 
Note: The Real GRP of industrial sector in Zhejiang and Yunnan are calculated with constant price 
at the base year 1978.  
After taking the logarithm and first-order difference, the problem of non-sta-
tionary was eliminated, which means variables were stationary. The results are re-
ported below. 
Figure A4  
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Table A3  
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root (Real GRP of industrial sector) 
Zhejiang    
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root   Number of obs= 36 
  --------------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller------------- 





Z(t)  -3.192 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0205 
Yunnan    
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs= 36 
  --------------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller------------- 





Z(t)  -4.833 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
By using the newly generated stationary variables, a two-sample independent t-
test was run to determine if there were differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
Table A4  
Two-sample t test with equal variances (Real GRP of industrial sector) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
dlnrea~Z 37 0.1347 0.0112 0.0681 0.1120 0.1574 
dlnrea~Y 37 0.1056 0.0062 0.0376 0.0931 0.1182 
combined 74 0.1201 0.0066 0.0566 0.1070 0.1333 
diff  0.0291 0.0128  0.0036 0.0546 
diff = mean(dlnreal_secz) - mean(dlnreal_secy) t= 2.2716 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 72 
Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9869 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0261 Pr(T > t) = 0.0131 
The result shows that the difference in means was estimated as 0.029 with a 95% 
confidence interval from 0.0036 to 0.055. The two-tailed p-value is 0.026, so that 
there were significant differences between the real GRP of industrial sector in 
Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
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2.1 Real GRP of Industry Sector from 1978-2015: significant difference 
The figure below shows that the real GRP of industry sector in both Zhejiang and 
Yunnan had an increasing trend over time, which can be inferred that the data were 
not stationary and the result of the DF test shows that there were  unit-roots pre-
senting and the data had a non-stationary problem.  
Figure A5 
The real GRP of industry sector in Zhejiang and Yunnan 
Note: The Real GRP of industrial sector in Zhejiang and Yunnan are calculated with constant price 
at the base year 1978.  
After taking the logarithm and first-order difference, the problem of non-sta-
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Figure A6  
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root (Real GRP of industry sector) 
 
Table A5  
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root (Real GRP of industry sector) 
Zhejiang    
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root   Number of obs= 36 
  --------------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller------------- 





Z(t)  -3.191 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0205 
Yunnan    
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs= 36 
  --------------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller------------- 





Z(t)  -4.497 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0002 
By using the newly generated stationary variables, a two-sample independent t-
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Table A6 
Two-sample t test with equal variances (Real GRP of industry sector) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
dlnre~dz 37 0.1376 0.1150 0.0700 0.1143 0.1610 
dlnre~dy 37 0.1035 0.0060 0.0362 0.0914 0.1155 
combined 74 0.1205 0.0067 0.0580 0.1071 0.1340 
diff  0.0342 0.0130  0.0084 0.0600 
diff = mean(dlnreal_secz) - mean(dlnreal_secy) t= 2.6388 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 72 
Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9949 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0102 Pr(T > t) = 0.0051 
The result shows that the difference in means was estimated as 0.034 with a 95% 
confidence interval from 0.0084 to 0.06. The two-tailed p-value is 0.01, so the null 
hypothesis can be rejected and there were significant differences between Zhejiang 
and Yunnan. 
 
2.3 The total output value of industry from 1978-2015: significant 
difference 
The graph below shows a strong increasing trend in Zhejiang’s total output value 
and the total output value in Yunnan also had persistent upward movements over-
time. 
Figure A7 
The total output value of industry in Zhejiang and Yunnan 
0
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The result of the DF test shows that the total output value of industry in 
Zhejiang and Yunnan were not stationary. After taking the logarithm and difference, 
variables (Zhejiang: first order; Yunnan: second order) were stationary. The results 
are reported below. 
Figure A8  
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root (the total output value of industry) 
 
Table A7  
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root (the total output value of industry) 
Zhejiang    
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root   Number of obs= 36 
  --------------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller------------- 





Z(t)  -4.517 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0002 
Yunnan    
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs= 36 
  --------------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller------------- 





Z(t)  -5.897 -3.682 -2.972 -2.618 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
By using the newly generated stationary variables, a two-sample independent t-
test was run to determine if there were differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
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Two-sample t test with equal variances (the total output value of industry) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
dlnout~z 37 0.1683 0.0324 0.1968 0.1026 0.2339 
d2lnou~y 36 0.0048 0.0140 0.0837 0.0331 0.0236 
combined 73 0.0829 0.0204 0.1743 0.0423 0.1236 
diff  0.1730 0.0356  0.1021 0.2440 
diff = mean(dlnoutputz) - mean(d2lnoutputy) t= 4.8633 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 71 
Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
The result shows that the difference in means was estimated as 0.17 with a 95% 
confidence interval from 0.1 to 0.12. The two-tailed p-value was 0.00, so that there 
were significant differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan’s output value. 
 
2.4 Survey results of sampled firms  
2.4.1 Firm age of sampled firms: significant difference  
As the indicators are continuous variables, a normality test was run to determine if 
there were significant differences. 
 Table A9  
Descriptive statistics of sampled firm age 
 Zhejiang Yunnan 
Valid 100 100 
Mean 13.13 22.28 
Median 12.5 14.5 
Std. Deviation 8.971 19.034 
Variance 80.478 362.284 
Skewness 1.898 1.214 
Std. Error of Skewness 0.241 0.241 
Kurtosis 8.39 0.597 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 0.478 0.478 
 
By looking at the histograms below, it can be inferred that the data of firm age 
from both provinces, especially Yunnan, were skewed distribution. Therefore, the 
One-Sample Kolmogorov Smirnov test (K-S test) was run to test whether a variable 
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follows the normal distribution. The results show that both variables were not a 
normal distribution, so the Independent Samples Mann-Whitney U test was run to 
test if there were significant differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. The results 
are reported below. 
Figure A9 
Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test (firm age)  
The null hypothesis of the U test is that the distribution of the variable is the 
same across categories. The p-value was 0.004, so that the null hypothesis could be 
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2.4.2 Firm size (numbers of employee and total assets) of sampled firms: 
significant difference  
Table A10  
Descriptive statistics of sampled firm size  
 
Zhejiang Yunnan 
employee tot_assets employee tot_assets 
Valid 100 100 100 100 
Mean 329.7 26965.46 1772.3 463407.67 
Median 100 1685 195 13500 
Std. Deviation 766.256 130452.73 6421.632 1594912.94 
Variance 587148.96 1.7018E+10 41237352.9 2.5437E+12 
Skewness 4.521 7.069 5.265 4.195 
Std. Error of Skewness 0.241 0.241 0.241 0.241 
Kurtosis 23.031 53.462 27.948 17.199 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 0.478 0.478 0.478 0.478 
Minimum 6 50 10 100 
Maximum 5000 1110675 40000 9000000 
 
By looking at the histograms, it can be inferred that the total assets and numbers 
of the employee from both provinces were skewed distribution. K-S test shows that 
variables were not a normal distribution. Hence, the Independent Samples Mann- 
Whitney U test was run to test if there were significant differences between Zhejiang 
and Yunnan. The results are reported below. 
Figure A10 
Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test (firm size)  
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The P value was 0.00 for both total assets and number of the employee so that 
the null hypothesis can be rejected. Hence, there were significant differences in firm 
size between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
 
2.4.3 Predominant industries of sampled firms: significant difference  
Table A11 
The predominant industries of sampled firms 
Sector 








Zhejiang 48 5 6 41 100 
Yunnan 20 10 23 47 100 
Total 68 15 29 88 200 
 
For analysing nominal data, crosstab was used to run the Chi-squared, which 
was performed to evaluate if there were significant differences in categorical data.  
Table A12 
Chi-Square Tests (predominant industries of sampled firms) 
 Value df Asymp. Sig (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 70.826a 11 0 
Likelihood Ratio 80.263 11 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.670 1 0.196 
N of Valid Cases 200   
6 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2. 
The P-value of the Pearson Chi-square test was 0.00, so that the null hypothesis 
can be rejected. Hence, there were significant differences in predominant industries 
between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
 
2.4.4 Firm Types (registration categories): significant difference  
Table A13 




SOEs Private firms Foreign and HK funded firms 
Zhejiang 0 96 4 100 
Yunnan 29 63 8 100 
Total 29 159 12 200 
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Chi-Square Tests (registration categories of sampled firms) 









a 8 0 0   
Likelihood Ratio 68.768 8 0 0   
Fisher's Exact 
Test 59.399 
  0   
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 12.36
b 1 0 0 0 0 
N of Valid Cases 200      
a. 12 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 50. 
b. The standardized statistic is -3.516. 
The p-value of Fisher’s Exact test was 0.00, so that the null hypothesis could be 
rejected. Hence, there were significant differences in firm types between Zhejiang 
and Yunnan. 
 
2.4.5 Target markets of sampled firms: significant difference  
Table A15 
The target markets of sampled firms 









Zhejiang 25 18 71 57 171 
Yunnan 57 27 59 30 173 
Total 82 45 130 87 344 
For analysing data from multiple response questions, crosstab was used to run 
the Chi-squared test, which was performed to evaluate if there were significant dif-
ferences in categorical data. The results list as below. 
Table A16 
Chi-Square Tests (target markets of sampled firms) 









a 3 0 0   
Likelihood Ratio 24.255 3 0 0   
Fisher's Exact 
Test 23.967 
      0   
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Linear-by-Linear 
Association 23.59
b 1 0 0 0 0 
N of Valid Cases 344      
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.37. 
b. The standardized statistic is -4.857. 
P-value of the Pearson Chi-square test was 0.00, so that the null hypothesis could 
be rejected. Hence, there were significant differences in target markets between 
Zhejiang and Yunnan.  
 
3 The market regulations and policies in Zhejiang and Yunnan 
3.1 Applying for Business licence or Certification 
The data collected from Single-select multiple-choice questions were analysed by 
using the Chi-square test. 
Table A17 
Is it convenient to obtain the basic required licence or qualifications for start-
ing new businesses?  
No Yes To-
tal  
Zhejiang 13 87 100 
Yunnan 16 84 100 
Total 29 171 200 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 




0.363a 1 0.547   
Continuity Correc-
tionb 
0.161 1 0.688   
Likelihood Ratio 0.364 1 0.547 
  
Fisher's Exact Test 




0.361 1 0.548 
  
N of Valid Cases 200 
    
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.50. 
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Table A18 
Whether are there specialized requirements for starting new businesses?  
No Yes To-
tal 
Zhejiang  80 20 100 
Yunnan 38 62 100 
Total 118 82 200 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 




36.461a 1 0.000   
Continuity Correc-
tionb 
34.746 1 0.000   
Likelihood Ratio 37.850 1 0.000 
  
Fisher's Exact Test 




36.276 1 0.000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200 
    
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 41.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Based on the results shows above, for the former question, the P-value of the 
Pearson Chi-square test was 0.547, so that the null hypothesis can be accepted, 
which means that there is no significant difference in obtaining a business license 
between Zhejiang and Yunnan. For the latter question, the P-value of the Pearson 
Chi-square test was 0.00, so we can reject the null hypothesis, meaning that Zhejiang 
and Yunnan show a significant difference in obtaining additional certifications or 
qualifications. 
 
3.2 The Difficulty Levels of Accessing Market (Likert scale): significant 
difference  
As the Likert scale data can be considered as the continuous variable, the normality 
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Figure A11 
Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test (accessing market) 
The variables in Zhejiang and Yunnan were skewed distribution, and the K-S 
test shows that variables were not a normal distribution. Therefore, the Independ-
ent Samples Mann-Whitney U test was run to test if there were significant differ-
ences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. The p-value was 0.043, so that the null hy-
pothesis could be rejected. Hence, there were significant difference in the difficulty 
level of accessing market between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
3.3 Entry barriers: no significant difference  
For analysing data from multiple response questions, crosstab was used to run the 
Chi-squared test, which was performed to evaluate if there were significant differ-










Application process for license 3 3.6% 8 10.4% 
Application process for permit or qualification 3 3.6% 9 11.7% 
Specific prescribed requirements or political 
discrimination for private enterprise 2 2.4% 0 0.0% 
Registered capital 1 1.2% 0 0.0% 
Commercial credit 1 1.2% 2 2.6% 
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Manufacturing technique 18 21.7% 12 15.6% 
Requirement on sanitation certification and 
technique and equipment for environmental 
protection 19 22.9% 9 11.7% 
Regional protectionism 0 0.0% 1 1.3% 
Monopolies 4 4.8% 7 9.1% 
Intense competition 64 77.1% 68 88.3% 
Total 115  116  
 









15.31a 9 .083 .052 
  










.417b 1 .519 .521 .268 .015 
N of Valid Cases 231 
     
a. 8 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .50. 
b. The standardized statistic is -.646. 
The p-value of Fisher’s Exact test was 0.57, so that the null hypothesis could 
not be rejected. Hence, there was no significant difference in entry barriers between 
Zhejiang and Yunnan. 










Application process for license 7 9.0% 2 3.8% 
Permit and qualification 7 9.0% 1 1.9% 
No specific prescribed requirements or political 
discrimination 
6 7.7% 1 1.9% 
Reasonable threshold of registered capital 17 21.8% 3 5.7% 
No specific requirement on commercial credit 2 2.6% 0 0.0% 
Attainable threshold of manufacturing tech-
nique 
17 21.8% 4 7.5% 
Attainable requirement on sanitation certifica-
tion and technique for environmental protection 
2 2.6% 4 7.5% 
No regional protectionism 2 2.6% 2 3.8% 
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Fair market competition 23 29.5% 9 17.0% 
















22.86a 9 .007 .004 
  










14.01b 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 204 
     
a. 10 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .72. 
b. The standardized statistic is 3.743. 
P-value of the Fisher’s Exact test was 0.05, so that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. Hence, there were significant differences in entry incentives between 
Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
 
Table A21 
Other factors of entry incentives 
 
Zhejiang Yunnan 
Count % within location Count % within location 
Family business 7 15.9% 0 0.0% 
Familiar with business 32 72.7% 15 24.2% 
A complete industrial chain 5 11.4% 1 1.6% 
Favourable investment policy 4 9.1% 13 21.0% 
State development plan 5 11.4% 21 33.9% 
Supporting enterprises 4 9.1% 5 8.1% 
Abundant resources 1 2.3% 25 40.3% 
Total 58  80  
 












50.47a 6 .000 .000 
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40.81b 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 138 
     
a. 5 cells (35.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.52. 
b. The standardized statistic is 6.388. 
P-value of the Pearson Chi-square test was 0.00, so that the null hypothesis could 
be rejected. Hence, there were significant difference in other factors of entry incen-
tives between Zhejiang and Yunnan.    
 










Green Passage 13 23.2% 4 5.0% 
Reducing or waiving procedures or prescribed 
fees 
7 12.5% 4 5.0% 
Tax concession 25 44.6% 63 78.8% 
Local government provided free collateral loans 3 5.4% 1 1.3% 
Local government offered funds 27 48.2% 20 25.0% 
Local government offered concessional rent for 
land or equipment 
15 26.8% 21 26.3% 
Local government offered subsidies for R&D 12 21.4% 33 41.3% 














27.91a 6 .000 .000 
  









2.628b 1 .105 .109 .056 .008 
N of Valid Cases 248 
     
a. 3 cells (21.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.65. 
b. The standardized statistic is 1.621. 
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P-value of the Pearson Chi-square test was 0.00, so that the null hypothesis could 
be rejected. Therefore, there were significant differences in supporting policies be-
tween Zhejiang and Yunnan.  
 










Convenient transportation 86 86.9% 56 64.4% 
Sufficient electricity supply 92 92.9% 73 83.9% 
Internet access 12 12.1% 4 4.6% 
Sufficient gas supply 1 1.0% 0 0.0% 
Sufficient water supply 68 68.7% 69 79.3% 
Regular employee training projects 12 12.1% 1 1.1% 
Convenient public facilities like schools, 
hospitals, commercial center, etc. 















13.38a 6 .037 .026 
  










.491b 1 .484 .491 .250 .017 
N of Valid Cases 479 
     
a. 4 cells (28.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .43. 
b. The standardized statistic is .700. 
P-value of the Pearson Chi-square test was 0.037, so that the null hypothesis 
could be rejected. Therefore, there were significant difference in supporting public 
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Local government provides guideline 1 1.0% 16 16.0% 
Market price 66 66.0% 57 57.0% 
Cost of the products 62 62.0% 50 50.0% 
Agreements between companies 10 10.0% 1 1.0% 
Target profit 34 34.0% 26 26.0% 















23.10a 5 .000 .000 
  










5.502b 1 .019 .020 .010 .002 
N of Valid Cases 367 
     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.01. 
b. The standardized statistic is -2.346. 
P-value of the Pearson Chi-square test was 0.00, so that the null hypothesis could 
be rejected. Thus, there were significant differences in pricing principals between 
Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
 
4 Ownership relations and non-ownership coordination in Zhejiang and 
Yunnan 
4.1 Merge and acquisition activities: significant difference 
Table A25 
Merge and acquisition activities 
 
Firms have merged or acquired other companies 
No Yes Total 
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Zhejiang 88 12 100 
Yunnan 72 28 100 
Total  160 40 200 
 






Pearson Chi-Square 8.000a 1 0.005   
Continuity Correctionb 7.031 1 0.008   
Likelihood Ratio 8.185 1 0.004   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.007 0.004 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.960 1 0.005   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Firms have been merged or acquired by other companies 
No Yes Total 
Zhejiang 99 1 100 
Yunnan 83 17 100 
Total  182 18 200 
 






Pearson Chi-Square 15.629a 1 0.000   
Continuity Correctionb 13.736 1 0.000   
Likelihood Ratio 18.638 1 0.000   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.000 0.000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.551 1 0.000   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
P-value of Pearson Chi-square test for both questions: firms have (been) merged 
or acquired were less than 0.05, so that the null hypothesis could be rejected. Hence, 
there were significant differences in M&A activities between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
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4.2 Industry concentration level: significant difference 
Are there at least 5 firms with the same business activity as your company in your 
city? 
Table A26 
Industry concentration level 
 
Is there at least 5 firms with the same business activity in city (unit)? 
No Yes Total 
Zhejiang 24 76 100 
Yunnan 59 41 100 
Total  83 117 200 
 








a 1 0.000 
  
Continuity Correctionb 23.808 1 0.000 
  
Likelihood Ratio 25.863 1 0.000 
  





Linear-by-Linear Association 25.103 1 0.000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200  
   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 41.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
P value of Pearson Chi-square test was 0.00, so that the null hypothesis could 
be rejected. Therefore, there were significant differences in industry concentration 
level between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
How many companies with the same business as your company are there per 
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Figure A12 
Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test (industry concentration level) 
K-S test showed that variables were not normal distribution, so that Independ-
ent Samples Mann- Whitney U test was run to test if there were significant differ-
ences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. The P value was 0.00, so that the null hypoth-
esis could be rejected. Hence, there were significant differences between Zhejiang 
and Yunnan. 
 
4.3 Production Chain (firm types) and Other Business activities 
Table A27 








To purchase components from SOEs 9 60.0% 35 53.8% 
To purchase production equipment from SOEs 1 6.7% 18 27.7% 
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To outsource business to SOEs 4 26.7% 8 12.3% 
Technical cooperation with SOEs 6 40.0% 41 63.1% 
Research and development of products/pro-
cesses/markets with SOEs 8 53.3% 39 60.0% 
To share market resource with SOEs 2 13.3% 1 1.5% 
To train workers with SOEs 3 20.0% 4 6.2% 
Total 33  146  
 









12.57a 6 .050 .049 
  










.765c 1 .382 .408 .207 .030 
N of Valid Cases 179 
     
a. 5 cells (35.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .55. 
b. The standardized statistic is -.875. 
The p-value of Pearson Chi-square test was 0.05, so that the null hypothesis 











To purchase components from private firms 96 96.0% 91 92.9% 
To purchase production equipment from private 
firms 
89 89.0% 88 89.8% 
To outsource business to private firms 55 55.0% 33 33.7% 
Technical cooperation with private firms 25 25.0% 23 23.5% 
Research and development of products/pro-
cesses/markets with private firms 
23 23.0% 17 17.3% 
To share market resource with private firms 25 25.0% 4 4.1% 
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16.43a 6 .012 .011 
  










5.661c 1 .017 .018 .009 .001 
N of Valid Cases 585 
     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.22. 
b. The standardized statistic is -2.379. 
The p-value of Pearson Chi-square test was 0.012, so that the null hypothesis 









To purchase components from foreign funded en-
terprises 
14 48.3% 16 37.2% 
To purchase production equipment from foreign 
funded enterprises 
15 51.7% 32 74.4% 
To outsource business to foreign funded enter-
prises 
1 3.4% 2 4.7% 
Technical cooperation with foreign funded enter-
prises 
5 17.2% 6 14.0% 
Research and development of products/pro-
cesses/markets with foreign funded enterprises 
6 20.7% 5 11.6% 
To share market resource with foreign funded en-
terprises 
3 10.3% 2 4.7% 

















6.504a 6 .369 .386 
  










2.315b 1 .128 .130 .073 .015 
N of Valid Cases 109 
     
a. 8 cells (57.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .84. 
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b. The standardized statistic is -1.522. 
The p-value of Fisher’s Exact test was 0.37, so that the null hypothesis could 
not be rejected, which means that there was no significant difference between 
Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
 
4.4 The Long-term Partnership with Suppliers and Clients  
Table A28 
The Long-term Partnership with Suppliers and Clients 
 
Does your company have long-term partnership with suppliers? 
No Yes Total 
Zhejiang 13 87 100 
Yunnan 4 96 100 
Total  17 183 200 
 






Pearson Chi-Square 5.207a 1 0.022   
Continuity Correctionb 4.114 1 0.043   
Likelihood Ratio 5.460 1 0.019   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.040 0.020 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.181 1 0.023   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Does your company have long-term partnership with clients? 
No Yes Total 
Zhejiang 9 91 100 
Yunnan 8 92 100 
Total  17 183 200 
 






Pearson Chi-Square .064a 1 0.800   
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Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .064 1 0.800   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 0.500 
Linear-by-Linear Association .064 1 0.800   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
The p-value of Pearson Chi-square test of the long-term partnership with sup-
pliers was 0.022, so that the null hypothesis could be rejected, which means that 
there were significant differences in the long-term partnership with suppliers be-
tween Zhejiang and Yunnan. However, the p-value of the long-term partnership 
with clients was 0.8, so that the null hypothesis could be accepted, which means 
that there was no significant difference in the long-term partnership with clients 
between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
 
Figure A13 
Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test (the long-term partnership) 
K-S test showed that variables were not normal distribution, so that Independ-
ent Samples Mann- Whitney U test was run to test if there were significant differ-
ences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. The P value was 0.005, so that the null 
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hypothesis could be rejected. Hence, there were significant differences between 
Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
 
4.5 The Ways of Inter-firm Coordination 
Table A29 








Via the guided or supported from LGs 4 4.0% 12 12.0% 
Via formal industrial association 5 5.0% 9 9.0% 
Via informal negotiation between firms 100 100.0% 98 98.0% 
Total 109  119  
 
 









a 2 0.094 0.101   
Likelihood Ratio 4.926 2 0.085 0.101   
Fisher's Exact 
Test 4.644 
  0.101   
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 4.694
b 1 0.030 0.039 0.019 0.009 
N of Valid Cases 228      
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.69. 
b. The standardized statistic is -2.167. 
The P value was 0.094, so that the null hypothesis could not be rejected, meaning 
that there was no significant difference in the ways of inter-firm coordination be-
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4.6 Production Chain (locations) 
Table A30 
Production Chain (locations) 
 
To purchase components 
Local market National market Overseas market Total 
Zhejiang 63 42 15 120 
Yunnan 75 59 18 152 
Total  138 101 33 272 
Chi-Square Tests 









.419a 2 0.811 0.805 
  










.087b 1 0.768 0.792 0.419 0.067 
N of Valid Cases 272 
     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.56. 
b. The standardized statistic is .295. 
 
 
To purchase equipment 
Local market National market Overseas market Total 
Zhejiang 58 42 15 115 
Yunnan 31 84 30 145 
Total  89 126 45 260 
 









24.05a 2 .000 .000 
  










17.68b 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 260 
     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.90. 
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b. The standardized statistic is 4.205. 
 
 
To outsource business at: 
Local market National market Overseas market Total 
Zhejiang 49 6 1 56 
Yunnan 32 9 3 44 
Total  81 15 4 100 
 









3.782a 2 0.811 0.805 
  










3.722b 1 0.768 0.792 0.419 0.067 
N of Valid Cases 100 
     
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.76. 
b. The standardized statistic is 1.929. 
Based on the results of Pearson Chi-square test, locations to purchase compo-
nents and to outsource business in Zhejiang and Yunnan had no significant differ-
ence (p-value>0.05); while the locations to purchase equipment between Zhejiang 
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4.7 The Difficulty Level of Inter-firm Coordination (Likert scale): 
significant difference 
Figure A14 
Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test (inter-firm coordination) 
By looking at the histograms, it can be inferred that variables in Zhejiang and 
Yunnan were skewed distribution. And K-S test showed that variables were not 
normal distribution, so that Independent Samples Mann- Whitney U test was run 
to test if there were significant differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. The P 
value was 0.00, so that the null hypothesis could .be rejected. Hence, there were 
significant differences in the difficulty levels of inter-firm coordination between 
Zhejiang and Yunnan.  
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5 The Financial systems in Zhejiang and Yunnan  
5.1 Loans from Financial Institutions (1978-2015): no significant 
difference  
Figure A15 
The loans from Financial instructions 
The graph shows a strong increasing trend in Zhejiang’s loans from financial 
institutions and Yunnan also has persistent upward movements overtime. The re-
sult of DF test showed that two variables in Zhejiang and Yunnan were not station-
ary. After taking the logarithm and first order difference, variables were stationary. 
The results are reported below. 
Figure A16  
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root (The loans from Financial instructions) 
 
Table A31 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root (The loans from Financial instructions) 
Zhejiang     
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root   Number of obs= 36 
  --------------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller------------------ 
0
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 Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 10% Critical Value 
Z(t)  -3.833 -3.675 -2.969 -2.617 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0026 
Yunnan     
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs= 36 
  --------------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller----------------- 
 Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 10% Critical Value 
Z(t)  -3.228 -3.682 -2.969 -2.617 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0184 
By using the new generated stationary variables, two-sample independent t test 
were run to test if there were significant differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
Table A32 
Two-sample t test with equal variances (The loans from Financial instructions) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
dlnout~z 37 0.1979 0.0121 0.0733 0.1735 0.2224 
d2lnou~y 37 0.1761 0.0128 0.0781 0.1500 0.2021 
combined 74 0.1870 0.0088 0.0760 0.1694 0.2046 
diff  0.0218 0.0176  0.0133 0.0569 
diff = mean(dlnloans_Z) - mean(dlnloans_Y) t= 1.2401 
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 72 
Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.8905 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2190 Pr(T > t) = 0.1095 
The result shows that the difference in means was estimated as 0.02 with a 95% 
confidence interval from 0.13 to 0.57. The two-tailed p value was 0.22, so that there 
was no significant difference between Zhejiang and Yunnan’s. 
 
5.2 Source of Finance: significant difference  
Table A33 








Internal funds/retained earnings 97 97.0% 99 99.0% 
Owner’ contribution or issued new equity 
shares 
2 2.0% 13 13.0% 
New debt issuances including commercial pa-
per and debentures 
3 3.0% 7 7.0% 
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Bank borrowing 66 66.0% 77 77.0% 
Purchases on credit from suppliers and ad-
vances from customers 
12 12.0% 4 4.0% 
Borrowing from informal financial institutions 11 11.0% 0 0.0% 
Borrowing form friends or relatives 17 17.0% 3 3.0% 
Local government investment 1 1.0% 3 3.0% 
Local government loan 1 1.0% 1 1.0% 















37.33a 9 .000 .000 
  










5.221c 1 .022 .023 .012 .001 
N of Valid Cases 418 
     
a. 7 cells (35.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .50. 
b. The standardized statistic is -2.285. 
P value of Fisher’s Exact test was 0.00, so that we could reject the null hypothesis. 
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5.3 The Difficulty Level of Accessing Bank Loans (Likert Scale): significant 
difference  
Figure A17 
Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test (accessing bank loans) 
By looking at the histograms, it can be inferred that variables in Zhejiang and 
Yunnan were skewed distribution. The K-S test showed that variables were not 
normal distribution, so that Independent Samples Mann- Whitney U test was run 
to test if there were significant differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. The P 
value was 0.00, so that the null hypothesis could be rejected. Hence, there were 
significant differences in the difficulty level of accessing bank loans between 
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5.5 The Difficulty Level of Accessing Informal Finance Institutions (Likert 
Scale): no significant difference 
 
Figure A18 
Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test (accessing informal finance institu-
tions) 
By looking at the histograms, it can be inferred that variables in Zhejiang and 
Yunnan were skewed distribution. And K-S test showed that variables were not 
normal distribution, so that Independent Samples Mann- Whitney U test was run 
to test if there were significant differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. The P 
value was 0.26, so that the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Thus, there was 
no significant difference in the difficulty level of accessing informal finance institu-
tion between Zhejiang and Yunnan. However, due to the small sample size, the 
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6 The State-Business Relationship in Zhejiang and Yunnan  
6.1 Business Associations  
Table A34 
The business associations  
 
Whether the industry sector, which firm belongs to, has already had 
local business association? 
No Yes Total 
Zhejiang 18 82 100 
Yunnan 39 61 100 
Total  57 143 200 
 





Pearson Chi-Square 10.821a 1 0.001   
Continuity Correctionb 9.815 1 0.002   
Likelihood Ratio 11.017 1 0.001   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.002 0.001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.767 1 0.001   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 28.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Are there requirements for joining the association? 
No Yes Total 
Zhejiang 75 25 100 
Yunnan 78 22 100 
Total  153 47 200 
 





Pearson Chi-Square 0.250a 1 0.617   
Continuity Correctionb 0.111 1 0.739   
Likelihood Ratio 0.250 1 0.617   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.739 0.369 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.249 1 0.618   
N of Valid Cases 200     
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a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 23.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Do you have the membership of the business association? 
No Yes Total 
Zhejiang 49 51 100 
Yunnan 40 60 100 
Total  89 111 200 
 





Pearson Chi-Square 1.640a 1 0.200   
Continuity Correctionb 1.296 1 0.255   
Likelihood Ratio 1.642 1 0.200   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.255 0.127 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.632 1 0.201   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 44.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Based on the results of Pearson Chi-square test, numbers of business association 
between Zhejiang and Yunnan showed significant differences (p-value: 0.001); 
while the data collected from question about requirements of entering business as-
sociation and whether firm has the membership of the association showed that 
there was no significant difference between Zhejiang and Yunnan.  
 




Is there cooperation between the local governments and your firm? 
No Yes Total 
Zhejiang 91 9 100 
Yunnan 60 40 100 
Total  151 49 200 
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Pearson Chi-Square 25.976a 1 0.000   
Continuity Correctionb 24.328 1 0.000   
Likelihood Ratio 27.600 1 0.000   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.000 0.000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 25.847 1 0.000   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Based on the result of Pearson Chi-square test, p value was 0.00, so we could 
reject the null hypothesis, which means there were significant differences in busi-
ness-state collaboration between Zhejiang and Yunnan. 
 
 Zhejiang Yunnan Total 
Infrastructure construction 5 28 33 
Market development 2 7 9 
Technical cooperation 4 18 22 
Research and development of products 4 19 23 
Training and education 4 4 8 
Total 19 76 95 
 









a 4 0.272 0.282   
Likelihood Ratio 4.264 4 0.371 0.472   
Fisher's Exact 
Test 4.65 
  0.311   
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.758
b 1 0.185 0.199 0.11 0.031 
N of Valid Cases 95      
a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.60.  
b. The standardized statistic is -1.326. 
Tables above shows that there was no significant difference in the types of busi-
ness-state collaboration activities between Zhejiang and Yunnan (p-value>0.05). 
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6.3 Party Committees: significant difference  
Table A36 
Party committees  
 
Is there party committee being established in your firm? 
No Yes Total 
Zhejiang 69 31 100 
Yunnan 33 67 100 
Total  102 98 200 
 





Pearson Chi-Square 25.930a 1 0.000   
Continuity Correctionb 24.510 1 0.000   
Likelihood Ratio 26.523 1 0.000   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.000 0.000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 25.801 1 0.000   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 49.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
The p-value was 0.00, so we could reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, there 
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6.4 The Importance of Local Governments in the Enterprise’s 
Development (Likert scale): significant difference 
Figure A19 
Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test (importance of LGs) 
By looking at the histograms, it can be inferred that variables in Zhejiang and 
Yunnan were skewed distribution. And K-S test showed that variables were not 
normal distribution, so that Independent Samples Mann- Whitney U test was run 
to test if there were significant differences between Zhejiang and Yunnan. The P 
value was 0.00, so that the null hypothesis could be rejected. Therefore, there were 
significant differences in the importance of local governments in the firm’s devel-
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Count % within location Count % within location 
Excessive Competition 11 18.3% 22 26.8% 
Floundering Economy 16 26.7% 16 19.5% 
Overcapacity 3 5.0% 15 18.3% 
Fluctuation in Exchange Rate 5 8.3% 3 3.7% 
Shortage of Talent 6 10.0% 4 4.9% 
Difficulty in Updating 7 11.7% 9 11.0% 
High Cost of Labor Force 7 11.7% 11 13.4% 
Shortage of Labor Force 2 3.3% 1 1.2% 
Lack of Capital 8 13.3% 21 25.6% 
Outdated Traditional Industry 5 8.3% 3 3.7% 
Depressed Housing Market 6 10.0% 10 12.2% 
Plant expansion 23 38.3% 9 11.0% 
Rules and Regulations 4 6.7% 18 22.0% 
Heavy Tax 11 18.3% 6 7.3% 
Inadequate of Supporting Industry 0 0.0% 13 15.9% 
Total 114  161  
  














Value 44.127a 49.838 45.777 .054c 275 



















0 0 0 0.779 
Upper 
Bound 




















   
0.546 
 
a. 7 cells (23.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.24. 
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b. Based on 200 sampled tables with starting seed 2000000. 
c. The standardized statistic is -.232. 
The p-value of Exact test was 0.00, so that the null hypothesis could be rejected. 
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